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We are pleased to offer this especially rich and timely issue of the Journal of World-Systems 
Research. Readers will find not only a special symposium on Race in the Capitalist World-System, 
compiled by William I. Robinson, but also a special collection of papers on Ireland in the World-
System edited by Aidan Beatty, Maurice Coakley, and Sharae Deckard. The juxtaposition of these 
sections highlight the ways Ireland has served as a “testing ground” for techniques of capitalist 
exploitation of people and the natural environment, shaping the development of racist ideologies 
and practices in the world-system. As the media headlines feature daily reports of racial tensions 
and protests in numerous countries, and as xenophobic, Islamophobic, and racist discourses 
permeate electoral campaigns in the United States and other core countries, it is critical for us all 
to reflect on how the organization and operation of the global political economy contributes to 
these trends. In addition, as political leaders grapple with how to manage the deepening global 
financial and ecological crises, it is very instructive, as our special issue editors point out, to offer 
a “radical reappraisal” of Ireland’s economic development. 
 Contributors to the symposium and to our special issue on Ireland add a great deal to efforts 
to better understand the processes that reproduce all forms of racism and other exclusions, and 
their work points in the direction of much-needed strategies for re-structuring human relations and  
the world-system more broadly. Moreover, the articles in our special issue on Ireland in the World- 
System demonstrate how focused attention on a particular world region can illuminate broader  
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processes related to the world-system’s operation, enhancing our understandings of its impacts in 
other parts of the world. 
 Continuing the theme of how racial hierarchies drive the capitalist world-system, our regular 
research articles feature a contribution from Jonathan Leitner, who offers a rich historical 
perspective on the emergence of capitalism in the northeastern United States. His analysis 
documents how geographic conditions and proximity to New York City created labor mobility that 
empowered tenants, and how this, along with the region’s ability to trade with regions depending 
slavery and other more exploitative labor relations, contributed to the region’s core emergence. 
Nicolas Grinberg then offers us a perspective on global commodity chains that draws insights from 
the New International Division of Labor theory. His analysis of the global semiconductors industry 
illustrates how the operation of global hierarchies contribute to capitalist accumulation.  
 Our book review section features a special symposium on food and food politics in the world-
system. This themed section includes reviews of six books: Jennifer Clapp’s Food (reviewed by 
Jill Harrison); Alana Mann’s Global Activism in Food Politics: Power Shift (reviewd by Philip 
McMichael); Stefan Ouma’s Assembling Export Markets: The Making and Unmaking of Global 
Food Connections in West Africa (reviewed by Andre Nickow); Nora McKeon’s Food Security 
Governance: Empowering Communities, Regulating Corporations (reviewed by Laura Raynolds); 
Lambek, Claeys, Wong and Brilmayer’s edited volume, Rethinking Food Systems Structural 
Challenges, New Strategies and the Law (reviewed by Tomaso Ferrando), and Philip McMichael’s 
Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions (reviewed by Gerardo Otero). 
We hope you enjoy this issue, which reflects the work not only of the authors and our 
editorial teams, but also our reviewers, whose invaluable contributions to the journal are greatly 
appreciated. As we close, we remind you that the Journal of World-Systems Research is an open 
access journal, which makes us part of a global movement to protect and preserve what is known 
as the knowledge commons. We encourage readers to support open access publishing through 
financial support, by serving on editorial boards, conducting reviews, and publishing your work in 
open access journals like ours. For more information see the Public Library of Science’s (PLOS) 
“The Case for Open Access.” We encourage readers to support this journal, and you can do so by 
making a donation (see www.jwsr.org), or by volunteering to help as a reviewer, copyeditor, or 
translator. If you’re interested in volunteering, please send an email to: jwsr@pitt.edu. Also, given 
the international scope of our audience, we would like to include reviews of non-English language 
books in future issues. If you know of any foreign-language books that you think would be of 
interest to JWSR readers, or would like to offer your services to review books in a foreign 
language, please contact us at jwsr@pitt.edu.   
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Abstract 
Scholars of world-systems and global political economy have wrestled for decades with the genesis of 'race' as a 
social construct and its historical significance for the system of world capitalism.  Transformations in the world 
capitalist system pose a new challenge to Western theories of race.  Older colonial structures may be giving way 
in the face of capitalist globalization.  Racial or ethnic dimensions of the relations of exploitation in the capitalist 
world-system need to be reconceptualized.  This symposium aims to generated debate and interchange among 
scholars on such a reconceptualization and to contribute to real world struggles against racial inequities. 
Keywords: Race and Capitalism, Race and Globalization, Racism 
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Scholars of world-systems and global political economy have wrestled for decades with the 
genesis of “race” as a social construct and its historical significance for the system of world 
capitalism.1  Though much neglected in recent years with the rise of identitarian theories that 
give little weight to political economy, Oliver C. Cox’s 1948 work Caste, Class, and Race, 
remains a classical study. Despite its well-known limitations (especially its discussion on caste), 
it has not, in my view, been surpassed as a foundation text on the matter. Cox grounded his 
analysis of race in the imperative of an outwardly expanding capitalist system to recruit cheap 
labor for world accumulation to which was subordinate the need to rationalize and legitimate the 
racial systems put into place through European colonialism. It is worthwhile to reproduce Cox’s 
central argument: 
Our hypothesis is that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed 
among Europeans with the rise of capitalism and nationalism, and that 
because of the world-wide ramifications of capitalism, all racial 
antagonism can be traced to the policies and attitudes of the leading 
capitalist people, the white people of Europe and North America…. If 
we should put our finger upon the year which marked the beginning of 
modern race relations we should select 1493-94. This is the time when 
total disregard for the human rights and physical power of the non-
Christian peoples of the world, the colored peoples, was officially 
assumed by the first two great colonizing European nations. Sometimes 
probably because of its very obviousness, it is not realized that the slave 
trade was simply a way of recruiting labor for the purpose of exploiting 
the great natural resources of America. This trade did not develop 
because Indians and Negros were red or black, or because the cranial 
capacity averaged a certain number of cubic centimeters; but simply 
because they were the best workers to be found for the heavy labor in the 
mines and plantations across the Atlantic. Although this peculiar kind of 
exploitation was then in its incipiency, it had already achieved its 
significant characteristics. As it developed and took definite capitalistic 
form, we could follow the white man around the world and see him 
repeat the process among practically every people of color. But the fact 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 This assumes that the very term and concept of “race” is unproblematic. I make no such assumption. As well, there 
is the problem that ethnicity tends to become conflated with race. But these are discussions for elsewhere. 
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of crucial significance is that racial exploitation is merely one aspect of 
the problem of the proletarianization of labor, regardless of the color of 
the laborer. Hence racial antagonism is essentially political-class conflict 
(Cox, 1959 [1948], 321, 331-333). 
In the 1960s and 1970s – a time of decolonization and militant mass struggles around the world – 
scholars engaged in heated and unresolved debates on the matrix of race, class, and capitalism. 
Subsequently, social scientists who study race would argue that race cannot be reduced to or 
subsumed into class; others would go so far as to explain race as an immanent category. 
Depending on one’s views, the classical Coxian perspective has been enriched or challenged by 
post-structural approaches, ethno-national (or ethno-cultural) analyses, racial formation, critical 
race, and ethnicity theories, and the “coloniality of power” paradigm, among others. These 
approaches attribute differentiated weight to political economy in the explanation of race relative 
to ideational, cultural and psychological dimensions. Two paradigms predominate in the 
sociological literature on race and racism in the United States, the assimilationist paradigm and 
racial formation theory. Both emphasize the ideological and cultural construction of race and/or 
the formation of racial meaning and identity over the historical-structural roots of race and its 
material impacts. In Europe Barth’s ethnicity theory has had a major impact. The works of Stuart 
Hall, who famously stated that “race is the modality that class is lived,“ have had a major impact 
on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond, on thinking about race and its relationship to political 
economy, power and culture. 
Now, however, transformations in the world capitalist system pose a new challenge to 
Western theories of race. Older colonial structures may be giving way in the face of capitalist 
globalization, the decline of U.S. (and more generally Western) hegemony accompanied by the 
downward mobility of the once privileged white ethnic sectors of the Western working class, the 
rise of China and India, the BRICS, and a transnational capitalist class in the Global South. 
Chinese capitalists now employ thousands of Ecuadorans and Africans, among others, in mines 
and on plantations in South America and sub-Sahara Africa, in labor relations that are hard not to 
characterize as racialized and racist (that is, if we use the language of Western race theories). The 
same holds for some 300, 000 Filipina maids and other care givers who labor for Hong Kong 
households under conditions that often appear as racialized bondage, or for South Asian workers 
in the Gulf countries and Nicaraguans working in Costa Rica under such conditions, among 
many such examples. Directly counter to the arguments of much Western race theory, Chinese, 
Mexican, and Indian capitalists now own U.S. and European corporations that exploit poor white 
people. 
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Consequently, it is clear that the racial or ethnic dimensions of the relations of 
exploitation in the capitalist world-system need to be reconceptualized. As we give pause to such 
a reconceptualization, it is worth asking several questions. Should social scientists continue to 
ground their study of race in its Western/colonial historical origins in the accumulation of capital 
on a world scale?  Or do they need to reorient their analyses to integrate 21st century 
restructuring of the world economy in ways that challenge Western race theories?  We need also 
to ask, at what expense do world-systems scholars continue, for the most part, to neglect race and 
ethnicity – analytically, theoretically and politically – as critical categories? 
Although much has changed in the past half century, it is again a time of militant mass 
struggles. Our analytical and theoretical understanding of race and global capitalism are ever 
more urgent to an informed politics as both the deadly embrace of racism and struggles against 
racial oppression and exploitation intensify. In the United States a neo-fascist presidential 
candidate calls for the mass deportation of 12 million, largely Latino/a undocumented 
immigrants and sealing off U.S. borders to Muslims at the same time as the Black Lives Matter 
movement leads a renewed wave of mass popular struggle. In Central and South America, 
indigenous communities, under siege by mining, logging and agricultural interests, have 
launched one uprising after another in defense of their land and autonomy. In the Middle East, 
Palestinians appeared to be initiating a third intifada while nearly half of the Jewish population 
of Israel has expressed support for a policy of ethnic cleansing and the establishment of an 
apartheid state. Mass atrocities against vulnerable minorities are reported everywhere. The 
specter of genocide looms over some groups, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar. Clearly, the 
matter of praxis is anything but a mundane academic exercise. 
This symposium grew out of a panel on race and ethnicity in the capitalist world-system 
at the 2015 annual congress of the American Sociological Association. It brings together five 
commentaries and a concluding reflection from a variety of empirical, theoretical and 
paradigmatic vantage points. Yet all of them point to the need for new ways to explore the 
relationship of race to the capitalist world-system, and/or to examine the capitalist world-system 
in terms of the racial and racist organizations of its social relations. 
Ramon Grosfoguel argues in his contribution that “racism is a global hierarchy of 
superiority and inferiority” that “can be marked by color, ethnicity, language, culture and/or 
religion.” He calls for moving beyond “color racism as the exclusive or universal definition of 
racism.”  For Grosfoguel, racism demarcates groups into “human” and “subhuman.”  Those 
“classified above the line of the human are recognized socially in their humanity as human 
beings and, thus, enjoy access to rights (human rights, civil rights, women rights and/or labor 
rights), material resources, and social recognition to their subjectivities, identities, 
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epistemologies and spiritualities. The people below the line of the human are considered 
subhuman or non-human; that is, their humanity is questioned and, as such, negated.” 
Wilma Dunaway and Don Clelland criticize a global apartheid model in which “all the 
world’s peoples are homogenized under two broad categories that treat all whites as though they 
enjoy the same degree of supremacy and all dark others as though there are no ethnic or class 
differences among them.” Rising semiperipheral countries, they say, “are crucial to the study of 
race and ethnicity in the modern world-system.” In these countries “reactionary politics, 
xenophobia and discrimination against ‘foreign aliens’ are routinely documented” although the 
capitalists of these countries increasingly act globally yet are “neither ‘core’ nor ‘white’ in the 
sense of the global apartheid model, but they do share the pro-capitalist class interests of core 
capitalists.” 
Tanya Golash-Bosa turns her attention to recent mass deportations in the United States. 
The rise of a “politics of fear” in the aftermath of the 9/11/2001 attacks, the global financial 
crisis, and the opportunities that deportation create for corporate profit-making provided a toxic 
mix for the deportation of three million mostly men from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Mass deportation, she says “reinforces the racialized dimensions of the international division of 
labor that Grosfoguel emphasizes.”  She argues, contra Dunaway and Clelland, that “mass 
deportation is crucial to the maintenance of global apartheid – a system where (mostly white) 
affluent citizens of the world are free to travel where they like whereas the (mostly non-white) 
poor are forced to make do in places where there are fewer resources.” 
For his part, James Fenelon traces the race-based genocide that “accompanied every 
phase of world capitalism,” from the mercantile through to the industrial and now the neo-liberal 
eras of capitalism. He concludes that we should “expand analyses so as to account for the macro-
construction of race and systemic racism, often genocidal, within the longue duree of the modern 
world-system.”  In her fascinating if deeply troubling look at the global cruise ship industry, 
Francisca Oyogoa shows how the labor force in the industry is organized along racial and ethnic 
lines as a reflection of the larger racial and ethnic hierarchies in the world-system. “In both 
practice and discourse, cruise ships replicate patterns of racialized servility and hierarchies of 
color which date back to colonialism,” she notes. “Specifically, white men from core countries 
are at the top of the workplace hierarchy and are racialized as possessing the qualities necessary 
for leadership and dominance over others.”  In turn, “workers from peripheral nations, especially 
South East Asian men, are racialized as naturally suited for servility.” 
Finally, Bill Fletcher, Jr. comments on the five essays. “The challenge of addressing the 
question of race revolves around appreciating that it cannot be restricted to matters of color, 
superiority/interiority or hierarchy,” he insists. “Race is a system created with two objectives, as 
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well articulated by several of the authors, which include: one, domination and exploitation for a 
specific population, and, two, social control.” 
It is our hope that this forum will help foment broader debate and interchange among 
those who student the political economy of the world-system and those who study race and 
ethnicity. It is our hope as well that such debate and interchange will draw lessons from the real 
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Abstract 
This article provides a definition of racism inspired in the work of Frantz Fanon, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and 
contemporary Caribbean Fanonian Philosophers. It discusses racism in relation to zone of being and zone of non-
being. Racism is discussed as a dehumanization related to the materiality of domination used by the world-system 
in the zone of non-being (violence and dispossession) as opposed to the materiality of domination in the zone of 
being (regulation and emancipation). The approach shows how intersectionality of oppressions work differently 
for oppressed people in the zone of being as opposed to oppressed people in the zone of non-being. While in the 
zone of being oppressions are mitigated by racial privilege, in the zone of non-being oppressions are aggravated 
by racial oppression.  
Keywords: Racism, Racialization 
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Racism is a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that have 
been politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by the 
institutions of the “capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world-
system” (Grosfoguel, 2011). The people classified above the line of the human are recognized 
socially in their humanity as human beings and, thus, enjoy access to rights (human rights, civil 
rights, women rights and/or labor rights), material resources, and social recognition to their 
subjectivities, identities, epistemologies and spiritualities. The people below the line of the human 
are considered subhuman or non-human; that is, their humanity is questioned and, as such, negated 
(Fanon 1967). In the latter case, the extension of rights, material resources and the recognition of 
their subjectivities, identities, spiritualities and epistemologies are denied. 
This definition of racism allows us to conceive of diverse forms of racism, evading the 
reductionisms of many existing definitions. Depending on the different colonial histories in diverse 
regions of the world, the hierarchy of superiority/inferiority along the lines of the human can be 
constructed through diverse racial markers. Racism can be marked by color, ethnicity, language, 
culture and/or religion. 
 Although since colonial times color racism has been the dominant marker of racism in most 
parts of the world, it is not the only or exclusive form of racist marker. On many occasions we 
confuse the particular/concrete social marker of racism in one region of the world with what is 
taken to be as the exclusive form or universal definition of racism. This has created an enormous 
amount of conceptual and theoretical problems. If we collapse the particular social form/marker 
that racism adopts in the region or country of the world we have been socialized (for example, 
color racism) to make it equivalent to the universal definition of racism, then we lose sight of the 
diverse racist markers that are not necessarily the same in other regions of the world. The problem 
with taking a particular racist marker as the definition of racism, leads us to adopt the false 
conclusion that racism does not exist in other parts of the world if the form of marking racism in 
one particular region or country does not coincide with the “common sense” form of marking it in 
one’s own country. This example forms part of the pervasive “methodological nationalism” 
(Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003; Amelina et. al. 2012) that obscures the broader and world-
systemic understanding of a modern/colonial problem such as racism. 
Racism is a hierarchy of superiority/inferiority along the line of the human. This hierarchy 
can be constructed and marked in diverse ways. Westernized elites of the Third World (African, 
Asian or Latin American) reproduce racist practices against ethno/racial groups where, depending 
on the local/colonial history, those considered “inferior” below the line of the human can be 
defined or marked along religious, ethnic, cultural or color lines. 
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In the colonial history of Ireland, the British constructed their racial superiority over the 
Irish, not through the marker of skin color, but rather through a religious marker (Ignatiev 2008).  
When the colonizer and the colonized share the same skin color, the marker of 
superiority/inferiority along the line of the human has to be constructed with a different marker 
beyond color racism. What appeared at first glance to be a religious conflict between Protestants 
and Catholics was in fact a racial/colonial conflict. 
The same can be said of Islamophobia in Europe and in the United States today (Sayyid 
and Vakil 2011). Muslim religious identity today constitutes one of the most prominent markers 
of superiority/inferiority along the line of the human. Muslims are constructed in North America 
and Europe today as “barbarians,” “backward,” “uncivilized,” “violent,” “terrorist,” “abusive of 
children, women and gay/lesbians,” “un-adaptable to European values,” etc. I said “one of the most 
prominent markers” because in these two regions of the world color racism continues to be of great 
importance and entangles itself in complex ways with religious racism. Nonetheless, while the 
ethnic/racial hierarchy of superiority/inferiority is marked by the color of the skin in many regions 
of the world, in other regions it is marked by ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural identity. 
Racialization occurs through the marking of bodies. Some bodies are racialized as superior 
and other bodies are racialized as inferior. The important point here is that those subjects located 
above the line of the human, as superior, live in what Afro-Caribbean philosophers following 
Fanon’s work called the “zone of being,” while subjects that live on the inferior side of the 
demarcating line live in the “zone of non-being” (Fanon, 1967, Gordon 2006, Wynter 2003 and 
Maldonado-Torres 2008). 
 
Differentiated Intersectionalities/Entanglements:  
Zone of Being and Zone of Non-Being 
In an imperial/capitalist/colonial world-system, race constitutes the transversal dividing line that 
cuts across multiple power relations such as class, sexual and gender at a global scale. The 
“intersectionality” of race, class, sexuality and gender hierarchies, a concept developed by black 
feminists (Davis 1983, Crenshaw, 1991), occurs in both zones of the world that Fanon describes. 
However, the lived experience of the diverse oppressions and the particular way in which 
intersectionality is articulated is different in the zone of being as opposed to the zone of non-being. 
This is crucial because racism is not just a question of prejudice or stereotypes, but above all an 
institutional/structural hierarchy related to the materiality of domination. 
On the grounds of being racialized as superior beings, there are subjects in the zone of 
being that live class, gender, sexual and/or national/colonial oppression. However, they do not 
experience racial oppression but rather racial privilege. Thus, they live all those oppressions 
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mitigated by racial privilege. As will be discussed below, this has fundamental implications for 
how class, gender, sexual or national/colonial oppressions are lived. Given that in the zone of non-
being subjects are racialized as inferior, they live racial oppression instead of racial privilege. The 
intersectional entanglement between class, sexual, gender or national/colonial oppressions that 
exist in the zone of non-being are, therefore, qualitatively distinct from the way these oppressions 
are lived and articulated in the zone of being. In the zone of non-being, the multiple oppressions 
are aggravated by racial oppression. The issue that should be emphasized here is that there is a 
qualitative difference between how intersectional/entangled oppressions are articulated and lived 
in the zone of being as opposed to the zone of non-being in the “capitalist/patriarchal Western-
centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world-system” (Grosfoguel 2011). 
Neither of these zones is homogenous. Both zones are heterogeneous spaces. Following 
Fanon (1967), we could say that within the zone of being continuous conflicts exist between what 
the Hegelian dialectic characterizes as the “I” and the “Other”. In the “I” and “Other” dialectic 
within the zone of being there are conflicts; but these are non-racial conflicts, as the oppressor “I” 
recognizes the humanity of the oppressed “Other”. The “I” in the imperialist/capitalist/patriarchal 
world-system are Western, heterosexual, masculine, metropolitan elites in the core and the 
Westernized, heterosexual, masculine elites in the peripheries. Internal colonialism exists as much 
in the center as in the periphery. 
For Fanon, the Hegelian “Other” are the populations of the western metropolitan centers 
or the westernized subjects within the periphery whose humanity is recognized as such, but who 
at the same time live non-racial oppressions based on class, sexuality, gender or national/colonial 
dominations, under the hegemony of the imperial “I” in their respective regions or countries. The 
zone of being and zone of non-being are not a specific geographical places, but rather a position 
within racial structures of domination that operate at a global scale between centers and 
peripheries, but that are also manifested at a national and local scale against diverse groups 
considered as racially “inferior.” 
Zones of being and zones of non-being exist at a global scale between Westernized centers 
and non-western peripheries (global coloniality). But zones of being and zones of non-being also 
exist not only inside of the metropolitan centers (internal racial/colonial subjects in urban zones, 
regions, ghettoes, segregated communities, etc.), but also within the peripheries (internal 
colonialism). The zones of non-being within a metropolitan or peripheral country are the zones of 
internal colonialism. However, it is here that the critical decolonial sociology of Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos (2010) contributes to clarifying the racial difference between the zone of being and 
the zone of non-being. This is related to the question of the materiality of domination. 
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Fanon’s Zones and De Sousa Santos’ Abyssal Line 
According to de Sousa Santos (2007; 2010), modernity is characterized by an abyssal line between 
the inhabitants above and below the line. The abyssal line is the line that demarcates the zones 
where codes of law are recognized among European empires and the lawless zones where violence 
is the rule. The zones of law correspond to Europeans or the superior race while the lawless zones 
to the colonial territory. De Sousa Santos refers here to the 1494 treaty of Tordesillas between 
Portuguese and Spanish empires. The Treaty of Tordesillas was made to clarify the confusion 
created between the two empires by the newly claimed colonial territories in the New World.  
If we translate the “abyssal line” as equivalent to the Fanonian “line of the human” and we 
consider those that live above the abyssal line are in the zone of being, while those that live below 
the line the zone of non-being, then we can establish a dialogue between the work of de Sousa 
Santos and Fanon that could enrich our understanding of modernity and the 
capitalist/imperial/patriarchal/racial/colonial world-system that we inhabit. The difference 
between the two zones is related to the materiality of domination in racial hierarchies. For de Sousa 
Santos (2006), the way conflicts are managed in the zone of being (above the abyssal line) is 
through what he calls mechanisms of regulation and emancipation. 
“Regulation” refers to civil/human/women/labor rights and legal codes, relations of 
civility, spaces of political negotiation and action that are recognized for the oppressed “Other” in 
their conflict with the oppressor “I” within the zone of being. “Emancipation” refers to discourses 
of liberty, autonomy, and equality that form part of the discourses and institutions used for the 
management of conflicts in the zone of being. Due to the fact that the oppressor “I” recognizes the 
humanity of the oppressed “Other” in the zone of being, the latter lives class, gender, sexual and 
national/colonial oppressions mitigated by the racial privilege of having as the materiality of 
domination methods of “regulation” and “emancipation.”  As a trend, conflicts in the zone of being 
are regulated through non-violent means. Violence is always an exception, used only in 
exceptional moments.  Moments of violence exist in the zone of being, but they exist more as an 
exception than as a rule. 
On the contrary, as de Sousa Santos (2007; 2010) affirms, in the zone of non-being—below 
the abyssal line—where people are dehumanized in the sense of being considered below the line 
of the human as non-humans/sub-humans, the methods used by the 
imperial/capitalist/masculine/heterosexual “I” and its institutional system for the management and 
administration of the conflicts, is by means of violence and by overt appropriation/dispossession.  
As a trend, conflicts in the zone of non-being are managed through perpetual violence, with only 
exceptional moments where methods of emancipation and regulation are used. This is the inversion 
of the way conflicts are managed in the zone of being. The racist violence and dispossession used 
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as materiality of domination in the zone of non-being aggravates the lived experience of class, 
gender, sexual and national/colonial oppressions.  
Since the humanity of the people classified into the zone of non-being is not recognized, 
and given that they are treated as non-human or subhuman, that is, without norms of rights or 
civility, then acts of violence, rape and appropriation are permitted that would otherwise be 
unacceptable in the zone of being. For de Sousa Santos, both zones are constitutive of each other 
and form part of the project of colonial modernity. On the other hand, for Fanon, the dialectic of 
mutual recognition of the “I” and the “Other” that exists in the zone of being collapses in the zone 
of non-being where there is no recognition of the humanity of the other. The latter has important 
implications such as those described by de Sousa Santos. 
To summarize: the conflicts in the zone of being are administered through perpetual peace 
with exceptional moments of war; in the zone of non-being we have perpetual war with exceptional 
moments of peace. The class, gender and sexual oppression lived within the zone of being and 
within the zone of non-being are not the same. Since conflicts with the dominant elites and ruling 
classes within the zone of being are non-racial, we have it that in the conflicts of class, gender and 
sexuality the “Other Being” shares in the privileges of the imperial codes of law and rights, the 
emancipation discourses of the Enlightenment and their peaceful processes of negotiation and 
resolution of conflicts. In contrast, since in the zone of non-being conflicts of class, gender, and 
sexuality are at the same time articulated with racial oppression, the conflicts are managed and 
administered with violent methods and constant appropriation/dispossession. Class, gender and 
sexual oppression as lived by the “Non-Being Other” are aggravated due to the joint articulation 
of such oppressions with racial oppression. 
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Using world-system concepst, this essay challenges the popular racial bifurcation of the world between whites 
and peoples of color.  
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“The problem of the 21st century,” contends Manning Marable (2009: 1), “is the problem of global 
apartheid” because the racist logic of the white master race still exists. According to Ali Mazrui, 
global apartheid is driven by “pan-Europeanism” and western-controlled transnational capitalism, 
two processes that have intensified since the end of the Cold War (2007: 96, 98). This world 
bifurcation is supposedly grounded in white supremacy which is defined to be “a political, 
economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material 
resources. . . and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted 
across a broad array of institutions and social settings” (Ansley 1997: 592). In other words, the 
capitalist world-system is conceptualized as a global divide between “whiteness” and 
“coloredness.” 
From the perspective of world-systems analysis, the global apartheid model is deeply 
flawed. Indeed, this model is particularly orientalist (Said 1978) because it “herd[s] people under 
falsely unifying rubrics” by “invent[ing] collective identities for large numbers of individuals who 
are quite diverse” (Said 2003:18). The capitalist world-system is framed as “the troubled 
relationship between the white European world and the world of those defined by whites as the 
‘dark others.’” Thus, the global apartheid model is preoccupied with the study of “the racial 
categorization of some people as ‘white’ and superior, while others are categorized as ‘not white’ 
and as eminently different and inferior’” (Vera and Feagin 2007: 1, 5). On the one hand, all the 
world’s peoples are homogenized under two broad categories that treat all whites as though they 
enjoy the same degree of supremacy and all dark others as though there are no ethnic or class 
differences among them. On the other hand, European countries are not characterized by the white 
racial solidarity that this model suggests. Indeed, each of these countries has a history of oppressing 
white ethnic minorities. To complicate matters, the model lumps whites of Eastern Europe, Russia, 
the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America with the peoples of color. To muddy the waters 
further, the wealthiest core of the modern world-system is defined as European to the exclusion of 
Japan, which has its own history of international imperialism and exploitation of ethnic groups. 
 
A False Duality that Eliminates the Middle 
One of the worst flaws of the global apartheid model is its fictitious bifurcation of the capitalist 
world-system into a western colonizing core and a nonwestern colonized periphery. Absent from 
this model is an important third tier of countries, the semiperiphery, identified by world-systems 
analysts as an important intermediate position between the core and periphery. The 
semiperipheries are crucial to the study of race and ethnicity in the modern world-system in several 
ways. First, semiperipheries are exploited by the core, but they, in turn, exploit poorer countries. 
Indeed, the worldwide process of “expropriation of surplus value” is a structural relationship in 
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which “the middle tier both participates in the exploitation of the lower tier and is exploited by the 
upper tier (Geschwender and Levine 1994: 80). Semiperipheral elites act in their own behalf to 
drain surpluses from peripheries through subimperialism which is “akin to the global dominance 
of an imperial power but at a subsytemic level” (Shaw 1979: 348-51). When they act in a 
subimperialist fashion, semiperipheries often employ strategies that target, marginalize and 
oppress ethnic minorities. The most common form of subimperialism is not the application of 
military force, but rather the routine operation of global value chains that exploit ethnic 
communities. 
Second, several semiperipheries have exhibited higher growth rates than the core since the 
1980s, and they often achieve that economic development through national agendas that target and 
exploit ethnic communities within their own countries. Semiperipheral agriculture and 
industrialization are grounded in intense exploitation of ethnic minorities to secure low-paid and 
unpaid labor for national export agendas (Clelland 2014). 
Third, semiperipheries now host a majority of the world’s population and most of the 
world’s diverse array of ethnic groups. In addition, Southern semiperipheries are magnets for 
transnational migration. Twenty-five countries were the destinations for two-thirds of the world’s 
transnational migrants in 2013. Sixteen of those destination countries were Southern 
semiperipheries. Migration into the South accounts for more than 44 percent of transnational labor 
migrants and nearly 82 percent of refugees, and the vast majority of this migration is to Southern 
semiperipheries.1 As a result, semiperipheral states are just as involved in regulating migration 
flows and restricting citizenship rights as western core countries. Reactionary politics, xenophobia 
and discrimination against “foreign aliens” are routinely documented in Southern semiperipheries. 
The United Nations World Value Survey (1981-2014) indicates that there is far greater 
racial/ethnic intolerance of immigrants in these Southern semiperipheries than in the western core.2 
Fourth, we should state an obvious point that is usually ignored by western scholars of 
race/ethnicity. The numbers of peoples impacted by semiperipheral ethnic exploitation and forced 
displacement far exceeds the incidence of racial discrimination in western core countries. Much 
like the European core, semiperipheral states construct legal definitions of ethnic minorities in 
order to target them for marginalization and exploitation in relation to domestic and foreign 
development agendas. Every semiperipheral country has its own marginalized ethnic communities 
that are treated like internal peripheries. In 2011, forced displacements were concentrated in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Analysis of International Organization of Migration (2014).  
2 Analysis of World Value Survey databases, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp. 
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world’s semiperipheries where the lands of ethnic minorities were reallocated to large export 
producers.3 
Finally, some semiperipheries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, and South Africa) are significant 
exporters of arms to areas of the world in which ethnic conflicts are occurring. 
 
Ethnic Complexities of the Transnational Capitalist Class 
We agree with Robinson (2014: 64) that “the principal contradiction on a world scale is one of 
class” because the world-system is choreographed by transnationalized capitalists who seek to 
exploit racial and ethnic minorities to expropriate wealth, not to construct “white supremacy.” 
Despite core economic dominance of the world-system, there are “multiple poles of intensive 
accumulation. . . that are magnets for transnational investors” (Robinson 2014: 64). Global 
business investment now flows increasingly from South to North and South to South. Indeed, 
Southern firms now account for one-third of world FDI flows (The Economist 2011). Clearly, these 
Southern capitalists are neither “core” nor “white” in the sense of the global apartheid model, but 
they do share the pro-capitalist class interests of core capitalists. 
Outside the western core, those who directly exploit workers are capitalists of the same 
color, but not usually of the same ethnicity, as workers. These extractors of economic surplus are 
the elites of the semiperiphery who act in their own behalf and as compradors to foreign capital. 
Compradors are the capitalists and state elites who do the hard work for their transnational class. 
They make production possible through strategies to capture labor and resources from ethnic 
communities. One task of these dark capitalists is to drain economic surplus from cheap labor and 
from the natural resources in ethnic communities. Through support action from state elites, ethnic 
minorities are subject to super-exploitation. The most common form is not military imperialism, 
but the routine operation of commodity chains that feed off of the cheap labor and ecological 
resources of ethnic communities. 
One indicator of the important role of semiperipheries is the changing ethnic composition 
of the transnational capitalist class. In 1956, the US accounted for 84 percent of the Global 500 
list of the world’s largest corporations. Over the last two decades, the number of Southern 
semiperipheries with such corporations more than doubled, indicating that the ethnic diversity 
within this group is widening to every region of the world. By 2014, nearly half the world’s largest 
corporations were based in nonwestern semiperipheries.4  
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Analysis of UNHCR (2012, map, p. 2). 
4 Analysis of Forbes (2014). 
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There is another empirical indicator we can employ to measure the growing ethnic 
complexity of the transnational capitalist class. Since 2000, the numbers of wealthy billionaires 
have expanded faster in Southern semiperipheries than in western countries or Japan. More than 
half the world’s wealthiest capitalists reside in 51countries that the global apartheid model places 
outside the white core. China, India and Russia have more billionaires than the combined total for 
all western core countries except the United States. Brazil has more billionaires than France, 
Canada, or Australia. South Korea and Turkey have more billionaires than Australia or Italy.5 
Each of the nonwestern countries represented among the lists of billionaires and largest 
corporations has a history of incorporating and exploiting ethnic minorities. It is crucial to realize 
that semiperipheral capitalists and nonwestern state elites are not innocent bystanders of the 
globalized economic processes that sustain world inequality. Top executives of nonwestern 
corporations, billionaires, and many state elites form the transnational capitalist class fractions in 
their own countries. They service core capitalists and are complicit in creating and sustaining the 
inequalities of the world-system. In other words, they represent a fraction within the transnational 
capitalist class that is necessary to the global neoliberal project. But they are based on the 




We have challenged the stereotype of “white capitalism” by emphasizing the important roles of 
semiperipheries, transnational capitalists and nonwestern states in ethnic conflict, exploitation and 
repression. We have not reduced race/racism to a black/white dichotomy. Indeed, we have strongly 
argued against that mistake. Nor have we argued that race/racism no longer have any relevance. 
What we do contend is that race and racism are western concepts that are not automatically 
applicable everywhere in the world, most especially when the semiperiphery and nonwestern states 
are omitted from analysis. As we move into the 21st century, semiperipheries will increasingly 
exploit and repress ethnic groups in ways that parallel past western colonialism. 
 We are not equipped with adequate theories to help us analyze those phenomena because 
we cannot simply pick up existing theories of race in the West and force them upon those 
situations. Nor can we generalize claims of racial discrimination to entire nonwestern populations, 
like the global apartheid model does. In every Southern country, transnational capitalists are 
complicit in the exploitation of ethnic territories. To make our point, we shift the conceptual frame 
to reflect the nonwestern realities of the world-system. In western sociology of race, those who are 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Analysis of Hurun Research Institute (2015).  
 
Journal of World-System Research  |  Vol. 22  Issue 1 | Dunaway and Clelland   21 
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.608 
most privileged are white while peoples of color are the exploited. What theory will we use if 
China becomes the world hegemon and expands its exploitation of the world’s racial and ethnic 
groups? Until we have a body of theory that can address such questions without ethnocentrism and 
orientalism, we will not be prepared to analyze race and ethnicity in the 21st century world-system. 
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Abstract 
This article reviews and synpsizes race-based slavery and genocide extant across the Americas for a half 
millennia of colonial capitalist development, and identifies four major phases;  conquest, colonization, capitalism, 
and hegemonic global capitalism. Examples of genocide are presented for each phase, and differences between 
Catholic driven Latin America conquest and Protestant driven Anglo American genocidal domination are 
delineated and put into thelongue durée of the modern world-system.  
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The analysis put forth here informs an otherwise confusing or confounding description of how 
capitalist political-economic forces have changed the modern world, and how racial constructions 
are misunderstood and misrepresented without a global context.  
Supremacist ideologies central to the tripartite systems of racism in the twentieth century—
the Jim Crow South, the Nazis of Germany, and South African Apartheid—(Frederickson 2002) 
were borne in the Spanish Catholic conquest of the Caribbean, the reconstructed motherland of 
Hispaniola, and initial conquests of the western European war nations, within the genocide that 
took place in Ayiti (Haiti), (Dupuy 2014). These ideologies were reproduced and adapted to 
specific geo-political situations by every racist regime and produced the “civilized” superordinate 
dominant population, and conversely the “savage” subordinated inferiorized population (Williams 
2012).  
Political regimes and empires adapted and employed outright forms of genocide to 
construct three domination systems—conquest, colonialism, and capitalism. Genocide was a 
central feature (Kuper 1985) in each of these systems that created the modern world system over 
the same half-millennium of its development (Wallerstein 1999). Slave labor, race, genocide, and 
systemic racism contribute toward European enrichment during non-tributary conquest phases, 
followed by genocidal land-takings directly connected to developing colonialism, or Quijano’s 
“coloniality.” 
 Genocide accompanied every phase of world capitalism, including twentieth century 
forms that arose in Europe. Theory needs to account for the macro-construction of racism in the 
longue durée that by colonizers and states as perpetrators of genocidal conquest (Fenelon 2016). 
The political economy of the historic formation of racist systems is essential to understanding the 
social construction of race in a “New World” colonized by Old European countries (Bonilla-Silva 
2015:73-87) and spanning mercantile, industrial and neoliberal eras of capitalism. Williams (2012) 
notes the “savage anxiety” of colonizing countries, in which conquering civilizations discounted 
indigenous peoples as “tribes” and denied genocide through constructs that have inferiorized the 
peoples conquered as needing the civilizing influence of Christians. These rationalizations were 
extended toward African-descent people. The market slave systems of the transatlantic “exchange” 
of labor and land profits that were established are the underpinnings of capitalism. Race and 
genocide are therefore state formulaic, applied to Native Nations in wars of extermination, and 
deployed in the destruction of Indian tribal sovereignty (Deloria and Wilkins 1999).  
 The best way to illustrate these large systems is to identify the genocide that took place 
through their geo-spatial and temporal development—Spanish Catholic conquest in the Caribbean 
for over a hundred years, English Protestant conquest in the Americas for one hundred and fifty 
years, United States capitalist expansion over North America for a hundred and fifty years, and 
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western powers’ economic penetration of global markets for another hundred years (Robinson 
2005). 
 
Examples of Genocide and Racism over 500 Years of the Modern World-System 
Race-based slavery and genocide extant across the Americas for a half millennia of colonial 
capitalist development involved four major phases; conquest, colonization, capitalism, and 
hegemonic global capitalism. 
 
Conquest Phase Genocides in the Caribbean: Holocaust, Early Non-Formulaic Racist 
Systems, Wealth Extraction 
Columbus’s 1493 second voyage to Hayiti launched a Holocaust of Hispaniola—enslavement and 
massive killings of Native peoples morphing into flat-out genocide with the death of 3 to 5 million 
people (depopulation rates from 94% to 99%). Columbus introduced Spanish-Catholic 
supremacist ideologies through invading armies of settlers and soldiers that fueled five hundred 
years of racist expansion and domination. The 1493 Papal Bulls designated indigenous peoples as 
uncivilized “pagans” and “savages” (Newcomb 2008), while the Doctrine of Discovery 
underwritten by Prince’s Rights to Conquest established a racial identification of Native peoples 
as Indios (Indians) regardless of the size or complexity of their societies. These supremacist 
ideologies became the basis of grouping peoples racially as outside “civilization” and “savages” 
in a “New World.” 
Tenochtitlan was the capital of the Aztec empire, situated in the central valley of Mexico, 
with trade routes throughout the Americas, and complexity equal to the world’s most advanced 
urban areas. Cortez landed on the Yucatan, advanced inland, made alliances and sowed fear, 
slaughtering thousands of Native peoples pre-emptive to entering the Aztec capital and forcing 
Mochtezuma to submit. Cortez executed the emperor and looted the treasury while his troops raped 
Native women. The devastation unleashed by a smallpox plague that spread throughout the capital 
allowed Cortez to reconstruct an alliance with enemy states of the Aztecs and then to re-invade the 
city in a long, bloody siege. The Spanish achieved control of the capital. They razed Aztecan 
buildings to the ground and built Mexico City over the ruins. New Spain conquered surrounding 
territories, searching out gold and silver mines. The conquerors put down resistance, including two 
hundred years of suppressing Mayans and Puebloan peoples. 
The encomienda system over land and labor forced Catholics to struggle with 
rationalization. The mission system spread Christian ideologies, such as those espoused in the 
famous debates at Valladolid, in Spain, that claimed Indians only acquired souls and human rights 
if they were converted. The mission system thus created the Mission California Indians that were 
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wiped of their national origins, native language, socio-economic systems and religious 
understandings. Analysts see the virtual erasure of the California indigenous groups as a prime 
example of genocidal (Costo and Costo 1987) and racial culturicide (Fenelon and Trafzer 2014) 
through a form of settler colonialism (Veracini 2010) based on non-state trade and corporate 
structures for dominance. When armed colonial conquerers penetrated the Americas they all 
engaged in genocidal warfare. The English established beachheads at Jamestown and Plymouth 
and from there launched wars of genocide. 
 
 
Colonization-Phase Genocides in Anglo-America:  
Racist Trading Houses, Recreating Colonial England 
We need to identify the different types of settler colonialism, noting English versus Spanish or 
French modes, each involving the imposition of state religions. The Spanish Catholic system led 
to missions. The English Protestant led to the genocidal elimination of Native Nations. Catholic 
systems thus appeared to be more fluid while Protestant systems involved doctrines of Christian 
pre-destination that hardened into more essentialist racist constructions in the rationalization of 
genocide through profiteering from the slave trade, the plantation systems, and the destruction of 
indigenous sovereignty. The Protestant Reformation revered profiteering and separated financing 
for trading companies from the state. The conquering states established legal formulas for 
corporations to freely conduct slave-trading and set up plantation systems that resulted in genocide. 
When California became a state, the government launched “extermination” campaigns that 
legalized the seizure of land and the whole scale murder of Indians by settler-militias (Fenelon and 
Trafzer 2014). Protestant rationales of God-given Manifest Destiny (combining Catholic 
Discovery, Protestant pre-destination and state supported militias) pushed the Mission system to 
genocide, eliminating California Indians at greater than 95% depopulation. The English 
established trading companies in North America and conducted wars to maximize profits, 
including the enslavement of Africans as a corporate rather than a state activity. The rise of 
European capitalism was predicated on vast wealth transfers that supported large banking systems 
of finance and insurance for shipping and industrial goods trade in an Atlantic triangular trade 




Capitalism Phase Genocides in the United States: Racist Citizenship Systems, 
Extinguishing Land Claim 
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The United States laid the groundwork for the legal destruction of Indians by excluding them from 
citizenship. Examples of genocide include Washington’s destruction of central Onondaga (peace) 
fire-keepers of the Haudenosaunee confederacy (five nations) and the forced removal of the 
Cherokee nation and the “five civilized tribes” in the southeastern United States The 
Haudenosaunee confederacy (Iroquois) managed to stay intact after the “French and Indian War.” 
During the U. S. Revolutionary War the Mohawk were pulled into the English orbit, with the 
Onondaga maintaining neutrality. But General-President Washington viewed the Indian 
confederacy as a threat, sending an army under General Sullivan to destroy it. 
Less than twenty five years later, former general, U.S. President Andrew Jackson used 
similar tactics against the Creek, Choctaw and Cherokee to produce land wealth for his allies in 
the government and a common enemy on which to focus the nation’s hatred. Jackson engineered 
Indian Removal legislation through Congress to forcefully “remove” the Cherokee and other 
Indian nations to a newly created Indian Country west of the Mississippi. Analysts view the 
resulting death rates of 30 to nearly 50 percent as genocide. Thus, citizenship or its denial, race or 
its social construction, and the state or its social institutions have been instrumental in creating 
subordinated peoples, identified through racial categories, coercively grouped, and often destroyed 
on a genocidal scale. 
Related 19th century examples include the Louisiana Purchase, blatant genocide already 
mentioned in California, multiple genocidal events against various Indian nations, such as the 
Mankato hangings in 1862, the militia massacre at Sand Creek in 1864, and the perfect coda of 
Wounded Knee in 1890. These represented “freedom” for pioneers of settler-colonialists, death 
and destruction for Indian nations and peoples excluded from citizenship, and a new state built on 
genocide, none more potent than California, (Fenelon and Trafzer 2014). 
 
 
Global Capitalism Phase Genocides: “Neo-Liberal” Empires, Othering, Extinguishing 
Indigeneity 
Independence movements in the colonies, to which growing corporate global capital now subject 
the previous colonial conditions of economic dependence and market controls, accompanied the 
decline and fall from hegemonic status by a vast colonial empire of the English. The same 
hegemonic forces that grew out of European expansion and genocide throughout the Americas and 
the world now turned to political-economic systems of control over the once subordinated 
colonies. This involved creating small elites in urban centers inevitably linked to global markets 
through trading and market systems centered in the previously hegemonic Euro-American 
systems.  
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Smaller systems copied these relations from the West. Military-industrial development and 
expanding capitalism followed the Meiji “restoration” in Japan, which employed genocidal tactics 
similar to those of the West in the destruction of Nanjing and labor exploitation of conquered 
populations in the so-called East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Holocaust in northern Europe, 
perpetrated by the German Nazi regime against Jewish people as a “race”—the most intensive and 
planned genocide the world has ever seen—epitomizes how high civilization and advanced 
industrial capitalism undertakes genocide (Fein 1979). After World War II the West reconstituted 
itself as champion of citizenship and freedom. It denied the many genocidal episodes against 
Native peoples and indigenous nations and institutionalized new forms of racist enslavement 
(Kuper 1985). 
 Wars are violent outgrowths of a forever expanding system of capitalism. It is in these 
wars that we see that where “neoliberalism” claims to work for democratic and free market systems 
as a cover for the consolidation of transnational corporate capitalist relations through international 
structures imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The wars in Rwanda 
and Bosnia-Herzogavinia, for instance, proceeded through “ethnic cleansing.” More recent 
genocides, such as the attempt to extinguish indigeneity in Guatemala through the pretext of 
“development” supported by transnational banks and corporate mining-agricultural interests, and 
Israel occupation against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza remind us of the earlier “settler 
civilization versus violent Others” constructs that shaped the capitalist world-system. 
 
Concluding Observations on Genocide and Racism over  
500 Years of Developing Capitalism 
Genocide and ideological racist constructions were central features in a 500-year development of 
capitalism through its varied phases. The history of systemic racism and legal genocide through 
which the western system was built call into question the entire ideological structure of 
contemporary neoliberalism. What we know with certainty is the two largest systems of 
ideologically and demographically destructive societies known to mankind – Nazi Germany as the 
most intensive in the Holocaust, western colonialism as the most extensive in the genocides of 
America Indians – have developed and maintained race, racism and genocide as state policy in the 
service of building world empire and global domination. The creation of race and establishment 
of varied patterns of racism were global and genocidal from the onset. We need to expand analyses 
so as to account for the macro-construction of race and systemic racism, often genocidal, within 
the longue durée of the modern world-system. 
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Abstract 
Cruise ships present a useful context to study contemporary developments in globalization.  U.S.-owned cruise 
companies have managed to create the “ideal” context for contemporary corporations: very little government 
oversight of labor relations, an available pool of very cheap labor dispersed across the globe, lax environmental 
regulations, high profit margins, and corporate tax rates around 1%. A typical cruise ship leaving the U.S. 
contains workers from 75 to 90 nationalities.  Crewmembers performing menial service work are recruited 
exclusively from “poor countries” in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Crewmembers 
typically sign 10-month contracts stipulating 10-14 hour workdays/7 days a week without vacation or sick days. 
There is a striking correlation between workers’ pay/status and their countries’ position within the world 
system.  Staff members are usually white Westerners, while crewmembers are exclusively from the global south. 
On cruises the legacies of imperialism and colonialism are often the basis of workers’ racialization as 
appropriate servants.  
Keywords: Cruise ships, Racialization 
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The modern day cruise ship industry is representative of both change and continuity within the 
world system. The industry is an exemplar of a new era of globalization wherein the neoliberal 
agenda prevails. Specifically, cruise companies founded in the United States during the 1970s have 
grown into massive transnational corporations that enjoy minimal government oversight, a large 
pool of cheap and disposable labor dispersed across the globe, high profit margins, and minimal 
taxation. While these companies are largely free from state regulation, they manage to exert 
significant influence over the policies of governments in the core and periphery. The lack of labor 
organizing has also created a situation wherein companies have almost complete control over a 
vast labor force recruited primarily from Asia, South and Central America, the Caribbean, and 
parts of Eastern Europe. The nationalities represented by capital and labor originates from tens of 
different countries and is unique in their confinement to a singular, contained workplace. However, 
in both practice and discourse, cruise ships replicate patterns of racialized servility and hierarchies 
of color, which date back to colonialism. Specifically, white men from core countries are at the 
top of the workplace hierarchy and are racialized as possessing the qualities necessary for 
leadership and dominance over others. Workers from peripheral nations, especially South East 
Asian men, are racialized as naturally suited for servility.  
From their origins in the early 1970s in Miami, cruise ship companies have transformed 
themselves from small-scale, informal, debt-ridden entities into global behemoths. The cruising 
industry remains one of the fastest growing sectors in the global economy. In the United States, 
three companies account for 80% of the market share. In 2014, cruise ships carried 23 million 
passengers, owned 178 ships, and employed over 200,000 employees (CLIA 2015). These 
transnational corporations are working together across nation-state lines. The Cruise Lines 
International Association works internationally to lobby governments that flag ships, host ports, 
supply labor, and subsidize shipbuilding. These efforts have created a very business-friendly 
environment for ships to operate in across the globe. For example, in 2013, Carnival Cruise Co., 
the industry leader, had $15 billion in revenue, $2.2 billion in profits, and a taxation rate of 
approximately 1%. The reasons for this success are multi-faceted but a key factor is the “flags of 
convenience” (FOC) system.  
Although these companies were founded in the United States, the FOC system allows 
companies to choose which countries’ flag under which they fly. The “flagging” country then 
assumes responsibility for supervising and enforcing the ship’s compliance with their national and 
international regulations on ship safety and working conditions. Panama, Liberia, and the Bahamas 
currently account for 50% of the FOC business. These countries charge registry fees and tonnage 
fees, but companies are not taxed on any of the revenue they generate on ticket sales, tours, and 
shipboard purchases. It is no coincidence that cruise companies flag their vessels in such peripheral 
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nations. If they flagged ships in the United States, they would be subject to domestic labor laws 
and corporate taxation. Coordinated efforts on the part of the cruise industry have successfully 
prevented any attempts in the U.S. Congress to alter the FOC regime (Garin 2006, Chin 2008). 
Under the current system, the cruise companies have considerable leverage over flagging states. 
For example, in 2003 registry fees amounted to 17% of the Liberian government’s revenue. In 
Panama, the industry successfully secured a change in domestic labor law: workers’ mandatory 
day off each week is now given at the employer’s discretion (Klein 2002).  
Theoretically, seafaring workers have explicit rights enshrined in international law 
(freedom of association and collective bargaining) and they are specifically covered by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
conventions. ILO Convention 147 (1976) explicitly states that each country that registers ships 
(flag state) must pass laws specifying minimum standards for employment and living conditions. 
This convention also states that employers must pay for travel costs associated with taking a leave. 
ILO Convention 180 (1996) specifies that seafarers should work no more than 72 hours in any 7-
day period. Furthermore, ILO Convention 179 (1996) requires governments to closely supervise 
all crewing agencies, which recruit seafaring workers. Private agencies must be licensed and must 
not charge workers a fee to get a job. Furthermore, ILO Convention 147 gives extensive powers 
to port authorities to detain any vessels, which do not meet ILO labor standards. Because these 
flagging countries are desperate for the income generated from registry fees, they have no incentive 
to enforce international labor laws governing work at sea. As a result of the FOC system, cruise 
companies are beyond the reach of any single seafarer’s union. Furthermore, unlike previous eras, 
there is no single nation-state that workers can lobby to have their labor rights upheld on cruise 
ships. This lack of meaningful labor laws has created a population of workers that are relatively 
powerless against capital.  
The cruise industry is characterized by a regime of “labor flexibilization.” A typical cruise 
ship contains workers from 75-90 different countries, 70% of whom work as hotel staff and are 
afforded no job security. Most workers are male. This global supply of labor is procured through 
the usage of independent crewing agencies. Crewmembers sign 8-10 month contracts that the 
employer can terminate for any reason. These contracts are usually vague about specific work 
duties and stipulate 10-12 hour workdays, 7 days a week, without vacation or sick days. 
Crewmembers are usually afforded half a day off each week, at the discretion of their supervisor. 
Crewing agencies often exploit the desperation of potential employees. “It is common practice for 
these agencies to charge each new recruit for their roundtrip airfare, medical examination, 
seafarer’s book, work visa, and an administrative fee. The end result is that these workers from 
poor countries are often paying $1,500-$2,000 just to get the job” (ITWF 2002: 5). Additionally, 
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most cruise companies take an indemnity (approx. $500) from each employee, which is forfeited 
if they break their contract. Large recruitment fees, an indemnity along with the expense of buying 
their own uniforms, shoes, and other supplies means that many crewmembers are working the first 
couple of months just to get out of debt (ITWF 2002). The company pays them meager wages. For 
example, laundry workers earn between $400-600 a month. Room cleaners and wait staff can 
expect a monthly wage of $50 which must be supplemented by passenger tips (ITWF 2002, Chin 
2008). These very diverse workplaces are by no means egalitarian or post-racial.  
There is a stark dividing social line between “staff” and “crew” employees. While their 
jobs do not necessarily require more education or skill, staff is paid significantly higher wages and 
interacts with passengers as quasi-equals. Staff employees are permitted to take advantage of the 
numerous amenities and services offered to passengers. Unlike their crew counterparts, staff 
employees can be observed eating in passenger cafeterias, relaxing in the spa, playing around in 
the main pool, or drinking and dancing in passenger bars and dance clubs. Crew, on the other hand, 
holds such jobs as room cleaners, waitstaff, bartenders, and cooks. These workers eat day old food, 
live in cramped quarters with no windows, and are forbidden from utilizing any passenger 
amenities.  
The employer also seeks to divide the crewmembers along national lines in order to obviate 
labor solidarity. In 1981 there was a strike led by a group of 240 Honduran workers who were also 
siblings, cousins, and friends from home. Since that time is has been the explicit policy to hire a 
very heterogeneous workforce to forestall any potential labor unrest. As a senior executive from 
Carnival acknowledges, after 1981 “The whole [goal] was not to have a ship with 15 percent or 
more of one nationality” (Garin 2006).  
Cruise ship employment is highly stratified along the lines of nationality and color. The 
main authority figures on the ship (captain and staff captain) are almost all white men from core 
nations. With few exceptions, Carnival’s senior officers are all Italian; Royal Carribbeans are 
Norwegian; Princesses are British; and Holland America’s are Dutch (Garin 2006). White women 
are overrepresented in “front of the house” positions (e.g. hostesses), childcare, and personal 
services (Chin 2008). It is important to note that the cost of labor is not the only factor influencing 
hiring and job placement decisions.  
In a book co-authored by Bob Dickinson, the former President and CEO of Carnival, they 
assert that certain nationalities are predisposed to servitude. “It is more difficult to find Americans 
who have a flair for service hospitality. The egalitarian nature and heritage of Americans tend to 
work against their ability to be motivated to serve others” (Dickinson and Vladimir 2008). This 
begs the question, if certain people are unsuited for servility, then who is? The answer harkens 
back to the days of colonization.  
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Discourse from company management and crewing agencies demonstrates that Southeast 
Asians (mostly men) in particular are perceived to be the most appropriate servants. “They seem 
to have been born with a wonderful service culture. They always greet guests and always smile. 
And, they do it so naturally…Managers compare them with Eastern Europeans who are considered 
unable ‘to smile…always so rigid’” (Zhao 2002: 11, italics mine). When asked why so many 
Filipino men are hired for service work, a crewing agent asserts “…the attitude of the Filipinos, 
and positive attitudes in terms of their dedication to work. Filipinos are obedient, resilient, happy 
people…it runs in the blood.” Other rationales focus on cultural subservience. “You know, 
Filipinos are very well educated…but they are also typically culturally subservient. And that’s one 
of the reasons they’re so popular on cruise ships, because…they can walk around and even under 
sometimes oppressive conditions they know they’ve got to smile and be subservient and they do 
that.” In other cases, the link between the present and colonialism is made more explicitly. On 
Holland America for example, a large number of the workers originate from Indonesia, a former 
Dutch colony. Cruise industry researcher, Ross Klien, notes that the colonial relationship between 
the Dutch and Indonesians was replicated aboard cruise ships. Indonesian men are racialized as 
“naturally reverent and deferential to the Dutch bosses, not just as their employer but also as the 
colonial power under which previous generations grew up” (Klein, 2002: 124). Given that 
Southeast Asian men have been racialized as obedient and subservient, it is no surprise that they 
experience discrimination in their attempts to move the workplace hierarchy into positions of 
authority (Terry 2013).  
Cruise companies also maintain considerable leverage over port cities. In the 1990s 
member nations of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) declared their intention to impose a 
head tax of ten to fifteen dollars per cruise ship passenger. These taxes were proposed to generate 
funds for infrastructure maintenance and upgrade in port cities. The cruise industry balked. 
Companies began pitting port cities against each other and threatening to withdraw business from 
those countries that would not capitulate to the neoliberal agenda. Eventually, the coordinated 
efforts among island-nations were abandoned and the cruise industry was successful in continuing 
to transfer costs onto the citizenry of these peripheral nations (Garin 2006).  
Cruise ship companies are not bound by or to any one particular nation-state. These 
transnational corporations have manipulated the “flags of convenience” system to successfully 
evade regulation of their businesses by any singular country or institution. At the same time, they 
have considerable leverage over the various nations with which they deal including port cities and 
flagging states. This is future that the neoliberal agenda seeks to bring about for humanity, a 
situation wherein transnational corporations have tremendous power over pliable nation-states. It 
is a future where mostly brown workers are desperate and disposable.  
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Whiteness in the World System 
I agree with Dunaway and Cleland (2016) that global capitalism can not be reduced to a project of 
“white supremacy.” However, colorism persists. Specifically, whiteness functions as “property” 
in many contexts, including cruise ships. Cheryl Harris’ (1993) groundbreaking work elucidates 
the ways in which “white skin” provides material and status benefits for those who are allowed to 
claim “whiteness.” The proliferation of skin “bleaching” products across the globe underscores the 
extent to which whiteness (or closeness to whiteness) is highly esteemed (Glenn, 2008). In the 
context of cruise ships, “whiteness” does not exclude European workers from servility, however, 
those laborers are overrepresented in “front of the house” and more prestigious jobs. In this regard, 
“whiteness functions as property” for the employer as well.  
Racism, in various manifestations, is used to justify nation-based hierarchies aboard the 
ship. Some narratives are rooted in the history of “Orientalism” which essentializes and 
homogenizes “Asian” bodies (Said, 1979). The history of colonization, also serves as an 
underpinning to naturalize the servility of brown and black bodies. I argue that we must pay 
attention to the extent that profit-making motives are inextricably linked to racism in the world-
system and how various racializations are used to justify global inequities. 
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By the time President Obama leaves the Oval Office there will have been 3 million deportations from the United 
States during his eight years in office.  This sum is 50 percent more than the total number of all deportations prior 
to 1997, and far more than any previous U.S. president.  I argue in this essay that the confluence of four factors in 
recent years has created the conditions for mass deportation from the United States: (1) nearly all deportees are 
Latin American and Caribbean men; (2) the rise of a politics of fear in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001; (3) the global financial crisis; and (4) the potential that mass deportation creates for 
corporate profit-making.  I place this argument in the larger context of race and ethnicity in the capitalist world-
system.  
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Immigrants who have lived in the United States for decades, have their children and grandchildren 
in that country, and who have no connections to their country of birth can be arrested in their 
homes, taken to a detention center, and summarily deported without legal representation or due 
process. This denial of basic rights and the targeting of one racialized group fit neatly into a critical 
race perspective on U.S. immigration policy. But, how does it fit into the larger world-historic 
context? 
 Ramon Grosfoguel (2015), among others, has argued that race is an organizing principle 
of the international division of labor. Some workers transgress this global hierarchy by leaving 
their countries of birth and coming to the United States to labor as undocumented workers, where 
they find themselves at the bottom of the domestic labor hierarchy. When the threat of deportation 
looming over these workers becomes a reality and undocumented workers are deported to their 
homelands, they are pushed out of the bottom of the employment hierarchy in the United States 
and into the labor markets in their country of birth, where their options for survival are much more 
limited. In this fashion, deportation reinforces the racialized international division of labor as well 
as the racialized hierarchy of the domestic labor market. 
 
Mass Deportation, the Aftermath of 9/11, and the Great Recession 
In the post-9/11 context, a construction of the dangerous immigrant has emerged, and this 
construction is gendered male and racialized as a Latino criminal (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-
Sotelo 2013) or an Arab terrorist (Naber 2006). People perceived to be Arabs have been victims 
of hate crimes and other forms of harassment due to the conflation of Arabs and terrorists.  
 However, relatively few Arabs have been deported from the United States since 9/11 
(Golash-Boza 2012). Instead, state policies alleged to combat terrorists have largely targeted 
Latinos. Mass deportation is a form of state repression based on stereotypes of “criminal aliens” 
that appears to disproportionately target Latino and Caribbean men. In 2008, there were 10.4 
million undocumented people in the United States, 4.1 million of them were women, and 80% 
were from Latin America or the Caribbean (Passel and Cohn 2009). Any non-citizen can face 
deportation, but undocumented immigrants are most at risk for deportation. Although 20 percent 
of undocumented immigrants are not Latin Americans, these immigrants account for less than 2 
percent of deportees. And, although 40 percent of undocumented immigrants are women, they 
make up only 11 percent of deportees. Notably, the percentage of male deportees increased from 
76 in 1999 to 89 percent in 2012.1 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The Office of Immigration Statistics provided me with removal data by sex between 1998 and 2011 and 
published this data for 2012. 
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This escalation of deportations targeting Latino men has been carried out in the name of 
making the United States safer—both from “criminal aliens” and from terrorists. Notably, the 
stated mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), according to its website, is “to 
secure the nation from the many threats we face,” and a substantial portion of the DHS budget has 
been dedicated to deporting Latinos who pose no obvious threat to the nation. These “controlling 
images” (Collins 2004) of black, Latino, and Arab men as threatening have served as discursive 
fodder for the implementation of state repression. If people in the United States did not live in fear 
of terrorism and of crime, it would be more difficult for the state to justify spending $30 billion a 
year on mass deportation. 
Scholars of global capitalism argue that the current crisis of capitalism is a new one—and 
that it was caused by the transnational capitalist class having reached its limits: nearly all corners 
of the globe have been incorporated into global capitalism (Robinson 2014; Sassen 2014). The 
financial activities of investors and speculators led to a collapse of U.S. financial markets in 2008, 
which was at the core of the most recent crisis of global capitalism (Robinson 2014).  The 
escalation of mass deportation in the United States is one instance of the state’s repressive response 
to the crisis. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, we have witnessed a shift towards more interior enforcement 
of immigration laws. With the slowdown in employment, fewer immigrants have attempted to 
enter the United States, and thus there have been fewer border apprehensions. Immigration law 
enforcement officers in two branches of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carry out 
deportations: Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). CBP is only authorized to work up to 100 air miles from the border; most interior 
enforcement falls to ICE. In 2002, ICE apprehensions accounted for 10 percent of all DHS 
apprehensions. By 2011, that figure was nearly 50 percent. There was an abrupt rise in interior 
apprehensions in 2008. 
This shift from 83,969 ICE apprehensions in 2007 to 319,934 ICE apprehensions in 2008 
is a consequence of the implementation of the Secure Communities Program and the consequent 
rise in interior enforcement. The Secure Communities Program is a deportation program that 
mandates coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in immigration 
law enforcement and has been decried by immigrant rights organizations for creating fear in 
immigrant communities. The program’s implementation at the very height of the Great Recession 
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Who Profits? 
While some have pointed to the opportunities opened up for profit making by mass deportations, 
it is difficult to substantiate the claim that corporate profit is the primary explanation. It is clear, 
however, that certain sectors bring in enormous profits from mass deportation. It is also clear that 
corporations have spent millions of dollars lobbying for legislation that would enhance these 
profits. 
The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)—the largest private prison contractor in 
the United States—was awarded its first government contract in 1984. The CCA reported 
substantial profits during the 1990s. The company was doing so well that at the end of the twentieth 
century it began to build speculative prisons—“excess prison space for inmates who did not yet 
exist” (Wood 2007: 232). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, rates of 
incarceration leveled off and the CCA faced serious problems of overcapacity and mounting debt. 
By 2001, CCA had 8,500 empty beds and was over a billion dollars in debt (Wood 2007). As states 
had cut back funding for prisons the CCA looked to the federal government. Its federal lobbying 
expenses increased from $410,000 in 2000 to $3 million in 2004. These efforts paid off, primarily 
because of the rise of immigration detention in the aftermath of 9/11. 
In 2009, Congress passed a bill that included a “detention bed mandate.” This mandate 
requires immigration detention facilities to fill 34,000 beds each day with non-citizens awaiting 
deportation or an immigration hearing. In 2009, 49 percent of ICE immigration beds in the United 
States were in private detention facilities. After the implementation of the quota, this percentage 
went up to 62 percent (Carson and Diaz 2015). Between 2008 and 2014, CCA spent ten million 
dollars on lobbying related to immigration detention and immigration reform. This lobbying paid 
off, as the company’s annual profits increased from $133 million to $195 million in this time period 
(Carson and Diaz 2015).  
 The rise in detention has been accompanied by a rise in deportations. Countries that 
receive deportees have responded to this flow by finding ways deportees can be put to use. One of 
the uses of deportees is as skilled laborers. Call centers in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
are replete with deportees. They answer phone calls from people located in the United States and 
often earn only $100 a week. Having lived in the United States, they speak English and are familiar 
with U.S. culture. Their cultural competence is an asset since the majority of callers are from the 
United States. The state of Baja California in Mexico, by way of example, has about 35 call centers 
that employ 10,000 people, nearly half of them deportees (Spagat and Millan 2014). Overall in 
Mexico, the call center sector doubled between 2005 and 2010, making it a $6 billion industry 
(Wessler 2014). 
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Conclusion 
Understanding mass deportation requires a consideration of the political economy of racialized 
and gendered state repression. This consideration renders it evident that mass deportation 
reinforces the racialized dimensions of the international division of labor that Grosfoguel 
emphasizes. And, although Dunaway’s essay in this symposium argues against the notion of global 
apartheid due to the rise of the BRICs, a look at mass deportation renders it evident that the 
sustainability of a system whereby workers in one country earn $10 an hour and those in a 
neighboring country earn $5 a day is dependent upon the enforcement of national borders. Mass 
deportation is crucial to the maintenance of global apartheid—a system where (mostly white) 
affluent citizens of the world are free to travel to where they like whereas the (mostly non-white) 
poor are forced to make do in places where there are fewer resources. As Dunaway points out, 
there are many affluent non-whites for whom borders pose no problems. However, global 
apartheid is not dependent upon the same strict racial divisions that undergirded apartheid in South 
Africa. Instead, mass deportation reinforces the limited mobility and enhanced vulnerability of 
black and brown labor alongside the rise of non-white billionaires who are happy to reap benefits 
from this marginalized labor. Global apartheid would not be feasible without deportation, as 
deportation is the physical manifestation of policies that determine who is permitted to live where. 
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Response to the Symposium Essays 
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The articles assembled in this collection speak to a desperately needed debate and theoretical 
advancement on matters of race, national oppression, ethnicity and global capitalism. What is most 
intriguing about this collection is that the authors do not fear stepping into the realm of supposed 
heresy. They are prepared to ask tough questions and advance, in some cases, unorthodox 
assertions and conclusions. This, alone, makes this entire collection a must-read. 
The challenge in addressing the question of race revolves around appreciating that it cannot 
be restricted to matters of color, superiority/inferiority or hierarchy. Race is a system created with 
two objectives, as well articulated by several of the authors, which include:  one, domination and 
exploitation for a specific population, and, two, social control. To a great extent this latter matter 
of social control was not addressed directly in this collection though was implicit in several essays.  
 In William Robinson’s introduction, he quotes the iconic Oliver Cromwell Cox as situating 
the construction of modern racism in the period of 1493-4. I would suggest shifting that at least 
one year earlier to 1492 with the successful “Reconquista” carried out by the Castilians in Spain. 
This was the removal of the last of the Moorish kingdoms from Iberia and the expulsion of Jews. 
It was in this moment, as Etienne Balibar pointed out in his volume (with Immanuel Wallerstein) 
Race, Nation, Class, that we witnessed the merging, to a great degree of Christianity and a new 
concept of whiteness. This construction of race was further developed in the 15th century by a 
combination of the Spanish and Portuguese invasion of the Western Hemisphere (and subsequent 
genocide, as noted by Fenelon), the slave trade in Africans, and the English subjugation of Ireland  
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and, with it, the imposition of a system of racial/colonial domination on the indigenous population. 
It is the latter that is of particular importance in understanding the origins and development of race 
and racist oppression in North America (a subject going beyond the scope of this paper). 
When race is only viewed in terms of superiority/inferiority it misses a larger context. The 
construction of race certainly helped to justify slavery, colonialism and genocide. But it also served 
a purpose that is equally relevant to this day:  social control. Race identified who was inferior and 
superior and with that, created the zones of being and non-being referenced by Grosfoguel. But in 
creating those zones, i.e., in creating a relatively privileged position for a specific “race” (in most 
cases identified as “white”), the objective of the capitalist ruling elites was to ensure that a 
‘uniform’ was made available for one segment of the population denoting the ‘army’ in which they 
were now enlisted. That ‘army’ served to not only suppress those in the zone of non-being but, in 
so doing, acted to suppress themselves. In the USA context this could be witnessed through the 
collapse of bond servant revolts (indentured servants) that crossed so-called racial lines by the end 
of the 17th century (as explored in great detail by the late Theodore Allen in his two volume work, 
The Invention of the White Race). 
Of what relevance is this to the current situation? A major source of debate within this 
collection revolves, whether implicitly or explicitly, over the question of “global apartheid.”  
Dunaway and Clelland make a strong argument that the notion of “global apartheid” fails to 
appropriately identify the conjuncture. It would be wrong to suggest that they deny the continuing 
importance of race in making their argument regarding transnational capitalism. They correctly 
point out that racial construction today is substantially different than in the colonial and anti-
colonial era. Transnational capitalism has introduced a new equation, which is the construction of 
a global class that is not simply the extension-through-subordination of comprador elements in the 
global South. The situation has become far more complicated. 
Yet the question is whether the framework of “global apartheid” is useful. I would argue 
that it is, but only insofar as one understands it not in a 20th century context, i.e., apartheid South 
Africa redux. Global apartheid can be understood as the racialized subordination of supposedly 
un-assimilatable populations taking place in this era of global capitalism. Such racialized 
subordination, to again borrow from Balibar, is not exclusively or mainly defined by biological 
superiority/inferiority—in contrast to earlier forms of racism—but is in many respects defined by 
cultural compatibility, alien-ness, and the notion of relevant and irrelevant populations. If, for 
instance, one examines right-wing populist movements, one sees in common their identification 
of specific populations that are asserted to be un-assimilatable. They are allegedly incompatible 
with the dominant ethno-racial construct and, as a result, pose a danger. Golash-Boza and 
Grosfoguel speak to this in their respective essays.  
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Oyogoa’s essay on cruise ships actually serves as a very appropriate metaphor for global 
capitalism and race in the explicit exploration of matters of social control. It is not just that the 
cruise lines are, for all intents and purposes, free of most nation-state controls, but the system that 
they have put into place is consistent with the centuries-old pattern of maintaining social control 
through the construction of a racial division of labor. In this division of labor each layer in the 
hierarchy comes with a particular role along with a justification or mystification, as the case may 
be. Oyogoa’s reference to the Filipinos and the manner in which they are portrayed reminds one 
of the descriptions of the Black sleeping car porters who worked for the Pullman Company on the 
railroads in the early 20th century. They were expected to smile and be entertaining and to put up 
with whatever hardship, including the humiliation of being referred to as “George” instead of the 
use of their own name.1 
Global apartheid cannot be used as a means of suggesting anything approaching a 
monolithic white bloc vs. a monolithic black, yellow or brown bloc. Such was never the case and 
it certainly does not apply today. As William Robinson and others have pointed out, the evolution 
of global capitalism has meant, among other things, that the “global South” can be found in pockets 
in the global “North” and vice versa. It is also the case that the decline of nation-state empires has 
meant a transformation in imperial privilege (rather than racial privilege) such that the so-called 
native (white) populations in the global North find themselves facing a reduced living standard, 
job loss, etc., while in parts of the global South, elites-of-color are emerging who, according to the 
imperial/racial myth, should never supersede those in the metropolitan countries. This situation 
creates an ideological conflict for the native (white) populations who feel threatened by such a 
transformation and particularly threatened by the additional entrance into their countries of 
populations which are perceived to be difficult, if not impossible, to assimilate. 
“Global apartheid,” then, refers to the system created and imposed by global capitalism in 
order to structure the reorganization of the planet. This includes the creation of redundant 
populations, and corresponding failed states that become “reservations” for the unnecessary. Also, 
the rise of the semi-peripheral countries, discussed by Dunaway and Clelland, which create their 
own systems of racist oppression in line with the larger system of global capitalism. 
The notion of global apartheid is also ironically useful in addressing some of the situations 
that Dunaway and Clelland point to as evidence that such a system does not exist. In a world where 
neoliberal globalization is the hegemonic framework, there is a fight for resources and space. The 
conquest of vast proportions of the planet’s wealth by an ever shrinking segment of the global 
population means that there is much less to go around. It is in such a situation that the genocidal 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 “George” from George Pullman, the owner of the company. 
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‘gene’ that exists within capitalism becomes fully activated and one witnesses the horrors of the 
Indonesian slaughters in East Timor or the Hutu holocaust carried out against Tutsis (and their 
Hutu allies) in Rwanda, to name only two. Certainly in the case of Rwanda, there was an explicit 
conceptualization of race as justifying the genocide, wherein the right-wing Hutu genocidiers 
portrayed the Tutsis as less than human.2 
This collection reminds us all that race and racism, though generally associated with 
matters of color, were never so restricted. Islamophobia has become, in much of the global North, 
a socially acceptable manner in which to be racist. Islam is not only associated with those who 
cannot be assimilated but is associated with the ‘colored peoples’ of the world and, therefore, not 
to be linked with the Judeo-Christian heritage. Islamophobia is, therefore, less about religion and 
more about the origins of the religion and the segments of the planet in which this religion is 
largely based. 
Global capitalism, and specifically transnational capital, needs populations that can be 
mobilized to not only advance their interests, but to serve as a safety valve in the context of the 
three major crises afflicting the planet:  the crisis of global capitalism; the crisis of the environment; 
and the crisis of the legitimacy of the State. Right-wing populist forces are attempting to motivate 
and activate a segment of the population based on fear and irrationality in order to preserve the 
nation-state and to impose various forms of authoritarianism, thereby reversing the progressive 
victories of the 20th century. Though transnational capital is less sanguine on the preservation of 
the nation-state—except and insofar as it advances the interests of global capitalism—it shares 
with right-wing populism an interest in strengthened authoritarian statism (to borrow from Nicos 
Poulantzas) in order to ensure not simply the continuity of the system but its further evolution. 
“Global apartheid” holds out the hope, particularly for segments of the white populations of the 
global North, that there is a place for them in the brave new world of transnational capitalism. 
A final thought. In 1988 I was introduced to the concept of “anti-Irish racism.”  I was on a 
visit to Northern Ireland and Britain as part of an effort to better understand the similarities between 
the struggle of the Irish nationalist (Catholic) population in the north of Ireland, and that of African 
Americans in the United States. There was reference to this term “anti-Irish racism” which made 
me very uncomfortable. After all, how could there be racism against a population that was “white.”  
In many respects the conquest of Ireland by the English, and their complete and total 
subordination of the indigenous population not only helped to define the terms of the system of 
racial (and later national) oppression to be instituted in North America against “people of color” .  
But it also provided a clue to understanding race as about various “markers,” as noted by 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Going so far as to reference them as “cockroaches.”  
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Grosfoguel. The Irish were declared to be an inferior race by the English, treated horribly and 
holding no rights that the English were bound to respect…until and unless they agreed to serve the 
Empire, or in the case of the United States, to serve the interests of the white republic. Despite the 
racial and national oppression imposed on the Irish, there were many of them who chose to fight 
to become white, that is, to situate themselves in their own minds and within the racial hierarchy 
of the dominant world bloc. If nothing else this demonstrated that the fact of oppression, no matter 
how vicious, in no way guarantees that the victims will seek or establish a progressive alternative. 
They may, like many of the victims of the Jewish Holocaust, choose to relocate—physically and/or 
ideologically—and ensure that while they will never be victims again…this will be done at the 
cost of victimizing someone else in the racial hierarchy. It is for these reasons that the debate 
contained in this volume is of such importance and relevance. 
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In 2008 Ireland entered an economic free-fall. The collapse of the Celtic Tiger challenged some of 
the central tenets of mainstream political thought in Ireland, as the country was revealed to be less 
a deregulated mouse that roared, and more of a politically weak and underdeveloped semi-
periphery whose elite had little real control over the country’s economy. Since then, the Irish 
political elite, as well as the ECB-IMF-European Commission Troika, have shown themselves to 
be strong supporters of socially destructive austerity policies. This has prompted a slowly 
emerging backlash, most notably protests against government plans to privatize the water supply. 
And in the recent February 2016 elections, a process of serious electoral re-alignment along Left-
Right lines has been clearly evident. 
 
 
New articles in this journal are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is published by the University Library System, University of Pittsburgh as part of 
its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
ISSN: 1076-156X  | Vol. 22  Issue 1 Page 50-53  |  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.642|  jwsr.org 
 
Vol. 1 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 
 
Journal of World-System Research  |  Vol. 22  Issue 1 | Beatty, Coakley, Deckard   51 
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.642 
 This political moment is an apt one for radical reappraisals of the history of Ireland’s 
economic development, of the structures of power in Ireland and of the structures of power within 
which Ireland is bound up; issues, problems and questions for which world-systems analysis 
provides a most useful set of theoretical tools. 
 Ireland, both historically and in the present, has exhibited traits of both peripheries and 
semi-peripheries. Indeed, the papers in this issue’s symposium on “Race in the Capitalist World-
System” point out that the early modern English conquest of Ireland was a seminal moment for 
the history of whiteness, racism and global structural inequality. While Ireland suffered de-
industrialisation, destitution and famine in the 19th century, it did not experience a “second 
serfdom” in the early modern era, like Eastern Europe or Latin America, and in the closing decades 
of the twentieth century it appeared to have changed from “the poorest of the rich,” as The 
Economist once labelled it, to one of the seemingly most successful economies in the European 
core. Investigating these phenomena can lead to a fuller understanding of world-systems and the 
patterns of global economic dependency. Therefore, the various papers in this symposium seek to 
use world-systems analysis to arrive at a fuller understanding of Ireland, while also seeking to use 
Ireland for a fuller understanding of the world-system as well as the characteristics of European 
semi-peripheries in relation to cores.  
 Aidan Beatty’s study of “The Irish Revolution Without a Revolution” critiques what he 
sees as “the conventional view among Irish historians that a revolution occurred in that country 
between the passing of the Third Home Rule Bill of 1912 and the end of the Civil War in 1923.” 
Irish nationalists spoke of a “break” with Britain, but in many respects what they demanded was 
simply the right to manage the country themselves along the same capitalist lines. The nationalist 
mainstream did not seek an economic or social revolution; this paper seeks to understand the 
structural reasons why this was so.  
 Thomas Murray’s paper situates the history of the Irish constitution in the successive, 
international waves of constitution-making that have tended to correspond with decisive moments 
or ruptures in the contested formation of the historical capitalist world-system since the late 
eighteenth century. The changing nature of the Irish constitution, he suggests, owed to certain local 
manifestations of anti-systemic movements within the historical capitalist world-system and 
constitution-makers’ attempts to contain—militarily, politically and ideologically—these 
movements’ democratic and egalitarian ideals and practices. Various configurations of the balance 
of power in Irish society between “national” (core-peripheral) and “social” (capital-labour) forces 
crystallised in constitutional form.  
 Continuing the macro-level historical analysis, Tommy McKearney’s “Northern Ireland: 
From Imperial Asset to International Embarrassment” places contemporary Northern Irish politics 
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and economics within a longer history of British imperialism and British rule in Ireland. 
McKearney has long been active within leftist and republican politics in Northern Ireland, and was 
involved in the hunger strikes in the H-Blocks Prison in the early 1980s. His paper is more in the 
style of personal observation than a conventional academic analysis; it is accompanied by a 
response piece by J.K. Jacobsen. 
 Sharae Deckard’s “World-Ecology and Ireland: The Neoliberal Ecological Regime” argues 
for the usefulness of applying not only the tools of world-systems analysis, but also Jason W. 
Moore’s world-ecological paradigm, to analysis of Ireland’s role as a semi-periphery in the 
environmental history of capitalism. She observes that the socio-economic particularity of 
neoliberal capitalism in its Irish manifestation has increasingly been critiqued since the collapse 
of the Celtic Tiger, but little attention has been paid to neoliberalism as ecology within Ireland. 
Thus, her contribution explores the characteristics of the Irish neoliberal ecological regime during 
and after the Tiger, identifying the opening of new commodity frontiers (such as fracking, water, 
agro-biotechnology, and biopharma) constituted in the neoliberal drive to appropriate and 
financialize nature. She argues that what is crucial to a macro-ecological understanding of 
Ireland’s role in the neoliberal regime of the world-ecology is the inextricability of its financial 
role as a tax haven and secrecy jurisdiction zone from its environmental function as a semi-
peripheral pollution and water haven. 
 Maurice Coakley’s “Ireland, Europe and the Global Crisis” explores Ireland’s relationship 
to the European Union, and the background to the EU’s imposition of austerity policies in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. He argues that the combination of the financialisation of Europe, 
consolidated by monetary union, alongside the collapse of the Soviet bloc has transformed the 
character of the European Union, turning it into an increasingly coercive formation that has 
undermined democracy across Europe. Ireland’s attempt to establish itself as a bridge economy 
between the United States and Europe brought it a brief prosperity during the Celtic Tiger era; it 
is now paying the price for its extreme dependency on external capital. 
 Finally, we end with an extended interview with Denis O’Hearn. O’Hearn has pioneered 
the use of world-systems analysis and dependency theory for understanding Irish historical 
development, most famously with his 2001 book, The Atlantic Economy: Britain, the US, and 
Ireland. In this interview, O’Hearn discusses his views of Irish politics and economics since the 
publication of that work, his views of mainstream “revisionist” historiography, and recent 
developments since 2008, including the rise of the EU’s PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
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Abstract 
There is a conventional view among Irish historians that a revolution occurred in that country between the passing 
of the Third Home Rule Bill of 1912 and the end of the Civil War in 1923.  The violence of those years, the collapse 
in support for the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), the meteoric rise to power of Sinn Féin, a new sense of 
meritocracy, a greater sense of democracy and a widespread radicalism; all are seen as elements of a major change 
in Irish politics and life, a ‘Revolution.’  Drawing on Gramsci's notion of a “revolution without a revolution,” this 
paper seeks to understand the events in Ireland of 1912-23, not as a sudden rupture with the past but as the 
culmination of a much longer period of (often British-backed) capitalist development in post-Famine Ireland. This 
paper argues that Irish nationalist politics in the decades before 1912 is better understood via categories such as 
class, gender, capitalism and the pervasive power of the British state.  As such, as well as pursuing a reassessment 
of the project of Irish historical development and state-building, this paper also seeks a reassessment of the project 
of (an equally statist) Irish historiography. 
Keywords: Ireland, Nationalism, Historiography, Irish Civil War 
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There is something of a consensus among Irish historians that a revolution occurred in that country 
between 1912 and 1923. The violence of those years, the collapse in support for the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP), the meteoric rise to power of Sinn Féin, a new sense of meritocracy, a 
greater sense of democracy and a widespread radicalism; all are seen as elements of a major change 
in Irish politics and life, a “revolution.” One of the first serious historical works to study the period 
in these terms was David Fitzpatrick’s Politics and Irish Life, a seminal study of local politics in 
Clare. This county, he argues, underwent a profound social upheaval as, with echoes of Enoch 
Powell, those lower down the social ladder now “had the whip-hand” over those previously 
dominant (Fitzpatrick 1998: 49, 62). This collapse in deference seems, for Fitzpatrick, to have 
been the defining characteristic of the “revolution.” Not dissimilarly, Senia Pašeta has studied the 
decline in power in the decades before 1918, of an older conservative Catholic middle-class. These 
people were soon to be replaced, she argues, by emergent, radical lower middle-class Republicans 
(Pašeta 1999). The controversial Peter Hart has uncontroversially argued that the revolution was 
the product of competing, incompatible claims on the state and on popular loyalty: “The legitimacy 
and existence of the British state was directly and forcibly challenged; this challenge was 
supported by a large proportion of the Irish population; and Irish sovereignty in the 26 counties 
was ultimately transferred to a new polity and government” (Hart 2002: 18). Sitting somewhat 
uneasily with these analyses, Conor Kostick’s Marxist study sees the revolution as the intense 
agitation of workers and peasants’ movements, happening in parallel to the high politics of Sinn 
Féin and the Irish Republican Army but generally outside of their control (Kostick 2009). 
All of these historians, in different ways, have made important contributions to the 
scholarly understanding of what was, by any reckoning, a tumultuous period during which Irish 
society exhibited important changes. This essay, however, proffers a different analysis and 
chronology of modern Irish history. Reviewing the secondary literature on the Irish revolution, as 
well as drawing on a smaller amount of primary research, this macro-historical essay argues that 
it is more profitable to trace a long arc of development from the years after the Famine well into 
the twentieth century, rather than identifying a rupture in Irish life in the years surrounding the 
Easter Rising of 1916. There was not a revolution, so much as there was a slow process of capitalist 
evolution, as post-Famine Ireland was integrated more and more into the capitalist world-system. 
Irish nationalism was a product of this socio-economic change and the Irish War of Independence 
was not a rupture with the past, but the culmination of that past. 
In the aftermath of the War of Independence (1919-22) and Civil War (1922-23), the 
nationalist laureate W.B. Yeats spoke of a long gestation of Irish cultural ferment, stretching from 
the Parnellite schism of the early 1890s up to his own time (Cairns and Richards 1988: 58). More 
 
Journal of World-System Research  | Vol. 22  Issue 1 |  Revolution Without a Revolution   56 
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.602 
recently, Patrick Maume’s much-cited, if archly empiricist work has taken the notion of a “long 
gestation” as a framing device for understanding early twentieth-century Irish politics in general 
(Maume 1999). While Maume is somewhat circumspect as to what was “gestating” during this 
long gestation, he is right to place an emphasis on long-term change; temporality can be a slippery 
problem in scholarly analyses of “revolutions.” As Immanuel Wallerstein points out, revolution is 
a term that connotes “sudden, dramatic, and extensive change. It emphasizes discontinuity.” Yet, 
when many scholars come to study “revolutions,” what they often end up studying are the much 
slower, long-term social changes that feed into an ostensibly sudden rupture with the past. 
Wallerstein even goes so far as to query the analytic utility of such a slippery and contradictory 
term (Wallerstein 2011b). At the very least, the study of a revolution should not be divorced from 
the formative events of preceding decades.1  
Compounding this, Irish political and economic development, as Denis O’Hearn notes, 
occurred along a “path dependent process of globalization” (O’Hearn 2001: 15). Declan Kiberd 
has similarly suggested that Irish nationalists remained trapped within the very codes they sought 
to oppose (Kiberd 2009: 204).2 The Irish revolution, such as it was, was also trapped with certain 
delineated codes and operated along pre-existing paths. There was a certain amount of radicalism, 
but this was tempered by a coterminous conservatism. As Fitzpatrick, the historian, and Kevin 
O’Higgins, the 1920s Irish Minister for Justice, have both suggested, this revolution was a 
markedly conservative event.3 To understand why Ireland had a “conservative revolution” (a 
potentially oxymoronic term) requires placing the events of 1916-23 in a much broader historical 
and world-systemic context. What was gestating in the decades before 1912 or 1916 were market-
driven economics, private property, an Irish variant of a privatised sense of selfhood; in other 
words, capitalist modernity. And already, well before 1916, Ireland and Irish identity were 
markedly affected by the country’s status as a supplier of agricultural raw materials for British 
                                                                                                                                                             
1  In Kostick’s Revolution in Ireland, his first chapter, on the “Prelude to Revolution,” is dated 1913-1917. He begins, 
however, by tracing the country’s socio-economics back to the Act of Union of 1800, thus more than tacitly 
recognising the slow pace of class-based histories. 
2 Kiberd says of Gerty McDowell and The Citizen, minor characters in Ulysses: “Gerty’s problem… is rather like that 
of the nationalists in ‘Cyclops’: her rebellion is doomed because it is trapped in the very codes it opposes.” 
3  Fitzpatrick concludes his analysis by stating: “if revolutions are what happen to wheels, then Ireland underwent a 
revolution between 1916 and 1922 [in which] social institutions were turned upside down, only to revert to full circle 
upon the establishment of the Irish Free State.” More than fifty years earlier, Kevin O’Higgins famously asserted that 
“We were probably the most conservative minded revolutionaries that ever put through a successful revolution.” Dáil 
Debates, ii, 1909 (1 March 1923). Quoted in Laffan(1985). 
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markets. The dominant currents of early twentieth-century Irish nationalism were products of this 
capitalist modernity on the periphery4 of the British economy, and never broke from its strictures.  
The problem with speaking of an “Irish Revolution” in the 1910s and 20s is much the same 
as that identified by Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (1986) for a roughly contemporary 
Egypt: 
In retrospect, the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 was far from being a 
revolution in the classic meaning of the term. Its leadership was largely 
drawn from the native Egyptian elite (albeit from newer, rurally based 
strata rather than the Ottoman-derived element that had dominated 
political life in the nineteenth century). It was primarily a political 
phenomenon, aiming at no socioeconomic transformation of class 
structure and as a result achieving none (the rural risings of 1919 were 
quickly repressed and were not repeated); the main economic aspiration 
of the nationalists was to seek to create a native Egyptian capitalist sector 
parallel to the foreign one that had dominated the economy to that time). 
Most important, even its political achievements were limited to a greater 
measure of (but by no means total) independence from Great Britain, 
which continued to maintain both military forces in the country and 
influence over Egyptian affairs. But to many Egyptians who participated 
in the Revolution of 1919, these limitations were either irrelevant or 
temporarily overlooked. At the time, Egyptians perceived it as a genuine 
revolution (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986: 40). 
The dynamics identified by Gershoni and Jankowski are conceptually similar to those explored in 
this paper: the nationalist elite at the head of the Irish “revolution” represented the class interests 
of a slowly emerging and predominantly rural bourgeoisie, whose economic interests were tied to 
Ireland’s agrarian status. Like their Egyptian contemporaries they had a marked interest in 
ensuring that their political revolution never became a socio-economic one. Thus, their 
“revolution” never seriously challenged the country’s status within the world-economy. In this, 
Ireland did not buck any postcolonial trends. Perry Anderson has recently argued that in India, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Ireland complicates the notions of periphery and semi-periphery in world-systems theory: it displays many 
characteristics of peripheral economies [a trend toward economic mono-culture, a mostly weak state] whilst also 
having a higher standard of leaving and relative democratic freedoms usually seen in core or semi-periphery states. 
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instance, “the motto of independence has invariably been: what empire has joined, let no man put 
asunder.” Anderson explains this both by recourse to the material interests of Nehru and the 
Congress party (“As a party, Congress was controlled by a coalition of rich farmers, traders and 
urban professionals, in which the weight of its agrarian bosses was greatest, and its policies 
reflected the interests of these groups, unconcerned with the fate of the poor.”) as well as something 
more diffuse: an Indian nationalist ideology produced by the colonial encounter itself. He talks of 
“the umbilical cord attaching the Congress regime of the post-independence years to the 
arrangements of the Raj” and identifies an “Anglophone provincialism” as being key elements 
here. As such, Anderson’s broad conclusion is that “There was no overthrow of the Raj, but a 
transfer of power by it to Congress as its successor” (Anderson 2013: 105-115). My contention is 
that something very similar happened in Ireland: not only was nationalist discourse heavily 
determined by the relationship with British rule but the Irish “revolution” was also strongly 
delimited by the economic and political “umbilical cord” linking Ireland to Britain and the broader 
world-system. What Ireland experienced in the years orbiting 1916 was “a revolution without a 
revolution.” 
In seeking to understand Italy’s political and economic development, Antonio Gramsci 
espoused the idea of a “passive revolution,” something he also labelled “revolution without a 
revolution,” a slow change in the political order that avoids any rupture in social relations (Gramsci 
1999: 250).  
The “passive” aspect refers to the way challenges may be thwarted so that 
changes in production relations are accommodated within the current 
social formation. This might not be done in a “passive” way but refers to 
the attempt at “revolution” through state intervention or the inclusion of 
new social groups within the hegemony of a political order but without an 
expansion of mass control over politics (Morton 2003: 634).  
This is a useful heuristic device for historical sociology. Drawing directly on Gramsci, Riley and 
Desai’s comparative study of Italy and India talks of passive revolution as “a revolutionary model 
of political organization and revolutionary political techniques… pressed into the service of a 
conservative modernization project” and “Specific to passive revolutions is the paradoxical 
combination of conservative aims and revolutionary means.” Moreover, “passive revolutions leave 
intact, and may even strengthen, the social and political power of pre-existing dominant classes” 
(Riley and Desai 2007, 816). The Irish events of 1916-22 certainly echo this; a new mass party 
rapidly came to prominence, armed militias attracted tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of 
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members, and populist politics were to the fore. Yet, the social order was not drastically altered, 
agrarian and labor agitation were undercut and ultimately suppressed, and the country’s status in 
the world-economy remained largely the same. It was a (political) revolution without a (social) 
revolution. But it could be better to go even further, not just to redefine things along the lines of a 
“passive revolution” but perhaps to abandon the term “revolution” altogether. The “passive” part 
of Ireland’s “passive revolution” highlights why “revolution,” with its attendant notions of rupture 
and drastic change, can be unhelpful for fully understanding the events of 1916-22. Talk of 
“revolution” helps us to get at the popular mood in Ireland, but also blinds us to the deeper 
structures of Irish society and of Ireland's global status, which were not only unchanged by the 
“revolution,” but were not seriously threatened.  
Indeed, Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest (2012:11) have recently shown how global 
structures of power “shape movements and their possibilities for challenging the social order, and 
the interactions of movements with states and interstate actors then transform the larger set of 
structures that form the stage on which social conflicts are expressed.”5 The Irish “revolution” 
occurred within a broader system of British power that ensured it would remain conservative. 
Scholars’ continuing use of the analytical lens of “revolution” elides these larger questions of 
global power. Writing with Rachel Kutz-Flamenbaum, Smith (2010: 211-218) has also criticized 
the manner in which contemporary social science research “focuses on movements within 
particular states and frames conflicts largely within existing national (or diasporic) boundaries.” 
According to Smith and Kutz-Flamenbaum, “The assumption that conflicts are bounded by 
national politics blinds the researcher to the ways these conflicts are shaped by a larger world 
system” and its attendant issues of political power. “Moreover, state-centric approaches ignore the 
fact that the national state can only exist within a larger system of states and institutions that 
recognise, legitimate and help to reinforce their authority and control over particular geographic 
regions.” 
These are problems familiar to Irish historiography. The scholar of nationalism John 
Hutchinson (1996) and the British imperial historian Stephen Howe (2000) have both labelled Irish 
revisionist historians “methodological nationalists,” due to the manner in which they avoid 
comparative analyses and shy away from questioning the historicity and ontological reality of the 
Irish “nation.”6 The continued use of the analytic category of “revolution” represents a comparable 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Smith and Wiest are here drawing on Terry Boswell & Christopher Chase-Dunn. The Spiral of Capitalism and 
Socialism (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
6 Using the same rhetoric as Howe and Hutchinson, Smith and Kutz-Flamenbam (2010: 218) state that “the 
‘methodological nationalism’ that characterises a considerable amount of the social science literature… indicates a 
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problem. Viewing the events of 1916-22 as a revolution means accepting a nationalist narrative of 
a break with the past and a break with Britain. The use of this term imposes a singular narrative 
on a diverse set of events and thus subtly elides the competing political projects of the period. 
Many events that have been called a “revolution” are a mix of the radical conservative and all are 
experienced as a sudden rupture even if the temporal roots are far deeper; The analytic utility of 
this term, not only for the study of Irish history, is not always clear and as a scholarly tool 
“revolution” perhaps creates more problems than it solves. 
For sure, the War of Independence was a culminating moment in a longer history of social 
change. But this resulted in a delineated widening of access to elite power rather than in a break 
with that power. It was a “revolution without a revolution.” Recognising this requires recognising 
a hidden Ireland, the underlying power dynamics of Irish society, rather than focusing on the 
conspicuous and the ubiquitous: military engagements, elections, and parliaments. Who ruled 
Ireland underwent some change as the Union was dissolved. How Ireland was ruled did not 
radically change. 
In his politically charged account of The Invention of the White Race, Theodore Allen 
offers an intriguing alternative to more conventional chronologies of Irish historical development, 
in an analysis deserving of serious attention. With broad brush-strokes, Allen dissects the political 
relations between oppressors and their victims and, in seeking to understand the long-term 
structural dynamics of these unequal power-relations, he places much emphasis on what he calls 
“the intermediate social control stratum.” By this, he means an elite cadre within colonized and 
racially oppressed societies who act as a conduit for the political projects of the dominant colonizer 
or oppressor. The lack of such an Irish “intermediate social control stratum” was, Allen states, “the 
central problem of British rule in Ireland for more than two centuries” after the colonizing wave 
of the sixteenth century (Allen 2012: 70). This changed, however, in the aftermath of the 1798 
Rebellion, an event that shook British complacencies in Ireland. The barring of Irish elites from 
political power “was a luxury that the British ruling class could no longer afford. The resolution 
of the crisis would mean nothing less, and nothing more, than a change in the system of British 
colonial rule in Ireland from racial oppression to national oppression, by the incorporation of the 
Irish bourgeoisie in the intermediate buffer social control stratum” (Allen 2012: 92, emphases in 
original).  
In this context, Allen identifies a “détente with the Catholic hierarchy and bourgeoisie that 
was sprouting between the cracks of Protestant Ascendancy” and suggests that “Catholic 
Emancipation meant… in short, the formal admittance of propertied Catholics, although on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
tendency of scholarship to remained within the statistical and conceptual confines (prisons?) of the modern national 
state.” 
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necessarily subordinate basis, into [Britain’s] buffer social control stratum” (Allen 2012: 92-97). 
Allen’s central programmatic claim is that “For the British colonial bourgeoisie, the categorical 
imperative was maintenance of the legislative union. If forced to it, they would be ready to abandon 
rule by religio-racial oppression in favour of admitting the Irish Catholic bourgeoisie into a role in 
the system of social control” (Allen 2012: 92-97). The central thrust of this paper is that accepting 
a limited set of the Irish Catholic bourgeoisie’s demands (demands which were usually expressed 
in the new language of nationalism) meant abandoning the Union but ultimately was also the 
manner in which that Irish Catholic bourgeoisie were more fully incorporated into the capitalist 
world-system. The form and content of bourgeois Irish nationalism, I suggest, was heavily 
determined by this “system of social control” as leading nationalists devoted much energy to 
damping down anti-systemic politics. For much of the nineteenth century, Irish nationalists had 
worked to sublimate class tensions into an ostensibly cross-class nationalist project.  
In a recent, highly innovative work of historical sociology, Anne Kane, focusing 
specifically on the Land War (1879-1882), argues that Irish national identity, as we currently 
understand that term, was in many ways a product of this period of intense agrarian agitation. Even 
more, she states that it was during this period that ideals of private property acquired a new, 
hegemonic status in Irish society. As Kane shows, during the earliest stages of the Land War, the 
demands of smallholding tenants drew on radically different ideas of property ownership than 
those held contemporaneously by “strong farmers,” those with larger farms of fifty acres or more. 
Broadly speaking, the “strong farmers” believed in private property, the smallholders had not yet 
been taught the rules of private property, and the former looked with suspicion on the radical 
demands of the latter. By the end of the Land War, however, a certain amount of nationalist 
solidarity had been built up between small and large-farmers, and the idea of (relatively) inviolable 
private-property rights had been solidified in Ireland. Looking backwards and forwards at the 
longer history of Irish agrarianism, Kane concludes that the process that intensified during the 
Land War culminated with formal independence in 1922 (Kane 2011 1-29). Nationalism, in the 
Land War as in 1922, was a leading means for sublimating competing class interests within a 
homogenized (but at heart, bourgeois) vision of the “nation.” 
The path identified by Kane in the Land War certainly continued to be trudged in later 
decades. Fergus Campbell, studying the agrarian agitation of the 1890s, picks up on some 
remarkably familiar tropes. The Irish National League, successor to the Land League (suppressed 
during the Land War), adopted a constitution that “avoided advocating an agrarian policy that 
might alienate grazier support.” The agrarian agitation of 1898 led to the founding of the United 
Irish League (UIL), a top-down organisation headed and controlled by William O’Brien, a wealthy 
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ex-MP. Though particularly active in the more impoverished west, its local leadership tended to 
come from relatively wealthier and more elite backgrounds. “Unlike the Land League, which the 
UIL self-consciously emulated in a number of fundamental ways, the new League did not commit 
serious crimes in order to achieve its objectives.” Nonetheless, the perceived radicalism of the UIL 
worried the IPP leadership, who were concerned that a focus on land redistribution, as Campbell 
says, “might alienate the support of the wealthy nationalist graziers of east Leinster.” In a process 
that did much to defang smallholders’ class concerns within the movement, the UIL were 
effectively integrated into the conservative IPP at the start of the twentieth century (Campbell 
2005: 25-43). 
Bourgeois Irish nationalism’s class biases continued to manifest themselves in some 
remarkably similar ways during the “revolution.” Denis O’Hearn (2001) has spoken of how Ireland 
remained trapped within a certain kind of capitalist path-dependency. This was no less the case in 
terms of how, even at the height of the supposed revolution, the interests of workers, smallholders 
and peasants continued to be suppressed in favour of a set of bourgeois interests masquerading as 
“the national interest.” Already during the Lockout, the bitter labor disputes of 1913, the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood’s Irish Freedom newspaper criticised socialism as a divisive ideology: 
“we wish, if at all possible, to heal breaches within the nation, to avert the war of class against  
class at a time when every class must stand together to save the nation, to reassert her 
independence, to rehabilitate our national life” (“Capital and Labour” 1913). As had long been the 
case, Irish nationalists continued to define their “nation” in narrow and exclusionary bourgeois 
terms. P.S. O’Hegarty (1924: 178-180), the co-editor of Irish Freedom, was certainly critical of 
socialists, seeing them as lazy and a threat to the nation, in general denouncing those who, he felt, 
put individual goals over supposedly shared national interests.  
The IRA’s Dan Breen held to a similar view of the Labor candidate who stood against him 
in the Tipperary constituency during the 1922 general election (Breen: 1924: 254). He would later 
claim the Labour Party represented “a very poor type of manhood. They are one and all a gang of 
chancers with no interest in Ireland or the Irish people” (Breen 1966). Even Ernie O’Malley, a 
leading IRA figure who was not unsympathetic to left-wing politics, was critical of “extreme 
labour,” claiming “The Volunteer spirit in essentials was hostile to Labour, afraid that any attention 
to its needs or direction would weaken the one-sided thrust of force” (O’Malley: 1936: 59). On a 
personal level, he remembers “my annoyance at the convictions of purely revolutionary workers 
who stood outside the nationalist movement and a certain amusement at their arguments” 
(O’Malley: 1936: 144). Sinn Féin had already claimed to stand “less for a political party than for 
the Nation… Believing that the time has arrived when Ireland’s voice for the principle of 
untrammelled National self-determination should be heard above every interest of party or class, 
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Sinn Fein will oppose at the Polls every individual candidate who does not accept this principle”  
(Sinn Féin 1918). In 1921, the Sinn Féin-allied Cumann Léigheachtaí an Phobhail [Republican 
Lecture Group] issued a pamphlet on “the labour problem” which sought to present an image of 
aloofness from petty ideological squabbles, whilst still claiming strikes were the product of unions’ 
“selfish” demands for higher wages. The author also claimed “Labour… is like a virulent foreign 
element in the social system” and “whatever else we are, capitalist or worker or neither, we are all 
Irishmen interested beyond anything else in the welfare of our common country, and as an Irishman 
speaking to Irishmen I put it that these industrial conflicts, if continued, will inevitably impair, if 
not utterly destroy, our common country” (O’Ceileachar 1921). 
This kind of thinking, obviously, did not represent the entire gamut of Irish nationalism. 
Leftist nationalists and republicans had long proved themselves adept at reworking the rhetoric of 
bourgeois nationalism. James Connolly’s Labour in Irish History had already posited the Irish 
nationalist return to sovereignty not only as a return to a glorious past, but also as the return to a 
lost Irish communal economics (Connolly 1919). Connolly employed a sense of historical time 
and a masculinist language of revival familiar to Irish nationalists. He claimed that socialism would 
be a return to “the Brehon laws of our ancestors” and was “the only principle by which the working 
classes can in their own turn emerge in the divinity of Freemen, with the right to live as men and 
not as mere profit-making machines for the service of others” (Markievicz 1925). Similarly, the 
Labour Party’s organ The Watchword of Labour drew on nationalist rhetoric when, during the War 
of Independence, it denounced the right-leaning Irish Independent as “Connolly’s Murderers” and 
“journalistic supporters of British rule in Ireland” (“Connolly’s Murderers Attack ‘Watchword,” 
1919).7 In his study of socialist republicanism, Richard English devotes considerable attention to 
the contradictions inherent in left-wing nationalism, particularly the degree to which socialism, an 
ideology privileging the interests of the working class, sits uneasily with the cross-class unity 
ostensibly inherent to nationalism and Irish republicanism (English 1994). This is not inaccurate. 
Yet, it should also be said that the far less discussed, but far more prevalent “capitalist 
nationalism,” by far the stronger tendency within pre-Treaty Sinn Féin,8 was also riddled with 
contradictions; it sought to promote an economic system based on individual self-interest but 
alongside a political system based on a supposed cross-class solidarity. During all this tumult, and 
as leftist ideas gained increased traction, the very real danger with socialist republicans was that 
they might expose these capitalist contradictions. Thus, leftists would have to be suppressed and 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 In the aftermath of the Easter Rising, the Independent infamously called for Connolly’s quick execution. 
8 ‘…characteristic of the party was a vote in the Naas Sinn Féin club on “Capital versus Labour from the Sinn Féin 
point of view.”  Most of those present voted in favour of capital (Laffan 1999: 257). 
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their politics and concerns blocked by, and from, the harmonious narrative of Irish nationalism’s 
fraternal unity. There would be no social or economic revolution. 
The denunciations and dismissive attitudes of Breen or O’Hegarty reflected the more 
concrete actions taken against those who, in the midst of the crisis, seized land, went on strike, or 
formed soviets. A Sinn Féin manifesto condemning a spate of land seizures in Kerry, signed by 
leading party members Piaras Béaslaí, Fionán Lynch and Austin Stack, declared that “The present 
time – when the Irish people are locked in a life and death struggle for freedom… is ill-chosen for 
the stirring up of strife amongst our fellow countrymen.” Instead, signposting the later claims of 
post-1922 Irish politicians to be above petty ideological politics, the manifesto pushed for social 
politics to be fully removed from the nationalist agenda. “All our energies must be directed towards 
clearing out—not the occupier of this or that piece of land—but the foreigner who holds the Nation 
in his grip” (Sinn Féin 1920). Similarly, Art O’Connor, acting minister for agriculture, when 
intervening in a land dispute in Kerry in early 1920 felt that “the people confused license with 
liberty.” As Laffan says, “his response was worthy of a Dublin Castle official” (1999: 315-316). 
Yet, even if land seizures and labor actions were never as radical as they might have appeared, 
there was widespread fear of them. As one official Dáil report concluded: 
All this was a grave menace to the Republic. The mind of the people was 
being diverted from the struggle for freedom by a class war, and there was 
a likelihood that this class war might be carried into the ranks of the 
Republican Army itself, which was drawn in the main from the 
agricultural population and was largely officered by farmers’ sons (Laffan: 
1999: 315) 
Conor Kostick, in his work on Revolution in Ireland, has successfully recovered the voices of those 
involved in land seizures and strikes. His account steps out of more conventional understandings 
of the War of Independence and Civil War, highlighting the serious ideological struggles that 
marked quotidian politics at this time. His work, however, is not without its problems. His claim 
that there was a “deep radicalisation” of the Irish working class between 1917 and 1923 probably 
overstates the depth of this change (Kostick 2009: 25). He relies on an essentially Leninist set of 
arguments to explain why this ostensibly radicalised working class did not prove more successful. 
A properly socialist vanguard, he argues, could have led the workers to victory (Kostick 2009: 47). 
The leaders of the Irish labor movement, Kostick says, had “no desire to play the role of Lenin or 
Trosky” (Kostick 2009: 150) and “the appearance of a Bolshevik-style party in Ireland had been 
smothered in the vital years of 1918 to 1920 more by the apparent radicalism of the labour leaders 
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than as a result of any structural considerations” (Kostick 2009: 157). This, of course, is to presume 
that the rank-and-file of the labor movement wanted a Bolshevik-style revolution, of which there 
is scant evidence. In fact, from the Land War onwards, conservative notions of private property 
had become increasingly dominant across rural Ireland. Timothy McMahon, for instance, has 
shown how a desire for private land-ownership among those “near the bottom of the social ladder” 
was part of the “rising expectations” of late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century Ireland 
(McMahon 2010). And Donald Sassoon, in his panoramic history of the European Left has 
critiqued the kind of analysis in which Kostick engages, which tends to ignore deeper (and more 
politically awkward) structural questions in favor of the simpler suggestion that for revolutions to 
succeed, all that is needed are “good and consistent socialists.” (Sassoon 2010: 63)Against 
Kostick, and for precisely structural reasons, it is strongly questionable whether rural Ireland was 
genuinely ripe for a Bolshevik-style revolution. 
Already as early as de Valera’s electoral victory in 1917, the Catholic clergy (not usually 
known for their radicalism) had begun to swing behind Sinn Féin.9 Kostick astutely notes that the 
First Dáil’s “radical stance with respect to Britain was accompanied by an outlook that in many 
other respects was conservative and, above all, Catholic” (Kostick 2009: 50). Moreover, he 
identifies Sinn Féin’s “philosophy of sublimating social differences in their model of an Irish 
nation” (Kostick 2009: 69). A major concern of this nationalist elite was to prevent any kind of 
substantive change in the social or economic order. Just as the word “nation” serves to hide a 
number of competing concerns, so also “revolution” imposes a singular narrative on a diverse set 
of events. Kostick argues that it is “clear that nationalist leaders such as Griffith and Collins were 
dealing both with opposition from Britain and aspirations from below which they saw as 
destabilising a future Irish society” (Kostick 2009: 5). What Wallerstein (2011b) identifies in the 
French Revolution, that there were actually two revolutions (one bourgeois and one anti-systemic), 
could also be tentatively applied to Ireland, with the important modification that the “anti-
systemic” forces remained quite weak and the bourgeois “revolutionaries” were dedicated to 
conserving the prevailing socio-economic order. 
As agrarian agitation increased during the War of Independence, prominent landowners 
flocked to the Republicans seeking protection. Sinn Féin, acting through their newly founded 
parliament, the Dáil, “was desperate to prevent ‘selfishness’ from breaking up the unity of the 
national struggle and equally anxious to prove its credibility with the landowners…. The point of 
the Dáil’s activities was to prove to the landlords and big business that they could be relied on to 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Though Kostick points out that Sinn Féin’s membership were not universally supportive of this clerical support 
(Kostick 2009: 32-33). 
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maintain the usual law and order.” (Kostick 2009: 112-113, emphases added). As one piece of 
Sinn Féin electoral propaganda frankly noted: “It has been said that a Free Ireland means an Army 
and Navy. That is so. It has also been said that this means Red Ruin and Revolution… These are 
the facts. A Free Ireland does not mean Revolution: It means peace and prosperity… A Free Ireland 
means—not Red Ruin—but the salvation from Red Ruin” (de Valera 1917). Sinn Féin’s 
leadership, whatever about their erstwhile radicalism, were themselves part of the same native 
bourgeoisie crystallising in post-Famine Ireland. For long-term structural reasons, it would be their 
class interests that would define the scope of this “passive revolution.”  
In the same vein, it is not clear how radical a political or economic break Sinn Féin sought 
from Britain. In a 1918 interview with the Christian Science Monitor, which Sinn Féin later 
reissued as a pamphlet, Eamon de Valera claimed that the Irish sought “to be free… not to have a 
master.” At the same time, though, he claimed that once the “enforced partnership” with England 
was ended, a new friendship of equals, of “independent neighbours” could emerge, “each 
respecting the rights and interests of the other” (de Valera 1918). The implied assumption was that 
the country’s socio-economic structure would not change, rather there would just be a change in 
terms of who had the responsibility of managing Ireland. Indeed, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 
left much untouched. The northeast corner of the island would remain a part of the United 
Kingdom, British troops would continue to be stationed in Ireland (on both sides of the border), 
and the Irish state would continue to contribute to the British national debt. 
Nevertheless, defending the Treaty in which he had been so closely involved, Arthur 
Griffith, spoke of it as a “Treaty of equality,” the first official document to recognise Ireland’s 
equality with England (Griffith 1922). Even de Valera’s much-debated Document No. 2, a 
proposed alternative to the Treaty, accepted partition as well as the country’s continued status 
within the Empire. De Valera was probably being more accurate than he intended when he frankly 
asserted, in September 1922, “I must be the heir to generations of conservatism. Every instinct of 
mine would indicate that I was meant to be a dyed-in-the-wool Tory or even a Bishop, rather than 
the leader of a Revolution” (de Valera 1922). Declan Kiberd has suggested that Irish nationalists 
remained trapped within the very codes they sought to oppose. Irish nationalist ideology, for all its 
anti-British rhetoric, was itself a product of British rule and British influence. Sinn Féin, whatever 
about their claims to represent a supra-ideological “national” interest, were inherently ideological 
and advocated an agrarian-based and essentially capitalist political project. What they ultimately 
sought was the right to run the socio-economic entity called “Ireland” along capitalist lines and 
within a still British-centric world-system. As Wallerstein says:  
 
Journal of World-System Research  |  Vol. 22  Issue 1 | Beatty   67 
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.602 
 
The interstate system is not a mere assemblage of so-called sovereign 
states. It is a hierarchical system with a pecking order that is stable but 
changeable. That is to say, slow shifts in rank order are not merely 
possible, but historically normal. Inequalities that are significant and firm 
but are not immutable are precisely the kind of processes that lead to 
ideologies able to justify high rank but also to challenge low rank. Such 
ideologies we call nationalisms (Wallerstein 1991: 82). 
“Nationalism” was the ideological means for understanding Ireland’s status within the broader 
capitalist world-system. But more than that, Ireland’s semi-peripheral economic status also had a 
major determining role on the ideological form and content of Irish nationalism. This is the rub of 
the issue: the main currents of Irish nationalism were too bound up with the country’s global 
politico-economic status to be able to (or really want to) imagine a revolution in that status. 
Some in the Irish labor movement did seek to oppose all this. The famous Limerick Soviet, 
for instance, took control of that city in April 1919. Two years later, workers at the Cleeves’ Bakery 
in nearby Bruree took control of their factory and declared it a soviet: “Bruree Mills and Bakery 
are now the property of the workers. The mill and shop are open for the sale of bread, flour and 
meal. It is hoped to reduce prices and do away with profiteering within a day. By order of the 
workers.” There was something ephemeral about this, however. The Bruree soviet only lasted nine 
days after which “work resumed as normal” (Kostick 2009: 174-175). The Limerick Soviet lasted 
all of two weeks: “British authority had been shaken but remained intact” and, according to 
Kostick’s Leninist appraisal, “the workers fall back into passivity” (Kostick 2009: 86). 
It is more accurate to say that those who went against the dominant capitalist trends of Irish 
nationalism failed to develop a coherent ideological alternative. Even some of the ostensibly 
radical soviets, for instance, still operated within a discourse and praxis of private property and 
wage labor. The first “soviet,” at an asylum in Monaghan (close to what would soon be the border 
with Northern Ireland), merely sought a four-shilling pay raise. Their “soviet” lasted twelve days 
and ended when that pay-raise was secured. Of the various strikes discussed by Kostick, many 
clearly did not have radical intentions and several ended within a single day (Kostick 2009: 116-
117). Kostick himself recognises that, while there would be over a hundred “soviets” declared in 
Ireland between 1919 and 1920, “The news coming from Russia was insufficient for a full 
understanding of how a soviet functioned” (Kostick 2009: 74). Moreover, and more important for 
the focus of this paper, it is worth recalling that bourgeois nationalist politics remained dominant 
during this period and the new political space that benefitted land agitators and striking workers 
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was the product of the nationalist struggle. Nationalist thinking and language continued to 
predominate. Terence Brown, for instance, has noted how even “as intelligent a social 
commentator as Peadar O’Donnell,” a strong supporter of rural agitation, couched his radical 
economic programme within classically nationalist terms (Brown 1985: 94). Perhaps mirroring 
how Irish nationalists remained trapped within British codes, so also anti-systemic figures like 
O’Donnell remained trapped within nationalist political codes. O’Donnell would later write about 
the regret he and other veterans of the War of Independence felt about the lack of a social 
revolution during those years, and how they may have even contributed to its suppression. His 
perception, mixing nationalist and class-based shibboleths, was that “Fenian Ireland, the Ireland 
of the poor” had approached “the very doorstep of a struggle for power” but “failed to achieve a 
leadership to correspond with its needs and was driven back in confusion” (O’Donnell 1963: 19-
20 & 32). 
Working-class agitation was never as organised or as radical as Kostick suggests. 
Certainly, though, the fear of radical social change had an impact on the nationalist leadership; 
the emerging nationalist elite backed away from a full confrontation with the British partly out of 
a fear that it would unleash more subversive dynamics in Irish politics. Additionally, the form and 
content of Irish nationalism had long been influenced by British ideas of economics, state 
formation and social organization and the British never had too much to fear from the likes of 
Arthur Griffith or even de Valera. Consciously or not, Griffith or de Valera ultimately acted as 
defenders of a British-centric economic system, suppressing rural agitation and leftist workers’ 
movements. Mainstream Irish nationalists, even at the height of this “revolution,” remained a kind 
of “intermediate social control stratum.” 
At the eve of the War of Independence, Kevin O’Higgins, rapidly emerging as a leading 
figure in Sinn Féin and later to be a dominant figure in post-1922 politics, told his interrogators in 
the Special Crimes Court that “most of us who support Sinn Féin in these days are out only for the 
independence of Ireland and not necessarily for the destruction of the British Empire; our idea 
would be if the British Empire behaved itself” (Regan 1999: 84). Sinn Féin, of course, was never 
a unified force. Even at the height of its electoral successes, the party continued to hold a diversity 
of political viewpoints. Moreover, O’Higgins could be accused of playing to the choir here, telling 
his prosecutors what they wanted to hear. Nonetheless, he was still hinting at a deeper conservative 
imperative within the party and the “revolution.” A desire to dampen down anything that would 
undermine the prevailing socio-economic order was a major concern of Sinn Féin’s leadership 
throughout the War of Independence. O’Higgins himself spilt much ink on the dangers to the 
“social fabric” (O’Higgins 1922; Regan 1999: 86). 
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As early as 1919, the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, John French, was moving away from a 
policy of trying to suppress Sinn Féin, instead arguing that the partition of Ireland with a moderate 
Sinn Féin rule in the South was tolerable: “The British administration had come to appreciate the 
divergence between the relatively conservative Sinn Féin activists, such as Arthur Griffith, and 
those more willing to carry out military activities… The more the movement in the South was led 
by the conservative Catholic middle class, the less it would demand of Britain” (Kostick 2009: 
63). Lloyd George may have brazenly informed the British Parliament that Irish sovereignty could 
not be allowed, but also, as Kostick points out, the British prime-minister “was more sensitive to 
the nuances of nationalist politics in Ireland, at least to the extent that his experience with the 
followers of John Redmond [the leader of the IPP] had taught him that there was a relatively 
moderate wing of the movement with whom it might be possible to do business.” Thus, though the 
British were considering a military dictatorship, they “also sought out possible compromises. It is 
for this reason that, on his return to Ireland at the end of 1920 [after an American fund-raising 
tour], British Intelligence did its best prevent harm coming to de Valera; they adopted a similar 
approach to Arthur Griffith” (Kostick 2009: 96-98, emphases added). 
The range of British interests and imperial political objectives during the Irish War of 
Independence, Treaty negotiations, and Civil War remains a frustratingly understudied field within 
mainstream “revisionist” historiography, a lacuna that says a lot about revisionism’s unwitting 
ideological assumptions. Nonetheless, as John Regan has quite reasonably stated “His Majesty’s 
British ministers had not won a world war to lose a local one on the issue of the Crown in the 
backyard of the Empire” (Regan 1999, 374). At the 1919 May Day Parade in Glasgow, Constance 
Markievicz, a leftist veteran of the Easter Rising, addressed 150,000 workers (Nairn 1997: 33). In 
the era of the Red Clydeside, the British elite cannot have been enamoured with these more radical 
strands of Irish nationalism and the possibility that they would spread across the Irish Sea. The 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed at the end of 1921, kept Ireland within the Empire, partitioned off the 
industrialised north-east of the island, and helped to pour water on any radical aspirations. It was, 
Regan concludes, “an imperial settlement and can only be understood within the pink swathes of 
that global context” (Regan 1999: 374). There were profound power-disparities between the 
British state and the Irish rebels, which partly explains the British-centric content of the Treaty. 
But more than that, it is important to give due focus to the “much greater consensus” identified by 
Regan, “over the rights of private property, the rights of the private citizen, and Church-party-state 
relations” (Regan 1999: 375). Ireland had long been an agrarian periphery of the British economy. 
Maintaining Ireland as a pliant source of raw materials was an integral part of this capitalist project. 
This was not, as Irish nationalists would later claim, a devious plot by British policy-makers to 
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prevent Irish economic success. Rather, it was a much more impersonal function of Ireland’s 
continuing status in a broader economic and political system; “the trend in the periphery was 
towards monoculture” (Wallerstein 2011a:102), and Irish people remained primarily the producers 
of agricultural products for British markets.  
Much like Lampedusa’s famous assessment of the Italian Risorgimento [itself the original 
subject of Gramsci’s “revolution without a revolution”], everything had to change, in order for 
everything to stay the same. That the Union came to an end did not mean the end of conservative 
political thinking: 
The responsiveness of the newly independent Irish state to the interests 
established by capitalist colonial rule and its anxiety to preserve and 
enhance those interests were manifested from the beginning. A major 
concern of the newly independent state was to stress that though the flag 
and the anthem had changed, though the language used on some official 
occasions had become Gaelic, and though the seat of legislation had 
moved from London to Dublin; despite these changes, the content of the 
legislation was substantially the same. It was very much “business as 
usual” in independent Ireland. It was “freedom from” rather than “freedom 
for” (Crotty 1986: 71). 
 
The Irish nationalist leadership tended toward the economically conservative and valorised 
a private-property-based agrarianism, the very commercial form that reified the country’s semi-
peripheral status. Nineteen-Twenty-Two brought little in the way of substantive change in the Irish 
social-order or economics. The first Free State government, under the leadership of W.T. Cosgrave 
and the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal [The Irish Organization], remained wedded to British 
markets and British orthodoxies, as a number of scholars have noted (McCabe 2011; Regan 1999: 
146-147). In 1920s Ireland, agriculture continued to employ over half the workforce, and 
accounted for eighty-six per cent of all the Free State’s exports (Dooley 2004: 4). And ninety-eight 
per cent of these exports, worth £51.8 million in total, went to Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Cumann na nGaedheal’s economic policies were tailored to this situation (Dunphy 1995: 20-21). 
De Valera and his Fianna Fáil [Soldiers of Irish Destiny] party, in power after 1932, did try to 
change this, engaging in a tariff war with Britain, the so-called Economic War (1932-38). It 
ultimately did little to change the country’s position within the broader world-system. As J.J. Lee 
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has pointed out “in 1937, despite the Economic War, Ireland still depended on Britain to take 91 
per cent of her exports” (Lee 1989: 187).  
It is telling that neither of the two dominant parties in post-1922 Ireland were quick to 
abandon the ideas of Irish privatised agrarian economics. Cosgrave promoted agriculture over all 
else, arguing it was the “spring and fertiliser of many other forms of industry natural to an 
agricultural country such as this is” (Regan 1999: 146, emphases added). Even de Valera, who 
drew on a more popular political base and sought to end Ireland’s peripheral economic status, 
sought to do so primarily via agriculture, the very sector that reinforced the country’s economic 
“servitude,” rather than through rapid and heavy industrialization, as other developmentalist states 
would seek to do in the twentieth century. Indeed, in a recent work that seeks to understand Irish 
historical development in the context of world-systems analysis, Maurice Coakley has spoken of 
the “limits of independence” in Ireland (Coakley 2012: 155-158). This could be expanded upon 
by speaking about the limits of an Irish nationalism whose ideological form and content was so 
strongly determined by the country’s gradual modernisation on the agrarian semi-periphery of the 
world-system.10 Even at the height of the “revolution,” Irish nationalism remained something of 
an “intermediate social control stratum,” albeit acting on behalf of a harder to define capitalist 
orthodoxy, rather than the easier to pin down British rule. 
 
Conclusion 
For those at the centre of contemporary Irish politics, as with other anti-colonial nationalists, 
discussions like this were probably irrelevant. The events of 1916 to 1923 were experienced as a 
“genuine revolution.” The question of whether it was a revolution is intimately linked to the 
categories of analysis used to understand these events. The vast majority of Irish historians have 
understood events from the Easter Rising to the end of the Civil War through the prisms of the 
“nation” and the “nation-state.” Moreover, they have often adopted a micro-historical focus.11 
Drawing on Fernard Braudel’s view that “histoire événementielle” [event-dominated or episodic 
history”] can be “dust,” Immanuel Wallerstein notes that such a micro-historical focus can act as 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Mike Cronin has intriguingly called Ireland’s situation after 1922 one of ‘Informal Empire’. His claim that Cumann 
na nGaedheal’s economic policies “stressed orthodoxy over ideology,” however, confuses the issue and elides the 
degree to which capitalist orthodoxy was, and is, highly ideological. This was not ‘post-treaty pragmatism’, as Cronin 
claims, but the construction of a reinforced hegemony post-1922 (Cronin 2000). 
11 Commenting on the micro-histories favoured by Irish historians, Regan says that “In these approaches—local, 
personal, intimate—the greater political forces at play—abstract, impersonal, universal—too easily can go 
overlooked… Rather than liberating us this approach may be limiting, even voyeuristic… It also marginalises ideology 
as a motivational factor” (Regan 2013: 210-211). 
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dust in a double sense: “that it spoke about ephemeral phenomena; and that it got into our eyes, 
preventing us from seeing the real underlying structures” (Wallerstein 2004: 15).12 With this kind 
of thinking in mind, this paper has sought to use these “underlying structures” (class, ideology, 
Ireland’s status within capitalism’s global division of labor) as its primary categories of analysis. 
The macro-level narrative that results departs markedly from the story of a revolution in early 
twentieth century Ireland. For sure, it is a narrative that ignores some specific nuances, but 
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Constitutions feature prominently in the struggle between the “spirits” of Davos and Porto Alegre 
over the future of the capitalist world-system (See Wallerstein, 2011).1 The strengthening of non-
majoritarian decision-making arenas, notably constitutional and treaty-based courts, is a function 
of the former spirit. From Laval in the European Court of Justice to Citizens United in the U.S. 
Supreme Court and beyond, judicial activism in the service of corporate power proliferates (Ewing 
2012; Hirschl 2007).2 Conversely, those movements seeking to make the world more democratic 
and egalitarian have turned to popular constitution-making assemblies to institute alternatives to 
neoliberalism, including socio-economic rights, ecological protections and decentralized decision-
making. Initiatives along these lines in Bolivia and Ecuador were repeated in Iceland following 
the 2007 financial crisis (King 2013; Meuwese 2013).  
The contemporary prominence of constitutions is unsurprising. Historically, new 
constitutional forms have emerged in the wake of exceptional circumstances, their framers 
generally seeking to endow newly emergent regimes with authority (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 
2009). The world’s earliest written constitutions, such as those documented by Aristotle in Greece 
in the 4th century B.C., typically delineated the distribution of authority within a political 
community. Although sometimes misleading as a guide to practice, these “power maps” broadly 
set out the formal rules, functions and institutions of government (Duchacek 1973: 1). From the 
17th century onwards, as the Age of Revolutions swept  Europe and the Americas, constitutions 
were re-imagined to act as a limit to the arbitrary power of rulers, thereby substituting “a 
government of laws” for “a government of men” (Thornhill 2013: 196). 
Considering the ensuing era, Jon Elster (1995: 368) has described seven “waves” of 
constitution-making emanating from a number of seismic, sometimes widely experienced, crises. 
These include: (1) the late eighteenth century constitutions of the post-revolutionary United States, 
Poland, and France; (2) the 1848 revolutionary constitutions of Europe; (3) the post-World War 
One constitutions of “new” European nation-states; (4) the post-World War Two constitutions of 
Japan, Germany and Italy; (5) the post-decolonization constitutions of Africa, Asia and South 
America; (6) the mid-1970s constitutions of newly democratized Southern Europe and (7) the post-
1989 constitutions of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Remarkably, these 
constitutional waves correspond with significant turning points in the contested formation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 For further development of the ideas presented here, see Thomas Murray, 2016. Contesting Economic and Social 
Rights in Ireland: Constitution, State, and Society 1848-2016. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
2 Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2008] IRLR 160; Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 U.S. (2010). 
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historical capitalist world-system (Arrighi 1994; Wallerstein 2004). This article attempts to think 
through the nature of this correspondence in Ireland.3  
The work falls into three parts. Part one theorizes the relationship between constitutional 
development and the world-system. Key changes in the world’s constitutions, coinciding with 
what Duncan Kennedy (2006) has periodized as the globalization of “classic” (1850-1930), 
“social” (1900-c.1970) and “neoformal” (c.1945 onwards) legal thought, are traced to the shifting 
fortunes of anti-systemic movements from 1848 onwards. Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish: the 
Constitution of Ireland), I suggest, had a dialectical relationship to Ireland’s incorporation into the 
historical capitalist world-system and to concomitant socio-political struggles over this evolving 
process. Various configurations of the balance of power in Irish society between “national” (core-
peripheral) and “social” (capital-labor, but also inclusive of “other” feminist, youth, anti-racist and 
anti-homophobic currents) forces crystalized in different constitutional forms at different times 
(See Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2011). Constitutional change or stasis resulted from 
established elites’ attempts to contain—militarily, politically and ideologically—anti-systemic 
movements’ ideals and practices.  
Part two outlines Ireland’s semi-peripheral constitutional development between 1848 and 
1945. Over this period, Ireland resembled postcolonial peripheries insofar as popular, anti-
systemic mobilizations adopted “national” rather than “social” trajectories. Constitution-makers 
in 1922 were thus free to reproduce “classic” political and market institutions inherited from the 
British Empire, including an enlightened conservative mode of conceding reforms to preserve a 
semi-peripheral economy from its worst excesses. Similarly, in 1937, the “social” form of 
constitutionalism adopted did not fundamentally change inherited political or market institutions, 
but instead prioritized creating a “native” or Catholic family law regime (See Chatterjee 1994; 
Lentin 1998). In 1922 and 1937, constitution makers registered and reproduced this conservative 
balance of core-peripheral and capital-labor relations, most notably in their determined exclusion 
of social constitutional forms that envisaged direct state intervention in economic production and 
welfare redistribution. 
Part three traces Ireland’s semi-peripheral constitutional development between 1945 and 
2008. The country re-incorporated into a now U.S.-led world-system, advancing a state 
developmental project dependent on attracting multinational capital flows from the 1960s onwards 
before increasingly abandoning that project’s social or redistributive content after the neoliberal 
turn of the 1980s. Anti-systemic struggles transformed and fragmented. Post-68 social, youth and 
feminist movements’ rejection of Catholic social norms governing family and sexuality occurred 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 “Ireland” is generally used here to refer to the twenty-six counties of the Republic of Ireland. Depending on the 
political context, this territory has also been designated the Irish Free State, Eire, the Irish Republic and Ireland. 
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alongside organized labor-led conflicts over the expansion and subsequent removal of “social” 
limits to the market. Elite political actors negotiated Ireland’s transformation by relocating both 
market and family law conflicts to the non-majoritarian, expert domain of judicial review and EU 
treaty formation. Neoformal modes of legal thought, invoking abstract but positively enacted 
values embedded in domestic constitutions and international treaties, helped to legitimate this 
process and its results. 
Diverse but limited changes to the Irish Constitution occurred through amendment via 
popular referendum and through judicial review. The Irish Courts generally reproduced “classic” 
constitutional forms, emphasising individualism, anti-statism, and “negative liberties” (including 
private property rights) ahead of communitarian norms, the interests of the “common good” or 
“positive” rights to welfare. Nevertheless, neoformal “human rights” conflicts have been fought 
in Irish and European courts by or on behalf of women, children, prisoners, gays, Travellers, 
asylum seekers, the disabled and the transgendered among others. These groups have successfully 
combined litigation with civil society activism to challenge repressive norms and expand collective 
freedoms. After the 2007 crisis, neoliberalism and associated modes of legal thought remain 
hegemonic. Their rapidly reduced and declining legitimacy, however, presents opportunities for 
anti-systemic movements as well as for more democratic, more egalitarian constitutional projects.   
 
Co-constitutive Transformation:  Law, Society and History 
We might divide the numerous works addressing constitutional development into “formalist” and 
“instrumentalist” accounts (Bourdieu 1987). Towards the formalist pole are those who consider 
constitutions to be autonomous from society and see in constitutional law self-contained principles 
developed through formal reasoning. Such jurisprudential analyses comprise the majority of 
recently published research on constitutions (Stone Sweet 2011). Towards the instrumentalist pole, 
conversely, are those who view constitutional law as registering and reproducing society’s 
prevailing values, institutions or interests. Cultural contextualists examine whether constitutions 
are congruent with broader social norms. Functionalist accounts emphasize how constitutions 
relate to a wider, often pre-existing institutional context and underline the relationship between 
constitutions, state-building and state legitimacy. Finally, interest-based accounts emphasize the 
wider social relations or constellations of power that determine constitutional development.  
Collectively, this body of scholarship’s theoretical assumptions are questionable. On the 
one hand, formalist and culturalist accounts often accord the law primacy to other social 
phenomena and assume the state to be a neutral site of contestation between competing interests, 
thereby misrecognising the violent, “de-sacralised” nature of state practices (Congost 2003). On 
the other, in dismissing as “ideological,” “superstructural” or otherwise “epiphenomenal” the 
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structure of constitutional forms, functionalist and interest-based accounts risk emptying their 
analyses of the specific role of the legal field in the reproduction of those power relations that they 
claim to reveal (Fine 1985). Ultimately, the central point of contention here — the law’s autonomy 
within society — cannot be resolved a priori but must itself be interrogated in terms of its 
emergence from particular historical conditions and previous social struggles (Bourdieu 1987: 
815).  
The field’s dominant methodologies are also problematic. Traditionally, constitutional 
studies used single-country case-studies to the detriment of wider comparison (Hirschl 2007). 
While comparative constitutional studies are now resurgent, the problem with both single and 
multiple case-study approaches is that the hermetic isolation of nation-states remains assumed. 
Scholars thus tend to attribute to internal dynamics changes happening in strictly analogous ways 
in other jurisdictions (Kennedy 2006: 25). Recently, alternative “global” accounts of constitutional 
development have emerged, emphasising commonalities among diverse constitutions in terms of 
the transnational migration of constitutional ideas (Tushnet 2009: 3-17). A world-systems analysis 
of constitutional development gives critical expression to this emergent intellectual trajectory, 
potentially resolving its outstanding theoretical and methodological problems in a more coherent 
analytic synthesis.  
The present analysis thus accords constitutions neither primacy nor epiphenomenality. 
Rather, by critiquing and synthesising the various insights of both formalist and instrumentalist 
analyses, it seeks to account for the development of constitutional forms in terms of their forming 
part of “a rich totality of many determinations and relations” (Marx 1996a: 146). Specifically, it is 
considered possible here to acknowledge the production of constitutional norms and discourses as 
part and parcel of wider legal and cultural transformations, while nevertheless insisting on 
understanding these developments within an overall frame of world-systemic inquiry, emphasising 
the development of the economic and inter-state world-system and anti-systemic politics (Arrighi, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein 2011: 30; see also Harvey, 1989: 355).  
When considering this connection, it seems necessary to emphasize the manner in which 
the world-system of historical capitalism combined two key processes: the formation of an 
economic world-system and the formation of an inter-state world-system (Arrighi, Hopkins and 
Wallerstein 2011: 30-3).4 This world-system produced a number of crucial antagonisms and 
corresponding anti-systemic movements, which may be divided, for analytical purposes only, into 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 In terms of the former, “core” regions of world capitalism, characterised by skilled, capital-intensive production, 
came to subordinate the economies of “peripheral” regions. Concomitantly, the inter-state system’s emergence was 
central to these processes, providing security of labor-power, property and trade as well as opening up new markets, 
colonies and ecologies to exploitation. 
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“social” and “national” tendencies.5 Over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rulers’ 
concessions to and, later, the triumph of popular, organized social and national movements 
underpinned the emergence of the modern nation-state, combining representative democracy with 
social reforms. Similarly, this shifting balance of core-periphery and anti-systemic relations 
crystallized in the various constitutional forms emerging in the course of successive waves of 
constitution-making.  
In this regard, the critical legal studies scholar, Duncan Kennedy (2006), has forwarded an 
important periodization and geographical understanding of three overlapping “globalizations” of 
“classic” (1850-1930), “social” (1900-c.1970) and “neoformal” (c.1945 onwards) law and legal 
thought, each globalization understood as providing a broadly shared conceptual or justificatory 
vocabulary of socio-legal change (and not a one-size-fits-all model of law reform). Here, we might 
similarly distinguish the contested development of classic, social and neoformal forms of 
constitutionalism. In contrast to Kennedy’s emphasis on Weberian rationalization processes, 
however, I wish to foreground the importance of anti-systemic struggles and movements to socio-
legal transformation. In this manner, world-systems analysis not only incorporates the 
transnational nature of nation-states’ constitutional transformations but more usefully accounts for 
their timing as well.  
 
Constitutional Forms in the World-System: Classic, Social and Neoformal 
Briefly stated, “classic” constitutional forms (1850-1930) co-emerged with the rapid development 
of the British Free Trade cycle of accumulation. In the wake of the 1848 Revolutions, classic 
constitutions registered wider “national” movement influences and claimed an organic unity 
between the state’s fundamental law and the nation’s essence or geist. Independence movements 
in the Habsburg, Ottoman, French and British Empires as well as unification advocates in Italy 
and Germany explicitly identified constitution-making with nation-state building (Thornhill 2013: 
250). Concomitantly, the widespread emergence of new forms of labor, factory workers in newly 
industrialising cores and farm workers in cash-cropping peripheries, stimulated the development 
of particular legal forms, notably the prioritization of contract law as well as of the individual as 
the central juristic subject (Kennedy 2006: 36). Classic constitutions thus tended to register the 
primacy of private over public law and of property and contract. Politically, the democratic 
component of “national sovereignty” and “basic rights” forwarded in these constitutional projects 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 “Social” antagonisms emerged between landed and landless in predominantly agrarian, peripheral societies and 
between capital and wage-labor in predominantly industrial, core societies. Concomitantly, a series of “national” 
antagonisms emerged in the course of inter-state contestations, principally between a national bourgeoisie and the 
imperial metropole. 
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was strictly limited. The French Constituent Assembly of 1848 most clearly illustrated this (Marx 
1996b). Initial drafts fused classic, liberal rights of property, free belief, education, and equality of 
access to public office with material rights to employment and decent living conditions. The “Party 
of Order’s” brutal suppression of the Parisien workers, however, dictated the latter provisions’ 
eradication. 
Social constitutionalism (1900-1970) coincided with the decline of British hegemony, the 
ascent of anti-systemic movements and the associated development of state capacities. Proponents 
of “social legal thought” redefined law as a purposive activity, thereby providing a justificatory 
vocabulary for state intervention to meet societal needs and to respond to collective, 
interdependent problems, including war, mass unemployment, urbanization, as well as financial 
regulation (Kennedy 2006: 48). Public law now came to delimit private law while both 
international and domestic law regimes provided for increasing state intervention. In core 
countries, this took the form of legalising universal social insurance and need-based entitlements; 
in peripheries, labor and land reforms. Importantly, social constitutions retained classic 
constitutional rights, including guarantees of property and contract. Politically, the overarching 
goal was “class-abatement,” limiting the appeal of revolutionary groups, particularly in the wake 
of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and preserving class-rule by means of limiting social polarization 
and ensuring social mobility (Marshall 1950: 32). Comparable strategies underpinned the social 
provisions of the Mexican constitution (1917), the Wohlfahrtstaat principles of Germany’s 
Weimar constitution (1919) and Roosevelt’s proposals to introduce a second bill of socio-
economic rights to the U.S. constitution in the early 1940s (Sunstein 2004; Thornhill 2013: 287).  
Post-World War Two, the emergent U.S. Free Enterprise cycle of accumulation era 
occasioned the globalization of a third, hybrid mode of law and legal thought, “public law 
neoformalism” (1945 - ). For three decades, core countries witnessed unprecedented levels of 
economic and social development, a phenomenon commonly attributed to diverse forms of state 
intervention to ensure full employment, growth and citizens’ welfare, founded on the class 
compromise between capital and organized labor (Harvey 2007: 10). In both cores and peripheries, 
political elites faced with conflicting pressures of tradition and of modernization—in both market 
and family law—shifted resulting disputes away from the domain of electoral politics and turned 
to the judiciary to resolve them instead (Kennedy 2006: 70). Constitutional courts’ case-loads 
increasingly shifted from traditional business and property disputes towards important civil, 
political and socio-economic rights conflicts. In the United States, for instance, the Warren and 
Burger Supreme Courts introduced significant precedents concerning race and gender equality as 
well as criminal due process and electoral fairness (McKay 2009: 343-50). Public law 
neoformalism offered a justificatory discourse for this disruptive mode of juridical activity, 
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enabling actors to invoke “supposedly transcendent but also positively enacted values in 
constitutions or treaties,” whether classic or social norms, to justify changing the status quo 
(Kennedy 2006: 64).  
The role of constitutional courts became even more significant as the U.S.-led cycle of 
accumulation underwent a profound crisis in the mid-1970s. Given the associated transformation 
of class forces, particularly the decomposition of organized labor as a class for itself and the 
ascendancy of corporate and financial power, a specifically “new” or neoliberal constitutionalism 
came to prominence within the broader “neoformal” mode of law and legal thought. In the post-
1989 era of globalization, a robust, anti-majoritarian logic of property rights entrenchment, 
redefining the public sphere in more privatized and more commodified ways, has accompanied the 
expansion and deepening of international trade and investment rules (Gill 1995). The European 
Court of Justice, for example, has been both neo-formalist and neo-liberal in its interpretation of 
the canonical “freedoms” of goods and persons in a single market, “pushing the project further and 
faster than the Member States had been prepared to go on their own” (Sweet Stone 2010: 5). This 
logic has shaped the legal infrastructure of the WTO, EU and NAFTA as well as a range of national 
constitutions, notably those recently created in Eastern Europe and the Middle East but also, 
through judicial activism, those of much older standing (Peebles 1997; Go 2003; Walker 2013).  
 
Ireland’s Constitutions in the World-System 
Ireland makes for a particularly useful country case-study of these socio-legal transformations. Its 
constitutional development blends a mix of socio-legal cultures—including a common law 
tradition in the Atlantic English-speaking orbit; a wider European or continental law tradition 
mediated by its legal intelligentsia and by the dominant position of the Catholic Church; and a 
semi-peripheral and post-colonial heritage that, notwithstanding its relative economic wealth and 
liberal democratic development, suggests commonalities with the experience of states in today’s 
Global South. Comparatively speaking, however, the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution showed 
little trace of the robust social constitutionalism that characterized contemporary constitution-
making in Mexico and Weimar Germany. Similarly, while the 1937 Irish Constitution incorporated 
a pronounced Catholic social discourse, it did so without expanding welfare rights or significantly 
altering the state’s institutional make-up. Clarifying Irish exceptionalism here is a useful step 
towards understanding the subsequent reception and development of neoformal constitutionalism.  
Scholarship on the Irish constitution, however, has yet to consider its development 
critically, specifically how it intersects with long-term structures, class interests or popular 
movements. The first wave of Irish constitutional studies, led by John Kelly (1967), Brian Farrell 
(1988) and Basil Chubb (1991), concentrated on the Irish “state tradition” as a liberal legacy of 
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British rule as well as on the nationalist and/or confessional aspects of the 1922 and 1937 
constitutions. While recent scholarship, notably by Gerard Hogan (2005) and Bill Kissane (2011), 
has usefully contextualized Irish constitutionalism within wider European and Transatlantic 
traditions of constitution-making, the focus of this research continues to centre on the shifting 
intersection of liberal institutions and norms with nationalist and Catholic ones. In comparative 
constitutional studies, similarly, the Irish case is most readily forwarded as an example of a socio-
legal order deeply expressive of and divided by questions of national identity (Tushnet 2009: 12). 
Chubb’s thesis on the “normative force” of the Irish constitutional tradition, a basic law gradually 
adjusting to changing societal norms, remains the standard explanatory account of change 
(1991:117; Kissane 2011: xii). Unlike existing studies, the key unit of analysis adopted here is not 
the Irish state or its constitution per se but rather the historical capitalist world-system.  
The present survey attempts to synthesize existing studies of Irish constitutionalism into a 
more coherent whole. In places, this has necessitated original analysis of archives and 
jurisprudence. The specific method of inquiry has been to analyse and contextualize within the 
world-system the actions and discourses of actors involved in creating the 1922 Irish Free State 
Constitution and the 1937 Irish Constitution as well as those involved in referendums and judicial 
review cases important to the constitution’s subsequent development (See Fairclough 2003). 
Hence, the Irish “case” is not explained in terms of “internal” factors such as constitution makers’ 
“innate conservatism” (See Farrell 1988: 18) but rather understood dialectically in terms of its 
semi-peripheral relations within the world-system and how this conditioned popular anti-systemic 
struggles and discourses as well as governance strategies to contain them, coercively, politically 
and ideologically. What follows is less a final account than a challenging invitation. Adhering to 
a spirit of dialectical inquiry, the reader is encouraged to think through this argument’s 
implications “critically and querulously” (See Bookchin 2005: 77). 
 
 
Containing Anti-Systemic Movements: 
Classic and Social Constitutionalism in Ireland 
Emerging in 16th century Europe, the capitalist world-system gradually incorporated Ireland as a 
semi-periphery within Britain’s regional economy (Crotty 1986; O’Hearn 2001). The late 17th 
century settlement imposed by England established a propertied Protestant minority as rulers, with 
core support, over the mainly un-propertied Catholic majority, among whom the folk memory of 
illegitimate land confiscations remained potent. Incorporation aided England’s drive toward 
hegemony in the 19th century, but at the cost of eliminating indigenous Irish production and thereby 
limiting capacities for future industrialization. The process transformed the countryside, 
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occasioning land clearances for a peripheral mode of agricultural production centred on the export 
of food and primary commodities to the core (O’Hearn 2001: xi, 104-14). For the immense 
majority, impoverished conditions ensured persistent emigration and periodic famine. The island’s 
population declined from 8 million in 1800 to 4 million in 1900, a figure which remained 
unchanged until the late 20th century.  
Core-periphery relations were subject to intense contestation. The landlords and their 
agents emerged as a powerful and relatively autonomous part of the colonising regime, protecting 
their interests from tenants (and the landless) primarily through their control of the colonial 
administration at Dublin Castle as well as political alliances at Westminster (Slater and 
McDonough 2008: 18). Ensuing “anti-systemic” conflict took both “social” and “national” forms, 
with the latter proving dominant. While “social” resistance to landlordism took the form of diffuse 
secret society traditions in the countryside, “national” advocates in urban areas, drawn from both 
an Anglo-Irish patrician class and an emergent indigenous petty bourgeoisie, adopted more 
centralized organizational forms, notably the mass party, to promote Irish variations on the 
nationalist ideologies flourishing in the wake of the 1789 and 1848 European Revolutions (See 
Garvin 1986). 
Within the “national” anti-systemic movement, the Irish Republican Brotherhood adopted 
clandestine, militant and illegal means to advance independent statehood for Ireland, at times 
identifying this goal with a radical social programme. The IRB were central to landless laborers’ 
and tenants’ organizing in the Irish National Land League to wage “land wars,” mass direct actions 
for land ownership and redistribution. Conversely, “constitutional nationalists” represented a small 
though growing male, property-owning franchise and parleyed militant resistance into concessions 
on a strictly limited form of independence (or “Home Rule”). Of these reforms, Daniel 
O’Connell’s securing of Catholic enfranchisement in the 1820s was essential to establishing a 
nationalist, mass party and electoralist tradition in Ireland. Moreover, between 1880 and 1910, the 
Irish Parliamentary Party, a disciplined, electoral machine under the leadership of Charles Stewart 
Parnell and later John Redmond, negotiated successive Liberal and Conservative governments’ 
abolition of the established Anglo-Irish landlord caste. A mass transfer of land ownership, 
overseen by a Land Commission, occurred. 
A number of features distinguish the Irish case as a semi-periphery, including its 
comparative wealth, industrialization, educational levels and religious homogeneity. The 
prominent role of the Catholic Church in 19th and 20th century Ireland is particularly striking. 
Unlike in Southern Europe and the Spanish or Portuguese colonies, the Church in Ireland was not 
closely linked to the ruling class. On the contrary, the Catholic Church’s episcopal hierarchy, 
typically drawn from the more affluent farming strata, aligned itself with constitutional nationalism 
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and asserted its authority to intervene in the colonial administration and nationalist politics on 
behalf of the native population. In return for their support, the bishops expected deference to their 
“moral monopoly” and, in particular, control over the material means of producing that monopoly 
among the poor, specifically education, health and charitable services (Inglis 1998: 57). For the 
recently created petite bourgeoisie, leaving such services under church control was both pious and 
cost-effective. 
By the 1900s then, the country’s major property interests, including banks, graziers, 
railway companies, breweries and dairies, as well as a newly emerged middle stratum of “native” 
owners of medium-sized farms, supported reproducing, deepening and accelerating core-periphery 
linkages within the British regional economy. Meanwhile, the mass of the working population, 
consisting of small farmers and landless laborers, emigrated or remained “land hungry” in the 
countryside while a smaller, politically conscious proletariat emerged in the slums of Ireland’s 
main cities. Worker-syndicalist and republican-insurrectionary challenges to these capital-labor 
and core-peripheral relations occurred in 1913 and 1916 respectively.6 Their containment suggests 
that the subsequent emergence of a popular anti-systemic movement was far from inevitable. Just 
as it had taken a moment of world-systemic rupture, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, 
to form the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1800, another such moment of 
global upheaval, World War One and the Russian Revolution, would be central to its breaking. 
The 1922 and 1937 Irish constitutions owed directly to and would be shaped by the mass, anti-
systemic forces temporarily unleashed. 
 
Popular Anti-Systemic Movements and the “Classic” Constitution of 1922 
A global wave of working class unrest and militancy emerged between 1917 and 1923, involving 
general strikes in the United States and Europe, as well as worker uprisings in Austria, Hungary, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. Concomitantly, war weakened or destroyed the multinational European 
empires, replacing them with a patchwork of nation-states carved out from their territory 
(Hobsbawm 1994: 85-109). In Ireland too, “national” and “social” anti-systemic struggles 
overlapped, sometimes uneasily. A rapid escalation in labor and agrarian militancy coincided with 
the Irish Republican Army’s pursuit of an anti-colonial struggle. Meanwhile, Sinn Féin, the 
nationalist party identified with the republican insurrection of 1916, won a decisive electoral 
victory in 1918, abstained from taking seats at Westminster and formed an underground 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 In 1913-14, some 20,000 workers, organized on the basis of syndicalist ideas and forms, engaged in an unsuccessful 
five-month battle with the country’s 300 primary employers for the right to unionise. In 1916, the IRB (acting through 
the Irish Volunteers) and Irish Citizen Army (a revolutionary workers’ militia) seized the difficulty presented to 
England by World War One to launch a week-long insurrection in Dublin. 
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government in Dublin instead. The manner in which Sinn Féin substituted a mass party for a mass 
movement ensured the victory of conservative forms of classic constitutionalism, acutely 
defensive of church, state and capital (Murray, 2015a). 
This outcome was not inevitable. For a brief period, direct democracy in workplaces and 
communities flourished. Between August 1918 and August 1923, there were five general strikes, 
and eighteen local strikes, twelve of these in 1919. Workers took over and ran more than eighty 
workplaces, establishing “soviets” at the Cleeves factory in Limerick, the foundry in Drogheda, 
Co. Louth and the coal mines of Arigna, Co. Roscommon and Castlecomer, Co. Kilkenny. Trade 
union membership rose dramatically, from 100,000 in 1916 to 255,000 in 1920, and transport 
unions’ refusal to handle British military equipment was crucial to the IRA’s success (Ferriter 
2005: 210-1; Kostick 2009: 5, 148). Concomitantly, as the IRA forced the retreat of law 
enforcement to cities, rural communities created a network of local militias and arbitration courts 
(Kotsonouris 1994). The challenge to classic legal institutions and norms mounted. Small farmers 
and landless laborers, concentrated in Connaught and along the Western seaboard, escalated local 
rent-strikes into widespread cattle-driving and land-grabbing. Graziers favoured the creation of a 
“White Army” to combat “agrarian Bolshevism” (Lee 1989: 181).  
 During the ensuing military conflict with Great Britain (1919-21), social polarization and 
popular democracy posed a decisive threat to Sinn Féin’s capacity to govern. Class conflict, 
particularly agrarian agitation, threatened to split the IRA’s rank and file (Laffan 1995: 253). The 
party responded with a mixture of conciliation and coercion. In early 1919, Sinn Féin, with the 
support of the trade unions and Labor party, announced a radical form of “social” legal thought.7 
The Democratic Programme (1919) declared all rights of private property to be subordinated to 
the public welfare, assured Irish citizens of “an adequate share of the produce of the Nation’s 
labor” in return for serving the public welfare, and further outlined commitments to welfare state 
initiatives (Dáil Debates, 21.01.1919). In practice, however, Sinn Féin insisted on private property 
rights. Crucially, the party centralized the organic courts and banned their hearing of land disputes. 
Property-owners now looked to Dublin, not Westminster, to report expropriation (Casey 1970: 
321).  
Westminster, meanwhile, reinforced classic legal institutions and norms. The Anglo-Irish 
Treaty (1921), concluded at the cessation of armed hostilities between British and Irish forces, 
represented a classic negotiation of sovereignty between an imperial metropole and national jurists 
(Kennedy 2006: 50-4). The Treaty denoted sovereignty in classic legal terms, providing for a state-
form with a monopoly on the right to command in its territory (See Lerner 2011: 169). It further 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The Labor party did not contest the 1918 or 1921 elections, acquiescing in Sinn Féin’s demand for national plebiscites 
on leaving the Empire. 
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envisaged the reproduction of existing rights of private property and free trade in the Irish Free 
State, retaining national debt repayments while remaining silent on social issues such as land 
purchase or the redistribution of large untenanted estates (Dooley 2004: 42). Under the terms of 
the Treaty, Sinn Féin would form a Provisional Government, empowered to create a constitution 
for the new Irish Free State. 
Throughout 1922, constitution making occurred as a split in the “national” movement over 
the Treaty led to civil war. Here too, “social” concerns overlapped. Opposition to the Treaty 
strongly correlated with poorer areas of high emigration and agrarian radicalism (Pyne 1970). In 
addition to Westminster, Irish society’s established interests, notably the country’s large land and 
business owners, as well as the Catholic hierarchy and media, supported “constitutional 
government” and pressed for the re-imposition of “law and order” (Kostick 2009: 180). Class 
conflict, including “the recent revival of cattle-driving,” and intra-nationalist violence loomed 
large in constitution makers’ minds (UCDA P4/320). In addition to immediate coercive measures, 
institutional design was deemed crucial to countering revolutionary groups.  
Insofar as the Treaty permitted, the government-appointed drafting committee and 
subsequent Constituent Assembly broadly advocated a conservative, classic nationalist 
constitution. A generation previously, the British constitutional theorist, AV Dicey, claimed that 
established elites could best retain their power in the face of mass electoral politics through 
executive dominance of parliament, bicameralism and a written constitution setting out rights for 
minorities, notably property rights (Tulloch 1980: 23). Initially, the Irish Free State adopted the 
Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty; ultimately, it incorporated all three checks. For 
national constitution-makers, however, the legitimacy of these institutions was now based on the 
will of the Irish people under God (See Kohn 1932: 81). Notwithstanding the “artificial” fostering 
of the “English Common Law,” the state’s system of law would reflect the nation’s “organic” 
normative order or national spirit (UCDA P4/352), a disposition entirely characteristic of classic 
legal design.  
Two distinct forms of social constitutionalism also emerged, challenging laissez-faire 
constitutionalism and financier-grazier control of Irish political economy. Clement France, a 
visiting American labor lawyer, proposed provisions to regulate property rights and ensure that the 
state captured the “unearned increment” arising from land value increases, thereby checking 
speculation in land and incentivising industrial investment (UCDA P4/308; 325; 339). 
Concomitantly, Catholic proponents of social legal thought such as Alfred O’Rahilly (UCDA 
P4/309; 328) or Labor TDs Tom Johnson and T.J. O’Connell, fearful of the Catholic hierarchy and 
of alienating farm-owners, supported a less interventionist state (Dáil Debates, Vol. 1, Col. 494-5, 
708; 20.09.1922; Col. 755, 26.09.1922; Col. 697, 25.09.1922). Their proposals, emphasising the 
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rights and duties of property and including modest welfare measures and children’s rights, were a 
pale shadow of the Democratic Programme. Nevertheless, they encountered strong opposition. 
Classic liberal market advocates such as the economist, George O’Brien (UCDA P4/339), 
or Archbishop Harty (UCDA P178/24), questioned the social provisions’ economic viability in a 
free market economy as well as their political viability given their potential to alienate 
conservative, land-owning supporters of the Treaty. When British law officers objected to the 
“Soviet character” of the constitution’s declaration of “economic sovereignty,” the offending 
provisions were quietly dropped (UCDA P4/362-3; Mohr 2008: 72-3). Finally, during the 
Constituent Assembly debates that autumn, the Provisional Government, having won the 1922 
general election and having secured an effective military victory over anti-treatyites, eliminated 
any vestiges of a social constitutionalism in favour of state power (“law and order”) and economic 
necessity (“national economy”) (Dáil Debates, Vol. 1. Col. 707; 25.09.1922).  
Ultimately, the 1922 Constitution was limited to two “programmatic declarations” only, 
one specifying a pre-existing right to elementary education and the other providing for state 
ownership of national resources (Kohn, 1932: 174). The debates and their outcome anticipated the 
manner in which the Provisional Government party, later Cumman na nGaedheal (Irish: Society 
of the Gaels), would defend financier-grazier interests throughout the 1920s (O’Hearn 2001; 
McCabe 2011). A large cohort of society, however, including republicans defeated in the civil war, 
organized labor, and small farmers, remained alienated from the Irish Free State.  
 
Incorporating Anti-Systemic Movements in the 1937 Catholic Social Constitution  
Ireland’s second constitution making episode occurred during the Great Depression (Arrighi 1994: 
277-285; Hobsbawm 1994: 85-109). Internationally, the decade was characterized by rethinking 
forms of state or “social” control of the laissez-faire market, primarily in response to mass 
unemployment (Kennedy 2006: 21-2; Thornhill 2013: 301-3, 317-23). Among liberal 
democracies, the social took the form of the Matignon Agreements in France or the New Deal in 
the United States. Nationalists in Poland, Austria, Hungary, Spain and Portugal used a highly 
selective form of Catholic corporatist constitutionalism to justify more authoritarian government. 
In Italy and Germany, fascist movements introduced a highly coercive system of corporate societal 
management, achieving full employment while leaving intact the “classic” freedoms of capital. In 
all cases, social legal thought was proposed to prevent communist alternatives, whether supported 
by Stalinist Russia or autonomous such as occurred in Republican Spain (Kennedy 2006: 38).  
Ireland did not experience the same extremes of mass unemployment and polarization as 
in the rest of Europe. Social forms of constitutionalism, however, similarly depended on a politics 
of “class-abatement” (Marshall 1950: 32). A range of “national and social” antagonisms 
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proliferated in 1930s Ireland, ranging from a boycott campaign of land annuities to Great Britain 
through agrarian and republican agitation over the Irish Land Commission’s slow rate of land 
redistribution to the Irish Women Workers’ Union’s campaign against slum landlordism in the 
cities (Dooley 2004: 104; Murray 2000: 317-22). Moreover, a strike against Dublin Tramways 
occurred in 1935 while the subsequent building sector strike of 1937 was the largest since the 
foundation of the state (Ferriter 2005: 373). The broader mass of Irish society, however, including 
its “national” and “social” anti-systemic movements, adhered to liberal democratic, representative 
politics.  
The newly formed Fianna Fáil (Irish: Soldiers of Destiny), whose leadership comprised of 
anti-treaty republicans, was central to the incorporation of civil society energies into a mass party 
and, ultimately, the state. While Cumman na nGaedheal remained a classic cadre party committed 
to law and order and free trade, Fianna Fáil created a populist, cross-class base of support for 
national independence, self-sufficiency and social equality. Built on a mushrooming network of 
local branches, the party would prove one of the most successful in Europe, forming a single party 
government for all but ten years between 1932 and 1981. Notwithstanding increased 
manufacturing, accelerated land redistribution and a modest expansion of welfare spending, 
however, Fianna Fáil governments did not fundamentally up-root core-peripheral dependency 
(O’Hearn 2001). Irish banks continued to invest the proceeds of the UK-centred cattle trade in the 
City of London until the late 1950s while mass unemployment and emigration persisted (O’Connor 
2011: 144). 
The 1937 Irish Constitution’s classic form registered and reproduced precisely this balance 
of core-peripheral and capital-labor forces. Fianna Fáil Taoiseach Éamon de Valera, secure as the 
“chief” of a nationalist mass party, correctly believed a unilateral rejection of the Treaty possible. 
Drafted primarily by de Valera with the aid of a select committee of civil servants, the constitution 
redefined the territory of the new state of “Eire” to include the island of Ireland, asserted the state’s 
legitimacy on the basis of popular sovereignty, removed inherited monarchical legal symbols and 
emphasized “national” traits such as the Irish language and Christianity. The 1937 Constitution 
retained its predecessor’s conservative institutional design, centralising authority in the executive 
and representative party at the expense of local government or more direct forms of popular 
autonomy. Similarly, the text provided for a Supreme Court to interpret its provisions, including a 
list of classic civil-political rights, notably that of private property.  
At the same time, the prominence of conflicts over credit, land, and living standards 
ensured a much greater crystallization of social constitutional forms than had occurred in 1922 
(Murray, 2015b). The primary conflict resided between civil servants, notably John Hearne and JJ 
McElligott, who advocated continuity and clericalist advisors to de Valera, such as the Jesuits of 
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Milltown Park or the Holy Ghost Father, John Charles McQuaid, who desired a much stronger 
recognition of Catholic doctrine (UCDA P150/2393-5). The fundamental rights provisions took a 
Catholic social form. They acknowledged the “special position” of the Catholic Church (article 
44.1.2) and entrenched the Church’s interests in property (article 44.2.6), education (article 42) 
and social policy, most notably in the constitution’s recognition of the family unit and of woman’s 
special contribution in the home as well as its comparatively exceptional prohibition of divorce 
(article 41).  
The Bunreacht’s affirming of Irish national identity, most apparent in the Preamble and 
Articles 40–45, appealed to and helped reproduce ethnically narrow and patriarchal norms (Lentin, 
1998). Family law proved more amenable to Catholic social influence, however, than market law. 
Primarily at the behest of the Department of Finance, who feared such rights would inspire rather 
than satisfy agitators, Catholic social proposals for land redistribution, welfare provision and social 
credit were relegated to “directive principles” (article 45) unenforceable in court (UCDA 
P150/2416). The text framed the state’s duty to the “weaker sections” of Irish society in terms of 
“charity” not justice or equality.  
In the subsequent plebiscite, the 1937 Irish Constitution was accepted by a narrow majority 
of some 56% to 43% (Coakley and Gallagher 2010: 75). The balance of contending core-peripheral 
and capital-labor relations occasioned a conservative consolidation of existing state and market 
institutions. The Catholic social provisions that constitution-makers thought necessary to isolate 
revolutionary agitators intervened in family, not market law. Voting for the Bunreacht thus 
endorsed what the Irish Press (16.06.37) described as “hallowed traditions”: the institution of the 
family, the indissolubility of marriage and, naturally, the right of private ownership. What was 
new, however, was the 1937 Constitution’s increased legitimacy based on a nationalist mass party 
incorporating residual and emergent anti-systemic opposition. The new basic law’s rhetorical 
qualities thus cohered with broader subjective understandings of a small-holding, agrarian, 
Catholic and nationalist Ireland (See Kissane, 2011). By prioritising capital flows over welfare and 
by outsourcing welfare provision to the Catholic Church, however, the constitution protected and 
legitimated the particular interests of those financiers, graziers and assorted professions who 
benefitted from economic peripheralization.  
 
Neoformal Constitutionalism in Ireland and the European Union 
The politics of contesting the Irish Constitution thereafter was inextricably world-systemic. Post-
World War Two, Ireland broadly functioned as a semi-periphery, one in which “national” forms 
of anti-systemic politics took precedence over “social” alternatives, and the population’s welfare 
remained subordinate to the needs of stable, increasingly global capital flows (O’Hearn 2001; 
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O’Connor, 2011). We might distinguish, however, two periods in which these tendencies operated 
to lesser and greater effect. During the expansionary phase of the U.S. Free Enterprise cycle of 
accumulation, between 1945 and 1973, the Irish economic model collapsed and reformed. 
Successive Fianna Fáil governments abandoned protectionism for free trade and the emergent 
European common market. During the 1960s, export-led industrialization, centred on attracting 
multinational corporations and incentivising foreign direct investment, notably from the industrial 
cores of Germany, Japan and the United States, brought about comparatively modest growth rates 
and increased welfare expenditure.  
The second period, from 1973 to the economic crisis of 2008, came about following a 
signal crisis of the U.S.-led accumulation cycle. During this period, Irish economic development 
took an increasingly neoliberal form as successive governments prioritized securing global capital 
flows and integration into the global economy ahead of national developmental goals such as 
domestic employment or living standards. Ostensibly, the goal was to boost employment in the 
short term and to build local capacities to support indigenous industrialization in the long run. In 
reality, the primary beneficiaries of the subsequent Irish boom were multinationals engaged in tax 
avoidance and indigenous “middle-men” specialising in property, transport, legal, financial and 
accounting services (McCabe 2011; McGee, 2012; McDonald, 2014). In particular, the dominance 
of financier-property speculators within Irish political economy remained unchallenged: property 
bubbles occurred periodically prior to the most recent crash of 2007 (MacLaran, Attuyer and 
Williams 2010). 
Politically, the pronounced disarticulation of a “social” alternative in Ireland, whether 
social democratic or more radically anti-systemic, requires attention. Between 1945 and 1968, Old 
Left movements had achieved their historic goal of state power almost everywhere, including both 
the Communist parties of the Eastern bloc and the social democratic parties in power, or alternating 
power, in the pan-European world. In the latter instance, welfare state expansion, the principal 
policy of the social-democratic parties, was accepted and practiced by their conservative opponents 
(Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2011). In Ireland, mirroring other postcolonial contexts, a 
nationalist mass party, Fianna Fáil, successfully incorporated organized labor into informal 
consultations (as opposed to formal negotiations) on economic development and wage-bargaining 
from the 1960s onwards, an alliance that would persist until the 2007 crisis. Unlike their European 
counterparts, Irish trade unions did not successfully articulate (or form the central group within) a 
cross-class, “social” form of national economic development or solidaristic welfare state 
expansion (Cousins, 2005). 
Ireland’s semi-peripheral trajectory deeply conditioned its experience of the 1968 anti-
systemic rupture. Notwithstanding dramatic changes wrought by industrialization, urbanization, 
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new media and improved living standards, the possibility of a stronger left-right alignment of Irish 
politics floundered on core-peripheral relations. Following British repression of the civil rights 
movement in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, the increased role of paramilitarism and state 
coercion on the island of Ireland split left-leaning nationalist and social tendencies in the south, 
and, in particular, reversed Labor’s stance on refusing coalition with Fine Gael (O’Connor 2011: 
220). In subsequent decades, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor gradually redefined the coordinates 
of nationalism from irredentism towards the principle of unification by popular consent in 
Northern Ireland, from national-cultural revival to liberal economic growth. Successive Irish 
governments proposed changes to the Constitution, particularly its national sovereignty and 
Catholic social provisions, in response to the conflict and to the demands of European integration 
(Chubb 1991: 85). 
Without achieving state power, post-68 social movements in Ireland, as in core countries, 
reduced the capacity of older generations, men and “majorities” to subordinate youth, women and 
“minorities” (See Arrighi, Wallerstein and Hopkins 2011). Successive campaigns challenged the 
ideological hegemony of the Catholic Church, winning key battles concerning women’s equality 
in the workplace, censorship, adoption, illegitimacy, divorce, homosexuality, civil partnerships 
and marriage equality. “Social” advocates were notably less successful, however, in challenging 
neoliberal development. From the late 1980s onward, the Labor party joined Fianna Fáil, Fine 
Gael, and the emergent Progressive Democrats in supporting further rounds of European 
integration, a process that necessitated and furthered acceptance of neoliberal norms. In association 
with autonomous elements from social movements and community groups, Sinn Féin, the Greens 
and various Trotskyist formations have since dominated opposition to welfare state retrenchment 
and EU integration (O’Connor 2011: 262). Crucially, the priorities of Sinn Féin, the largest party 
mobilising anti-systemic resistance, remain more “national” than “social” (See Maillot 2005: 103). 
An increasingly popular rejection of Catholic social norms governing family and sexuality thus 
coincided with successive nationalist-led governments’ removal of “social” limits to the market.  
The Irish Constitution both registered and reproduced this local manifestation of world-
systemic politics in a series of seminal referendums and cases. Before looking at particular 
conflicts, however, an outline of the twin mechanisms for constitutional change is necessary. In 
terms of referendums, government parties, notably Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, have dominated 
decision-making concerning their necessity, timing and wording. Ireland’s history of referendums 
thus reflects their priorities. There have been three distinct categories of referendum: those that 
pertain to comparatively minor institutional changes (such as the lowering of voting age limits or 
the regularization of local government elections), those that pertain to significant changes to the 
state (such as European integration or the territorial claim over Northern Ireland) and those that 
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pertain to significant changes to the law’s Catholic social nature. Use of the referendum to change 
the constitution has increased over time: six occurred between 1937 and 1972 while a further 
twenty-three took place between 1973 and 2008 (Coakley and Gallagher 2010: 445-6). 
In terms of judicial review, a U.S.-style Supreme Court emerged in Ireland. Constitutional 
cases are heard through the ordinary courts and the Supreme Court remains the final court of 
appeal.8 Broadly speaking, the judicial appointment process, dominated by Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael, has ensured the selection of conservative supporters of existing regime norms from among 
dominant status groups (white, male, upper class and Christian if not Catholic). “Traditional” 
norms in common law regimes include a strong defence of individual and property rights as well 
as “judicial restraint” or “deference” to parliament in constitutional cases (See Morgan 2001: 105). 
In law schools and the wider public sphere, social legal thought remained comparatively 
underdeveloped. Changing constitutional norms thus depended vitally on citizens taking new 
rights claims to court and on supportive networks of barristers and civil society groups (Hogan, 
Barrington and McEntee 1985: 107; Sturgess and Chubb 1988: 420). Support structures for taking 
such cases, mirroring the state’s low welfare effort, were poorly financed, ensuring advantages to 
those able to fund cases (O’Morain 2003). Unsurprisingly, Ireland’s “rights revolution” was a 
comparatively conservative one (See Epp 1998). 
 
Farewell to the Catholic Social Constitution 
The conservative, nationalist dominated stasis of core-peripheral and anti-systemic relations in the 
1950s and 60s occasioned comparatively few changes to the 1937 Irish Constitution, or indeed 
proposals for amendment (See McMahon 1979). A contemporary report of a cross-party 
Constitution Review Committee (1967: 8), created by Taoiseach Seán Lemass (Fianna Fáil), stated 
that the group was “not aware of any public demand for a change in the basic structure of the 
Constitution.” The committee did, however, recommend removing certain Catholic confessional 
provisions, partly in response to changing social mores and partly with a view to furthering 
diplomatic relations with Northern Ireland’s Unionist administration. To this end, in 1972, the 
government proposed and a majority voted to remove the constitutional provision outlining the 
“special position” of the Catholic Church. At the same time, faced with the conflicting pressures 
of tradition and modernization, Lemass privately encouraged liberal judicial appointees to emulate 
the activist U.S. Supreme Court under Earl Warren (Sturgess and Chubb 1988: 144). 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 European integration further occasioned the emergence of supra-national court structures, notably the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, where EU statutes and case-law take precedence over 
national law. 
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Constitutional change in Ireland, as in the United States, owed partly to an empowered 
judiciary. Chief Justice Cearbhall Ó’Dálaigh’s court of the 1960s newly interpreted the 
constitution so as to acknowledge the existence of rights not explicitly listed in the constitution 
(Ryan v Attorney General [1965]). At least eighteen such “un-enumerated” rights would be 
identified over the following three decades (Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 87). The Supreme Court 
proved particularly activist regarding the preservation and enlargement of civil liberties, 
emphasising limits to police powers and rights of due process as well as expanding the private 
sphere, most notably with regard to the liberalization of Catholic social or family law. In the 
celebrated McGee [1974] case, the Supreme Court acknowledged an “unenumerated” 
constitutional right to marital privacy and thereby struck down Catholic “social” laws banning the 
importation of contraceptives. Thereafter, the spectre of an Irish judge following American 
precedents to liberalize divorce or abortion legislation mobilized conservative Catholic groups into 
action. 
In market law, the judges retained a classic liberal view of individual rights trumping 
collective rights or social justice concerns. Judge Hanna’s expressed inability to comprehend the 
meaning of such social constitutional terms as the “common good” or “social justice” would 
remain the traditional response of jurists trained in the canons of positive law (Pigs Marketing 
Board v. Donnelly [1939]). This classic disposition was most apparent in the judiciary’s 
interpretation of the 1937 Constitution’s trade union provisions. In NUR [1947], Educational 
Company [1961] and Meskell [1973], the courts prohibited picketing to obtain “closed shop” 
agreements and further established a low threshold for employers to obtain injunctions to restrain 
workers’ collective action. Thus, while other European countries’ legally entrenched corporatist 
bargaining models over this period the Irish Constitution was used to reverse inherited common 
law immunities for industrial action (Wilkinson 1989). Among other factors, the strength of this 
Anglo-American constitutional model induced trade unions’ subsequent acceptance of FF-led 
social partnership and a restrictive Industrial Relations Act (1990). 
From the 1970s onwards, however, as the crisis of the U.S.-led accumulation cycle 
deepened, neo-formal fixes increasingly involved national governments relocating majoritarian 
decision-making to international treaty-based institutions. As neoliberal elites sought to restore 
profitability by disembedding social reforms, successive Irish governments proved complicit by 
removing key policy-making instruments, notably monetary policy, from industrial relations and 
parliamentary arenas in order to insulate these decisions from majoritarian pressures (Hirschl 
2007; Mair 2013). This shifting balance of core-peripheral and anti-systemic relations crystallized 
in a series of particular changes to the 1937 Irish Constitution. The contested removal of capital 
from the constraints of “social” development in market law and of society from the “Catholic 
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social” in family law animated each of the seven referendums on EU treaties occurring between 
1972 and 2008.9 From a peak of 80 per cent approval for EEC membership in 1972, majority 
support for EU integration has declined steadily in line with its increasingly neoliberal form since 
Maastricht (Anderson, 2007).  
The size of EU-critical opposition in Ireland is remarkable given that proponents of EU integration 
encompass the state’s three largest political parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and, from the 1980s 
onwards, Labor) combined with the Irish Famers’ Association, the Irish Business Employers’ 
Confederation, the American Chamber of Commerce, and both state and private media. 
Multinational corporations intervened directly in the Lisbon (2009) referendum to advocate a 
“yes” vote (Kennedy, 2009). Conversely, both “national” (Sinn Féin, the Irish Sovereignty 
Movement as well as Catholic conservatives) and “social” (Trotskyite Parties and social 
movements) advocates have helped organize anti-systemic opposition. Remarkably, in the Nice 
(2001) and Lisbon (2008) referendums support fell below 50 per cent, pronouncedly so in working 
class constituencies. On both occasions the treaties were rejected, modified, and approved at a 
second referendum (Table 1). Social partnership inhibited effective anti-systemic resistance. 
Notably, having remained neutral in 2008, SIPTU, the country’s largest trade union, opted to 
support the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
 
 
Table 1. European Treaty Referendum Results: 1972-2012 
                                                                                            Turnout        Yes         No 
Accession to the European Communities (May 1972)             71              83         17 
Single European Act (May 1978)                                             44              70         30 
Maastricht Treaty (June 1992)                                                  57              69         31 
Amsterdam Treaty (May 1998)                                                56              62         38 
Nice Treaty I (June 2001)                                                         35              46         54  
Nice Treaty II (October 2002)                                                  49              63         37 
Lisbon Treaty I (June 2008)                                                     53              47         53  
Lisbon Treaty II (October 2009)                                              59              67         33 
Stability, Co-ordination and Governance (May 2012)             50              60         40 
Sources: Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 445-6; www.environ.ie. 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Ireland’s comparatively unusual use of the referendum stemmed from a constitutional challenge to the government’s 
ratifying the Single European Act in 1987. The Supreme Court ruled that those treaties affecting competences of the 
Irish constitution required approval by referendum (Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987]; Crotty 1988). 
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Over the same period, youth, feminist and “minority”-led attempts to remove the Catholic 
social imprimatur on constitutional issues such as abortion, divorce, homosexuality, adoption and 
illegitimacy proceeded haltingly. Attempting to win over unionist opinion to improve North-South 
relations, Fine Gael Taoiseach Garrett FitzGerald proclaimed a “crusade” to remove sectarianism 
from the Irish Constitution, before bowing to Catholic pressure groups and holding a referendum 
to prohibit abortion in 1983 (Ferriter 2005: 717-9). The Fine Gael-Labor government also failed 
to carry a referendum to legalise divorce in 1986. By the 1990s, however, the counter-
mobilizations of students, feminists, liberals and the wider Left had grown to a majority. In 1992, 
referendums prompted by court cases constitutionalized a right to leave the state for and to obtain 
information on abortion. In 1995, the constitutional ban on divorce was narrowly overturned 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Catholic Social Referendum Results: 1972-2015 
                                                                                                          Turnout        Yes         No 
Remove “special position’ of Catholic Church (1972)            50             84           16 
Abortion: right to life of the unborn (1983)                             54             66.9        33.1  
Right to Divorce (1986)                                                           61             36.5        63.5  
Abortion (1992)  
- exclude suicide as permissible grounds for termination        68             65.4        34.6 
- right to travel                                                                          68             62.4        37.6 
- right to information                                                                68             59.9        40.1  
Right to Divorce (1996)                                                           62             50.3        49.7  
Abortion: exclusion of suicide (2002)                                     50             49.6        50.4 
Children’s Rights (2012)                                                          34             58           42 
Marriage Equality (2015)                                                         60             62           38 
Sources: Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 445-6; www.environ.ie. 
 
The judiciary’s progressive liberalization of Catholic social family law was similarly 
interrupted. Judicial activism prompted successive Irish governments in the 1970s to make 
conservative (as opposed to liberal) appointments to the bench, primarily to ensure a tough line on 
IRA paramilitaries through the Special Criminal Court (Sturgess and Chubb 1988). During the 
1980s, conservative appointees tended to preserve the “Catholic social” constitution, notably 
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defending challenged laws criminalising homosexuality (Norris v. Ireland [1988]). In the X-case 
[1993], however, the Supreme Court acknowledged a right to pursue an abortion in strictly limited 
circumstances where a mother’s life was at risk. From that point onwards, possibly in response to 
the very public contestation of the X-case ruling, the Supreme Court has no longer proved 
particularly “activist” regarding constitutional interpretation. Strict, literal interpretations of the 
Constitution, not unlike the emergent “originalist” legal culture in the United States, gained greater 
support (Coakley and Gallagher 2010: 88). Groups for choice regarding abortion and for the 
decriminalization of homosexuality subsequently pursued successful legal actions to the ECHR.  
In terms of market law, the Irish Supreme Court continued to strike down social legislation 
in defence of negative liberties or property rights. Special interest groups, including employers, 
landlords and farming associations, successfully used the constitution to challenge state regulation 
of the market place. These cases included successful constitutional challenges to rent restrictions 
and land taxation measures (Blake [1981]; Brennan [1983]; see Keane 1983). Conversely, 
responding to claimed socio-economic or “positive” rights, the Supreme Court proved reluctant to 
impose additional economic costs on the state. Judges, ostensibly distinguishing between 
“distributive” and “commutative” justice as well as claiming a commitment to the principle of the 
separation of powers, have characteristically refrained from challenging duly enacted legislation 
or issuing compulsory injunctions to the government in the realm of social expenditure (O’Reilly 
[1989]; Sinnott [2001]; T.D. [2001]). Seminal cases concerning court-ordered public expenditure, 
notably the introduction of free legal aid and the payment of welfare arrears, have instead been 
fought and won at the ECHR (Airey [1979]; O’Morain 2003: 13).      
Both of the trajectories of Irish constitutional development outlined here - the 
disembedding of the (Catholic) social in market and family law – have featured prominently in the 
state’s neoliberal response to the global economic crisis of 2007. On the one hand, constitutional 
referendums on children’s rights (2012) and on marriage equality (2015) have further eroded 
residual Catholic social norms. Similarly, the recent Constitutional Convention (2011-13) 
considered further referendums along these lines, including the removal of confessional and 
gender-biased provisions. Moreover, after numerous critical judgments in the ECHR, protests 
following the death of a woman denied a termination in an Irish hospital compelled the Fine-Gael-
Labor coalition government to legislate for the X-case. Campaigns for the repeal of the 8th 
amendment and for a woman’s right to choose continue. On the other hand, constitutional 
referendums on Lisbon (2009) and on the so-called Fiscal Compact (2011), campaigned for and 
won by traditional proponents, have entrenched austerity and completed the project for a neoliberal 
European Constitution, albeit without its more symbolic features. The challenge for those creating 
(or defending what is left of) a “social” state is stark. While the Constitutional Convention also 
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proposed a referendum to constitutionalize socio-economic rights, the government retained and 
exercized its veto over this proposal. Social movements, however, notably those currently involved 
in housing and water privatization struggles, continue to demand socio-economic rights and, in the 
case of the trade union-led Right2Water (2015), to demand their constitutionalization. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, Bunreacht na hÉireann merits understanding as a world-constitution. Specifically, 
Ireland’s constitutional development had a dialectical relationship to its incorporation into the 
historical capitalist world-system and to concomitant socio-political struggles over this evolving 
process. In the period between 1848 and 1945, Ireland resembled postcolonial peripheries insofar 
as popular, anti-systemic mobilizations adopted “national” rather than “social” trajectories. 
Following the world-systemic rupture of 1917, the manner in which Sinn Féin, a disciplined 
nationalist mass party, substituted itself for a popular anti-colonial movement and associated class 
conflicts ensured that conservative forms of classic constitutionalism triumphed over both social 
democratic and radical alternatives. In the 1920s and 1930s, the comparative weakness of social 
democratic or communist forms of anti-systemic resistance resulted from their internal 
fragmentation over national and social priorities and to their respective reliance on parliamentary-
clientelism or paramilitary-vanguardism. Equally important, Fianna Fáil, a national-populist mass 
party, conceded reforms to co-opt small farmers and organized labor while targeting coercive 
measures, including censorship, at rival republican, communist and feminist groups.  
 In 1922 and 1937, constitution makers registered and reproduced this conservative balance 
of core-peripheral and capital-labor relations, most notably in their determined exclusion of social 
constitutional forms that envisaged direct state intervention in economic production and welfare 
redistribution. The 1922 Irish Free State Constitution thus reproduced political institutions and 
norms inherited from the British or Westminster model, notably those concerning electoral 
democracy and centralized executive-administrative authority. It also reproduced an enlightened 
conservative mode of conceding reforms, notably land redistribution, to preserve the inherited 
peripheral economy from its worst excesses. Again, similar to other postcolonial peripheries, the 
“Catholic social” form of constitutionalism adopted in 1937 did not fundamentally change these 
inherited political institutions, or classic laws of property and contract, but instead prioritized 
creating a “native” or Catholic family law regime. The Bunreacht similarly envisaged a model of 
welfare provision based on paternalist charity rather than justice or solidarity. 
Ireland’s contested incorporation into the historical capitalist world-system and associated 
constitutional forms, however, depart from a strictly postcolonial interpretation of Irish 
peripheralization. First, membership of the white, English-speaking Atlantic economy facilitated 
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Ireland’s integration into the world-system on increasingly better economic and political terms 
than other peripheries, particularly from the late 19th century onwards. Second, to a more 
pronounced degree than elsewhere, the conciliatory redesign of British-Irish relations, specifically 
the adoption of electoral and land reforms, created a residual Anglo-Irish and emergent Catholic 
Irish middle class of sizeable land-owners, professionals and administrators by the early 20th 
century, thoroughly integrated into the “national” (peripheral) economy and, to varying degrees, 
the state apparatus. Third, unlike in Spanish or French colonies, the Catholic Church had not been 
popularly identified with the colonising regime, thereby strengthening its moral monopoly 
throughout the 20th century, marginalising rival ideologies and legitimating the independent state 
on the basis of supernatural authority more than popular reason. Together, these long-term factors 
facilitated a particular form of political stability or quietism unknown to poorer peripheries.  
In the period between 1945 and 2008, Ireland’s changing constitutional forms registered 
and reproduced more widely experienced, transnational developments. Semi-peripheral re-
incorporation into a U.S.-led world-system, driven by the expansion of multinational corporations, 
prompted economic growth, limited industrialization, and fostered an increasingly suburban, 
consumerist and mass society. An emergent nationalist-populist consensus on liberal economic 
growth and more liberal values displaced a residual nationalist project of territorial reunification 
and cultural revival. As in the pre-war era, nationalist dominance owed to the capacities of a 
reformed comprador class— now centred on multinational service provision, the professions, 
government and administration—to advance a programme of “national interest” still capable of 
co-opting small farmers, organized labor and community groups. “Growth” accompanied 
comparatively modest levels of redistribution through EU-subsidized mass agricultural 
production, voluntary wage bargaining and gradual welfare state expansion. Anti-systemic 
movements fragmented. With rapidity from the 1980s onwards, post-68 social, youth and feminist 
movements’ rejection of Catholic social norms governing family and sexuality coalesced with 
neoliberal governments’ removal of “social” limits to the market.  
While these developments form part of a more widely shared experience in the world-
system, certain dynamics or historically specific legacies colored emergent constitutional forms in 
Ireland. From the 1970s onwards, the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland split the left and 
reanimated nationalist-confessional politics against the encroaching “liberal agenda.” Moreover, 
the moral authority of the Catholic Church, albeit gradually diminishing, endured into the 1990s, 
its influence still apparent in the Bunreacht’s religious-gendered language and, in particular, the 
retention of highly restrictive provisions concerning abortion. Nevertheless, in Ireland, as 
elsewhere, the “national” bourgeoisie, faced with competing pressures of tradition and 
modernization in market and family law, relocated contentious political issues to the non-
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majoritarian, expert domains of treaty formation and judicial review, notably those of the European 
Union.  
Emergent neo-formal constitutional forms incorporated legacies of both domination and 
freedom. The Irish courts generally reproduced classic constitutional forms, emphasising 
individualism, anti-statism, and “negative liberties” (including private property rights) ahead of 
communitarian norms, the interests of the “common good” or “positive” rights to welfare. 
Concomitantly, numerous minoritarian “human rights” conflicts—fought by or on behalf of 
women, children, prisoners, gays, Travellers, asylum seekers, the disabled and the transgendered 
among others— have successfully challenged repressive constitutional norms and expanded 
formal and substantive freedoms. Importantly, the displacement of politics to technocratic legal 
domains was and remains legitimated by popular actions, not just by majoritarian referendums but 
also by periodic and significant citizen-initiated court cases.  
Today, as the spirit of Davos ushers in a return to classic, laissez-faire jurisprudence in the 
service of corporate power, it is impossible to tell whether an alternative spirit of Porto Alegre may 
succeed in creating a more democratic, more egalitarian world. The present analysis suggests three 
insights for movements acting in the latter spirit. First, it underlines the deep-rooted relationship 
between state formations, constitutionalism and anti-majoritarian politics, specifically the defence 
of the rights of propertied minorities from mob-rule or, as the Greeks defined it, “democracy.” 
Second, it cautions social movements against expecting too much from state forms such as 
constituent assemblies or public interest litigation strategies as a means of challenging systemic 
priorities. Progressives cannot abandon political politics for judicial politics (Unger 2009: 111). 
Third and finally, this analysis highlights instead the potentialities of organized movements, 
premised on direct democracy and direct action, to effect systemic transformations (See Graeber 
2013). If pre-existing institutional legacies, including state, constitutional and proto-state 
formations, may limit or contain these potentialities, moments of world-systemic rupture, such as 
occurred in 1917 or 1968, can enhance them in altogether new, unexpected and inspiring ways. 
The possibility of moving against and beyond anti-democratic constitutionalism, as ever, depends 
on us.  
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Abstract 
The Northern Ireland story is more complex than the trite tale of orange versus green or two warring tribes. Current 
inhabitants are not settling ancient scores. Northern Ireland is the product of colonialism, the plantation of Ulster, 
machinations of a British state determined to retain a strategic outpost, 50 years of one party discriminatory 
government and the recent conflict. The Good Friday Agreement facilitated an end to armed conflict but is 
inherently flawed. Compounding the Stormont Assembly’s very limited ability to steer the economy is reluctance by 
the political parties to accept the rationale of the Agreement. Republicans are unhappy that Northern Ireland will 
remain British while unionists dislike the fact that republicans are partners in administration. Northern Ireland’s 
two leading parties, The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin (SF,) do not have the power (even if they 
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changing demographically while also facing economic challenges at a time when both England and Scotland are 
reassessing the nature of the Union. 
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Northern Ireland is something of an anomaly. An area of deep running antagonisms nurtured by 
history, masked, apart from occasional spurts of violence, by an air of mundane normality. On the 
surface this region is much like any other region of the United Kingdom with an ordinary if 
somewhat modest Western European economy. The area is served by proper airports, decent 
motorways and by most standards it has efficient basic services. In spite of high rates of 
unemployment in comparison with other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland or Ulster, as it is 
sometimes wrongly called, is a part of the industrialized and developed world. Yet, alone among 
all the British and Irish police forces, every officer in the Police Service of Northern Ireland openly 
carries a firearm on duty. By itself, this fact underlines the very different nature of this area, and 
added factors such as the number of former prisoners in the devolved administration make this a 
place apart.  
 However mundane or normal Northern Ireland may look to the visiting stranger, it is not 
just another part of the British state, now in strained economic circumstances. There are significant 
differences that may be summed up in a stark note from the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) to 
mark Remembrance Day in November 2014. Britain’s armed forces suffered their greatest number 
of causalities since the ending of the Second World War, in Northern Ireland. Official MoD figures 
recorded 1441service personnel having lost their lives in several decades of conflict with militant 
Irish republicans. The armed conflict is over, but its impact remains and reverberates. 
 The latest Office for National Statistics1 (ONS) region and country profiles analysis takes 
a look at the regional characteristics of the UK, exploring aspects such as population, age, 
employment, crime and house prices. The profile of Northern Ireland shows one of the youngest 
populations in the UK with a median age of 37.6 years. In 2011, the population stood at 1.8 million 
with the area’s output accounting for 2% of Britain’s economic output reflecting the fact that the 
six Northern Irish counties deliver the lowest added value of any UK region. Unemployment, 
currently running at 7.5%, is concentrated in a number of deprived or marginalised areas. This has 
been a feature of life in the region for decades. Setting aside the dry statistics, Northern Ireland 
shares many of the features found in any other peripheral regions of the United Kingdom or indeed 
other regions of Western Europe experiencing the impact of de-industrialization in the wake of 
globalization-induced flight of heavy industry eastwards. Northern Ireland’s increasing 
geopolitical and economic marginalization helped make the current peace process possible, but, at 
the same time, austerity measures resulting from the global financial crisis are destabilizing 
political institutions and intergroup relations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 http://bit.ly/1trCNTx  
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Contemporary Northern Ireland is the product of English-led colonialism, a seventeenth century 
migration of English and Scottish settlers into Ulster, sectarian machinations by a British state 
determined until recently to retain a strategically important outpost, one party discriminatory 
government between 1920 and 1972 and a prolonged violent/bloody conflict through the final 
years of the twentieth century.2 History can rarely be used to justify current actions but it certainly 
offers an insight into how the northern part of Ireland finds itself in its present situation. Late 
sixteenth century London with its Tudor monarchy viewed Ulster and its Gaelic inhabitants as the 
most dangerous region in all of Britain3 and Ireland. In the closing days of that century, Elizabethan 
England suffered its greatest military defeat, at the hands of northern Irish Gaelic clans. Those who 
inflicted this reverse on English arms in 1598 were at the time allies of a Spanish monarch who 
had attempted to invade England with his armada a mere ten years previously.  
 Faced with this threat to the stability of the kingdom, James 1 on his succession, decided 
to replace the rebellious population of Ulster with more loyal subjects. Throughout the following 
decades, a violent campaign was launched to remove the indigenous inhabitants and people the 
province with loyal communities from Scotland and England. The process became known as the 
Plantation of Ulster.  
 Those who came as planters were in many ways indistinguishable from the natives, and 
but for one of history's great seminal events (the Protestant Reformation) would probably have 
become assimilated through time. Unfortunately this difference was to remain one of the decisive 
fault lines in this part of the world for centuries. Festering resentment caused the old inhabitants 
to launch frequent attacks on the new planters resulting in reprisals, which kept open these 
divisions through the following two centuries. Governments in London were content for centuries 
to allow divisions survive in order to maintain a virtual colony of settlers in Ulster. Feeling 
constantly under siege, the settlers acted as a garrison and thereby guarantor of London's strategic 
interests in Ireland. 
 Due to the counter attraction of the Americas as a better destination for emigration in the 
early part of the seventeenth century, the Ulster Plantation was only a limited success. It drew 
sufficient numbers to form a garrison population but not enough to entirely displace the surviving 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 For general histories from different stances see; Moody & Martin (2012); Foster (1990), Lee (1989), Rumpf & 
Hepburn (1977), Ferriter (2000), Coogan (2002a). 
3 See for example how the northern part of Ireland influenced English mindset of the period, Colin Murphy (2013) 
“How Shakespeare's plays reveal the secret of England's Irish obsession.” Irish Independent. 11 August 2013 
(http://bit.ly/1vqaRVK 
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indigenous inhabitants who were left to seek a precarious and resentment filled existence in the 
unwanted wastelands of the north of Ireland (Bardon 2011). 
 Maintaining a colony where the natives outnumber the colonialists frequently means that 
position and influence are protected by different and dubious practices. On one hand the colonists 
require physical military protection of the mother country and secondly they must convince 
themselves that they have a moral right or indeed duty to rule over the natives. Over the following 
centuries the planted northern Irish community, with military assistance from London, accepted 
and carried out the tasks of policing and containing the original inhabitants. As England evolved 
into Great Britain and grew to become a world superpower, it recognised Ireland as of vital 
strategic importance. The island occupies the gateway to Britain's western shoreline and was thus 
a potentially dangerous staging post for an invasion of Britain, if occupied by a hostile power. The 
settlers or Protestant population were, at base, a military asset to the growing empire. 
 Problems did arise nevertheless. One of the difficulties frequently faced by colonial powers 
is that occasionally dependencies rebel and seek independence. Towards the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, Britain’s North American colonies were doing just this and simultaneously 
spreading the gospel of republican democracy abroad. In time the American “disease” spread to 
France and shortly afterwards the British government was alarmed to see the ideas and ideals of 
revolutionary France take hold in Ireland. To London’s dismay, the anti-monarchist message had 
its greatest impact among the northern Irish Presbyterians, the very populace Britain had seen as 
its residential Irish garrison. Worse from a British point of view, this was happening at a time when 
His Majesty’s Government was locked in a bitter war with France. 
 To counteract republican influence in the north of Ireland, Britain’s agents worked 
diligently to re-ignite religious animosities that were by then becoming less intense. They exploited 
unrest that had arisen in central Ulster as a result of mechanization having led to the displacement 
of artisan Protestant weavers by unskilled Catholic workers. Displaced and disgruntled Protestant 
artisans were encouraged to attack Catholic workers who they saw as rivals taking their 
employment. To do so, they were organised into a group called “The Peep O’Day Boys” (Smyth 
1995) which was to become the Orange Order (Jess 2007). What might otherwise have been a 
footnote of Luddite activity in Irish labor history therefore became a battleground leading to the 
founding of the Orange Order as a reactionary counter-weight to the democracy movement led by 
the republican United Irish movement. In 1798 The United Irishmen rebellion, inspired by the 
American and French revolutions, and led by the Protestant Wolfe Tone, was crushed (Pakenham 
2000). What had been a temporary sectarian expediency for Britain in dealing with and dividing 
revolutionary France’s Irish allies did not end after the battle of Waterloo. Divisions cultivated and 
nurtured during the Napoleonic era lasted to the present day. The famine of 1845-48 scarred and 
Journal of World-System Research  | Vol. 22  Issue 1 |  Northern Ireland           
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.636 
112 
depopulated Ireland but a land war arose in the later half of the 19th century which eventuated in 
the 1903 Wyndham Act granting land reform on conservative terms, and was conceived as a means 
of “killing Home Rule with kindness” (Seth-Jones 1983: 377; Lyons 1972: 320; Warwick-Haller 
1990). 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Conservatives in Britain still saw Irish demands 
for a devolved parliament in Dublin as a threat to the integrity of their Empire. To forestall what 
was becoming politically inevitable, they built upon the old animosities they had cultivated 
decades earlier and encouraged northern Irish Protestants, who were all too eager for their own 
reasons to heed them, to establish their own separate state composed ultimately of six (of the nine) 
Ulster counties partitioned from the rest of Ireland. There was no obvious logic for selecting all 
the six counties chosen to make up the new state though interesting explanations have since been 
mooted (Laffan 1983). Two of those counties (Tyrone and Fermanagh) had a pro-republican (or 
pro-independence) majority and were to bitterly resent inclusion in the partitioned entity. By 
insisting on including the greater portion of territory, the new Unionist state of Northern Ireland 
contained a very significant minority of those opposed to its existence. A community who felt 
isolated, vulnerable and compelled to live within what they feared would be a hostile and 
unfriendly state. They were soon to learn that they were not mistaken. 
 In 1920, the newly formed government of Northern Ireland under Sir James Craig feared 
not only militant Irish Republicanism but also the impact of organised labor. Trade unionists had 
in 1907 overcome old animosities and challenged the ruling class in Belfast with a city wide work 
stoppage (Beresford-Ellis 1996). Again in 1919 a mass strike by engineering workers had 
threatened unionist unity. There was too at that time the distant but real threat of Bolshevik-style 
revolution that had not only shaken Russia but had frightened the ruling class in every part of 
Europe. Faced with such a scenario, it was no surprise therefore, that the wealthy industrialists, 
merchant princes, aristocrats and reactionary military men, who formed the government of 
Northern Ireland would encourage bitter sectarian divisions in order to divide any potential 
opposition and maintain their hold on power (Farrell 1980; Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 1996). Indeed, 
loyalist resistance to Home Rule over 1912-1914 nearly brought the UK to the brink of civil war 
(Ryan 1956). 
 When the new state of Northern Ireland was established in 1920, it inherited three centuries 
of distrust and animosity between its inhabitants. Two aspects of this new creation were clear. In 
the first instance those supporting the state were not just giving it political approval but were also 
actively involved in its protection and maintenance by acting in a policing role. The second 
important feature was that in order to retain the loyalty and support of all its Protestant population, 
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the new state found it necessary to reward its supporters with privileges that could only come 
through discriminating against the minority Catholic population. 
 When after 50 years of such practice, the disgruntled Catholic minority managed to 
organize to protest in a way that could not be ignored or easily suppressed, there were bound to be 
problems (McCann 1993; Rose 1971). Supporters of the state were ill-prepared for dealing with 
significant criticism or objections and found it impossible to make the type and extent of 
concessions that would have been necessary to prevent civil disturbance. Centuries of living as a 
protected colonial minority had left the Northern Irish unionist constituency reluctant to deliver a 
democratic transition, and by this time as well, any such concessions would seem to arch-Loyalists 
to be tainted with concessions to Irish republicanism (Bell 1976; Bruce 1995). In previous 
centuries, dissent and agitation for reform had been met with physical suppression, and this tactic 
was resorted to again when Northern Ireland's Catholic population demanded reform in 1968. 
 
The conflict years 1969-1994 
Throughout the Northern Ireland state’s first fifty years of existence, its Unionist regime had ruled 
with absolute authority and brooked neither dissent nor questioning of its right to govern as it saw 
fit. On a number of occasions during that half-century, the state had been challenged by armed 
actions carried out by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The various IRA campaigns failed 
abysmally to undermine the northern state to any significant degree. On the contrary, these 
sporadic and ineffective efforts had, if anything, reinforced the regime. They demonstrated, by 
their failures, the power of the Northern Ireland government while simultaneously allowing the 
regime to use the perceived threat to solidify its support base. By the middle 1960s, it appeared 
that not only was physical force Irish republicanism a thing of the past, but that it had no further 
role to play in the Ireland of the twentieth century. Circumstances, however, were to challenge this 
presumption.  
 The Provisional IRA did not initiate the Northern Irish conflict of the latter 20th century. 
Unlike previous IRA campaigns conducted in Northern Ireland, the organization, which had sold 
off its arms after the 1956-62 border campaign and taken a leftward political turn, was completely 
unprepared for what broke out around it in August 1969. The outbreak of armed conflict came as 
much of a surprise to the leadership as it did to the outside world at the time.4  
 The immediate cause for the 1969 outbreak of lethal violence in Ireland was, initially at 
any rate, a response to events arising out of demands for equality and democratic rights made 
through the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Unlike criticisms of the northern 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 This is the consensus view in any serious treatment of the period. See Coogan, 2002b; Bowyer Bell, 1989; Taylor, 
1998; McKittrick & McVea, 2012. 
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state in previous decades, the NICRA critique did not focus on the more esoteric aspects of national 
self-determination and/or the perceived injustice of partition. Instead, the civil rights movement 
concentrated its demands on the issues of immediate concern to the disadvantaged Catholic 
community. “British Rights for British Citizens” was among the prominent placard messages at 
NICRA rallies and marches (Coulter 2015). As earlier noted, in order to retain support from an 
often demanding Protestant working class, Northern Ireland governments had awarded them, albeit 
unofficially, certain crucial privileges, which included preferential treatment in the allocation of 
employment, housing and cultural rights. To deliver for its supporters, the state’s ruling class had 
to maintain control over local government, through which it was able to regulate the allocation 
especially of social housing.5 
 With control of local government, it also was possible to award town-hall funded 
employment to the state’s supporters (Protestant, in practice). In rural Northern Ireland, 
experiencing the consolidation of agriculture resulting from mechanization post-World War Two, 
such employment, even on a part-time basis, was greatly valued as it helped supplement declining 
farm incomes. Elsewhere, the northern state facilitated the selective practice of finding jobs for its 
supporters by either directing government subsidies towards industries where there was a 
concentration of its voters or by the more direct method of awarding state or local government 
funded positions to it followers.6  
 Finally, in order to surround its discriminatory practices with a modicum of justification, 
(in the eyes of its supporters at least) the Unionist ruling class elevated its own cultural 
predilections to the level to a state religion while curbing those of its opponents. The Irish 
languages, Gaelic football, traditional Irish music were shunted aside by the state and on occasions 
some events were banned. Even the state-controlled media (the BBC) often overlooked Irish 
culture. The 1954 Flags and Emblems Act essentially promoted the Union Flag everywhere while 
permitting authorities to ban other symbols (Purdie 1990: 30). While this form of inequality did 
not have a detrimental physical impact, it was a constant reminder to the Catholic population that 
they were deemed second-class citizens in what they called the Orange State of Northern Ireland 
(Farrell 1980). The unavoidable outcome of blatant discrimination against one section of society 
was to generate bitter resentment against the state, its institutions and its supporters. When, in the 
late 1960s, a civil rights movement, inspired by the American civil rights movement and liberation 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 See: Disturbances in Northern Ireland.Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland. 
Chairman: The Honourable Lord Cameron, D.S.C. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Excellency the 
Governor of Northern Ireland, September 1969. 
6 See Farrell, 1980; Darby, 1976; Whyte, 1983; and the Cameron Report "Disturbances in Northern Ireland 1969” 
(Belfast: HMSO Cmd 532).  
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movements elsewhere, began to agitate around incidents of gross malpractice in housing, 
employment and electoral fraud, the Catholic community supported the campaign enthusiastically. 
 The authoritarian Northern Ireland regime was not similar to that of an absolutist 
monarchy. Society was not divided, as was Bourbon France, into the state against the people but 
rather government and its supporters against a minority (Catholic) population that could not help 
but question the legitimacy of the state and challenge its discriminatory practices. Paradoxically, 
though, an expanding UK welfare state in the context of heightened labor militancy also exerted 
an impact upon contention in Northern Ireland (most notably an increased presence of Catholic 
students at Queens University Belfast who became critical figures in the civil rights movement 
and the Troubles).7 Therefore, when the civil rights movement began to agitate for an end to 
structural privileges, many in those communities benefiting from the status quo responded 
aggressively in defence of their advantageous position. Moreover, since the origins of division lay 
in the area’s colonial past, many among the majority Protestant community believed that they were 
entitled to defend their position “using all means which may be found necessary” (Ulster’s Solemn 
Oath and Covenant, 1912), which ominously meant armed force. This was a defining feature of 
the Northern Ireland state: any reform of the state was viewed very widely as a Republican attack 
on the unionist community, and so most likely would spark a violent reaction. Cooler heads, of 
which there were too few even in the Cabinet, could hardly prevail in this fraught atmosphere 
(Bloomfied 1994; Faulkner 1978; Bew & Patterson 1985). 
 This was what happened in response to the Civil Rights Association and violent attacks on 
the movement increased throughout 1968 and 1969. Before long it became evident that the state 
was resorting to a long-held strategy of preventing meaningful political reform by deploying all 
its resources, official and unofficial. Urged on by demagogue Ian Paisley, and condoned in practice 
by the state, working class Protestants launched physical attacks on civil rights demonstrations. In 
doing so, they were taking a lead from the state's police force, which had violently attacked one of 
the first civil rights demonstrations in October 1968 in Derry City. In August 1969 tensions boiled 
over into bloody two-way conflict. The state’s police had launched a punitive attack on the Bogside 
community of Derry City and were repulsed. As it became evident that the police force was unable 
to contain the situation through the use of normal riot control techniques, other options were 
deployed.  
 From the foundation of the Northern Ireland state there had been an understanding that the 
Catholic population of Belfast was effectively the Achilles heel of nationalism and republicanism 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 My thanks to a referee for stressing this point.  
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in Ireland. They were a minority vulnerable to attack surrounded by often, hostile communities. In 
practice they were treated as hostages to the good behaviour of their co-religionists in the six 
counties and south of the border. This is not to discount the danger in Republican areas of Derry, 
where the Battle of the Bogside in August 1969 signalled a major turning point. This minority 
community, in turn, also was an Achilles heel for the UK in that the community's mistreatment, 
upon erupting into an international issue, became an embarrassment and encumbrance for 
Westminster.  
 So when the state and its unofficial supporters launched an armed offensive against 
Catholic districts in Belfast in mid-August of 1969 in response to the difficulties the police were 
experiencing in containing the riots in Derry, it was understood to be just another sad but 
unremarkable chapter in the Northern Ireland story. Once again Belfast's Catholic population was 
to be punished as an example to others. In a 24-hour period (14th/15th August) six Catholics were 
shot dead by police and hundreds more made homeless as a result of attacks by mobs carrying 
incendiary devices.8  
 In previous eras this punitive assault had succeeded in terrorising Belfast’s Catholic 
population into submission, with a ripple effect on their co-religionists elsewhere. It is a matter of 
speculation in some quarters still why there was such a different response on that occasion. The 
IRA, and its non-existent arsenal, was not a factor. Perhaps because of widespread identification 
within the Catholic community with the civil rights movement and its articulation of their 
grievances, many saw this as a defining moment in their existence. Whatever the reason, many 
Catholics clearly resolved not to accept what had been their lot for generations. 
 In spite of the fact that central government in London committed regular British army 
troops in 1969 to stabilise the situation, Belfast’s Catholic population still felt insecure. There was 
a conviction in working-class areas most affected by the violence that only by acquiring their own 
arms could they guarantee their security. History had left them with a fundamental suspicion of 
British Army bona fides and in late 1969 people from Catholic areas of Belfast began a frantic 
trawl to acquire small arms.  
 Initially a number of defence groups sprang up in Catholic areas. Very often these groups 
were built around former British army personnel. While these ex-servicemen were prepared and 
able to organize and even provide defence structures, they were not equipped with the contacts or 
knowhow to access the quantity of firearms required. There was no tradition of firearms possession 
by Northern Ireland’s Catholic population, and obtaining guns was a specialist task. In reality there 
was only one section of society that had the contacts, skills, knowledge and wherewithal to access 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 See: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch69.htm  
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this type of material, and that was a segment of militant Irish republicans in the IRA, which split 
in December 1969 into the Official IRA (which would declare a ceasefire in 1972) and the 
Provisional IRA. 
 Notwithstanding the perception held by a majority within the Catholic community over the 
previous decades that the IRA with its physical force school of thought had become redundant, 
some people with old IRA connections unexpectedly found themselves with a military role to play 
after all. As had happened at the beginning of the 20th century, unionism had again introduced the 
gun into Irish politics, engendering the altogether predictable reply from a militant wing of 
republicanism. The newly formed and revitalised IRA (Provisional) was nevertheless still 
politically cautious even as it embarked on a campaign of sniping and bombing. Many of its 
founding members were veterans of previous failed campaigns and were wary of launching an all 
out assault for which they lacked the resources anyway. They did not, for example, opt for a 
maximum programme of establishing an all-Ireland Republic for another two years (McKearney 
2011: 108). Only after the indiscriminate use of internment in 1971 and the shooting dead of 14 
civilians in Derry City in January 1972 on Bloody Sunday did the provisional IRA abandon its 
limited programme and declare its objective to be that of breaking the political connection with 
Britain (McGuffin 1973). 
 What had caused the IRA (Provisional) to opt for a maximum program was not merely a 
response to popular anger at British army shootings on Bloody Sunday. There had long been a 
view held within the Catholic community of Northern Ireland that attempting to reform the 
Northern Ireland state was impossible. Now, however, it seemed that there was no prospect of 
reform being imposed by London. The early hope that Westminster would force through 
meaningful change was dashed by the actions of its military as the behaviour of the British Army, 
sent in "aid of the civil power,” since 1969 had managed to thoroughly alienate the Catholic 
population. A bloody curfew on the Falls Road, internment without trial, Bloody Sunday and 
retaining Unionist one-party rule in Stormont convinced the Catholic population that the British 
government’s principle interest lay in maintaining the status quo. In reality, the IRA was 
responding to, rather than creating, a sense of anger and alienation within the Catholic working 
class.  
 Committed to overthrowing the Northern Irish state, the Provisional IRA made an analysis 
of its strength and of the balance of forces it had to contend with. In classical Irish republican 
thinking and theory, the core of the problem was the presence of the British government and its 
troops in Ireland. The reasoning was straightforward. The House of Commons was the sovereign 
parliament with overall responsibility for the area and the British Army was the ultimate agent 
used by the state to enforce its will. 
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 Drawing on bitter experience from past failures the Provisional IRA, nevertheless, took on 
board a pertinent fact. The northern Irish state’s first line of defence was not, in reality, the regular 
British Army but its locally recruited police force supported by a part-time regiment of the British 
Army also recruited locally, the Ulster Defence Regiment. When the British government decided, 
in the mid-1970s, to give priority to the use of these locally recruited forces, it became inevitable 
that the conflict in Northern Ireland would assume a different character, with unavoidable 
sectarian consequences, pitting as it did one community against the other rather than conducting 
a battle strictly between the IRA and the regular forces of the British state. 
 In light of Britain’s centuries-long involvement in Ireland, it is difficult to see how London 
could have been unaware of the consequences of its action. Transferring the focus and primary 
responsibility for patrolling and securing the area away from the regular British Army and onto 
locally recruited agencies made a difficult situation much worse. As regular British troops’ 
involvement was downscaled, giving a primary role to the Ulster Defence Regiment9 and the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary,10 it became inevitable that the IRA would concentrate its assault on the 
locally recruited forces. The predictable result was an ever more bitter communal divide. Imperial 
and colonial counter-insurgency strategies that concentrate on deploying local forces inevitably 
comes at the price of exacerbating divisions within that community, society or country, and 
Northern Ireland was no exception to this rule.  
 
 
The Good Friday Agreement and how Northern Ireland society has changed 
It is useful to reflect on two points when considering an end to any conflict. In the first instance it 
is important to examine the concrete facts leading to the ending of hostilities and secondly it is 
worth keeping in mind that very few peace settlements are as neat or all-encompassing as they 
sometimes appear from a distance. Few battles have ended due to an unexpected and astonishing 
outbreak of mass enlightenment, and moreover almost every peace settlement leaves a store of 
unresolved issues. Northern Ireland was not an exception to this general rule either. 
 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) came about as a result of several converging 
factors. The local protagonists had come to realise, albeit somewhat reluctantly, that it was unlikely 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was raised by Act of Parliament in 1970, and was the largest infantry regiment 
in the Army with fulltime and parttime soldiers on its strength. 
http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/regiments/5952.aspx. See also: Urban, 1992: 15-16, 50, 53.  
10Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), state police force in Northern Ireland, established in 1922. The RUC had a 
paramilitary character until 1970, when the force was remodeled along the lines of police forces in Great Britain. In 
1970 the security of Northern Ireland became the responsibility of the RUC, the British army, and the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (UDR). http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511633/Royal-Ulster-Constabulary-RUC  
Journal of World-System Research  |  Vol. 22  Issue 1 | McKearney  
  
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.636 
119 
either would gain a decisive military advantage over the other. Unsurprisingly, there was also a 
large degree of conflict-weariness across the stressed communities. In a wider context, the British 
government recognised that with the IRA signalling its willingness to negotiate an arrangement 
falling within what London considered acceptable, that it was important to take advantage of the 
opportunity. Moreover, post cold war euphoria had created a view among leading western 
governments’ that it was opportune to address some burdensome legacies of a dated colonialism. 
There was a belief encouraged by the Clinton White House that at least some of these issues could 
be resolved through U.S.-sponsored diplomacy as had been attempted with the Oslo Accords in 
1993 or in South Africa in 1994. 
 Prior to the open intervention of these agencies, there had been an extensive series of secret 
meetings and contacts between Britain’s Secret Services and the IRA and between the IRA and 
the Dublin government through various intermediaries. Margaret Thatcher gave approval for secret 
talks with the IRA in 1990 though we don't know exactly when exchanges began in earnest and to 
what extent they spelled out bottom-line positions (Watt 1999). It is clear that the 1994 IRA 
ceasefire did not come as a surprise to the governments in London or Dublin. What is fair to assume 
is that the initiative involved a number of confidence building and trust raising measures by both 
sides.  
 As a consequence of the preparatory work and the IRA declaration of interest in a 
permanent ceasefire, external agencies came together in order to broker a settlement with all 
interested parties in Northern Ireland. In practice this meant that the British Government invited 
Irish and U.S. government representatives to assist in searching for a settlement. While it appeared 
on the surface that the facilitators were beginning with a blank page, the reality was that the British 
government was working to a plan that had been originally set out at the beginning of the 1970s. 
The “Sunningdale Agreement” (Dixon 2001: 136-150) of 1973, the basis for a failed power-
sharing experiment in 1974, was based on an arrangement whereby the major parties in Northern 
Ireland would again share administrative power. To a large extent this programme dictated what 
the eventual outcome in the 1990s would be, echoing in practice the colour choice for Henry Ford's 
motorcar ... any colour you liked so long as it was black. 
 However pre-determined the outcome, there was a logic underpinning Britain's insistence 
on imposing power sharing on Northern Ireland’s political parties. For a start, it sent an 
unambiguous message that the six-county state would remain intact, therefore reassuring Northern 
Irish Unionists and making them more likely to accept an emerging settlement. There was of 
course, the fact that this arrangement was not inimical to Britain's wider defence interests. 
Unspoken but of great importance also was that in terms of Irish realpolitik, an internal Northern 
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Ireland settlement also suited the Dublin government, which paradoxically was probably at least 
as fearful of Irish unity as were unionists in the North. 
 Although the external facilitators should not be accused of cynicism or bad faith, there 
were certain domestic political calculations involved in relation to the government administrations 
helping broker the deal (Mitchell 1999). U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern all found it agreeable and politically expedient to 
portray themselves as skilful arbitrators of a peace process that would undoubtedly be universally 
admired and applauded if delivered. As such, they were not working to a Northern Irish time scale 
alone but also had their own periods in office in mind. Wishing to see a conclusion before their 
administrations ended, the facilitators pressed hard for decisions to be made by the local Northern 
Irish parties. While there is always a certain tension between the need to get things done on one 
hand and to do them properly on the other hand, the former generally entails leaving loose ends.  
 What emerged as the Good Friday Agreement might be summed-up quite simply. The IRA 
made major ideological concessions in theory and in practice, chief of which was its acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the six-county state and with it the de facto acknowledgement of the unionist 
veto over ending partition. Furthermore by agreeing to permanently relinquish armed insurrection, 
verified by decommissioning its weapons, the IRA was signalling a dramatic about turn in what 
had been militant Irish republican orthodoxy for generations. Unionism, on the other hand, had 
also made an enormous concession to Republicans. By agreeing to enter government with what 
were in reality, senior members of the IRA, unionism had abandoned one of its crucial tenets that 
the Protestant majority alone was entitled to govern what had for long been its exclusive fiefdom. 
 A basic difficulty arising from the perceived need to force an agreement though was that a 
considerable amount of creative obfuscation was employed. In short, this took the form of avoiding 
detailing the hard logic of the agreement in favour of allowing different political communities to 
draw their own most favourable interpretation from the settlement. Compounding this political 
smokescreen was the fact that not only were the underlying implications of the agreement not 
clearly defined and spelled out to the Northern Irish community, but because of this, there was no 
agreement or consensus around the cause for past disputes. All sides would thereby draw their own 
interpretation of where the agreement was leading and from where it had come.  
 This may have been viewed as an enlightened arrangement—possibly even of Solomon-
like wisdom—but the two sides nevertheless found it impossible to openly and honestly explain 
to their supporters what they had agreed to. The IRA described the agreement to its constituency 
as a stepping-stone to a thirty-two county Irish republic, while unionism attempted to persuade its 
electorate that the agreement guaranteed the permanency of the union. Obviously both could not 
be right—at least not in the end—which was conveniently far away. 
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 Unionists also conceded the role of the Irish government in Northern Ireland affairs through 
the creation of the North/South Ministerial Council and the British Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference. The question of how to handle Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the 
United Kingdom appeared to be settled. The six-county state would remain part of the United 
Kingdom for so long as a majority of its electorate wished it to do so. This was certainly an answer 
of sorts, but it failed to address the other question of what might happen in the event that the 
electorate changed its mind. Moreover, by stating that the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland indeed would change when the electorate sought to break the link with Britain, the issue 
of Irish unity and ending partition remained on the agenda. While some observers detect a trend in 
Catholics toward becoming less nationalist and more “Northern Irish,” the evidence so far is a 
rather thin reed to lean on (Morrow 2015). 
 Ominously too, and due to the nature of Northern Irish politics, such a change would 
possibly come about when the Catholic population outnumbered the Protestant community. This 
in turn perpetuated not just the ongoing sectarian headcount in light of changing demographics, 
but it also ensured that communal politics (as distinct from more normal Left-Right or Liberal-
Conservative politics) would play an enormous part in any political agenda in the days to come. 
 However necessary the GFA was in facilitating an end to armed conflict, the institutions 
created by the treaty had inherent flaws. Under it, devolved government has strictly limited fiscal 
authority (and therefore little power or ability to address social and economic issues) and both 
major constituencies have the ability to stymie each other with little incentive to cooperate. Two 
factors in particular contributed towards stifling the work of the institutions arising from the GFA. 
The D'Hondt system under which the power sharing assembly's executive is elected and the 
regulation permitting a legislation-blocking “Petition of Concern” have blunted the effectiveness 
of the political institutions created by the agreement.11 
 In order to ensure that both communities in Northern Ireland would have representation in 
the executive and to prevent a return to majority rule, the D'Hondt system guarantees that there is 
a shared administration in Northern Ireland. There are obvious advantages in this, insofar as it 
entrenches rights for minorities in a society divided along ethno-religious lines. Without such an 
arrangement, it would have been impossible to create any type of political administration in the 
region. However, in the absence of a majority administration with the ability to make and enforce 
decisions, government is frequently in deadlock. At its best, the D'Hondt system might provide for 
harmony and agreement allowing party differences to be overcome. In the absence of agreement, 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 The basic idea of the D’Hondt System is that a party's vote total is divided by a certain figure, which increases as it 
wins more seats. As the divisor becomes bigger, the party's total in succeeding rounds gets smaller, allowing parties 
with lower initial totals to win seats. On the D'Hondt Rule, see also O'Leary & McGarry,1996: 374-375. 
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as is the case in Northern Ireland at present, it merely leads to stalemate and that has practically 
become the default position in Northern Ireland. 
 Moreover, with the D'Hondt system not providing agreement, the existence of the “Petition 
of Concern” has added to what has become almost a virtual breakdown in the Northern Ireland 
assembly. In practice any vote taken by the assembly can be made dependent on cross-community 
support if a petition of concern is presented to the assembly speaker. In such cases, a vote on 
proposed legislation will only pass if supported by a weighted majority (sixty percent) of members 
voting, including at least forty percent of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present 
and voting. Effectively this means that—provided enough MLAs from a given community agree—
that community can exercise a veto over the assembly's decisions. Since the restoration of 
devolution in 1998, the device has been used a total of sixty three times, and more than half of 
those were in the past two years. 
 Over the recent past, petitions of concern have been lodged in order to prevent the scrutiny 
of a minister’s performance when it appeared obvious that, at best, he was guilty of incompetence. 
In other situations it has been used in an almost table-tennis-like fashion as one veto begets another 
veto which in turn begets yet another veto. 
 Northern Ireland’s two leading parties, the DUP and SF, are therefore embedded within a 
dilemma. They do not have the power (even if they wanted to use it) to address the social and 
economic issues that might enhance their constituents’ lives and contentment and encourage 
people to place more emphasis on life’s pleasures and less on its difficulties. Deprived of this 
option, the parties are obliged to work within a political accommodation that most of their 
supporters find unappealing at best, giving endless cause for disagreement.  
 The weakness inherent in not being able to agree to viable and working political structures 
was initially masked by competition within the two main power blocks. As Sinn Féin battled for 
hegemony within the Catholic community, it had to play a more conciliatory role in order to sustain 
the institutions so that it would be able to disadvantage the SDLP. To a similar extent, the DUP 
had to restrain itself sufficiently in order to enter an administration-sharing accord with Sinn Féin 
if it were to supplant its unionist rival in the UUP. As the two main parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, 
gained the upper hand over their nearest rivals, they then turned more attention towards bickering 
with each other, and functional weaknesses in the system began to grow more obvious.   
 In spite of this situation of suspended animation, the Good Friday Agreement cannot be 
dismissed as having failed. There are many achievements to its credit. Few could dispute the 
incalculable benefits of having brought an end to a prolonged and bloody conflict. Lives were 
undoubtedly saved and quality of life rose to a different and better standard. Ultimately, few would 
argue with Winston Churchill's old observation that jaw jaw, regardless of how acrimonious, is 
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better than war war, and this is a view still shared by the overwhelming majority in Northern 
Ireland. 
 Moreover, the GFA delivered measurable political progress no matter how difficult this 
may be to see at times. This was a breakthrough that had seemed impossible in earlier generations. 
The old practice, arising from the area’s colonial past, of a Protestant parliament for a Protestant 
people was definitively laid to rest by the institutions arising out of the GFA. Importantly too, this 
outcome was clearly underwritten by the British government, sending a clear signal that whatever 
had remained the same, there was to be no return to the past, and with this went a definitive ending 
of the Orange state. The genius of the GFA lay in that it allowed itself to be all things to all 
participants. By giving the IRA an opportunity to enter parliamentary politics and even aspire to 
share the administration of the area and to do so while being able to tell its supporters that this was 
an opening to their main objective of an all-Ireland republic, the GFA provided the organization's 
leadership the space to deliver and then maintain a cessation of armed actions. 
 By delivering a sustained ceasefire, the GFA, in turn, was able to persuade the unionist 
population that, no matter how distasteful it might be to have the IRA in Stormont, there was an 
absence of the violence that had inflicted so much damage on their community. Moreover, the 
GFA redressed a deficit that had concerned unionism for years after the old Stormont parliament 
had been prorogued in 1973. Without a local administration acting as a form of breakwater between 
itself and government in London, unionism felt nervous about London governments’ long-term 
intentions. One of the ironies of Northern Ireland is that unionists distrust London only slightly 
less than they do Dublin. The over-generous allocation of members to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly assuaged this fear, for a time at least. At its most basic the GFA provided a most 
sophisticated, elaborate, and complex fig-leaf to those who wanted an excuse to end a war but who 
had difficulty agreeing on how to build a shared and integrated society post-conflict. 
 
Factors that have emerged since signing of Good Friday Agreement 
Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the crucially important establishment of an 
administration in 2007 under the joint management of the Democratic Unionist Party’s Ian Paisley 
and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, there have been significant changes to the political and 
economic landscape in which Northern Ireland sits. The now largely pacified region no longer 
receives priority treatment from Westminster, Scotland’s brush with independence is causing the 
format of the union to be reviewed, de-industrialization in peripheral regions coupled with the 
simultaneous expansion of a London-centric financial sector is altering the economic balance of 
the UK, changing demographics in the six-county area, and the likelihood of a strategic review by 
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Westminster in relation to Ireland as a whole are all important factors which will impact on the 
future of Northern Ireland.  
 No matter how relieved the population is at an end to political violence, there is the 
anticlimax of becoming just one other peripheral region of the UK. No longer is the area deemed 
a special case when assessed by the Treasury in London and no longer can leading politicians in 
Northern Ireland expect to be received at short notice by the Prime Minister at Downing Street. 
Following the heady and intoxicating days of being entertained by world leaders and interviewed 
by the international media, it’s back to the dreary steeples for the North’s political class.  
 On the rare occasions when the region features in the London media it is usually to draw 
unwanted negative coverage arising from riots and civil disturbances. These usually result from 
disputes over flag flying, marching bands, Irish language speakers or some other issue the British 
have difficulty understanding. Deprived of the old dangerous nuisance factor, the area and its 
politicians have now to make their own way in an indifferent and difficult world, which now also 
includes the rest of the UK. 
 Nor is it just a matter of being out of the international spotlight. The British Treasury treats 
Northern Ireland in the same manner as it does any other part of the UK. No longer is the security 
allocation sacrosanct and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne decided to reduce 
social security provision, there was no exception made for Belfast. In fact, the resultant need to 
pare annual expenditure caused interminable wrangling between the parties in the Assembly and 
added to the instability of the local political institutions.  
 Looming too on the horizon in relation to Northern Ireland’s future is the mooted 
reorganization of the United Kingdom into a more federal, rather than centralised union (Rigby, et 
al. 2014). The recent Scottish referendum was clearly the catalyst for this initiative and while the 
Scots voted against independence, the large number seeking to break with London has left the 
issue an ongoing concern and liable to be resurrected at any time in the future. The implications 
for Northern Ireland are not only in the uncertainty resulting from the inevitable re-organization 
of the UK but there is the clear reminder that profound change to the constitutional position of the 
region is distinctly possible.  
 Ominously too for the unionist position is the ever-present demographic factor that puts an 
unnerving question mark over the long-term future of Northern Ireland within the United 
Kingdom. The closely monitored sectarian headcount is indicating that the numerical difference 
between the Catholic and Protestant communities is constantly diminishing, and the numbers will 
probably level out within the next quarter-century. Whether this will lead to a united Ireland is 
speculative, and the outcome of any vote remains far from certain. At the same time it would be 
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naive to believe that long-held political opinions will change dramatically in the next 20 or 30 
years.  
 While Northern Ireland is changing demographically, it is also facing major economic 
challenges at a time when both England and Scotland are reassessing the nature of the Union. This 
matters enormously, since many of Northern Ireland’s problems stem at least as much from the 
unequal distribution of wealth and power in a class sense as from a failure to reconcile two (or 
possibly three) different ethnic identities. The area has one of the highest levels of child poverty 
in the UK, the highest level of economic inactivity in the UK, reputable voluntary agencies fear 
for the well-being of the elderly, and there is an ongoing exodus of the young. Neo-liberalism and 
globalization have not being kind to Northern Ireland, and this is not likely to change anytime 
soon. 
 Moreover, deprived of fiscal authority and subsequently left without either the compulsion 
or incentive to plot an economic course, politics in Northern Ireland tends to descend into 
promotion of single-identity community issues, which in turn tends to merely highlight those 
matters that divide the communities such as; flags, emblems, cultural activities, commemorations, 
and sporting events. Economic and social issues are presenting profound problems that an 
assembly—obsessing over parades, demolished and disused prisons, and protocols surrounding 
flags and emblems—is not best equipped to deal with. At present, these questions are widely 
discussed, but no potential solutions are being offered. In time, this concentration on contentious 
but symbolic issues rather than addressing underlying social, economic and educational issues may 
prove to be a costly indulgence.  
 Significantly too in this context is the fact that as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, the 
economic rationale underpinning the union has been steadily eroded over the past few decades. 
Paradoxically, this is due in no small measure to the efforts of the strongly pro-unionist Margaret 
Thatcher and her supporters. As Britain’s economy has moved steadily away from manual-labor-
dependent coal, steel and heavy industry towards London-centric financial services, peripheral 
regions have grown less crucial to the needs of the center. In terms of the overall British economy, 
Northern Ireland is now the least crucial region of all. The nature of the United Kingdom’s 
economy means there is no compelling economic reason for placing real priority on retaining 
Northern Ireland. The area offers little in the way of profit garnering, either in terms of what it 
produces or consumes. 
 Running alongside Northern Ireland’s declining economic vitality is a palpable loss of 
patience by central government with the ineffective political situation in Northern Ireland. Alex 
Kane, a former adviser to David Trimble, wrote in the Belfast Newsletter (Belfast Newsletter 
2014) that he would not vote in the local government elections because, as he said, “... the 
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Assembly isn’t working, the Executive is dysfunctional, we have farce rather than government, 
the parties don’t care; and nothing is being allowed to change.” Kane was not just highlighting the 
stalemate in the Northern Assembly but also echoed in his article the words of Theresa Villiers, 
the British Conservative Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who had bluntly warned local 
Northern Irish politicians that if Stormont can not evolve it may well collapse. She pointedly 
reminded them in her speech that a state that does not have the means to change is also a state 
without the means of its own preservation.  
 Ms. Villiers’ words carry a more profound meaning than many of her audience realised 
because they may well reveal a long-term change in Britain’s Irish policy. If this is the case—and 
it looks highly likely—that change is not relating to the North of Ireland alone but is something 
pointing towards a recalibration of London’s policy towards all of Ireland. Over the past few 
decades, Britain invested considerable political and military capital in the “Ulster Question.” Now, 
while undoubtedly content that it no longer has to contend with frequent bombings and gun battles, 
there is clearly a sense of frustration in Whitehall with the never-ending political deadlock in 
Belfast. Moreover, this exasperation has no doubt caused London to view Northern Ireland as 
unstable or even unmanageable, and therefore not the best possible fit for its wider requirements. 
Negotiations are currently underway between the parties to try and overcome these differences, 
but it is far from certain how permanent any agreement, if any, may be (McAdam 2014). 
 A principal attraction for London in the past was Northern Ireland’s role as providing a 
military base protecting Britain's western flank. While this will always remain a concern for 
London, the nature of the strategic calculation changes with politics and technology. Old style 
conventional surface vessel-based sea power is not as crucial in an age of supersonic aircraft and 
nuclear-armed submarines capable of remaining under the ocean waves for months at a time.  
 In contrast to the vexatious nature of northern Irish politics, the much more stable Southern 
Ireland is becoming a more attractive partner for Britain’s Irish interests. Dublin is becoming 
increasingly engaged with Britain and previous hostilities are all but forgotten by most in the 
Republic of Ireland. Queen Elizabeth made a historic visit to Ireland in 2011 and in return hosted 
an Irish state visit to Britain in 2014. It appears that London is more anxious to recruit the Southern 
Irish state as its ally on the island than depend on the more volatile Northerners. Moreover Britain 
is certainly aware of the potential for changing demographics and it is quite capable of taking the 
long view that at some time in the not too distant future it will be more advantageous to have the 
goodwill of Dublin. There is no doubt that these factors will play a major part in determining the 
future of Northern Ireland. What is in doubt is whether local northern Irish politicians and their 
parties can cope with the changes that are coming. The Northern Ireland case is exacerbated by 
dependency upon and control over funding by the British government. British government caps on 
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the Northern Ireland budget are creating extreme stresses on the Assembly and Executive. These 
stresses could either become a basis for unity across the ethno-nationalist divide or a further basis 
of frustration and division.  
 
Conclusion—and a comparison with South Africa and Israel/Palestine. 
There is a view held by many who participated in negotiating the Good Friday Agreement that it 
provides a template for other areas of conflict (Bew, et al. 2009). As with all aspects of human 
relations, there are some features of the Northern Ireland peace process that may have universal 
application. However it would be wrong to stretch this point too far. Northern Ireland was not 
unique but at the same time there were and remain many significant differences between this small 
six-county state and other zones of international conflict. In the first place Northern Ireland is a 
small and rather insignificant place in the world, both in terms of its strategic importance and 
economic muscle. There may have been a time when global politics, geography and the existing 
state of technology made Northern Ireland a vital part in Britain's projection of power across the 
north Atlantic. Now, however, Britain depends much more for its national security on the military 
umbrella provided by the United States than it does on its own indigenous armed forces. 
Contemporary technology with its nuclear armed submarines; drones, and supersonic aircraft have 
combined to reduce the importance of Northern Ireland's deepwater harbours and remote 
airdromes. 
 Economically, Northern Ireland is a minnow in terms of Britain's annual output. In terms 
of global output, Northern Ireland is a non-presence. Nor does it control any strategically important 
natural resources. Changes in the inter-state system and military technologies changed the strategic 
significance of Northern Ireland to the point of nullity. The change doubtless influenced Britain’s 
willingness to weaken Unionist control in Northern Ireland, particularly in the 1960s when the 
British government was redefining its role from declining hegemon to diplomatic facilitator 
(thereby increasing its vulnerability to international moral pressure).12 Consequently the area does 
not enjoy leverage in the world's halls of power. Nor does it—if left to its own devices—pose any 
significant threat to international stability, the balance of power, or the uninterrupted flow of 
precious or vital commodities. In short, none of the world's superpowers have a vested interest in 
influencing the governance of Northern Ireland. Undoubtedly, Britain is determined to ensure that 
Northern Ireland (or any part of Ireland) will not be occupied by a hostile power, but if that were 
to happen it would be tantamount to a declaration of war on Her Majesty's government. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 My thanks to a referee on this point. 
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it would require a hard-to-imagine shift in the balance of world power for any state to attempt to 
do so, considering the difficulties involved in occupying a base so close to Britain. 
 There are many basic differences between the Northern Ireland situation and that existing 
in other areas that either have had or are currently experiencing conflict, areas such as the Ukraine, 
South Africa, or the Middle East. These are areas of significant geopolitical importance and some 
with the ability to influence the flow of precious natural resources. If there was an international 
interest in Ireland it was peripheral. The Clinton White House had an interest in the Irish peace 
process, but it was more like the interest the mayor of New York has in the St Patrick’s Day parade 
rather than the type of interest the CIA has in events in the Middle East. British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair had a somewhat greater stake resting on the outcome since the IRA had physically 
attacked his state and its economy and armed forces. Nevertheless, there was for him and his 
cabinet the potential to be written into history as those who had finally solved the seemingly 
impossible “Irish Question.”  
 This is very different, for example, from what is happening in present day Ukraine, where 
battles are taking place within the context of global politics. Sitting as it does between the European 
Union and the vast Russian State, Kiev is a pivot or a halfway house between East and West. It is 
no surprise therefore that the conflict in that country is now being described in old Cold War terms. 
In many ways the Ukraine suffers a double affliction in that its people are in violent disagreement 
over how the country should be managed on one hand and on the other hand, that they are situated 
geographically between two superpowers. Ukraine’s destiny is not entirely in its own hands. 
 Look then at South Africa. This country was and remains a commodity-rich land producing 
much of the world's gold and diamonds. Moreover, its geographical position at the southern tip of 
Africa gives it a commanding position to control access to both the southern Atlantic and southern 
Indian oceans, two of the world's most important regions and vital sea routes. 
 During the apartheid years, the West, led by the United States and supported by its NATO 
allies, viewed South Africa through the prism of Cold War politics. The African National Congress 
(ANC) was advised and supported by the Moscow-leaning South African Communist Party, which 
had members occupying key positions in the leadership of the ANC. Consequently, the West 
feared an ANC victory, seeing it as a Trojan horse paving the way for a regime in Johannesburg 
that was influenced if not actually controlled by Moscow. In light of this analysis, the West took 
the view that the continuation of apartheid was a more tolerable option than a communist South 
Africa.  
 With the demise of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War these geopolitical 
considerations changed. Western powers that had not only tolerated but supported apartheid 
regimes in South Africa, changed direction almost overnight. No longer fearing the left wing of 
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the ANC, the apartheid regime became an embarrassment to Western powers, which withdrew 
their support, forcing the white minority to negotiate with the African majority. The lesson of 
South Africa is that its place in world super power politics was a determining factor in its history. 
Ultimately, the world powers that tolerated apartheid, if only reluctantly, played a major role in 
forcing change and ensuring that there would be a relatively peaceful transition rather than a 
mutually destructive cataclysm. Interestingly, the western powers that feared communism were 
also influential in ensuring that while the franchise was extended to all; the free-market South 
African economy remained essentially the same.  
 For many of the same reasons, Israel and the Middle East are also quite different from 
Northern Ireland. Although the U.S. government endeavoured to broker a deal in the Middle East 
involving the State of Israel and the Palestinian people and had apparently achieved considerable 
progress with the Oslo accords, the wider political environment worked against a permanent 
settlement. Unlike South Africa, the Middle East conflict was not simply a Cold War standoff. 
Whether or not there is a Soviet Union, the Middle East remains the world's principal “swing” 
supplier of oil, and as such it has a decisive influence on the world's economy. The United States 
and its allies view the State of Israel as a key component in maintaining a balance of power in the 
Middle East. Israel’s very existence prevents any of the contending currents within the Arab world 
gaining absolute dominance and thereafter creating turbulence in the world's economy through 
controlling the flow of oil. 
 There are, nevertheless, some intriguing parallels between the State of Israel and that of 
Northern Ireland, although not so much perhaps in the realm of peace-building but more in the 
make-up of the two states. The modern State of Israel had its origins, as did Northern Ireland, in a 
migration that displaced the local indigenous inhabitants. Furthermore, both states ultimately 
depend or have depended for their military survival on significant military support from a single, 
albeit different, external sources. There is too, in both regions, two communities separated 
ostensibly by religion but in reality by many other issues which have little to do with theological 
matters.  
 Ultimately, that may be where Northern Ireland and its “peace process” may sit in the 
greater world. The area is no longer an international news story, nor is it a strategically important 
location or asset in either economic or military terms. Ireland as a whole no longer is the valuable 
larder that, as Marx observed in the 19th century, shifts cattle, grain and hapless recruits into the 
factories and armies of the British empire (Marx 1958: 702-703). The details of the Northern Irish 
conflict and settlement are not of great interest to any but historians of Ireland or specialists in 
asymmetrical warfare. What relevance Northern Ireland has to an international audience lies in 
how it once fit into a wider context; that of protecting Britain’s flank. As technology advanced and 
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the empire declined, it became attractive for London to relegate the area’s significance and 
dispense with the ongoing embarrassment it caused. This is the real lesson from Northern Ireland.  
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"If you wish to know what the spirit of conquest, religious hatred, combined with all the 
abuses of aristocracy without any of its advantages, can produce, come to Ireland." - Alexis de 
Tocqueville, 18351 
"I remember when the market took off, about 1988/89 . . . We'd no idea it was going to 
escalate into what it did. Nobody had experienced the type of boom that came. There was a lot of 
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allied insiders is quite a rocky journey, but one with steady themes: deference to authority, 
comprador capitulation to external forces, celebration of the conventional, and exclusion or erasure 
of anyone the least bit critical of elite schemes.3 By the look of things, the Celtic Tiger, defunct or 
not, is still digesting its critics. The upshot of the Tiger era was not a presumably desired deepening 
(after a Rostovian “take-off” in the 1960s) of a vibrant, if mostly foreign, manufacturing base and 
a widening of prosperity, but resort instead to conjuring money out of thin air just long enough for 
the slickest operators to cash in.4 In retrospect, and even at the time, it is hard to credit the notion 
that defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory in the developmental quest, a debacle, given who 
was in charge, was always in the cards.5 
 Progress in Ireland is all too aptly signified in the serpent Ouroborus swallowing its own 
tail — especially in the dispiriting sense of symbolizing a cyclical return (Jung 1968). Ireland has 
been thrust not back to proverbial “square one” where the citizenry can radically reconsider the 
socio-economic enterprise and how to go forward from here; instead middleman elites, as McCabe 
terms them, defiantly pressed the reset button on what should be a discredited model. As the 
“success narrative” of the tiger years fades into recriminatory nothingness, one hopes it is true that 
“a debate started in earnest as to whether we managed collectively to delude ourselves over the 
last number of years,” despite a power structure that has not budged one bit (Share and Corcoran 
2013: 2, 3.). That one can name worse cases, such as Greece, is not comforting, as Coakley clearly 
shows. 
 Fintan O'Toole, Raymond Crotty, Paeder Kirby, Ronnie Munck, Jim Wickham and a host 
of scholars now arrayed around TASC sounded unheeded early warnings of misshapen 
development policies, and then in the 2000s of frothy financial legerdemain too (Jacobsen 1978, 
1987, and 1994; Crotty 1985; Wickham 1987; Munck 1993; O'Hearn 1998; O'Toole 2003; Kirby 
2002, 2008). Before the bubble burst Bertie Ahern, like Hamlet, dabbled with “self-slaughter” as 
a solution, at least for barking mad critics. Fear not for gatekeepers after the crash because no one 
gets punished for herd behavior in major institutions. The leaders plead they knew no one (who 
mattered) who raised grave questions about the developmental model or about the financial web 
of ghostly gossamer on which everything increasingly rested in the noughties. Irish academics too 
humbly even mock themselves for “operating at a safe remove from politics” when they were 
pointing out the economy rested on unstable ground (O'Connell 2012: 22). The core problem is 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 On the authoritarian strain in political culture see Ferriter, 2005. 
4 “Deepening” entails fastening foreign firms more firmly into local supply networks, generating more Irish-owned 
industry, public or private, service or manufacturing. See Yean and Loke, 2011.  
5 See O'Riain 2010, also O'Riain, 2013.  
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that just as gender patterns are seen as “reflecting essentialist and immutable realities,” so too is 
the world economy (O'Connor 2012: 60). It simply is out there and must be adjusted to. Structure 
rules all. On that point Celtic tiger proponents and critics seem agreed. Sod agency, unless it is an 
industrial development agency fine-tuning the terms of dependence. 
 Ireland from one end of the island to the other is the classic “policy taker” (versus “maker” 
or “breaker”) so far as the international order of predation is concerned, though there is no 
absurdity in Irish policy responses that was not manifested in mightier neoliberal powers like the 
United States and the UK (Krasner 1978). For decades financiers have been fashioning what is for 
them a utopian world without risk, which is not capitalism as the textbooks know it but a rigged 
game, ultimately protected and coddled by sympathetic politicians, judges, and administrators 
within the “competition state” (Ourossoff 2012). Will this preposterous free market 
fundamentalism ever become too threadbare to take seriously? What more calamitous events will 
it take? What screams from the bank bail-out experience is the “emperor's new clothes” 
observation that those in charge of the world economic system are busy doing their pious best to 
unravel it.    
 So ensued bailouts, austerity, and reinflation of bubbles in the United States, UK, and more 
widely the EU, in the service of shoring up banking systems that are themselves best described as 
toxic assets (Suskind 2011). In the Republic, symptomatically, a recent high-spirited volume 
“refuses to allow the next generation to accept the incarceration of thought that has captured its 
predecessor”—rejecting the “old official Ireland of banking oligarchs, social partnerships, mighty 
mandarins, and states monopolies”—and then trots out the same old “lean and mean” neoliberal 
nostrums (Burke and Lyons 2011). One cannot be blamed for yearning again for “the greatest 
growth in income per head over the period 1985-2010,” except that it hasn't sunk in that virtually 
all of it was bubble-based. It is not only decrepit Bourbons who forget nothing and learn nothing. 
Institutions resolutely close ranks during crises.  
 After relating a sour litany of scandals in finance, policing and political bribery in 1980s 
Ireland, keen investigators lamented that “institutions from An Garda Siochana to the Roman 
Catholic Church still operated on the basis that a scandal for the institution was worse than any 
infidelity to legal or moral standards” (Clifford and Coleman 2010: 198). Nothing, as Archbishop 
McQuaid reportedly stated after the liberalizing Second Vatican Council, has changed. Not if he 
could help it anyway. Not if they can help it now. McCullagh, like Coakley and McCabe, notes 
“discursive moments” in late 2008 when a self-serving elite diagnosis succeeded in blaming the 
entire Irish people, not bankers and speculators, for thinking up an infinitely complicated way to 
keep a stagnant system afloat on credit and exports. The key here is that you don't really have to 
fool people into believing a plainly silly story, you just have to fool people into thinking everyone 
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else believes the story, which is much easier and more disheartening for all those who otherwise 
might mount a challenge (Jacobsen 2008: 360-361). 
 The origins of this ideational and institutional stasis stem from thwarted revolutionary 
aspirations, which Foster, among many others, argues with ample if not clinching evidence was 
never likely in the 1916-23 epoch (Foster 2014: 329). Ernie O'Malley, cited in an essay above, 
serves as the ‘median’ Irish rebel, as unencumbered with social change aspirations as any politician 
or economist. O'Malley soon joined those who “rail against the new state for not delivering what 
they fought for.” So, beyond independence, there was some inchoate vision of social betterment 
(Foster 2014: 309). O'Malley expressed scorn for “the convictions of purely revolutionary workers 
who stood outside the nationalist movement and a certain amusement at their arguments” 
(O'Malley 1936: 144). Yet even this arch-nationalist Republican admitted that “class distinctions 
would jut out, and our merging into what we were pleased to call 'the people' was a figment” (p. 
317). O'Malley also credits the crucial and perhaps indispensible role of worker action for the 
success of the struggle, so far as it went, just as Kostick (2009) argues. It was not historically 
inevitable that labour “waited,” but the consequences are immense.  
 O'Malley was not disposed to think far ahead, but plenty of others were. Figures like James 
Connolly or Paedar O'Donnell or George Gilmore are not fairly characterized as “prisoners of their 
own concepts,” but were more aware of their constraints than critics seem to be of their own biases. 
(The Gerty McDowell image fails to "reverse the gaze" and consider that it is her beach 
companions who seem most locked into a self-stunting swirl, not her.)6 Peader O'Donnell's 
nationalism was the antithesis of bourgeois nationalism, which his opponents appreciated well 
enough to want to shoot him for the difference. Translating socialist principles into locally 
applicable terms is a legitimate activity, which has had its successes elsewhere. The argument by 
English, Grant and predecessors regarding the “theoretical inconsistencies of mixing 
republicanism with socialism” portrays this task as a kind of crime of intellectual miscegenation 
(like mixing Marx and Freud, which engendered many fascinating works), and is just as foolish 
and fruitless as opposition to any other form of miscegenation.7  
 So what is to be done? Pity the poor developmental state. The formidable task of “getting 
it right” regarding the coordination (and/or lucky confluence) of international conditions, domestic 
coalition formation, and suitable institutional structure is a work that is never quite done. 
Neoliberalism imposes daunting, if not impossible, conditions. What were advantageous 
arrangements yesterday can burden or obstruct one unduly today. There's no resting on laurels 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 For defenses of Gerty in this vein see Ross (2009) and Sondergard (2011). 
7 Grant, 2012: 223; English 1994. Grant allows for adaptability but implies this is somehow cheating. 
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because, as O’Riain, and countless preceding scholars observe, development is “a politically 
contested process that generates continuous, albeit different, challenges as it unfolds” (2004: 125). 
Pragmatism, a word people rarely quibble with, was interpreted to best serve the mission, as Albert 
Reynolds stated in 1989, “to evolve, and apply policy so as to underpin rather than undermine 
growth prospects” (Boss 2011: 120). The Celtic tiger carefully eschewed the dirigiste element that 
deepened success for some Asian counterparts. The Irish polity, like Anglo-American 
counterparts, also was heartily disinclined to redistribute benefits to the less well-connected 
(Connolly 2006: 2). High growth—regardless of the ‘black hole’—teamed up with rising income 
inequality, a stinginess regarding welfare, and a surge in “virulent racism” on both sides of the 
border toward immigrants (O'Riain 2004: 63: Kinealy 2010: 317). 
 The developmental ideal of “self-reproducing dynamics” was elusive because no one 
seriously pursued it. After the Telesis Report in 1982 sounded the tocsin about overreliance on the 
multinationals, the Irish Republic refashioned itself into what O'Riain termed a “developmental 
network state” whose purported objective was to thread foreign investment more securely into the 
economy, cultivate local enterprise, and deepen their connections. Irish growth also was based on 
a willing coalition that other analysts call neo-corporatism or a “cognitively locked social 
partnership,” espousing what O'Riain nicely terms “solidarity without equality” (Murphy 2008). 
Contrary to business hype, the sources of Ireland’s 1990s “takeoff” lay in foreign investor 
enticements, public sector spending, and a hefty influx of EU structural funds to shore up 
infrastructure. There is latitude for institutional experiment here and supple state institutions can 
influence the character of the market they operate in, even though O'Riain comes perilously close 
in all his work to a social constructivist claim that capitalism only is what states make of it.  
 The analytical upshot is that the “power of the global economy is not determining—the 
analysis shows that there is significant room for politics”—a lesson repeatedly noted from 
Fernando Cardoso in the 1970s stretching to yours truly in the 1990s (O'Riain 2004; Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979; Jacobsen 1994). Yet the point bears repeating. O'Riann, like other critics, shows how 
economic success, as understood by its main myopic beneficiaries, undermines the very 
institutional supports that make the system work in the first place. “If the institutions of the Celtic 
Tiger could generate the results they did in face of domestic neoliberal populism and an 
international order hostile to state and social shaping of economic life, what might they achieve 
given a more supportive political order?” (2004: 11). Good question.  
 Financialization means making money from money rather than from production (in the 
absence of sufficient demand and investment opportunities); it is devising, exploiting, and gorging 
on arcane pecuniary devices and getting away with it, even when failing (Salverda 2015; Hudson 
2015). With so much spare cash seeking investible outlets one might imagine investors would be 
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in a disadvantageous position and be eager to go along with any productive scheme public 
authorities propose. Such was not the casse. What Cerny (1997) termed the “competition state” 
edges itself away from the ordinary populace and places itself at the service of global firms and 
banks, trusting that everything would work out because there was no alternative. Kirby finds the 
Irish experience redolent of a “competition state with pockets of developmentalism” (2009: 19). 
Even those pockets look like grist for the next sell-off. The tally sheet on the waves of 
privatizations and public-private partnerships in the neighbouring UK has not been a happy one 
either, but they go on anyway.8 One path forward is a dispelling of the stubborn myth that valiant 
investors, and not state spending, always generate the conditions for productivity and prosperity, 
as Mazzacato most recently elaborated.9  
 As for the North, obfuscation was however regrettably crucial to achieve the Good Friday 
Agreement so that political figures could interpret it to their own communities in favorable ways. 
Stepping stone to the all-Island Republic or final recognition of the British link? Yet what an 
analyst alertly calls the Republican movement's “continuation of war by other means” slowly has 
gained the upper hand over recalcitrant working class loyalists (Bean 2011: 61, 62). Northern 
Ireland from 1997 onward has seen indefatigable foot-dragging, dissident Republican violence, 
escalation in house prices (until the crash), racist sprees by loyalist gangs, proliferation of so-called 
peace walls, and a power-sharing executive without much power to alleviate local economic 
pressures and under almost constant threat of collapse due to conflict between a resistant Sinn Féin 
and SDLP versus the leading conservative DUP over inflicting an austerity budget.  
 A pair of recent IRA-linked killings provided grist for an expedient effort by Unionist 
Parties to torpedo power-sharing again, but the peculiar reprisal—peculiar, given that the murder 
victims were former or active IRA members—was averted last November by the latest of many a 
last minute deal. In Northern Ireland more people are dying on the streets from homelessness than 
from political violence (Belfast Telegraph 2016). There is precious little sign that stringent 
economic conditions are uniting rather than alienating the communities. The inequalities that 
underlay the conflict have not gone away, though the Catholic community has made undeniable 
strides. The Catholic-Protestant gap is closing quickly in sheer demographics, but this trend 
predicts nothing as to the issue of unification since only a minority of Northern Catholics are 
interested in it. As McKearney observes, the political establishment in the Irish Republic, with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 'The Treasury estimated the lifetime costs of Labour-era deals at 215 billion pounds, paying for deals with a capital 
value of between 55 and 65 billion pounds.' Toynbee and Walker, 2013: 117. 
9 Mazzucato, 2013: 193. On the 'Sussex school' of technology and economics from which her analysis hails, see 
Jacobsen 1992.  
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wary eye as well on constitutional Sinn Féin, is in no more a hurry now than it was earlier to 
integrate a million plus discontented Loyalists into a single political structure (McKittrick and 
McVea 2000; Coakley 2002; Tonge 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
The argument that “state-centric approaches ignore the fact that the national state can only exist 
within a larger system of states and institutions” is a cogent one so far as it goes (Smith and Kutz-
Flamenbaum 2010: 211). Even the most conservative scholars of international political economy 
will agree heartily. The question is, how far? One brilliantly daffy theory I heard spun long ago in 
an Irish pub was that we all come into life with a mission to move half the distance away from our 
instinctive natures if we are to be fulfilled, content, or even just sane. If you are extroverted, move 
toward introversion; if introverted go toward extroversion. Everyone is thus encumbered with a 
difficult task. This is no less the case for analyzing how international forces affect nation-states 
through the interpretive (and interest-laden) lenses of domestic groups, at least those who manage 
to achieve a say in how the state responds.  
The Irish Republic's February 2016 election, sorting itself out among players as of this 
writing, can reasonably be seen, regardless of the eventual governing arrangement, as a spectacle 
of a stark yet muffled repudiation of mainstream parties and of neoliberal economic policy (Walsh 
2016). The two major centrist “civil war parties” Fianna Fail and Fine Gael barely got a majority 
of the vote, which is a remarkable drop from their standard post-independence 80% range (Loscher 
2016). Irish Labour's self-immolation in yet another ill-advised coalition (30 of 37 seats lost) leaves 
the field to a confused if potentially formidable opposition of scattered leftists and independents. 
One task today is generating a movement for an “alternative political economy”—one that does 
not privatize profits and socialize losses would do for a start—for which a recent TASC survey 
indicates immense latent popular support (TASC 2014). A related task is finding the economic 
policy equivalent of Andre Gorz’ “non-reform reforms” for guiding the next phase. From 
Tocqueville to the present an emphatic “lack of a moral tie between rich and poor” remains the 
case, and indeed is required for increasingly feral finance capital to expand. 
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Abstract 
Since the collapse of the Celtic Tiger, the socio-economic particularity of neoliberal capitalism in its Irish 
manifestation has increasingly been critiqued, but little attention has been paid to neoliberalism as ecology within 
Ireland. This article conducts an exploratory survey of the characteristics of the Irish neoliberal ecological 
regime during and after the Celtic Tiger, identifying the opening of new commodity frontiers (such as fracking, 
water, agro-biotechnology, and biopharma) constituted in the neoliberal drive to appropriate and financialize 
nature. I argue for the usefulness of applying not only the tools of world-systems analysis, but also Jason W. 
Moore’s world-ecological paradigm, to analysis of Ireland as a semi-periphery. What is crucial to a macro-
ecological understanding of Ireland’s experience of the neoliberal regime of the world-ecology is the 
inextricability of its financial role as a tax haven and secrecy jurisdiction zone from its environmental function as 
a semi-peripheral pollution and water haven. More expansive, dialectical understandings of “ecology” as 
comprising the whole of socio-ecological relations within the capitalist world-ecology—from farming to pharma 
to financialization—are vital to forming configurations of knowledge able not only to take account of Ireland’s 
role in the environmental history of capitalism, but also to respond to the urgent ecological crises of the 
neoliberal present. 
Keywords: World-Ecology; Ireland, Neoliberalism; Food-Systems; Energy; Pollution  
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Anna Klobucka’s observation that world-systems paradigms offer a more complex understanding 
of European semi-peripheries than the binary models of colonial and postcolonial development is 
particularly suggestive for the Irish situation (Klobucka 1997: 125-6). Ireland’s uneven 
development and peripheralization cannot be understood solely in the context of British 
colonialism, with no ability to account for its subsequent subordination to the hegemony of U.S. 
capital and to core Eurozone states. The historical development of Ireland has been profoundly 
shaped and continues to be shaped by its role as a politically weak and unevenly developed semi-
periphery within the European economy and the capitalist world-system as whole. The converse 
point could also be made, that as an “intermediating semi-periphery” (O’Hearn 2001: 200) 
Ireland has played a significant role in the emergence of different cycles of systemic 
accumulation as a laboratory for new forms of expropriation, from sixteenth-century plantation 
to twenty-first century neoliberal austerity. However, this role must be understood not only in 
terms of Ireland’s socio-economic relation to the world-economy, but of Ireland’s function in the 
world-ecology. This article argues for the adoption of the theoretical tools of world-ecological 
analysis in order to conduct a radical reappraisal in the current conjuncture of Ireland’s 
environmental history in relation to the structures of power and capital inside Ireland, and the 
structures of external power within which Ireland is bound.  
Within the Irish academy, the recent emergence of transdisciplinary approaches to 
ecology has coincided with the intensification of technocratic approaches to funding of 
environmental research. European schemes and policy agendas such as Horizon 2020 are mostly 
oriented towards producing bankable technological “solutions” to the chaellenges of climate 
crisis, energy sovereignty, and food security confronting contemporary Europe. This forecloses 
the possibilities of investigating alternative, more emancipatory organizations of nature-society. 
Obediently incorporating EU policy targets, Irish national funding bodies have emphasized the 
degree to which technocratic solutions should be monetized, part of the ongoing drive to bolster 
the knowledge economy and to convert universities into patent factories, where intellectual 
property can be enclosed and converted into alienable commodities.  
Thus, the “Food Harvest 2020” policy document produced by the Irish Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF) is rooted in an idealist conception of nature and 
tellingly motivated by the desire to “greenwash” the agri-industry at the same time as it 
implements the targets of ecological modernization laid out in the Horizon 2020 scheme. The 
document opens by declaring “Ireland’s historic association with the color green is linked to our 
unspoilt agricultural landscape and our temperate climate. The modern use of ‘green’ to identify 
concern for the natural environment has, for some time, been recognized as representing a 
natural marketing opportunity for Irish agri-food to build on” (DAFF 2010: 3). This cynical 
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manipulation of the word “green” strips it of ethical and political connotations and represses the 
history of ecological imperialism and violence implicit in the transformation of Ireland into a 
mythical “emerald isle”: whether the mass deforestations of early Plantation, or the violence of 
what Marx famously called “the clearing of the estate of Ireland” that enabled the nineteenth-
century conversion to grazier monoculture (Slater 2013: 29). Given the ongoing marketization of 
knowledge production in the Irish university and the unprecedented commoditization of new 
ecological commons under neoliberal capitalism, methodological approaches that historicize the 
evolution of regimes of capitalist nature in Ireland seem all the more vital.  
In the past two decades, the primacy of “nature” as a category for analysis in relation to 
capital has grown more urgent and given rise to an “environmental turn” in left and Marxist 
theory that increasingly approaches the economic crises of the capitalist world-system as 
inseparable from the ecological crises of climate change and peak appropriation. Environmental 
historian Jason W. Moore yokes Marxian ecology to world-systems frameworks in order to forge 
a “unified theory of capital accumulation and the production of nature” (Moore 2011a: 126). He 
reinterprets the concept of ecology, adapting the term oikeois to designate “the creative, 
historical, and dialectical relation between, and also always within, human and extra-human 
natures,” a perspective that attempts to transcend Cartesian dichotomies of humanity vs. nature 
in favor of an understanding of humanity-in-nature as the matrix in which human activity unfolds 
and the field upon which historical agency operates (Moore 2013: 3). Through this view, 
capitalism is not something that acts upon nature but rather through it (Moore 2015: 6). 
 World-ecology enables diachronic and synchronic investigation of environmental 
problems at different temporal and geographical scales, adapting Giovanni Arrighi’s history of 
the systemic cycles of expanding and contracting capital accumulation to construct an 
environmental history of capitalism. Arrighi argues that four successive complexes of hegemonic 
state-capitalist alliances (Iberian-Genoese, Dutch, British, and American) emerged over the 
longue durée of capitalism, produced and sustained by organizational “revolutions” that provided 
each hegemon a competitive edge in economic and politico-military power (Arrighi 1994: 1). For 
Moore, the systemic cycles of accumulation corresponding to the rise and fall of different core-
hegemonic complexes are founded in organizational revolutions not only of social relations such 
as class, but of biophysical natures. He posits the capitalist world-system as simultaneously a 
“capitalist world-ecology,” a “world-historical matrix of human and extra-human nature 
premised on endless commodification” (Moore 2011a: 108). This world-ecology is constituted 
not only through the periodic reorganization of geometries of power and economy, but through 
the remaking of socio-ecological relations: 
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World hegemonies did not merely organize resource and food regimes; 
the hegemonies of historical capitalism were socio-ecological projects. 
Dutch hegemony emerged through a world-ecological revolution that 
stretched from Canada to the spice islands of Southeast Asia; British 
hegemony, through the coal/steampower and plantation revolutions; 
American hegemony, through oil frontiers and the industrialization of 
agriculture it enabled (Moore 2011a: 125).  
As such, the capitalist world-system does not merely possess an ecological dimension, 
but is inherently constituted by ecological regimes and revolutions that periodically reorganize 
and renew the conditions of accumulation to allow intensified appropriation of ecological 
surpluses. These regimes are dependent on the “dialectic of plunder and productivity”: the 
appropriation of “free gifts” of nature and their transmutation through labor into surplus value 
(Moore 2015: 138). When commodity frontiers in each successive ecological regime are 
exhausted and no longer able to produce surpluses, then the conditions of accumulation falter, 
until new ecological revolutions emerge. These revolutions produce new technics of 
appropriation and locate new frontiers, while intensifying existing extraction. However, each 
revolution cannot resolve the exhaustion of the previous regime; it can only displace its 
contradictions to a new geographical sector and reconfigure them on a larger scale. Indeed, 
Moore suggests that the neoliberal regime that emerged in the late 1970s is now mired in an 
epochal crisis, faced by the disappearance of new frontiers of enclosure and diminishing returns 
from the financialization of nature.  
Since the collapse of the Celtic Tiger, the socio-economic particularity of neoliberal 
capitalism in its Irish manifestation has increasingly been examined, but little attention has been 
paid to neoliberalism as ecology within Ireland. As Lucy Collins remarks, much transdisciplinary 
research in Irish studies in areas such as built environments, migrant studies, heritage studies, 
and social justice is already inherently “ecological,” but tends to be compartmentalized or not 
consciously recognized as such (Collins 2014: 18). Any world-ecological history of Ireland must 
entail not merely examining “environments” and “landscapes,” but rather uncovering the 
periodic reorganizations of socio-ecological relations into new ecological regimes. Financial 
service centers and pharmaceutical factories, plantations and cattle ranches, tax havens and 
pollution havens, global empires and common markets are all forms of environment-making that 
constellate human relations and extra-human processes into new ecological regimes. More 
expansive, dialectical understandings of “ecology” as comprising the whole of socio-ecological 
relations within the capitalist world-ecology—from farming to pharma to financialization—are 
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vital to forming configurations of knowledge able not only to take account of past environmental 
transformations but also to respond to the global ecological crises of the neoliberal present.  
In this article, I will focus primarily on the contemporary period, conducting an 
exploratory survey of the characteristics of the Irish ecological regime during and after the Celtic 
Tiger, identifying the opening of new commodity frontiers (such as fracking, water, 
agrobiotechnology, and biopharma) constituted in the neoliberal drive to appropriate and 
financialize nature. I argue for the usefulness of applying not only the tools of world-systems 
analysis, but also Moore’s world-ecological paradigm, to analysis of Ireland as a semi-periphery. 
Before reading the particularities of Ireland’s contemporary neoliberal ecological regime, I begin 
with a summary of Ireland’s incorporation into the capitalist world-ecology in the early modern 
period, by way of demonstrating antecedents to and contrasts with the contemporary period. 
 
Food and Fuel: The Formation of the “Green Donkey” 
Moore identifies three key world-ecological regimes in the environmental history of capitalism: 
colonization and plantation in the early modern period, the partition of Africa and the integration 
of Indian and Chinese peasantries into the world-economy under high imperialism, and the 
neoliberal regime emerging from the 1970s (Moore 2000: 142-5). The rise of capitalism in the 
fifteenth century was enabled by an ecological revolution in humanity’s relation with extra-
human nature. Frontier-led appropriations of the “Four Cheaps”—food, energy, labor power, and 
raw material—unleashed a strategy of commodification shaped around the technics of the 
plantation, the monoculture, and the mine (Moore 2015: 17). The early modern revolution of 
labor productivity within commodity production and exchange turned on the emergence of a 
twinned dynamic that combined strategies of exploitation (within commodification) and 
strategies of appropriation (outside of commodification). This strategy was enabled by new 
symbolic regimes and technics that reconceived nature as abstract and external, time as linear, 
and space as flat and geometrical. Extra-human nature was reconceived as an allegedly free gift, 
a surplus that could be appropriated and put to work without cost to the capitalist. “Abstract 
social labor”—the invention of new forms of expropriation of surplus human labor—was reliant 
on the simultaneous invention of “abstract social nature,” the reimagination of nature as a source 
of “cheap” or free surpluses that could be rationalized and efficiently appropriated in service to 
commodity production (Moore 2014b: 5). Nature’s unpaid work was thus exploited in both 
human and biophysical form, whether the nutrient density of hitherto uncommoditized soils and 
of forests put to fire; the energy sources provided by new flora exported throughout imperial 
networks and transformed into global commodities, such as sugar or the potato; or the many 
forms of unpaid labor, including the reproductive labor of women and the work of slaves, 
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indentured servants, and tenant farmers. The symbolic regimes and technics involved in “abstract 
social nature” enabled the radical simplification of the “diversity of human and extra-human 
activity necessary to capitalist development but not directly valorized (‘paid’) through the money 
economy” (Moore 2014a: 21).  
While the Americas are rightly seen as the ground zero of capitalist accumulation in the 
early modern period, opening a “Great Frontier” (Webb 1964: xv) that enabled the European 
appropriation of vast ecological surpluses from hitherto uncommoditized regions, Ireland also 
functioned, on a smaller scale, as a frontier and testing ground for new technics and imaginaries 
that were crucial to the formation of the Atlantic economy and to the expansion of the capitalist 
world-ecology. The Atlantic island functioned as a geographical stepping-stone for transatlantic 
settlement and a laboratory, conveniently proximate to expanding Britain, in which to trial 
techniques of privatization and expropriation: “It was the very people who were most deeply 
concerned with the plantation and colonization of Southern Ireland—Humphrey Gilbert, Walter 
Raleigh, Richard Grenville—who took the leading part in planting the first colonies in Virginia. 
It is as if Ireland were the blueprint for America” (Wallerstein 1974: 88). The radical 
simplification of nature can be clearly seen in the context of Irish plantation, where mass 
deforestation fundamentally transformed the ecology of Ireland, accompanied by radical forms 
of dispossession of indigenous populations and targeted destruction of non-human species and 
flora, including wolves and broad-leaf trees, in order to facilitate the importation and production 
of exogenous crops and commodities for export, and to eliminate the social and cultural bases of 
the reproduction of pre-capitalist modes of life. As Archibald Lewis remarks of the role of 
English expansion in relation to frontier development in Western Europe, “The most important 
frontier […] was an internal one of forest, swamp, marsh, moor and fen” (cited in Wallerstein 
1974: 138). The significance of land and agriculture is almost overdetermined in Irish 
historiography, yet it is crucial to understand the transformation of Irish environments not merely 
as a product of colonialism, but rather in relation to the larger early modern revolution in 
capitalist accumulation. The reorganization of Ireland’s biologically diverse bogs and forests into 
rationalized sites of capitalist monoculture was crucial to the erosion of Irish self-sufficiency and 
the integration of the island into the capitalist world-ecology. 
 Edmund Spenser’s notorious political treatise, A View of the Present State of Ireland (ca. 
1598), composed from Spenser’s three-thousand-acre settlement in Munster in the 1590s, 
powerfully crystallizes the symbolic regimes associated with the reconception of Irish ecology as 
abstract social nature. Recounting the late wars of Munster as a historical precedent for the 
suppression of Irish insurrection and as a model for Tudor reconquest and plantation of Ireland, 
Spenser’s narrator approvingly describes the aftermath of English-imposed starvation of the 
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rebels: “In short space there were none almost left, and a most populous and plentifull countrey 
suddainely left voyde of man and beast; yet sure in all that warre, there perished not many by the 
sword, but all by the extremitie of famine” (Spenser 1997: 102). The ecological plenitude of Irish 
nature, conveniently emptied of its indigenes, is released for capture as ecological surplus. 
Spenser’s advocacy of tactical famine as a means of dispossession and as a force of creative 
destruction that will reshape the formerly unproductive Irish “wilderness” into generative 
plantation marks the historical transition from a feudal to capitalist mode of production, 
embodied in conceptions of abstract social nature as “tabula rasa” ripe for social reengineering. 
Sarah Hogan draws a parallel between the “shock doctrine” of neoliberal accumulation through 
dispossession, as described by Naomi Klein, and the “rationalistic, tactical, economic” 
expedients imagined by Spenser (Hogan 2012: 463) in the mathematical, abstract part of the 
work that proposes a scheme for English plantation. This scheme imagines the grid-like 
remapping of Ireland to impose a geographically dispersed network of plots, garrisons, and 
towns that will rationalize the countryside and produce new divisions of labor between Protestant 
English landowners and the newly landless Irish populace. Spenser proposes a radical 
simplification of Irish nature, suggesting the reorganization not only of social, but of ecological 
relations, in the course of agrarian revolution: “Evills must first be cut away by a strong hand, 
before any good can be planted, like as the corrupt branches and unwholesome boughs are first 
to be pruned, and the foule mosse cleansed and scraped away, before the tree can bring forth any 
good fruite” (Spenser 1997: 93). 
In this scheme, deforestation is a form of abstract social nature necessary to integrate 
Ireland into the capitalist oikeois and to eliminate human political resistance and non-human 
resistance to the ecological revolution, killing both the Irish “wolf-heads” who took refuge in the 
forests, and the wolves which threatened imported livestock; tellingly, both varieties of “wolf,” 
Celtic insurgent and canis lupus, had bounties placed on their heads by Cromwell. Clearing the 
forests literally made space for new forms of agriculture, opening up land and eroding the basis 
of previous social unities such as kinship and communal transhumance that posed resistance to 
the ecological revolution. However, the forests were also a commodity frontier in their own 
right, a source of unpaid energy surpluses. The ascendant logic of capitalist accumulation in 
Western Europe was driven by a need to found new regimes of cheap food and cheap energy:  
The drive for fuel and food—especially wood, wheat, and sugar—
reinforced the uneven development of world capitalism; in the case of 
western and eastern Europe, it transformed the latter’s small differences 
into large and durable inequality, and it created new peripheries in the 
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Atlantic islands and the Americas. This development of an unequal 
world division of labor, in turn, created new capitalist efficiencies of 
specialization between agriculture and pasturage and between agrarian 
activities and industrial activities (Moore 2000: 134). 
Wallerstein describes the “wood famine” confronting early modern capitalism as giving 
rise to an insatiable demand for wood products, which he labels “the other great basic need” next 
to food, and, along with sugar, the major growth crop of the early modern world-economy 
(Wallerstein 1974: 44-5). After the inexorable deforestation of Western Europe, England’s 
colonization of Ireland opened a crucial new frontier for the appropriation of timber. Oak was 
particularly scarce, and Ireland’s broad-leaf forests were “used up to supply England with 
timber” so that whereas one eighth of the island was under forest cover in 1600, it had “virtually 
disappeared by 1700” (Wallerstein 1974: 281). After timber supplies dwindled in the cores and 
semi-peripheries of the early modern world-system, a new revolution in cash-crop forestry would 
occur in the Baltic region, which by “the sixteenth century . . . had begun to export wood in large 
quantities to Holland, England, and the Iberian peninsula” (Wallerstein 1974: 45). The 
exhaustion of Ireland’s timber frontier demonstrates the sectoral relocation of commodity 
frontiers to new geographies and highlights the role of the Irish semi-periphery as an exemplar 
for the subsequent establishment of new timber frontiers in India’s teak forests, as well as the 
transformation of forested island ecologies in the Caribbean into cane-sugar monocultures 
through systematic deforestation. Furthermore, the Irish situation dramatizes the extent to which 
the invention of new modes of abstract social labor through which to expropriate surplus human 
labor—as captured in the evolution of new forms of capitalist agriculture to provide cheap 
food—are inextricable from the invention of abstract social nature and the creation of previously 
uncommoditized natures as a source of free surpluses—as captured in the reduction of the 
biodiversity of Irish forests to an “input” of cheap energy and timber. 
The ecological regime that took shape during the long sixteenth century was not merely 
mercantilist, but productivist in its creation of an agro-ecological revolution that combined 
market, class, and ecological transformations in a geography expanding from the Baltic and 
Scandinavian peripheries of Europe to the Caribbean and South America (Moore 2008: 59). If 
sixteenth-century Dutch hegemony was partly founded in the appropriation of grain from Poland, 
the rise of English hegemony was subsequently dependent on the Caribbean plantations, 
American Midwest grain-belts, and the agro-economy of Ireland. Raymond Crotty describes the 
“non-individualist, non-capitalist, land-based economy” of pre-conquest Ireland as characterized 
by “communally grazed land determined output, [wherein] the individual, by his work or the 
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work of his slaves or capital, could not affect output” (Crotty 2001: 101). The organization of the 
pre-capitalist Irish oikeois around cattle—which due to Ireland’s temperate climate could survive 
winters without fodder—enabled the Irish to avoid importing grain, and thus to maintain a 
degree of self-sufficiency without capital. Plantation, by enclosing, deforesting, and fencing off 
land, introducing new conceptions of cattle as private property to be sold in open markets, 
forcing populations to adopt regulated pasture and abandon hilly regions, building towns and 
garrisons in order to rationalize and control territories, and coercing those engaged in pasturage 
to begin practicing tillage and husbandry, undermined this independence from capital and 
converted the Irish into tenants deprived of rights to land. Nevertheless, as Eoin Flaherty reminds 
us, pre-famine geographies of communality such as the rundale persisted well into the nineteenth 
century (Flaherty 2013: 75).  
The expropriation and privatization of Irish land, and the subsequent emergence of 
intensive, enclosed and export-oriented agriculture which it enabled, could not have be achieved 
without the inauguration of a new agri-food system organized around the potato, which sustained 
the new forms of appropriation of unpaid peasant labor (Crotty 2001: 172). The Irish were the 
first Europeans to accept Solanum tuberosum, imported from the South American Andes, as a 
primary food crop (D’Arcy 2010: 120). If Irish farmers could subsist on the potato, the costs of 
the reproduction of labor could be drastically lowered. Crotty emphasizes the global imbrication 
of Irish agro-ecology within the larger world-system, drawing an explicit connection between the 
subordination of the Irish peasantry and the construction of a global “coolie” class stretching 
from the West Indies to Ireland to India (Crotty 2001: 178). The subsequent conversion of Irish 
agriculture to grazier economy must be understood as indelibly linked to the development of 
salting technology and the ability to provision slaves in the Caribbean plantations with foodstuffs 
produced by disenfranchised Irish peasants, even as the Molasses Act of 1732 forced a new 
market for British West Indies sugar in Ireland. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, when English agriculture encountered a yield crisis that 
forced England to shift from a grain exporter to a leading grain importer, Ireland’s subordination 
as a semi-periphery organized around agricultural exports intensified. Conor McCabe powerfully 
describes the post-famine conversion that transformed Ireland into a roofless factory producing 
livestock, reshaping socio-ecological relations around the monoculture of King Cattle: 
No matter how green the grass grew, no matter how flat the fields were, 
there was nothing natural about the Irish live cattle trade. It was a 
modern industrial assembly line, one which stretched for hundreds of 
miles, from the small holders of Sligo to the slaughter houses of 
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Deptford, and one for which the cattle ranchers supplied the raw 
material. The graziers did not produce beef. They did not produce shelf-
ready products. They exported livestock to British fatteners and slaughter 
houses, and it was there that the products which ended up on the kitchen 
table were made. This system of production had deep historical roots—
so much so that almost all attempts to disentangle the Irish economy 
from such a lopsided relationship as one which saw calves on grass as 
the ne plus ultra of agricultural and industrial ambition, were completely 
frustrated up until the 1950s, at which stage the importation of foreign 
industry was put forward as the seemingly perfect partner to the 
livestock business, Although not a straight line by any means, the first 
hints of this assembly line can be seen as far back as the early 1770s 
(McCabe 2013: 59). 
The means through which the implementation of extreme forms of economic 
rationalization and liberalism refused assistance to the famine-stricken in nineteenth-century 
Ireland and enabled vast clearances that made way for new forms of grazier economy and cattle 
ranching have been amply documented by Irish historians, and read productively in comparison 
to the forced integration of Indian peasantries into the world-market through the social 
engineering of famine in nineteenth-century India (Davis 2002: 9). The institution of the grazier 
economy would marginalize other sectors of industrial production and crystallize a pattern of 
asymmetric development that would persist into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, opening 
the door to the ascendancy of financialization in the neoliberal regime. 
 
Tax Haven, Pollution Frontier:  
Neoliberal Ecology with Irish Characteristics 
Whereas the early modern appropriation of new commodity frontiers from Ireland to the 
Americas provided a plenitude of surpluses that fueled the engine of capitalist accumulation for 
centuries, the neoliberal era confronts the exhaustion of the frontiers that made “cheap nature” 
possible. Farshad Araghi has argued that late capitalism is mired in a “crisis of cheap ecology,” 
caused by a decline of the short-term and contradictory gains of the Green Revolution and the 
loss of prior biophysical inputs in labor, energy, food and resources (Araghi 2010: 39). Loosely 
beginning in the 1970s, the neoliberal regime has relied on the rapid subsumption of whatever 
frontiers remained after nineteeth-century industrialization, including oil in the North Sea, West 
Africa and the Gulf of Mexico, the exhaustion of fertile soil and cheap water by agro-export 
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regimes appropriating food surpluses and peasant holdings from China to Mexico, and the 
privatization of cheap metals and oils enabled by the integration of the former USSR into the 
world market (Moore 2012: 245). However, following these enclosures, capitalist accumulation 
now confronts the stagnation of agricultural yields; a tendency towards mass urbanization that 
stresses the agro-demographic order; climate volatility, and geo-technical challenges to resource 
extraction, particularly of energy, water, and metals. The bubbles in global food and primary 
commodity prices since 2001 telegraph the decline of the “Four Cheaps” of labor, energy, food 
and raw resources, and the intensification of ecological contradictions by financial speculation.  
Rather than being defined by a new productivity revolution, the neoliberal era has instead 
advanced the penetration of finance capital into the global reproduction of human and extra-
human natures. Neil Smith describes the neoliberal invention of “nature banking,” which turns 
on the manufacture of “allowable natural destruction” by fragmenting nature into “tradable bits 
of capital,” as a fundamental shift in the capitalist production of nature that reconceives “nature 
as a financial accumulation strategy” (Smith 2006: 16). When traded on environmental 
derivatives markets, ecological commodities such as carbon credits allow financiers to speculate 
on and profit from price volatility as environmental crises accelerate. If previous forms of 
appropriation of nature emphasized the transmutation of ecological surpluses into use-values for 
capitalist production—wood into energy, cattle into food—these financial derivatives function 
primarily as market instruments, acting to transfer stewardship of previously uncontrolled 
commons to private business interests, and bringing nature under the control of the market in the 
attempt “to commensurate all of reality into generic income streams” (Moore, 2012a: 19). As 
such, neoliberal financialization extends beyond the manufacture of derivatives to the reordering 
of the totality of nature-society relations: “From the agro-food sector to working class 
households that depend on credit cards to pay groceries and medical bills, global nature has 
become dependent on a circuit of capital premised on accumulation by financial means rather 
than industrial and agricultural production” (Moore 2011: 43-4). Instead of the unprecedented 
horizontal expansion across space that marked earlier cycles of accumulation, the neoliberal 
regime privileges the vertical extension of profit-maximization strategies into new spheres of 
life, the transition from stakeholder to shareholder capitalism, and short-term profit-making 
strategies and privatization over the long-term strategies of fixed capital investment and 
development of new productive capacities. The neoliberal logic of accumulation is distinctive for 
its “impatience,”expressed in the extreme rapidity of its ecological asset-stripping. 
This temporal hegemony of finance capital over accumulation can clearly be seen in the 
context of the Irish semi-periphery. Semi-peripheries act as “transistor zones” where “two 
different segments of a commodity chain become articulated and receive their first pricing” thus 
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making it possible “for the core and periphery to transmit value to each other, especially as both 
the rural dispossessed of the hinterlands and the factors of the core’s jobbing interests congregate 
there, one to commodify their labor and the other to finance and insure the material apparatuses 
that will consume this labor-power” (Shapiro 2007: 37). Since the late twentieth century, the 
Irish semi-periphery has acted as a transistor zone par excellence for the negotiation of new 
modes of financialization and speculative entrepreneurialship. Ireland’s integration into the 
neoliberal ecological regime has been characterized by peripheral dependency on foreign capital 
investment, the tendency towards financialization and housing speculation rather than industrial 
production, the intensification of earlier monocultures formed under colonialism (such as the 
beef and dairy economies), the formation of new monocultures organized around new 
commodity frontiers in biocommodities, and the drive to enclose remaining commons (as in 
water, oil and gas).  
In Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and other key regions of the Global South, the 
“neoliberal turn” has been distinguished by a subordination to “eco-financial imperialism,” 
manifested in the coercive imposition of waves of privatization and structural adjustment 
programs by supra-national institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, in exchange for loans 
to finance state debts, and by an emphasis on “speculative-centric, carbon-intensive 
accumulation” (Bond 2014). In contrast, Ireland’s boom was preconditioned by what Peadar 
Kirby, Luke Gibbons and Michael Cronin describe as its “subservient integration” into market 
fundamentalism: a submissive, rather than coerced, orientation to American and West European 
capital (Kirby, Gibbons and Cronin 2002: 2). Ireland’s contemporary position might be 
considered alongside the “Southern national champions” that Ruy Mauro Marini describes in the 
South American context as “sub-imperialist”: favored allies of capitalist cores and pro-corporate 
regimes that promote financial globalization and act as regional platforms for accumulation, 
collaborating with the expansion of transnational capital in their territories, while willingly 
undermining their own productive capacity and economic sovereignty in exchange for the 
alleged position of partnership with the cores (Mauro Marini 1972: 14). The key difference is 
that unlike sub-imperialist nations such as Brazil or South Africa, Ireland does not enjoy the 
regional geopolitical privilege of acting as a “deputy sheriff” and policing the behavior of 
neighboring peripheries; rather it primarily functions as a “poster nation” exemplar of semi-
peripheral compliance with neoliberal financialization and austerity. 
In Ireland, the national fantasy of having achieved “First World status” as a roaring Tiger, 
and thus of having overcome the asymmetries of colonial development, was contradicted by the 
dependency of Tigerhood on offering financial services to multinational corporates courted by 
the state, transforming the country into a tax haven and secrecy jurisdiction zone, while 
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concentrating urban employment in low-paid service jobs. The Irish government took pride in 
anticipating the growth of the financial services market and reshaping the country into a 
“treasure island,” where the economic growth would be driven not by job creation or investment 
in production, but rather by maximizing profit through tax avoidance (Shaxson 2012: viii). The 
Finance Acts of 1986 and 1987 introduced new financial incentives to encourage private sector 
investment and established low corporation tax rates of ten percent for certified companies 
setting up in the newly established Irish Financial Services Centre, a designated area within 
which companies could undertake any business in the financial services area while receiving 100 
percent allowances on equipment and development spending, and 200 percent tax breaks for 
rental payments for ten years (McCabe 2011: 126). 
 As a tax haven, Ireland was attractive to U.S. and European multinationals because it 
offered cheaper property and salaries than its equivalent in Luxembourg, better geographical 
proximity to Europe than the Cayman Islands, and unlike the British tax havens in the Isle of 
Man and Jersey, it was already a member of the European Community. The advent of so-called 
“informational” capitalism in combination with the development of special tax breaks and 
financial services via the creation of the IFSC positioned Ireland as an export platform for 
foreign capital in the electronics and IT-sector industries in hardware, software and 
communications, with nearly every high-profile transnational with an IT portfolio establishing a 
European base in Ireland, including Apple, Intel, Dell, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, IBM, Hewlett 
Packard, Compaq, Xerox, Nortel, Ericsson, Panasonic, Philips, Siemens, Hitachi and Motorola 
(Smyth 2000: 125). Throughout the 1990s, a large proportion of European and central exchequer 
funding was invested in digitization of Ireland’s trunk transmission network (rather than in 
environmental infrastructures crucial to ecological resilience such as waste and water systems, or 
social institutions key to the functioning of Irish society, such as the health service and social 
housing) in order to form a base for the transition to a reticular economy (Cronin 2002: 56).  
The Tiger economy was directly implicated in “the pressure placed upon non-renewable 
ecological resources by a highly flexible and mobile post-Fordist capitalism” (Smyth 2000: 163). 
Information and communications technology (ICT) contributes to environmental problems and 
exhaustion of resources at every stage from production to use to disposal: from the energetically-
expensive manufacturing process, to energy-intensive operation of devices, especially as 
consumer usage continues to proliferate, to disposal of devices and network equipment 
(Williams 2011: 354). The significant amounts of energy consumed by personal computers, 
electronic devices and ICT infrastructure including telecoms networks, peripherals, server farms 
and data centers place a heavy burden on electric grids reliant on the combustion of fossil fuels 
and exacerbate climate change by contributing to greenhouse emissions of carbon dioxide. 
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Manufacturing computers and electronic and non-electronic components consumes not only 
electricity, but large amounts of chemicals, water, and a variety of exotic and highly refined 
materials including hazardous metals such as lead and cadmium. Despite the direct implication 
of the ICT industry in climate change and pollution, the environmental costs of the IT sector in 
the Tiger economy, and its dependence on the enclosure of new frontiers of water, waste, 
pollution, energy and raw materials, have been relatively invisible in the Irish context, obscured 
by the discursive tendency to portray the knowledge and creative economies as virtual and 
immaterial, or even as “green” and less energy-intensive than other forms of production. This 
invisibility is further aggravated by the absence of “establishment-reviewed epidemiological 
studies and the inability to trace the flight and subsequent destination of any particular pollutant” 
in Ireland: the existing science primarily functions not to track environmental consequences but 
rather to deny that pollution or resource-use exceeds “safe” levels or incurs “risk” (Allen 2005: 
20). In contrast to this view, what is crucial to a macro-ecological understanding of Ireland’s role 
in the world-ecology is the inextricability of its financial role as a tax haven and secrecy 
jurisdiction zone from its environmental function as a semi-peripheral pollution and water haven. 
We can adapt Jason W. Moore’s slogan that “Wall Street…becomes a way of organizing all of 
nature, characterized by the financialization of any income-generating activity” (Moore 2011b: 
39) to say that the “IFSC is a way of organizing nature,” with pernicious consequences for water, 
energy, and food systems in Ireland. 
 Indeed, the second major “muscle” of the Tiger economy, particularly after the dot-com 
crash, was the attraction of transnational pharmaceutical corporations. Ireland has followed a 
similar path to other semi-peripheries in becoming a haven for the processing wings of chemical 
and pharmaceutical corporations fleeing occupational and environmental regulation in their 
home countries, especially after the passing of the U.S. Clean Air and Clean Water Acts in 1970 
and 1972, which threatened to raise the costs of production. From the 1970s onwards, most of 
the giants of the global chemical industry set up shop in Ireland, including SmithKline, Pfizer, 
Merck, Schering Plough and Roche, which accounted for nearly seventy percent of 
pharmaceutical industry output worldwide (Allen 2004: 4). While this concentration of 
transnational pharmaceutical industries has often been seen as a phenomenon local to Ireland, it 
is better understood as part of a world-ecological transition to the outsourcing of toxic industries, 
waste and pollution from capitalist cores to mediating semi-peripheries.  
 As Robert Allen notes, Ireland’s role as a “pollution haven” is directly comparable to that 
of the Mexican semi-periphery after the imposition of environmental deregulation by free trade 
agreements: 
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In 1970s the U.S. chemical industry investment in Ireland was $22.25 
million. Within three years it had climbed to $175 million and by 1981 it 
had increased to $1,121 million (approximately 6 per cent of the 
chemical industry’s worldwide investment total)—by 2002 the IDA was 
quoting total investment at $12 billion. Over the same period in Mexico 
a similar increase occurred: in 1973 it was $503 million, in 1981 it was 
$1,144 million. […] In Ireland after 1981 investment fell off for several 
years before picking up again at the end of the decade. By 2002 the 
electronics and software industries had replaced the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries as the jewels in Ireland’s corporate crown. 
(Allen 2004: 4)  
Neoliberal financial markets have consistently orchestrated decisions as to which forms 
of pollution are allowed and which eradicated, as in the infamous statement by Lawrence 
Summers that Africa was “underpolluted” because “the environmentally induced loss of life in 
more developed countries was more expensive to the world economy compared with the 
cheapness of life (lost wages) in Africa” (cited in Smith 2006: 18). During the 1990s, at the same 
time as other European economies began to invest heavily in alternative energies, recycling 
schemes, waste minimization, and organic farming, and as other underdeveloped and under-
industrialized nations questioned or actively resisted the importation of toxic industries, the Irish 
state deliberately set out to attract industries of hazard, colluding with the powerful chemical 
lobby to soften EU environmental regulations. Not only does the Irish state demonstrate a lack of 
political will to enforce stringent environmental standards, improve environmental standards, or 
protect the quality of existing environments, but its principal objective has been to ensure that 
changes in regulation, particularly those imposed by the EU, would not be detrimental to the 
economic performance of the Tiger or deter multinationals specifically seeking to locate 
investment in a country where environmental regulation is lax. The main focus of the 
Environmental Protection Agency in Ireland has been “managing” environmental policy to 
ensure economic performance, rather than “protecting” ecosystems, a shift which George Taylor 
describes as “the complicated process of organizing consent around new definitions of the extent 
to which pollution can be justified” (Taylor 2001: 5).  
  While the role of tax breaks and financial services in attracting foreign capital to Ireland 
has been much remarked, far less attention has been paid to the cheap appropriation of Ireland’s 
ecological frontiers, including groundwater resources, which are at approximately 
“15,000m3/person/year” about “five times that of many other European countries” (Allen, 2004: 
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4). Ireland’s uncommodified groundwater resources—a source of “cheap water” that could be 
appropriated without cost to transnational corporations—have been key in attracting industries 
dependent on the exploitation of clean groundwater. Despite surges of public protests against 
industrial development in Ireland’s rural peripheries throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the state 
acted to suppress environmentalist discourses and awareness of pollution and resource 
consumption corresponding to the importation of toxic industries, thus creating a durable 
amnesia surrounding hydro-ecological crises in Ireland, whether pesticide pollution in agri-
business, or dioxin contamination by pharmaceutical plants. As Allen remarks in the context of 
the Merck plant’s toxification of the Ballydine watershed in the 1980s, “The great toxic disasters 
of the modern era happened elsewhere, out of sight out of mind and certainly out of Ireland. Yet 
Merck’s poisoning of the Ballydine environment occurred in front of our eyes in Ireland, but it is 
as if nothing strange happened in this place Mary Hanrahan calls the ‘valley of tears’” (Allen 
2005: 19). Much research remains to be done in order to reverse this process of invisibilization 
and gain a critical understanding of the costs of the reshaping of socio-ecological relations during 
the Tiger period.  
Another key dimension of Irish neoliberal ecology that demands further investigation in 
the context of the nexus of climate change, petroleum consumption, and pollution is the grazier 
economy. Denis O’Hearn wittily describes the restructuring of the Irish economy at the end of 
the 1980s as the transition from the “green donkey” to the “Celtic Tiger” (O’Hearn 2001: 167). 
While the Tiger economy incorporated new monocultures in pharmaceutical commodities and 
ICT industries and witnessed a massive boom in banking and construction, the novelty of these 
developments should not be overembellished. Noting that the Tiger was dominated by financial 
and property speculation rather than new indigenous exports, and characterized by a continued 
failure to develop national industries in fisheries and gas, Conor McCabe emphasizes the long 
historical roots of the agro-export regime that continued to prevail during the Tiger: 
The type of business activities which dominated the Irish economy in the 
twentieth century—cattle exports to Britain and financial investment in 
London; the development of green-field sites and the construction of 
factories and office buildings to facilitate foreign industrial and 
commercial investment; the birth of the suburbs and subsequent housing 
booms predicated on an expanding urban workforce—saw the 
development of an indigenous moneyed class based around cattle, 
construction and banking. […] Up until the 1980s, cattle was to Ireland 
what the car industry was to Detroit and, although the Irish Free State 
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gained partial independence in 1922, its economy, via the cattle industry, 
remained intertwined with that of the UK. The structural problems 
related to that situation—an independent country with a regional 
economy—had an influence on the so-called Whitaker/LeMass 
revolution in the 1950s and the superficial industrialization of the Irish 
economy in the decade which followed in its wake. This is also the 
period when we see a new type of Irish businessman—the speculative 
builder and financier—come to the fore (McCabe 2011: 10-11). 
Far from displacing the donkey, the contradictions of the Tiger emerged from the earlier 
ecological regime: the growth of financial speculation must be understood as dialectically related 
to the grazier export economy. Ireland’s “green” rural countryside, as celebrated by the Food 
Harvest 2020 report, should not be understood as the product of temporal “backwardness,” nor as 
innately pastoral and environmentally neutral, but rather as the structural product of semi-
peripheralization, characterized by uneven and combined development of some sectors to the 
exclusion of others in the favor of particular class interests, in this case, the overdevelopment of 
the conveyor-belt agro-export—economy which emerged in the eighteenth century. In the 1950s, 
nearly three-quarters of Irish exports were comprised of agricultural and food products, destined 
for UK markets, resulting in a persistent over-concentration of activity around the agricultural 
monoculture and over-reliance on low-valued-added exports of agricultural produce. After 
Ireland’s integration into EU, this overreliance was not corrected, since from the 1970s onwards, 
peripherality was a structuring principle in Irish applications for EU funding and CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) subsidies of the agricultural sector (Cronin 2002: 56). After the collapse of 
the housing bubble in 2008, the agro-export system organized around dairy and grazier 
monocultures has persisted as a fundamental sector of the Irish economy. As the Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform (DEPR) announced in 2011, “The agri-food, marine and forestry 
sector is Ireland’s largest indigenous sector and makes a major contribution to economic and 
social development, particularly in rural Ireland” (DEPR 2011: 22). 
The domination of cows rather than cars in the Irish economy does not mean that the Irish 
neoliberal ecological regime has been “greener” than the automotive regimes of Detroit or 
Wolfsburg. In his short story “Animal Needs,” Irish writer Kevin Barry tartly describes a farm in 
the west of Ireland as emitting a “general sensation of slurry” (Barry 2007: n.pg.), a phrase 
evocative of the dependence of the Irish agro-food sector on petrochemical fertilizers. Imported 
oil and GM-fodder underlie the production of Irish “cheap food,” as well as substantial waste 
frontiers: whether the carbon emissions produced by methane-expelling livestock or the pollution 
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of Irish watersheds by fecal coliforms and nitrate runoffs caused by pig slurry, agricultural waste 
and illegal dumping. A significant component of Ireland’s failure to reach its greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets is the steady escalation of agriculture greenhouse gas emissions since 
2012 as a result of the Food Harvest 2020 targets for expansion of livestock numbers, 
particularly of dairy cattle (Armstrong 2015). Understood in these terms, the Emerald Tiger is 
more brown than green. 
The post-Tiger turn to ever more technocratic forms of mass agri-business has only 
accelerated the ecological contradictions of the agro-export regime. Industrial capitalist 
agriculture is highly unstable and “overridden with unsustainable ‘technological fixes’ and 
masked by a host of externalized costs,” including dependence on “relatively cheap oil” to 
subsidize “the low-priced industrial grains and oilseeds on which global food security has come 
to hinge” (Weis 2010: 315). The acute volatility of global food prices has resulted in an extreme 
polarization of dietary combined and uneven development, with many poor people in the Global 
South confronted with worsening conditions of manufactured food scarcity, at the same time as 
meat and dairy-centered diets continue to rise in rapidly industrializing economies in China and 
India. However, as Tony Weis emphasizes, the causes of the food crisis run deeper than market 
turbulence:  
Industrial livestock production is the driving force behind rising meat 
consumption on a world scale, and the process of cycling great volumes 
of industrial grains and oilseeds through soaring populations of 
concentrated animals serves to magnify the land and resource budgets, 
pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture. 
These dynamics not only reflect disparities but are exacerbating them, 
foremost through climate change. […] Rising meat consumption and 
industrial livestock production should be understood together to 
comprise a powerful long-term vector of global inequality (Weis 2013: 
65). 
Contrary to the greenwashed vision of unspoiled rural environments offered by the 
Department of Agriculture, Ireland is a significant contributor to the biophysical contradictions 
of industrial capitalist agriculture, particularly the industrial grain-livestock complex that 
underlies the dairy economy and cattle economy, and thus imbricated in the crises of “cheap 
food” and “cheap oil” in the larger world-ecology. 
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Dairy exports, particularly of whole powdered milk and infant formula, are one of the 
largest sectors of the post-Tiger Irish economy, with a high rate of export to growing Asian 
markets. In 2012, as part of the Food & Agri-Services mission to China, the Chinese dairy 
producer Dairy United signed a Memorandum of Understanding with University College Dublin 
to collaborate on the creation of a trade corridor to facilitate the introduction of Irish exports and 
dairy agri-business to the Inner Mongolian region (UCD News 2012). This dairy revolution is 
reminiscent of India’s “white revolution” in the 1990s, conducted as an agro-fix to the waning of 
the Green Revolution and driven by neoliberal reforms dismantling the Nehruvian state 
(Scholten and Basu 2009: 1). The Chinese version aims to secure supply of dairy products for its 
burgeoning urban markets and emerges from the larger internal contradictions of China’s 
increasing limits to the appropriation of food, water, energy, and heavy metals. China’s land 
carrying capacity for mainland agriculture is nearing its limit, especially as the peasantry are 
increasingly deruralized and industrial development seizes more land. With a thirty-seven 
percent decrease in wheat, rice and corn yields predicted by the mid-twenty-first century, China 
is searching for revolutions in food productivity that can unleash new ecological surpluses 
through agri-technology (Economy 2007). Northern China’s Inner Mongolia has been subject to 
mounting clearances and land grabs, as the traditional grazing lands of minority ethnic 
Mongolians are seized by the Chinese state and nomadic peoples resettled in permanent housing. 
Ireland’s comprador role in China’s white revolution, reliant as it is on the colonization of Inner 
Mongolia, has a certain historical irony when the origins of the Irish grazier economy in colonial 
land clearance and liberalization are recalled. Ireland’s concerted courting of Chinese capital, as 
captured in Enterprise Ireland’s stated aim of “winning Chinese markets” (Story 2010: 1) also 
telegraphs the Irish semi-periphery’s attempt at economic realignment in the light of shifting 
inter-state competition and the potential waning of European and American core hegemony. 
Finally, with the EU abolition of milk quotas after 2014, the removal of crucial subsidies and 
deregulation of Irish dairy production has created pressure to open up new strategies of 
financialization in the dairy sector, and the Irish Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 
Simon Coveney, has been aggressively advocating for a fully functional dairy futures market 
(Halleron 2015). 
Post-Tiger, the politics of pollution structuring Irish environmental policy (Taylor 2001: 
39) have been intensified in the development of new biofinancial mechanisms and environmental 
derivatives, such as the dairy futures proposed above, and the water futures market envisaged as 
an extension of Irish Water. The absurd semantics of the plan for a Green Irish Financial 
Services Centre vividly capture the government’s embrace of nature as financial accumulation 
strategy:  
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We have the natural resources, the talent and the Government 
commitment necessary to become a hub for green enterprise. […]The 
planned Green Irish Financial Services Centre will build on the success 
of the IFSC and become a leading player in the global carbon market and 
promote Ireland as a centre of excellence in the management of carbon. 
(GreenIFSC N.d.) 
Besides providing new financial services in ecological commodities trading, the greening 
of the IFSC seems to consists largely of adding the word green to its title, while using 
accelerating climate crisis to force through new forms of biofinancialization. This is 
characteristic of the Irish government’s response to the evacuation of multinational capital since 
the 2008 financial crisis, which has been to impose rounds of intensified neoliberalization: asset-
stripping the public sector, flexibilizing labor, and restructuring higher education and healthcare 
to prioritize entrepreneurial “smart” technologies. If the Irish state had not previously been 
coerced into accepting structural adjustment programs, in the wake of the 2008 bank bailout, the 
largest in European history, it was subjected to the full artillery of neoliberal reforms by the 
European troika of the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and the European 
Commission, including budgetary austerity, privatization, reorganization of finance, opening of 
internal markets, removal of tariffs and barriers, and the disciplining of labor markets to increase 
flexibility. A key element of these reforms has been the identification of new ecological frontiers 
for enclosure: water via the privatization of domestic water provision; oil via the sale of offshore 
petroleum exploration licenses to transnational oil companies; natural gas through onshore 
hydraulic fracturing; fish through the development of mass aquaculture and intensification of 
salmon-farming; and biocommodities through the development of biotechnology industries in 
pharma, food, and energy.  
 The case of oil and gas in the Irish context demonstrates the transition from the era of 
easily obtainable fossil fuels—or “cheap energy”—to a late neoliberal regime of mounting geo-
technical challenges to energy appropriation—or “extreme energy”—in which more intensive, 
toxic, and high-risk technologies of extraction are implemented. With diminishing returns to 
existing methods of extraction, and no undetected frontiers or untapped oil reserves still awaiting 
discovery, capital has been forced to turn to ever-more costly—in both economic and carbon-
intensive terms—forms of energy extraction, from tar sands, to fracking, to deep-sea and rock 
formation drilling. Within this context of intensified competition for resources, Ireland has 
become a contested zone of experimental hydrocarbon extraction and energy imperialism, with a 
striking lack of national sovereignty over its resources. The ultra high-pressure upstream pipeline 
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and inland refinery built by Shell E&P Ireland in the Corrib field off northwest Mayo are a prime 
example of high-risk technologies that are being trialed in the Irish semi-periphery (upstream 
pipelines are usually only located under the sea or in uninhabited areas due to the risk of 
explosion posed by the volatile mix of chemical compounds and raw gas). The ecological regime 
intertwining Ireland’s role as a tax haven and as a water and pollution haven can be sharply seen 
in this energy scenario. The Irish licensing system for oil and gas exploration is marked by an 
extraordinary pro-corporate bias and subservience to foreign capital, with the result that the 
proportion of the government’s take of oil revenues is one of the lowest in the world, well below 
thirty percent. This is below even that of Peru, in contrast to seventy-five percent take of a 
country such as Norway (Johnston 2008: 39). The state share in revenues from the sale of gas 
from Corrib, according to a private 2003 consultants’ study for Shell, is estimated to be only 
seven percent (Shell to Sea 2012: 12). The introduction of the Profit Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) 
by Minister for Energy and Natural Resources Eamon Ryan in 2007, far from increasing 
potential state revenues, allows foreign companies to offset all costs and calculate the ratio of 
their capital investment against remaining profits, thus avoiding paying tax.  
Transnational oil and gas industries are among the most profitable companies in the 
world, and yet they are being subsidized by the Irish public at the same time as they are 
exploiting the lack of stringent environmental regulation to implement experimental forms of 
extraction. The tax regimes for fracking are amongst the most generous in the world, and Ireland 
is poised to become a key frontier for the shale gas revolution. Since 2008, three companies have 
been authorized to begin preliminary exploration for shale gas in parts of 12 Irish counties on 
both sides of the border, concentrated in rural, peripheral territories in Leitrim, Roscommon, 
Sligo, Clare, Cavan and Fermanagh. The need to locate and extract new oil and gas reserves as 
swiftly as possible has been consistently posed by the state as essential to Ireland’s national 
interest, despite growing public awareness of the environmental costs of fracking, which in the 
course of hydraulically fracturing rock with high-pressure liquid to release the gas, contaminates 
groundwater with methane (Osborn et al. 2011: 8172) and can unleash seismic tremors. 
However, the decade of concerted resistance to the Corrib project from the Shell to Sea 
movement and local protestors in Rossport, with international connections to Nigerian anti-Shell 
campaign and the Bolivian “gas wars” and “water wars,” has laid a crucial groundwork for 
grassroots resistance to the shale gas revolution, and may mitigate or delay the enclosure of new 
gas frontiers in crucial ways.  
In the context of water as a resource, the reform of the Irish water sector after the fiscal 
crisis is part of the state’s larger program to restructure the infrastructure sector around semi-
state companies that will secure their own revenue from charges and borrowing, in order to take 
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environmental services off the balance-sheet of overall government deficit figures (Bresnihan 
2015a: 7). This strategy of financial engineering is also being applied to other parts of public 
sector infrastructure, including healthcare, housing, and transport. Of the four main components 
of DPER’s 2011 investment—economic infrastructure, the productive sector and human capital, 
social investment and environmental infrastructure—the latter, entailing the privatization of 
waste and water systems, is the most significant in this context (DPER 2011: iii). Due to the 
successful defeat of water charges in 1977 and again in 1995 by community protests in Ireland’s 
own “water wars,” Ireland remained the only EU member state not to charge for domestic water 
and wastewater services, which were paid instead through general taxation. Accordingly, a key 
component of the Program of Financial Support agreed with the troika was to transfer 
independent assessment for responsibility for water services provision from 34 local authorities 
to a new water utility by the end of 2011. The 2013 Water Services Bill established Irish Water 
as a new state water utility responsible for operation, maintenance and upgrade of water services 
infrastructure, customer billing and charging. 
The privatization and commercialization of water services in the Global North and Global 
South has been a key dynamic of neoliberal accumulation—an unprecedented conquest of the 
hydrological commons that has accompanied the expansion of a water bubble and the drive to 
create international water futures markets. Ireland is now being belatedly inducted into this 
hydrological regime, in accordance with the emphasis on ecological modernization and 
hydrological management articulated in European agendas such as the Water Frameworks 
Directive. However, less attention has been paid to the specific process of biofinancialization, 
which constructs a new relationship between the flow of water and the flow of money in global 
financial markets (Bresnihan 2015b), “banking spatially on the future” through an “ecological 
fix” that redirects finance capital into the infrastructures necessary for social reproduction 
(Castree and Christophers 2015). The revenue generated by the introduction of household water 
charges by the Irish Water utility is not sufficient to finance the projected twenty-billion euro 
investments necessary to improve Ireland’s ageing, failing water infrastructure (Bresnihan 
2015a: 2). Instead, the new utility intends to raise independent external private investment by 
using the new stream of revenue from domestic charges to borrow from international credit 
markets, most likely by issuing infrastructure bonds similar to Bord Gáis’s five-year bonds. The 
semi-peripheral tendency of the Irish state towards weak market regulation plays a central role in 
transformation of a previously publically-funded, state-managed large-scale infrastructure into a 
financial asset for private investors. Water infrastructure can be understood as a new frontier for 
appropriation by financial capital, in which the material, spatially-specific components of the 
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water system, from pipes to plants to pumps, are transformed into an asset commensurable with 
other investment opportunities in terms of yield and risk (Bresnihan 2015b).  
The need to measure financial performance in order to demonstrate favorability of 
exchange also means that hitherto uncommoditized aspects of the hydro-social cycle are being 
incorporated into networks of finance, as in Irish Water’s attempts to install household water 
meters across the country. Bresnihan highlights the novelty of the transformations entailed by 
this process of biofinancialization, which integrates the flows of finance capital with the flows of 
the vital resources necessary for socio-ecological reproduction: 
What is being measured here is not the present value or condition of 
Ireland’s water resources and infrastructure but their future value and 
performance (i.e. as providers of ecosystems services). One consequence 
of this is the central role that data and information communication 
technologies will increasingly play in mediating and representing the 
value of the water network and the comparative performances of the 
utility and of individual households. This intensifies and extends a more 
general tendency in how ‘nature’ is being valued within contemporary 
capitalism: no longer a limited stock of material inputs metabolized 
within the production process, but an infinite series of performing assets 
that can be measured, evaluated, circulated and speculated on in 
financial markets. Of course, the overlaying of these new information 
systems onto water resources and infrastructures are not neutral or 
transparent. They transform social and ecological interactions and 
generate new exclusions. (Bresnihan 2015b) 
However, the establishment of Irish Water has been met by the most significant popular 
anti-austerity mobilization since 2008. The imposition of the new household water charges have 
been seen as the proverbial straw that broke the donkey’s back: a regressive burden on Ireland’s 
squeezed majority who have already born the pain of five years of austerity, and who already 
contribute to the cost of water provision through general taxation, making the water charge a 
double tax. Huge numbers have joined the campaign against water charges since autumn 2014, 
and protestors has made use of a wide range of tactics, from civil disobedience in the form of 
boycotts of registration to Irish Water and a refusal to pay charges, to direct actions blocking the 
installation of meters in working-class neighborhoods, to large-scale marches and mobilizations 
in the streets (Finn 2015: 49). At the time of writing, the charges seem likely to be defeated. 
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Eurostat, the EU statistics agency, ruled in 2015 that Irish Water failed the state corporation test, 
due in large part to the boycott of household water tax which crippled its revenue streams and 
blocked its capacity to fund itself into the future. The Irish public’s insurgent refusal of the new 
forms of social discipline required to transform water users into efficient, rationalized consumers 
presents a serious barrier to biofinancialization of the water system.  
Bioprospecting in the area of food systems, however, faces fewer obstacles to expansion 
in Ireland. A key feature of late neoliberal accumulation that seeks to open up new vertical 
frontiers for commodification, bioprospecting scours the natural world for sub-atomic 
commodities and patentable genetic material that can be transformed into laboratory-
manufactured genes. In her prescient discussion of DuPont’s OncoMouse, Donna Haraway 
observed that “biology—life itself” has become “a capital accumulation strategy” (Haraway 
1996: 65). Eco-systems and microbiomes are being “unbundled” on unprecedented levels in 
order to enable privatization of their constituent parts, forging new commodities that Kaushik 
Sunder Rajan terms “biocapital” (Sunder Rajan 2006: 2). Although this terminology is 
problematic to the extent that it treats biocommodities as a distinctive new form of capital itself, 
rather than a particular frontier of enclosure within the neoliberal regime of capitalism, Rajan’s 
observation that the life sciences have been commodified, financialized, and enclosed by 
corporate capital to hitherto unprecedented levels (Sunder Rajan 2006: 3) highlights a dominant 
tendency in the Irish setting. A central component of the EU policy agenda elaborated by 
European Technology Platforms in the agri-food-forestry-biofuels sectors is the “knowledge-
based bio-economy” (KBBE), which proposes bio-technoscience as a techno-knowledge-fix that 
can reconcile environmental and economic sustainability. The KBBE is a political-economic 
strategy that furthers the neoliberalization of nature and knowledge in EU member states through 
intellectual property regimes, framing ecological crisis as a problem of inefficiency which can be 
overcome through “benign eco-efficient productivity” and promising to unlock the productive 
potential of natural resources, but actually dependent on the production of “new combinations of 
‘living’ and ‘dead’ labour” (Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou 2010: 2898).  
 Within Ireland’s knowledge economy, despite the incessant urging of the government to 
“innovate, innovate,” the development of biocommodities is largely founded on the 
intensification of pre-existing monocultures in pharma, agri-business, and energy. These include 
genetic tests to identify thoroughbred horses with the greatest genetic potential for racecourse 
success (Equinome 2015); research by Irish university departments in life sciences and genomics 
into the molecular mechanisms and genetics of chronic diseases so that transnational biopharma 
industry partners including GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer and Merck can manufacture novel 
diagnostic solutions and gene therapies; the trials of transgenic “blight-resistant” potatoes 
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conducted by Ireland’s agricultural agency Teagasc (Teagasc 2013: 2); the Irish state forestry 
company Coillte’s creation of a sterile “green desert” of over a million acres of pesticide-laden 
monocultural non-native Sitka Spruce coniferous plantations for timber export (McCarthy 2013); 
and the development of Miscanthus and willow biomass plantations to replace the turf-based 
bioenergy regime in the now-exhausted peat bogs which Bord na Móna has strip-mined since the 
1950s as part of the LeMass energy modernization (Dauber et. al 2010). These developments in 
bioenergy and agriculture are celebrated by green capitalists as ecological modernizations that 
will resolve the problems of food and energy scarcity and alleviate climate change.  
 However, biotechnology is a “short-term fix” that has not yet provided a productivity 
revolution sufficient to resolve the current decline of cheap food, water, and energy inputs and 
thus to sustain cheap labor (Moore 2012a: 15). Agro-biotechnology has been bolstered by a new 
intellectual property regime and pushed forward as the techno-fix to crises of (manufactured) 
food and fuel scarcity, but has failed to produce substantive yield revolutions, even after two 
decades of dissemination and experimentation. Biomass plantations, though often perceived as 
carbon-neutral or low-carbon fuels that provide a way of getting off the “oil hook,” entail their 
own problems of decreased biodiversity, intensified deforestation, threatened food security, 
accelerated water use, and land grabbing, and can potentially produce carbon emissions greater 
than those of coal when planted on drained peat bogs and ancient grasslands, thus releasing more 
carbon than they capture, leading critics to question whether agrofuels are any “cleaner” than 
fossil fuels (Abbasi and Abbasi 2010: 919). Biotechnology has functioned primarily as a mode of 
wealth redistribution and economic restructuring of the world’s food and fuels system, 
transferring surplus capital and control over land, genetic resources, economic space, and market 
power from small farmers to international financial institutions, biotechnology firms, 
governments and transnational agribusiness conglomerates, by enclosing new vertical and 
molecular frontiers of life, as in the case of GMO seeds (Holt-Giménez 2009: 180). 
The socio-ecological violence of these extractive transformations in the eked-out regime 
of late neoliberalism is pervasive in the reconstitution of human subjectivity as post-genomic and 
the reshaping of the rules of reproduction, which are accompanied by the intensification of forms 
of state discipline, austerity, and biopolitical control, especially of the bodies of the poor, 
dispossessed, minority, and marginalized. According to the biopharmaceuticals wing of IDA, 
Ireland’s inward investment promotion agency, nine out of the world’s ten largest biopharma 
giants are currently based in Ireland, with thirty-three major plants clustered in the country, and 
since 2014, Ireland has become the world’s seventh largest exporter of medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products (IDA 2014). The biopharma complex mines vertical frontiers of life and 
reproduction in order to commoditize and reshape human nature on the molecular scale, so that 
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people’s very bodies and affects acquire economic and political value. The Irish pharma complex 
is at the heart of the global production of “pharmaco-pornographic capitalism” (Preciado 2008: 
107), manufacturing up to 6 of the so-called “blockbuster drugs” that annually earn more than 1 
billion dollars (IDA 2014). Many of these are psychotropic anti-depressants, which Beatriz 
Preciado argues reconstitute subjectivities through “micro-prosthetic mechanisms of control” 
(Preciado 2008: 107). As such, there is a dialectical relation to be uncovered in the Irish pharma 
complex between the mass manufacture of SSRI and SNRI export commodities for transnational 
corporations availing of tax, water, and pollution havens; the stark social violence produced by 
neoliberal austerity, labor precarity, and biopolitical control enforced by state apparatuses; and 




 The double dynamic of neoliberal governmentality, which deregulates markets while 
simultaneously intensifying state regulation and biopolitical subordination of human and non-
human forms of life, can be seen sharply in the Irish context of state repression of environmental 
protestors, whether in the jailing of the “Rossport Five” in 2005 and the forms of force 
consistently employed against Corrib protestors, or the political policing of anti-Irish Water 
campaigners which came to its head with the pre-dawn arrests by the Gardaí of left activists and 
working-class residents involved in the Jobstown sit-down strike in November 2014. In this 
article, I have offered a preliminary survey of the prevalence of cattle and construction, pharma 
and financialization within the Irish neoliberal ecology, but it is just as crucial to interrogate the 
ways in which the opening of new frontiers have been contested by anti-systemic protest and 
transformation from below. From the 1980s onwards, Ireland’s decades of successful community 
protests against environmental issues ranging from the campaign against nuclear proliferation 
and extraordinary success of the movement to block the entry of nuclear power plants; to 
campaigns against waste management and toxic waste incineration (Fagan 2003); to resistance to 
GMO foods and Monsanto despite the relentless pressure of the Monsanto lobby and emergence 
of locally-based movements in organic farming, slow food and permaculture; to Shell to Sea’s 
activism against the Corrib pipeline; to anti-fracking campaigns and the new campaign to block 
drilling and the creation of an oil refinery in Dalkey Prospect all offer evidence of the persistence 
of modalities of revolt and resistance that reject the neoliberal regime’s oppressive configuration 
of nature-society. Tasks for future world-ecological analysis of Ireland might be then not only to 
excavate these histories, but to re-imagine the ways in which nature-society can be reconfigured 
to be more emancipatory, biodiverse, and renewing of the dialectical interrelations between 
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humans and the rest of nature, thus rethinking the place of food, energy, and resource frontiers in 
conceptions of development and modernity. 
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Abstract 
This is a correction to the original article. For information about the changes made, please see the erratum 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2017.702. For Ireland—along with Spain, Portugal and Greece—membership of 
‘Europe’ was seen as an opportunity to escape their historical legacy of ‘underdevelopment’ and become fully 
integrated into core positions in the global system. Each of these states, and especially Ireland experienced 
significant growth in the European Union, but once the global financial crisis struck, they suffered a deep economic 
and social crisis, and came to be categorized once again as ‘peripheral’ to Europe. This acute recurrence of a core-
periphery divide in the European Union has been accompanied by a rapid diminution of democracy in the EU and 
its transformation into an increasingly coercive formation. The deprivation programmes imposed by the EU on the 
peripheral societies has not only damaged growth in the European economy, they have hugely diminished the 
legitimacy of the European integration project. The essay explores the roots of Europe’s changing power structures 
and assesses the implications of the Eurozone crisis for the future of the European integration project. 
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From the mid-1990s Ireland was acclaimed as one of Europe’s great success stories, and it was 
presented to the new entrants from Eastern Europe as a model for their own development. The 
Celtic Tiger provided clear evidence that by adopting pro-business and low tax policies any one 
of them could achieve standards of living on par with the Union’s core states. 
A few years later, in the wake of the global financial crisis, Ireland came to be re-classified 
in the financial media as a peripheral state, along with Greece, Spain, Portugal and, sometimes, 
Italy. In the wider media, the preferred term was PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), with 
Italy sometimes included in the grouping and sometimes not. This re-classification involved more 
than a fall from grace: it was a return to starting point.  
Ireland’s depiction as being on Europe’s periphery has a much longer history. In 1985, 
Giovanni Arrighi edited a collection of essays entitled Semi-Peripheral: the Politics of Southern 
Europe in the Twentieth Century where he argued that the states of southern Europe shared many 
common characteristics, including a roughly similar average national income level. Ireland, 
geographically distinct from Southern Europe, was not discussed in that volume, but it did share 
with them a roughly similar national wealth. In a later essay, The Semi-periphery in the Modern 
World System, Arrighi describes Ireland as an “organic member of the semi-periphery” (Arrighi 
1985; 1986; Broadberry & Klein 2012). 
For Marx, writing over a century earlier, the point of comparison was not southern Europe, 
but southern Asia. India was from “a social point of view […] the Ireland of the East.” It was not 
just the impoverishment of the population, especially the peasantry, which linked Ireland and India 
in his mind, but the fact that the roots of this destitution were similar. Both Ireland and India had 
been turned into agricultural provinces of Britain (Marx, [1853] 1969: 488) 
While Ireland was close to Mediterranean Europe in terms of average wealth, its historical 
trajectory was very different. Spain, Portugal and Italy were all colonial states; Ireland had been 
colonised. Arrighi noted: “Parliamentary democracy has never been at home in the semi-
periphery” Arrighi (1986:26) It certainly sank roots in Ireland. While all the Mediterranean states 
of Europe developed fascist or authoritarian regimes in the 1920s or 30s, Ireland retained a 
parliamentary democracy. The persistence of parliamentary democracy is usually explained, in so 
far as it is noticed, as a feature of British influence, but given that a separate state came into 
existence as a consequence of a revolt against British rule this is hardly convincing.  
Immanuel Wallerstein wrote: “One can interpret the whole development of Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Turkey in the interwar period as one grand response to the sense and reality 
of “having been left behind” (Wallerstein 1985: 37). This depiction also holds true for Ireland, 
with a modification: for at least a century Irish thinking was dominated by a sense and reality 
of“having been held behind. The linkage between national domination and economic 
backwardness was deeply rooted in the Irish popular consciousness. The Irish national 
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independence movement was closely associated with a peasant revolt against the landowning class 
and this resulted in a social structure quite distinct from that of Mediterranean Europe. While 
industry in Ireland (excepting the north-east which remained part of the United Kingdom) was 
probably less developed than in Mediterranean Europe, its agrarian structures were more 
emancipated. The power of the old agrarian ruling class had been decisively broken in Ireland, and 
this changed the socio-political composition of the new state and contrasted it to that of the 
Mediterranean states (Coakley 2012). 
In Ireland, as in most of Mediterranean Europe, the Catholic Church was particularly 
strong, but here too there were significant differences. In Ireland, it was Anglicanism not 
Catholicism which had been the feudal land-holding church—and the church of the land-owning 
aristocracy—and this gave Irish Catholicism a distinctive social complexion. Catholicism was 
perceived as the faith of the oppressed, despite the Church’s ambivalence toward the national 
independence movement. For the ascendant bourgeoisie, it was a valued ally not a rival (Paseta 
1999; Coakley 2012). 
The civil war that followed the Anglo-Irish treaty was won by the most conservative 
elements in the independence movement—with the support of Britain—and they pursued liberal 
economic policies little different from those previously imposed by London. Irish export trade 
mostly comprised agricultural primary products overwhelming destined for British markets. The 
Irish currency was linked to sterling and its banking system was dominated by the City of London. 
In shorthand, the social interests advanced by the Irish government were those of Ireland’s 
‘comprador’ bourgeoisie (Lee 1989; Regan 1999; Coakley 2012). 
With the global crisis of the 1930s, and the adoption of further austerity policies, the 
conservative government had become deeply unpopular and could no longer secure a 
parliamentary majority. In the elections of 1932, the left-of-centre Fianna Fail party (composed of 
elements from the losing Republican side in the civil war) came to power and adopted policies that 
sought to encourage development and reduce the extremes of poverty. This damaged the interests 
of the ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie and the more prosperous farmers, and there was an attempt to build 
a counter movement along the lines of continental fascism—the Blueshirts—but they were swept 
aside by an alliance of republican and labor activists. In effect, the capitalist class lacked the social 
weight to impose its interests in an unmediated way, either through a parliamentary system or 
through a direct dictatorship (Regan 1999; Coakley 2012). 
The Fianna Fail government policy of import substitution did lead to a significant increase 
in industrial employment over the following decades and their promotion of semi-state bodies 
contributed to wider social development, most notably the spread of electrification, while house-
building and welfare programmes reduced poverty levels. Yet these achievements did not come 
close to alleviating the long term effects of Ireland’s distorted development. Industrial growth was 
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never sufficient to offset the flight from the land. For most of the twentieth century, Ireland retained 
one of Europe’s higher rates of emigration. What Ireland and the Mediterranean countries had 
most in common—apart from their roughly similar rates of income—was that they combined 
features of both core and periphery, albeit in different variations (Lee 1989; O’Grada 1997). 
 
The semi-peripheral states and post-war Europe 
It is conventional among radical scholars to divide the post-war history of Western Europe and 
North America into two eras: the “Golden Age,” the three decades that followed the Second World 
War, and the neoliberal era that dates from the Reagan/Thatcher regimes. The former was 
characterised by high rates of growth, strong labor movements and the extension of social rights, 
the latter by declining growth, a weakening of labor and a diminution of social rights. For many, 
this history is seen as a shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism. Between the two eras was the crisis 
decade of the 1970s, an era of confrontation between labor and capital which ended with capital 
decisively gaining the upper hand. 
This historical chronology has much to recommend it, but a reflection on the history of the 
European semi-periphery suggests a number of qualifications. Ireland and the European semi-
peripheral states under discussion here do not quite fit the pattern. They largely missed out on the 
post-war Golden Age, though not on the decade of crisis. Their crisis decade was also more severe 
than that experienced in the core regions of the North Atlantic. 
Many scholars have pointed to the jailing of air-control workers in the United States by the 
Regan administration in 1981 and the defeat of the miners’ strike in Britain by the Thatcher 
government in 1984 as crucial turning points in the rise of the neoliberal order, and it is certainly 
true that these were important moments. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these conflicts did not 
involve a full-scale confrontation between capital and labor. Neither the United States nor the 
British labor movements mobilised en masse to defend their co-workers. Labor was defeated in 
absentia. There is a case for arguing that a critical turning point in that era of crisis occurred earlier, 
in the European semi-periphery. At the very moment that the United States was suffering a 
humiliating defeat in Asia, it achieved a historic victory in Europe by curbing the revolutionary 
aspirations unleashed by the decomposition of the Mediterranean dictatorships. This was 
accomplished not through force of arms, but through means of political and social concessions. 
The European Economic Community played a key role in the process.  
The semi-peripheral states of Europe in the post-war decades are often depicted as stagnant. 
In fact, they underwent important changes. Writing in the mid-1970s, at the height of the systemic 
crisis, Nicos Poulantzas argued that the crisis of the Mediterranean dictatorships needed to be seen 
in the wider context of the emergence of a new phase of imperialism characterised by the spread 
of what he termed dependent industrialization. The countries on the Europeans margins could 
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attract industry by offering lower taxes but this new industry was marked by a low level 
technology; limited labor productivity and the repatriation of profits. These countries also shared 
high levels of outward labor migration. This dependent industrialization was a distinguishing 
feature of U.S. (global) hegemony and gave global capitalism a very different shape from the era 
of British hegemony (Poulantzas 1976). 
One of the effects of this dependent industrialization was to transform the relationship 
between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ within nation-states, enabling the United States to play a 
greater role in determining the policies of other states and providing security for local ruling 
classes. For Poulantzas, this did not in any way eliminate patterns of domination in international 
relations, but it did make them a good deal more complex. The new American order encouraged 
the closer integration of west European states, not only in the core regions but also on Europe’s 
periphery (Poulantzas 1975). 
In the late 1950s, after a decade of economic stagnation, the Irish Republic—in close 
consultation with the World Bank—shifted away from import-substitution strategies toward more 
liberal economic policies. Attracting foreign capital became the central objective of the state and 
has remained so ever since. This shift in economic strategy had the important side-effect of 
enabling the Irish state to borrow from the global banks: the imprimatur of the World Bank 
permitted the adoption of Keynesian policies. Similar openings occurred in Spain and Portugal. 
Once Spain accepted NATO bases on its soil, the Franco dictatorship operated with U.S. protection 
and adopted economic policies of an increasingly liberal vein. Throughout the post-war decades 
the United States was actively involved in encouraging the liberalization of Europe’s southern 
economies (Lopez & Rodriguez 2011; Coakley 2012). 
 
The 1970s crisis and promise of Europe 
In Washington and in the capitals of Northern Europe there was concern that they would be unable 
to contain the revolutionary impulses unleashed by the disintegration of the Mediterranean 
dictatorships. Not only was there a risk that NATO might lose control of these states, there was a 
serious danger that these upheavals might impact on other countries, most especially France and 
Italy where militant workers’ movements were accompanied by a widespread radicalization of 
youth. ‘Europe’ played a crucial role in the political stabilization of these countries. 
While most commentators at the time assumed that Spain would be pivotal for the 
resolution of the Mediterranean crisis, it was Portugal where the crucial dramas unfolded. In 
Portugal the unthinkable happened when much of the colonial army, including many of its officers, 
came to identify with their anti-colonial enemies in Africa. The military overthrow of the right-
wing dictatorship in Lisbon unleashed a wave of popular struggles that threatened the whole social 
order. The turning point in Portugal was the Republica newspaper affair, where the principle of 
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workers’ control seemed to come into conflict with the principle of freedom of speech. The 
confrontation around Republica enabled Portuguese Social Democracy—with significant support 
from the German Social Democracy Party—to achieve political ascendancy in Portugal at a critical 
point in time. The Portuguese events showed that while there was a widespread mood for radical 
social change across Europe’s Mediterranean, the Soviet-style authoritarian model was not 
regarded as a desirable alternative (Foley et al 1975; Frank et al 1975; Poulantzas 1976). 
The European integration project was able to portray itself as representing an alternative 
political and social model to that of the United States, the USSR, and the fascist dictatorships. 
‘Europe’ was seen as combining the best elements of both socialist and capitalist systems in a 
political context of democratic representation and constructive co-operation between nation-states. 
The promise of entry into ‘Europe’ also served as an important counterweight against those sectors 
of the state apparatus which might have sought to re-establish dictatorial regimes. 
The Irish situation might seem far removed from the sharp social conflicts of the 
Mediterranean, but in Ireland too an acute political crisis arose in the early 1970s. A mass 
movement emerged in Northern Ireland at the end of the 1960s—influenced by the U.S. civil rights 
campaign—challenging the systematic discrimination against Catholics. When this movement was 
confronted by state violence, it morphed into a protracted guerrilla campaign seeking an end to 
British rule. In the early 1970s, this created a potentially explosive mixture where the unfinished 
goals of the national independence movement in the North risked converging with social unrest 
across the island. 
The enormous mobilizations across Ireland following the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings 
shook the political order, yet a few months later, the population voted by a substantial majority to 
join ‘Europe.’ Opponents of Irish entry argued that membership would curtail national sovereignty 
and democracy. Supporters of the EEC claimed that on the contrary, membership would weaken 
Irish economic dependence on Britain and give the country greater, not less, autonomy. In a context 
where the great bulk of Irish exports went to the British market, this was a strong argument.  
If a desire to avoid future war played a significant role in the original moves towards 
European integration, by the time Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined, the war was long 
over and the notion of a unified Europe has come to acquire a different connotation. The European 
Economic Community had been highly successful economically and the cooperative spirit it 
seemed to embody made it a beacon for other European states. Not only had the EEC countries 
achieved a level of prosperity unimaginable before the war, this prosperity had been much more 
widely distributed than in any previous historical era. For the three Mediterranean states, ‘Europe’ 
had another significance: it seemed to promise a consolidation of democracy in their home 
countries. This feature did not apply to Ireland, but the prospect of joining a co-operative 
association which promised a wider prosperity was hugely attractive. 
 
Journal of World-System Research  |  Vol. 22  Issue 1 | Coakley          183 
 
jwsr.org  |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.634 
Ireland joined in 1973 (alongside Britain and Denmark), shortly before the deepest global 
recession since the war. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. The 
thirty glorious years were over, and the wave of growth which had marked out the post-war era 
would not be repeated. There was another problem too: the notion of a European social model with 
which new entrants might integrate was always illusory. There was no single European social 
model. Different types of welfare systems existed in most of the core European states, but these 
were organized and funded at a national level, not at a pan-European one. What ‘Europe’ had done 
in its early decades was to facilitate these nation-states to maintain their existing internal social 
arrangements (Coakley 2012). 
A detailed comparison of the experience of these semi-peripheral states in the EU is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In general their fortunes were mixed. What Lopez and Rodriguez said 
about Spain could also apply to Ireland, and to a lesser extent to Portugal and Greece: 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that the general perception in Spain was of having 
left peripheral status behind, once and for all. For the young generations, it was 
enough to travel around Europe to realize that the differences had become marginal 
and that prosperity and modernity, if they existed at all, were to be found as much on 
the Spanish side of the Pyrenees as beyond. (2011: 13) 
 
At the same time each of these states experienced a weakening of their already fragile indigenous 
industrial bases. Their efforts to catch up with the core had the effect of increasing their 
dependence on external capital, the implications of which only became fully apparent with the 
global financial crisis (Lopez & Rodriguez 2011; Rodrigues & Reis 2012). 
 
Celtic Tiger 
The 1980s was Ireland’s second ‘lost decade’ since the Second World War, characterised by low 
growth and reductions in state spending alongside high levels of unemployment and high rates of 
emigration. The strategy of relying on foreign direct investment to achieve economic growth 
appeared to have failed. In 1990, Ireland’s per capita income was 62% of the EU average. A decade 
later, a surge of growth had enabled it to surpass that average, at least on paper. Ireland, it seemed, 
had finally taken its place among the core nations of the world. For the Irish elite, especially the 
elite intellectuals, it was a source of great pride. They could rejoice not only in the country’s new 
found wealth, but in the success of the neoliberal policy prescriptions which they had 
enthusiastically advocated. For the rest of the population, more prosaically, the great achievement 
of the Celtic Tiger was that it seemed to have finally eliminated unemployment and emigration 
(Kirby 2010; Paus 2012). 
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In the Celtic Tiger years, Ireland experienced an average growth rate of 6% and 
unemployment fell from around 20% to 4%. The key to Ireland’s surging GDP figures was a wave 
of investment by U.S. information technology and pharmaceutical companies. In 1989, foreign 
direct investment in Ireland increased sevenfold over the previous year and it continued to increase 
until peaking at €30 billion in 2002. Ireland became a conduit for U.S. corporations entering the 
European market. A significant factor in attracting U.S. direct investment to Ireland was its low 
tax rate, and numerous tax exemption schemes. The official corporate tax rate was 12.5% but it 
has been calculated that the actual effective rate was somewhere between 4% and 7%. One 
consequence of these tax avoidance schemes (and the repatriation of profits) is that Ireland’s great 
leap forward in GDP statistics hugely exaggerated its actual growth (McDonough & Dundon 2010; 
Allen 2012). 
Direct investment by U.S. corporations fell sharply following the dot-com crash, but the 
Irish state helped engineer a new wave of growth based upon a property boom, itself facilitated by 
the European Union’s liberalization of the financial sphere. Irish involvement in the single 
currency led to lower interest rates, while the Irish banks and credit institutions were able to borrow 
huge sums from the major banks in Germany, France, and Britain to fund their lending. The 
property boom was partly driven by a shortage of housing brought about by the state’s effective 
ending of its public housing programmes. House prices rose threefold between 1994 and 2006. 
Much of the lending was to a small coterie of politically connected property developers who 
invested not only in Ireland, but in Britain and across Europe. In 2007—when it ought to have 
been obvious to the most myopic that this was a bubble—Irish banks lent out €342 billion to the 
Irish private sector, three times the size of the Irish economy. The government and the leading 
state officials, as well as the media were all complicit in maximizing the credit bubble before it 
crashed. All of the subsequent debt was charged to the citizenry (Kirby 2010; Coakley 2012; 
Mercille 2013; Rafter 2014). 
In September 2008, Lehman’s Brothers, one of the major Wall Street banks collapsed, 
bringing in its wake the so-called credit crunch. Banks stopped lending to each other causing the 
largest financial crisis since the Second World War. Two weeks later, the Irish government 
announced it was guaranteeing all deposits and debts of all the Irish banks and their subsidiaries 
abroad. A year later, the ECB threatened to cut off emergency funding to the Irish banking system 
unless the government agreed to immediately apply for a bailout; the bailout involved an 
acceptance of a harsh austerity programme and an agreement to repay in full all the bondholders, 
even the unsecured ones (Irish Times 2014). 
 
The Unfolding Crisis 
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One of the knock-on effects of global credit contraction was to be raise bond rates. Since the 
formation of the single currency, bond rates within the Eurozone had converged, with the weaker 
states able to borrow at rates very close to those of the stronger EU states. In the post-Lehman’s 
mood of panic, financial investors began to distinguish between weaker and stronger states and 
speculate against the weaker ones. 
Greece was the first in the firing line. Greece’s public spending as a percent of GDP in 
2006 was one of the largest in the Eurozone, but it was slightly less than Italy, and not hugely 
greater than Germany. Once the financial crisis broke on Wall Street, Greek borrowing costs rose 
rapidly. What made it unsustainable was that neither Greece nor of any other the endangered states 
were able to re-finance their debts because their central bank did not have the power to buy state 
bonds. This followed from the design of the single currency. While the ECB is nominally an 
independent bank, it has been clear since the beginning of the euro-crisis that it is closely tied to 
the private world of finance and is ultimately answerable to the major states: France and more 
especially Germany. Had these states agreed to change the structure of the European monetary 
system, there would have been no currency crisis. The framing of the crisis as a consequence of 
excessive public debt and spending had the effect of both transforming and exacerbating the crisis. 
It neglected the crucial role of financial liberalization in bringing about the crisis in the first place, 
and diverted attention from the culpability and indebtedness of the private banks. Not least it 
ignored the central role that European monetary integration has played in the affair (Guilen 2012; 
Streeck 2014a). 
In the case of Ireland, there was a very real credit explosion in the new millennium, but 
this was concentrated in the private, not the public sector. In 2007, Ireland’s public debt ratio was 
25%, one of the lowest in the European Union. The explosion in Irish private debt was closely 
linked into, and largely dependent upon, the wider process of financialization that swept across 
Europe since the 1990s. The Irish banking surge was largely driven by a construction 
boom/bubble. The development of this bubble coincided closely with Irish membership of the 
euro. Irish interest rates were exceptionally low because of euro membership; these rates were 
largely determined by the needs of the German economy. Previously, Irish banks could only lend 
sums in relation to their deposit base. After monetary union, they could lend much larger sums 
based on what they could borrow from EU core banks. These banks in turns were facilitated in 
lending large sums because of the new financial instruments developed by Wall Street banks. A 
distinctive feature of these lending practices was that they were based on short term credit. The 
problem with short term credit is that it dries up very quickly in times of trouble, leaving the debtor 
stranded and unable to access new sources of funding to keep their business—or country—running 
(O’Riain 2014). 
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There was a very clear failure of the regulatory bodies in Ireland and other peripheral states 
to warn about the emergence of a financial bubble, to put it at its mildest. However, this failure 
was systemic. The European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund not only 
encouraged these practices but assured all concerned, just months before the crash, that if there 
was a ‘market correction,’ it would involve a ‘soft landing.’ The credit bubble in Ireland—and 
elsewhere on the European periphery—was encouraged by the major U.S.-based credit ratings 
agencies; the same agencies that would later play a key role in fomenting the Euro debt crisis. Far 
from pursuing a reckless fiscal policy, the Irish state had been continually restraining public 
expenditure, and had been enthusiastic in its zeal for neoliberal policies. Since 1990, they had 
carried out privatization across a range of public bodies that had been built up during their earlier 
‘developmental’ phase: food; insurance; shipping; steel; banking; energy; telecoms and air 
transport (Kirby 2010; McDonough & Dundon 2010). 
Spain and Portugal had also re-orientated their economies to the neoliberal zeitgeist. Both 
had lower rates of public spending than Germany. Spain had experienced a similar property-driven 
credit bubble as Ireland. Its high public debt by 2010 was a direct consequence of public 
authorities’ taking over the private debt of the banks and other financial institutions. Portugal had 
also pursued a neoliberal course during the 1990s. Unable to devalue its currency to boost its 
exports (and thus solve its balance its payment problem), the government encouraged financial 
liberalization and began an intensive course of privatization. Selling off public assets (much of it 
nationalised in the years immediately following the Revolution) enabled them to meet the 
immediate ‘convergence’ criteria for membership of the euro, but it left the country with only a 
very limited productive base with which to compete in the globalised economy. Even in the case 
of Greece, the representation of their fiscal problems as rising from extravagant social expenditure 
is erroneous. Much of the Greek public debt resulted from its excessive military budget and had 
little to do with social spending (Kouvelakis 2010; Lopez & Rodriguez 2011; Rodrigues & Reis 
2012). 
The image of the European core states bailing out the peripheral ones is quite at odds with 
what actually happened: the population of the peripheral states bailed out the banks of the core 
ones. The private banks in the core states, especially in Germany, France and Britain had lent large 
sums of money to the private banks in Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. They had also, to a 
lesser extent, bought public bonds from Greece and other states. What made these investments 
especially hazardous was that European banks, especially German ones, had bought huge amounts 
of dodgy financial assets from the big Wall Street institutions (Cafruny 2010; Lapavitsas 2012). 
The European leaders initially minimised the significance of the crisis, even blaming it on 
liberal economic policies. In the immediate aftermath of the Lehmans’ crash in September 2008, 
Peer Steinbruck the German finance Minister sharply criticised the United States for failing to 
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regulate financial markets and told the German parliament: “The U.S. will lose its status as the 
superpower of the world financial system.” This world will become multipolar with the emergence 
of stronger, better-capitalized centres in Asia and Europe. The world will never be the same 
(Financial Times 2008) The French President Sarkozy was even more blunt: 
 
Basically, a certain idea of globalization is biting the dust with the end of a financial 
capitalism which had imposed its rationale on the whole economy and contributed to 
corrupting it. The idea of the all-powerful market, which was not to be impeded by 
any rules or political intervention, was a mad one. The idea that the markets are always 
right was mad...Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market which is always 
right is finished. (EU Observer: 28 Septermber, 2008) 
 
In Europe, as in North America, the political elites’ questioning of neoliberal verities did not last 
long. Two years later, Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank proclaimed 
to a press conference: “The market is always right, and has to be completely respected at all times.” 
All the ECB has to do is to accompany “the market as it progressively gets back to normal” 
(Leaman 2014: 45)  
The change in tune was partially due to a realization of how deeply the European banking 
system was implicated in the American financial debacle: “At the start of the crisis, German banks 
had the largest leverage rates among OECD countries […] at the end of 2009 European banks were 
estimated to hold more than $1 trillion in toxic assets, more than two thirds of which were held by 
German banks” (Cafruny 2010: 126). 
Their losses to Wall Street made these banks’ exposure to the European periphery all the 
more critical. Unable or unwilling to confront U.S. financial capital, Germany and the other core 
states focused their wrath on Europe’s weaker states. Peter Böfinger, an economic advisor to the 
German government, told Der Spiegel in 2011: “(The bailouts) are first and foremost not about the 
problem countries, but about our banks which hold high amounts of credit there” (quoted in 
Chaterjee Common Dreams 28 May, 2012) 
The fact that Greece became the fulcrum of the European financial crisis was advantageous 
because it enabled the European authorities and the EU core states, especially Germany, to 
transform what had primarily been a banking crisis into a crisis of sovereign debt. In the process, 
the Eurozone debt crisis could be represented as a crisis of the European periphery caused by an 
excess of public spending.  
This representation of the European banking crisis was of huge significance. Greece was 
the first of the EU states to experience a sovereign debt crisis. By targeting Greece, the media in 
core states, especially in Germany, were able to draw on older forms of racial-cultural discourse 
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to win their case. It enabled the ECB and the core states to re-finance the major banks while 
directing political antagonism towards the peripheral countries. By implying that excessive public 
spending was at the heart of the Euro crisis, it upheld neoliberal or ‘ordo-liberal’ discourses, and 
legitimated the imposition of austerity policies across Europe. It also facilitated the re-emergence 
of a xenophobic nationalism in Germany, which would express itself a few years later with mass 
protests against the “rise of Islam.”  
The EU authorities and the major EU states made a political decision that the banking crisis 
would become a sovereign debt crisis: that the weaker nation-states would pay for Europe’s 
financial expansion. This represented a convergence of interests between the European banks—
effectively represented by the ECB—and the core states. Many of these tendencies were already 
nascent in the European integration project. The crisis brought them to the fore, and hardened them 
out, transforming Europe in the process. Not least they have transformed how the people of Europe 
perceive the European integration project (Lapavitsas 2012). 
 
The politics of austerity 
Merkel told an audience of Christian Democratic Union-supporting business leaders on June 12, 
2012: “The question of whether Greece carries out its programme is not just a question of whether 
the programme succeeds or not, but rather of whether obligations will be observed in Europe in 
future” (Deutsche Presse Agentur: June 12, 2012) Two main arguments were given in support of 
austerity policies: a moral one and an economic one. The moral one was that these states had 
overspent and should pay back what they owed. The economic argument was that austerity would 
make the peripheral states more competitive and would be to their benefit in the long run. 
The very word ‘austerity’ is a loaded one, implying moral restraint and a refusal of all 
forms of self-indulgence. The problem with the moral argument for austerity is that those who are 
being made pay the price for running up debts are not those who benefitted from the credit boom 
or those who took the decisions.  
The economic argument was that austerity would help states in crisis to become more 
competitive through a process of ‘internal devaluation,’ which would be achieved by lowering 
labor costs. The European authorities place great emphasis on structural reforms, especially of the 
labor market. Reduced social provision and more flexible employment conditions would result in 
lower wages, enabling the peripheral states to grow their way out of their fallen state and compete 
in the European and global markets. The problem with this argument is that a reduction of public 
spending—and lower wages—diminishes domestic demand. People have less money to buy 
goods, and so the whole economy goes into deeper decline. Many mainstream economic 
commentators like Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Martin Wolf 
have criticised the folly of these policies to no avail. Even the International Monetary Fund felt 
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obliged to criticise the futility of reducing public spending in a recession (Bloomberg News 2013). 
Most important of all, it hasn’t worked. The peripheral states entered an extended period of 
stagnation.  
 
The austerity regime in Ireland 
The austerity programme imposed by the Troika did not so much represent a break with Irish 
government policies of the Celtic Tiger period as a radical accentuation of these polices. During 
the boom, the state pursued policies of low taxation, privatization, accommodation towards 
markets and a reduction of public services. The feature that most distinguished Ireland from the 
Thatcherite-Blairite regime in Britain was its social pacts with the trade union movement. This 
was feasible because of rising employment and rising wages (McDonough & Dundon 2010). 
Once the crash came, Ireland suffered a massive economic decline. Unemployment and 
emigration soared and huge numbers of people found themselves in arrears with mortgage 
payments. Wages in both the public and private sectors were reduced. A string of regressive taxes 
were introduced, and there were deep cuts across a range of social services. Poverty and inequality 
have hugely increased. By 2014, Irish public debt compared to GDP was over 125%, five times its 
pre-crash rate.  
In Ireland, a small number of well-paid jobs were created by the arrival of U.S.-owned 
information technology and computer companies, but this did little to change the larger picture. 
Increasingly the Irish labor market is being polarised with middle income jobs being reduced and 
replaced by a small minority of secure highly paid jobs and a much larger number of precarious 
low-paid jobs (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al 2014; O’Broin: 2015). 
Figures for exports and GDP in Ireland that showed growth in 2014 led to a huge amount 
of media hype about an Irish economic recovery. Both statistics are so notoriously unreliable that 
even the IMF has publically questioned them, suggesting that they are distorted by the practice of 
‘transfer pricing’ employed by the transnational corporations (Irish Times, 30 January 2015). 
Meanwhile wages and personal consumption have been stagnant. One area that has seen a 
significant increase has been house prices and rents in the Dublin region, but this has only added 
to the levels of popular deprivation. The costs of utility bills, transport, and healthcare have all 
increased. While the official jobless rate has fallen from 11.9% in 2014 to 10.2% in 2015, more 
than one in every five workers is part-time. EU statistics show that a quarter of the Irish population 
is suffering material deprivation and a tenth is suffering “severe material deprivation,” one of the 
worst cases in the Eurozone (Burke 2014; Taft 2014a; 2014b) 
Brian Lenihan, the Minister of Finance during the banking crash, famously expressed 
amazement that there had been no riots in Ireland in response to the austerity budgets. In fact, the 
austerity programmes have produced a transformation in Irish politics. Fianna Fail, which had been 
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Ireland’s dominant party for eight decades, with a cross-class appeal, suffered a crushing political 
defeat in the elections of 2011. Fine Gael, the historical party of the Irish Right strengthened its 
position and became the leading party in the pro-austerity coalition government that followed, but 
it is not remotely close to being a majority party. The Irish Labor Party, which was the junior party 
in the coalition, experienced a meltdown in the local elections of 2014. In urban working class 
constituencies in particular, the pro-austerity parties have been marginalised.  
While the Irish and international media have waxed enthusiastically about Ireland’s 
recovery, this very image of recovery contrasts strikingly with the reality of deepening hardship 
which much, if not most, of the population has experienced. This contrast came to a head with the 
huge mobilizations against the imposition of water charges in 2014. The “Right 2 Water” campaign 
emerged as a coalition of forces, including oppositional currents within the trade union movement, 
grass-root activists and radical leftists. The initial response by the trade union leadership to the 
government’s austerity programme was extraordinary timorous; decades of social pacts with 
employers and government had left them thoroughly domesticated. The presence of a current of 
radical union activists was crucial to broadening and deepening this anti-austerity coalition.  
Believing their own propaganda, the government parties contested the 2016 elections on 
the slogan of keeping the recovery going, and were surprised to discover that most of the 
population had not noticed any recovery. The vote for Fine Gael, the main governing party, fell 
from over a third of the total in the 2011 elections to a quarter in 2016. Fianna Fail, which sought 
to distance itself from austerity policies, recovered some of its vote, but achieved nothing like its 
earlier support. The junior party in the government, Labor, suffered most, losing two thirds of its 
votes and the great bulk of its seats in the process, 
The left-wing anti-austerity forces made significant gains across the country winning 
around a quarter of the vote, with Sinn Fein and the far-left coalition significantly increasing their 
support. For the first time in eighty years the combined vote of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael has fallen 
below 50%. While these conservative parties combined certainly have the capacity to push through 
further austerity policies, they will no longer have a loyal opposition available to swap office with 
in the event of suffering political defeat in future elections. An important milestone has been 
passed. 
A more detailed look at the political economy of the northern Irish state is outside the scope 
of this article, but a couple of points need making. The peace settlement in Northern Ireland was 
premised upon a power-sharing system in a semi-autonomous regional government. Westminster 
maintained overall control. Since the election of the Tory-dominated government in Britain in 
2010, there has been a concerted attempt to impose an austerity programme on all parts of the 
‘United Kingdom,’ with a special emphasis on cutting welfare. In Scotland the left-of-centre 
Scottish National Party sought to block welfare cuts, while in Northern Ireland Sinn Fein and the 
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centrist Social Democratic and Labor Party—both representing the ‘nationalist’ community—
were able to use the power-sharing veto rules to block similar measures. 
Anti-austerity politics across the ‘United Kingdom’ is shaped by the distinctive legacy of 
the Thatcher era where a xenophobic English nationalism has come to play a major role in the 
dominant culture. The European Union is perceived by the English Right as being excessively 
generous in its welfare provisions (an attitude not dissimilar to that of the U.S. Right). In this 
context, many of those opposing austerity regard the EU as a positive force or at least as a lesser 
evil compared to the deeply reactionary politics of British Conservativism. 
 
The new Germany 
Prior to the twenty first century global crisis, Berlin sought to pursue its national interests while 
accommodating other states within the EU. Once the crisis broke, this approach was abandoned 
and Germany reverted to an increasingly coercive model. 
 A number of factors encouraged this. The costs of German unification led to an extended 
period of fiscal retrenchment. The German trade unions, fearful that German corporations would 
move factories to Eastern Europe, acceded to this with the result that wages in Germany have 
stagnated or fallen. This led to a growing competiveness gap between Germany and other parts of 
Europe, especially the south. The gap in competitiveness was masked during the boom years by 
the massive extension of credit from banks in the core regions to businesses and consumers in the 
peripheral regions. Once the crash came this gap became startlingly visible, but the peripheral 
states were not in a position to devalue their currencies in order to regain competiveness (Bellofiore 
& Halevi 2011; Lapavitsas et al. 2012). 
Since 2009, German exports have revived and Germany has built trade surpluses both 
globally and within the European Union. By definition, if Germany is running a trade surplus with 
the rest of the Eurozone, others must be in deficit, but the EU has no mechanism for dealing with 
this issue. Instead, Berlin and the EU authorities have insisted on rules of fiscal retrenchment which 
have imposed severe limits on public expenditure in countries which find themselves with trade 
deficits. A recessionary climate has spread across much of the Eurozone. Italy, France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium are all stagnant and their debts are rising.  
The relentless austerity drives suggest that both the neoliberal intellectual programme and 
the finance-led regime of accumulation are more deeply rooted in long-term changes in the 
capitalist order than many critical scholars acknowledge. 
 
The European Integration Project and the Global Order 
Up until quite recently the EU was widely viewed as representing an alternative model of 
capitalism to the United States: more humane, more law-abiding, and more pacific. European 
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integration was also viewed as a defensive measure against the power of the United States, 
enabling Europe to develop its home market and to establish a socio-economic order characterised 
by a high level of social cohesion. One difficulty with this perspective is that the United States has 
consistently supported the process of European integration. If European integration seemed likely 
to create a rival bloc, the United States would hardly acquiesce in the process. 
The relationship between the United States and European integration was the location of 
one of the key debates in post-war European radical scholarship between Ernest Mandel and Nicos 
Poulantzas, with Mandel arguing that the EU represented an alternative imperialist project by 
European capital seeking to defend itself against U.S. corporations, and Poulantzas stressing the 
key role that U.S. capital played in the formation of the EU (Mandel 1970; Poulantzas 1975). 
There are elements of truth in both positions. European economic integration assisted the 
larger corporations—both European and American—in their efforts to dominate the markets of 
Europe. Interestingly though, the bulk of investment by U.S. TNCs in Europe came after the 
formation of the ‘Common Market’ (Panitch & Gindin 2014). In the early phase, European 
economic integration was designed to stabilise the European economics and reduce friction 
between them. The United States encouraged this process in order to create a prosperous buffer 
zone against a potential Soviet threat to Europe. Washington was careful to ensure that European 
integration would not involve the exclusion of U.S. corporations or U.S. military detachments. 
Under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome—the founding treaty of the European Economic 
Community—there could be no discrimination against U.S. corporations. Moreover, European 
economic integration followed the incorporation of all the major west European states into the 
U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The U.S. approach towards Europe was never driven 
solely by economic considerations: geo-political factors were always present (Gowan 1999; 
Anderson 2011). 
The EEC—and its later manifestations—represented something of a compromise between 
the United States and the European states. The European states were permitted a considerable 
degree of autonomy and co-ordination, provided they operated within the rules laid down by 
Washington. Two points were crucial: the U.S. maintained military over-lordship of (western) 
Europe through the means of NATO, and U.S. capital could freely operate within Europe (or was 
at least not subject to any discriminatory practices). 
The compromise proved beneficial for Western European capitalism and the population of 
the core states experienced unprecedented levels of prosperity. Economic hegemony facilitated 
cultural hegemony and West Europeans came to absorb ‘American values’ through a myriad of 
means. Since then two key changes have occurred that have significantly altered the relationship 
between the United States and Europe: The drive to financialize the American and global economy, 
and the collapse of the USSR and its dominance over Eastern Europe. 
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The collapse of the Soviet system created not only new opportunities for U.S. global power, 
but also new difficulties, because the U.S. military was no longer necessary to deter the threat, real 
or imaginary, of the Red Army. In the period immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the collapse of the USSR, the future of NATO—and its usefulness—were widely debated. 
Peter Gowan has shown how the United States was able to use the military weakness (and political 
incoherence) of west European states during the Yugoslav crisis to re-assert its own dominance 
through NATO. Future entrants to the EU would first of all have to join NATO. This had been not 
been a requirement for earlier entrants like Ireland or Sweden (Gowan 1999). 
The end of the Soviet Union also played a central role in the re-structuring of the EU (it 
was only after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, that the name itself was adopted). Not only was 
‘Europe’ to be enlarged by incorporating its eastern neighbours, but its organizational structures 
were radically overhauled. The driving element in this restructuring was the creation of a single 
currency. Pressure to create a single currency came from a number of sources. Currency instability 
following the end of the dollar-gold link was one factor, but not the major one. The argument that 
it would improve trade between the European countries—and consequently growth—was 
influential, but hardly overwhelming. An effective currency union presupposed both economic and 
political convergence. Western Europe, let alone the East, was a long way from either. Purely geo-
political factors seem to have played an important role. The French political elite seems to have 
believed that German unification threatened the European project (or rather threatened their own 
central role within it) and that a single currency was necessary to tie Germany in (Connolly 1999; 
Anderson 2011). 
The key social forces lobbying for monetary union were the large corporations, American 
and European, industrial and financial, in bodies like the Europe Roundtable and the Association 
for the Monetary Union of Europe. They seem to have played a significant role in giving European 
monetary union its peculiar design. German disinclination to participate in a single currency was 
also one of the shaping factors: the Bundesbank has always opposed monetary union and Berlin 
only agreed to participate in a single currency on conditions of such extreme rigidity that have 
effectively made the currency almost unworkable. The most important point was this: there was to 
be no democratic oversight in the workings of the currency and no fiscal transfers between 
European states. Nor could states engage in deficit financing, which is crucially important to 
overcome recessions (Cafruny & Ryner 2003). 
Because the European Central Bank and the European Commission are not democratically 
elected or accountable, they have no popular legitimacy and little state apparatus of their own to 
ensure that their instructions are carried through. Their real authority then comes from the larger 
states in the Union who exercise the right to decide the exception. The full significance of all this 
only became apparent with the crisis of the Eurozone. 
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The formation of a single currency coincided with a significant structural shift in the make-
up of German and French capitalism. Both states had operated closely regulated economic systems 
with the financial sector servicing production. In Germany, the banks long had close links with 
industrial corporations, marked by interlocking directorships. In France, the state tended to play a 
more direct role ensuring that industry received strong support from public and private finance. 
These regulated systems now began to unravel. Both the banks and the industrial corporations 
came to the view that they could do better apart. Credit for industrial corporations was often more 
cheaply available in the open financial markets, while the large banks saw new opportunities for 
profit in the global financial markets, speculating on currencies, derivatives and other financial 
instruments. The rise and consolidation of the single currency coincided with a shift from bank-
based system to a market-based system of finance, especially in Germany, while the French 
government pursued a programme of privatization across the economy, including the banks (Grahl 
2011). 
Underpinning all this were declining growth rates in the European core states, just as 
occurred in the Unites States a little earlier. It was this long-term shift that encouraged the 
acceptance of the neoliberal paradigm by both public and private elites. European capital sought 
to emulate the American experience, and the U.S.-owned transnational corporations based in 
Europe encouraged the process. There can be little doubt that the absence of any ‘real existing’ 
systemic alternative gave the west European elites a whole new sense of confidence in their 
dealings with labor. The social compromises of the post-war decades now looked like a luxury that 
Europe could no longer afford; the apparent successes of the U.S. economy in the 1990s 




European integration and the erosion of democracy 
The 2008 financial crash consolidated trends within the EU which were already latent since the 
beginning of the second phase of integration. Most obviously the erosion of democracy has 
gathered momentum. The imposition of the Lisbon Treaty after the earlier rejection of the 
European Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch electorates in 2005 was an early warning 
sign. Bertie Ahern, the Irish premier at the time gloated “90% of it is still there” (Anderson 2011: 
59) The new Treaty was not put to a popular vote across most of Europe. Ireland was the only 
country whose constitution demanded that a referendum be held to ratify the treaty. When most of 
the voters rejected the treaty in the first referendum in 2008, a second referendum was imposed by 
the government and the electorate was left in do doubt that if they did not accede to the wishes of 
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Brussels, they would pay a heavy price. The tale of the two referenda set the scene for Ireland’s 
subsequent relations with the European Union (Anderson 2011). 
These events foreshadowed the radical diminution of democratic governance in Europe. 
Macro-economic policy is determined by an autonomous European Central Bank. Neoliberal 
decrees—over-ruling national governments and national courts—are imposed by the European 
Court of Justice, while the unelected European Commission has the exclusive powers of initiating 
legislation. The European Parliament only possesses very limited powers. Huge areas of decision-
making have been withdrawn from any democratic accountability. Wolfgang Streeck has summed 
it up: the European Union has become the key mechanism to free capitalism from the “democratic 
distortion of markets.” (Streeck 2014a: 106) 
It is hardly surprising that the population of Europe has become estranged from, and 
increasingly hostile towards the institutions of the European Union, and indeed the very idea of 
European integration. While the functionaries in Brussels and Frankfort can remain indifferent to 
this popular mood, the elected politicians cannot afford to be so sanguine (Mair 2013; Streeck 
2014a). 
The euro crisis has impelled a paradoxical shift in the patterns of power. The augmented 
power of unelected EU officials and institutions has been accompanied by the renewed ascendancy 
of Europe’s major state(s). Precisely because the EU lacks any democratic legitimacy of its own, 
it has been forced to rely heavily on the most powerful state(s). Initially it appeared that the leaders 
of France and Germany were assuming a joint presidential role in European decision-making. The 
recurring images of Merkel and Sarkozy holding joint summits to determine Europe’s future 
indicated as much, but it soon became clear that Sarkozy was little more than a cipher: Germany 
appears to be the only nation-state to which the European Union is accountable.  (Anderson 2012). 
In the wake of the financial crash there has been a radical accentuation of the core-
periphery divide within Europe, and a reiforcement of the hierarchy of nation-states. The promise 
of economic convergence between European nations has effectively been abandoned, as has any 
principle of equality between them. The EU has shifted from being a broadly co-operative alliance 
of states into being an increasingly coercive one. This has led not only to a loss of legitimacy for 
the European Union and its institutions, but also for those political forces most closely associated 
with them. Significantly, in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy this has involved the 
emergence of left-orientated anti-austerity forces threatening the old power structures. The 
treatment meted out to Greece following the election of Syriza in January 2015 is a clear indication 
of the great obstacles that any government challenging austerity policies will face. What the Syriza 
debacle did show was that the single currency has become the central mechanism for implementing 
the goals of financial capital in Europe. The European Central Bank quite deliberately engineered 
a bank run in Greece to bring Athens to its knees. The Syriza government’s unwillingness to break 
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with the single currency sealed their fate and guaranteed their capitulation to the destructive 
demands of Berlin and Brussels (Lapavitsas 2015). 
In Europe’s core states, popular disaffection is mainly taking the form of an upsurge of 
racist and anti-immigrant political movements. The mass arrival in Europe of refugees, mostly 
fleeing the wars in Syria and Afghanistan, has strengthened and galvanised this trend. Its roots are 
deeper and are direct consequences of Europe’s neoliberal evolution: the remorseless erosion of 
the welfare state; the cordoning off of most political decision-making from popular oversight and 
the elevation of possessive individualism in everyday life have all undermined older cultures of 
solidarity. These tendencies were hugely accentuated by the European elite’s response to the 
financial crisis which effectively extinguished any lingering notions of solidarity between 
countries. A similar political pattern is well established in Eastern Europe where socialist ideas 
have been heavily discredited by their association with dictatorship and where disaffection with 
economic liberalism tends to take a conservative-nationalist direction. 
Europe’s peripheral states find themselves in a trap. If they stay in the single currency they 
can expect to see their societies suffer more or less continual attrition. The EU rules prevent them 
from taking measures—whether currency devaluation or economic stimulation—which might 
permit economic recovery. Their economies are now integrated to a considerable degree with the 
wider European economy. If they leave the single currency, they will still owe debts denominated 
in euros, and can expect little mercy from the European Union authorities. For their part, the elites 
within the peripheral states are overwhelmingly committed to the project of European integration. 
They are, however, locked into a contradictory position. While they are comfortable with policies 
that weaken labor and lower wages, sharp declines in domestic consumption undermines growth 
prospects and drives many companies out of business. The austerity agenda creates particular 
problems for their political representatives. Jean-Claude Junker, the President of the European 
Commission captured the dilemma: “We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-
elected after we've done it. (Daily Telegraph: July 15, 2014)  
Ireland’s exceptional level of dependence on both U.S. capital investment and on access to 
European markets makes it particularly vulnerable to a systemic crisis and vulnerable also to 
retaliation by Europe’s rulers in the event of a government emerging that challenged the austerity 
agenda. For the Irish elite, the strategy of achieving national prosperity by creating a bridge 
economy between the United States and the European Union is unquestionable, but the limits of 
this strategy are becoming ever more apparent. As inter-state competition in Europe (and between 
Europe and the United States) intensifies, Dublin’s schemes for corporate tax avoidance come 
under pressure from both Washington and Brussels, pressure which the Irish state is in a weak 
position to resist. The state’s fiscal position dictates that it either increases taxation on Ireland’s 
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propertied elite or it further reduces popular living standards and erodes public services. Either 
approach will cause major political problems. 
This is not to suggest that progressive social reform is impossible in Ireland. There is ample 
scope for introducing re-distributive policies. A progressive system of taxation would enable an 
anti-austerity government to finance a programme of public investment in housing, infrastructure 
and public services. But the level of debt which has been imposed on the Irish public is so great 
that the arrival of a new European or global recession—or a new global financial crisis—would 
once again leave the Irish state exposed and at the mercy of the ‘troika.’ Any government seeking 
to break with austerity and to develop a sustainable social and economic strategy would need to 




The contention that the process of financialization carries with it the sign of autumn has been 
largely borne out by developments in Europe. More than that, the rise of financial capital in Europe 
has been accompanied by the erosion of democracy which has in turn enabled Europe’s elites to 
‘feather their own nests’ at the expense of the wider population, especially those at the margins of 
society. This diminution of democracy has been carried out under the rubric of closer European 
integration, which far from creating a deeper sense of solidarity among ordinary Europeans has 
had quite the opposite effect. At the level of popular sentiment, Europe has never been more 
divided since the end of the Second World War. 
For the population of the semi-peripheral countries, ‘Europe’ represented hope and a 
confidence that the era of poverty, unemployment, emigration and precariousness would be 
consigned to history and a new age of prosperity and modernity had arrived. There is not a lot of 
hope left now and even less confidence: the European Union increasingly seems like a cage for 
trapping Europe’s nations. This disillusionment with the idea of European integration is in turn 
undermining the structures of hegemony across the European periphery with political opposition 
increasingly driven in an anti-systemic direction. Any renewed financial crisis or return to global 
recession will greatly exacerbate these tensions and put the future of the European Union as risk. 
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Denis O’Hearn has long pioneered the use of world-systems and dependency theory for historical 
and contemporary understandings of Ireland, most notably in his award-winning work The Atlantic 
Economy: Britain, the US, and Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).  In this 
interview with Prof. O’Hearn, we invited him to discuss the major themes of our symposium — 
Ireland’s status in the global capitalist economy, relations with both the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, and the limits of mainstream academic analysis in Ireland.  Thus, as well as 
acting as a capstone to our symposium, we also intend this interview to highlight not only the 
importance of world-systems analysis for Irish studies, but also the relevance of Ireland for world-
systems theorists. 
 
Aidan Beatty, Sharae Deckard, Maurice Coakley (ASM): Is Ireland a semi-periphery? What are 
the dis/advantages of understanding Ireland as a periphery and a semi-periphery? Are there 
regional variations? What are your views of Giovanni Arrighi’s contention that GNP should be 
the measure for assessing a country as a periphery or a semi-periphery? 
 
Denis O’Hearn (DO): Yes, to the extent that we can define countries as “peripheral” or “semi-
peripheral,” Ireland belongs firmly in the semi-periphery. I say this mainly because of its extreme 
dependence on foreign investment and because of the distortions that creates in the Irish economy 
and in Irish development prospects. The two most distinct aspects of this in recent history have 
been the huge gaps between GDP and GNP, caused largely by TNC profit-repatriations, and the 
post-tiger construction bubble that was wrongly interpreted by most economists as a “soft-landing” 
from the period of high growth in the 1990s. Of course, when we apply world-systemic terms such 
as “semiperiphery” we must always add an asterisk. First, each semiperipheral zone is distinct both 
in its place within the global division of labor and in its relationships to core areas. Proponents of 
the method of incorporating comparison, as Dale Tomich and others have reminded us, regard the 
world-system as a self-forming whole that is formed and reformed by the ever-changing relations 
between its parts. Peripheral and semiperipheral zones are not simply acted upon but are constantly 
casting and recasting bargains with core states and corporations, in ongoing relationships in which 
they are less powerful but not powerless. Second, there are regional variations; not only are 
agrarian regions of the island of Ireland distinct from urban and more industrialized regions but 
each region has its own specificities. It may seem obvious to say it, but Kerry is not Donegal, nor 
is Cork Dublin. 
This was one of the main points Arrighi was making in his classic article with Jessica 
Drangel, where he showed that the world-system is comprised of countries that cluster into three 
distinct groups measured by GNP per capita (at least they did at the time the article was written). 
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But he did not define the zones in this way, rather they cluster by income because of the distinct 
structural characteristics of each zone. In particular, economic activities in semiperipheral zones 
are a mix of core and peripheral ones and as a result they are on average less profitable than the 
core but more profitable than the periphery; they are less technology-intensive than the core; and 
wage incomes are generally lower. Semiperipheral zones or countries within them are thus not in 
transition from periphery to core, as modernizationists would propose, but are structured in the 
middle. As Arrighi and Drangel put it, economic activities are structured in commodity chains that 
cut across state boundaries and this results in the semiperipheral mix of core and peripheral 
activities. Ireland is unique, however, in the degree of dualism of its economy, in the extreme 
domination of transnational capital in manufacturing and some services, on one hand, and 
traditional agriculture on the other. 
Of course, some of the indicators of coreness are where Ireland has supposedly been 
“different.” For example, as we saw so distinctly in the Celtic Tiger period but even before and 
after, Ireland had dramatically high profit rates in manufacturing. Indeed, they were far higher than 
those of core countries. Irish manufacturing also seemed to be dominated by high-tech firms and 
products, again moreso than core economies. But did this mean that the island was not 
semiperipheral? Here is where world-systems categories like semiperiphery are quite useful. Even 
at the point where the south of Ireland had surged dramatically from one of the “poor men” of 
Europe to the second-highest EU country in terms of GDP per capita, one could pick apart its 
“profit rates” and its “high tech” character and see that they were largely illusions caused by the 
economy’s extreme dependence on U.S. capital. Yes, profit rates were extremely high in the U.S. 
pharma and computer sectors, but that was largely because of practices like transfer-pricing and 
the fruits of such profit rates were largely lost through repatriation.  
As an interesting sidenote, the illusion of coreness in Ireland was partly produced by a 
statistical accident: the decision by Eurostat and others to use GDP rather than GNP as the basic 
measure of economic status. This made Ireland appear to be up to a third wealthier than it actually 
was.  
And one final point while we are on this subject: nobody seems to ever learn any lessons 
from this. Lately, the U.S. media has been reporting on U.S. corporate “inversions,” a practice by 
which big U.S. companies buy out smaller Irish companies like the pharma company Allergan and 
relocate their corporate headquarters to Ireland in order to take advantage of low Irish taxes on 
taxes. They have been reporting this as if it is a new thing but, of course, we have been talking and 
writing about such corporate tax-evading practices at least since the 1970s. It seems to be 
characteristic of business reportage on the semiperiphery that no one ever learns anything. The 
media go to the same group of “experts” who failed to see a recession or a bailout coming to find 
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out why the recession happened and how it will be fixed! Few people want real explanation, just 
the same old failed superficial answers. 
 
ASM: What other countries/situations are you most inclined to compare Ireland to? What are your 
views of academic analyses of Ireland, particularly of the revisionist school of historiography?  
 
DO: The answer to this question depends on the dimension of social reality or history we are 
interested in. Economically, Ireland is quite unique. If you look at measures of dependency, 
“globalization,” “openness,” or such things, no other country even comes close to Ireland in recent 
times. This is one reason why all the hype about the Celtic Tiger was just that…hype. For a time, 
you had Irish “experts” going all around the world, especially to Central and Eastern Europe, 
telling people how they could also become tigers, like Ireland. But it was all absurd! As I kept 
telling people, Ireland received something like 40 percent of high tech manufacturing investment 
into the EU with one percent of the population. This meant two things. First, the flow of inward 
investments had a much bigger effect on growth in a small country like Ireland than it could have 
in a larger country, even Hungary or a Czech Republic. Second, if Ireland was getting 40 percent 
and Britain another 40 percent of inward investment, where would the investment come from that 
was supposed to make all those East European tigers?! There is only one hundred percent in a 
hundred percent. 
Then, when we get to the crisis, things are different, as well. In the most recent crisis, for 
instance, Ireland suffered from a specific disease of corruption, construction, and speculation that 
masked its true economic weakness for five or six years. While some local fat cats were getting 
rich in a phantom construction sector, transnational corporations were actually disinvesting. That 
bubble finally burst at about the same time as it burst in Iceland, Greece, and elsewhere. But the 
Irish bubble was a different and quite specific bubble from Iceland or Greece. So comparison is 
instructive but one has to be very careful to specify what one is comparing and, especially, the 
points of difference between Ireland and other places. 
Historically, comparison is very interesting but again in a particular way. Ireland, as the 
first colony, played a very unique role in the British-led Atlantic economy. It was an important 
mediation point between England and the Caribbean and North America. But other characteristics 
of the colonial relationship are very important in a different sense for historical comparison.  
Take the Famine. Ireland is important comparatively not because its famine is like other 
famines, except to the extent that it was created by imperialism. As Mike Davis shows in his 
wonderful book Late Victorian Holocausts, Ireland is important because it was a test run for 
subsequent famines by which England and other European powers “created” the Third World. The 
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same is true of the policy of surrender and regrant, by which clan lands were turned into private 
property and indirect rule was established in parts of Ireland. Again, Ireland was a guinea pig for 
policies that England used throughout empire. And then later, of course, the use of interrogation 
and surveillance techniques in the North of Ireland was a testing ground for Brixton and other poor 
parts of Britain, as well as for “wars on terror” around the world. And during the late 1970s up to 
the 1981 hunger strike, the use of long-term prison isolation against political prisoners was a 
template that was later used by the United States and Turkey, among others. Of course, this kind 
of policy-testing using “worthless” lives goes on all over the world, not least in medical testing in 
the Global South but also among poor populations of core countries. I think it is in these indirect 
policy comparisons that Ireland is most interesting in a historical context. 
That brings us to your question about historical revisionism in Ireland. Obviously, I have 
big problems with this school of Irish historiography, which should more accurately be called 
historical negationaism because its purpose is the denial of colonial and imperial oppressions of 
the Irish people. I was always surprised by the use of this term in the Irish context because in other 
places, like Africa, “revisionism” meant widening the net to use more and different kinds of 
evidence to address historical questions. It meant that the historian could use oral narratives and 
songs as data. It meant that the historian was expected to consider creative ways of “doing history 
from the bottom up,” as the U.S. historian Staughton Lynd puts it. Think of all the beautiful 
histories and cultural studies that have been enabled by this kind of thinking. One of the most 
enlightening studies I know is Keith Basso’s book on the Apache, Wisdom Sits in Places. It is all 
about the use of oral wisdom to understand the past and the present, and to address the future. In 
his magisterial work The Art of Not Being Governed, James Scott even argues that people may 
refuse literacy as a strategy to maintain their autonomy. Recording and measuring are the means 
by which states establish control over previously autonomous people. In such contexts, uses of 
oral data are critical. 
But in Ireland we had “revisionist” historians telling us that this kind of data was invalid, 
that you could only believe data if it was written down. There are even studies of the Irish diaspora 
that claim special relevance because they use written letters by emigrants as data. I mean, what 
proportion of emigrants before the twentieth century could write home to provide their histories? 
This kind of thing is not just crazy, it is class biased. It is the history of the literate, which means 
history written from above. Boaventura de Sousa Santos talks of the “sociology of absences and 
emergences,” by which he means we have a duty to reclaim as real those experiences that have 
been discarded by the mainstream social sciences because they do not fit into their conceptions of 
“economy” or “society.” Moreover, we must see as “possible” many things that mainstream social 
sciences have continually called impossible, including utopia and communism and statelessness. 
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Thankfully, we also have a strong tradition of historiography in Ireland that recognizes such 
absences and emergences. I think, for example, of Jane Gray’s use of songs and poetry in Ulster 
Scots to recreate the gendered lives of spinners and weavers in protoindustrial Ireland. I have tried 
to follow such a “sociology of absences and emergences” in my work on Irish political prisoners 
and in subsequent work on isolated prisoners in U.S. prisons like California’s Pelican Bay. Rather 
than accepting the orthodox definitions of these prisoners as terrorists, in the Irish case, or gang 
leaders, in the United States, I have tried to understand them as full political subjects and, 
moreover, to recognize the lessons they have provided about how to build societies based on 
maximum participation, direct democracy, solidarity, and mutual aid. 
If Irish historical revisionism did us a service, however, it was to force us to reconsider our 
analyses of colonialism and imperialism. In particular, it did challenge certain forms of knee-jerk 
nationalism that were just as superficial as orthodox economic histories. Thus, whenever I tried to 
place Ireland in the historical capitalist world-system, as in my book The Atlantic Economy or in 
my work on the Irish and English cotton and linen industries, I faced a new challenge and I did 
feel a need to uncover data and archival sources that had not been used in traditional nationalist 
histories. I had to interpret them in new ways and with better techniques, including econometric 
estimators. We need to use every tool at our command, every source of data, from statistics to 
poetry, and perhaps some Irish revisionist works drove us harder to make better arguments and use 
data more rigorously. 
 
ASM: In relation to your work on The Atlantic Economy, how has Ireland changed since you wrote 
that book? Has U.S. hegemony declined and what does that mean for Ireland? 
 
DO: Well, Ireland has changed in some ways. The specifics of its relationships to and with world-
capitalism and especially with the EU have evolved. I wouldn’t say that U.S. hegemony has 
necessarily declined, but it has evolved and become more contradictory. For example, the United 
States has complicated its hegemony by overplaying certain military hands. It helped usher out the 
Soviet empire at the cost of creating an Islamic fundamentalism that is far more dangerous than 
any movement since the Second World War, although thankfully more localized than communism-
as-it-actually-existed.  
As for Ireland, it changed much more from the beginning of Atlantic Economy to the end 
of that study than it has changed since. Many of the key relationships that marked Irish dependency 
in the 1980s and 1990s are still there, particularly the overreliance on U.S. corporate investment. 
Perhaps the biggest change in the medium-term is political, including the fall-out of the peace 
process and the emergence of a new left political movement in Ireland. The Irish left is still not as 
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strong or as creative as Podemos in Spain or even Syriza in Greece but nonetheless it has at least 
the seeds of a challenge to Ireland as we have known it. I think at the end of The Atlantic Economy 
many people thought my analysis left Ireland in a dismal position, although I always argued for 
hope. Now, however, we live in a time of hope. This may sound strange to someone who focuses 
on the deep crisis we have just been through. But through crisis hope arose because more and more 
people began to see that another world is not only possible but necessary. We live in a time when 
a U.S. politician can run and be considered a serious contender for president and explicitly call 
himself a socialist. It is a time when people who refer to the one and the ninety-nine percent strike 
a chord right across the populations, not just of the Global South or Europe but even of the United 
States. So I think the biggest change since The Atlantic Economy is the return of hope and the 
promise of a new kind of politics. 
 
ASM: What are your views of the European Union and the role it plays both in Ireland and 
elsewhere? What role do you see the EU taking in the future? What are your views of the past, 
present and future of the single currency? 
 
DO: The EU has really gotten ugly of late (was it ever different?!). The raw use of power against 
the Greek people and the collapse, one might even say betrayal, of the hope that emerged with 
Syriza in their defiance against Berlin was a salutary lesson to progressives all over Europe. Tahrir 
took a few years to disappoint us but Greece deflated us overnight…from victory to despair! The 
EU has simply become more dictatorial, its economics have become more and more orthodox, and 
the collapse of any hint of progressivism in social democracy, including its overweening concern 
for macroeconomic orthodoxy over social welfare, has left little doubt about what the EU project 
is all about. The EU as an institution will be of little help to Ireland at least in the short run.  
But solidarity with the people of Europe has never been more important than now. There 
are movements that present the hope of a new kind of politics. Here I refer not so much to national-
level parties like Podemos—we have been betrayed by all kinds of political parties before. What 
is important are new ideas of politics, particularly the involvement of people at the grassroots and 
new emerging forms of local governance, as in Spain. All over the world, especially in poor 
suburbs of cities and in some rural areas, people are organizing new autonomous institutions of 
direct democracy and new economic practices that are based on self-management and mutual aid 
rather than profit before people. These things are still small and growing but there is no reason 
why more of them cannot happen in Europe and Ireland as they are happening elsewhere. 
As for the single currency, it may sound somewhat cynical, but it is what it is. A lot of 
people on the left spent a lot of time fighting against and then worrying about the single currency, 
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whether it would survive or should fall, or whether the EU would become a two-tier society. Of 
course, it already is at least two-tier, both class-wise and regionally. Obviously, the single currency 
is a source of power for the core of Europe and expulsion from the Euro is a threat that can be used 
against peripheral countries. But I think there are better and more fruitful struggles to engage. 
 
ASM: What are your views of the Republic today? What role does Financialization play in 
Ireland’s status in the global economy? What links and parallels, if any, do you see between 
Ireland and the PIIGS [Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain]? Why have things played out 
here differently in Ireland than elsewhere, since 2008, particularly in relation to anti-austerity 
protests? 
 
DO: You’ll excuse me if I begin by saying that we are still awaiting “the Republic”! But all kidding 
aside, I am interested to see the resuscitation of my “Celtic Tiger” analysis in the context of the 
crisis and post-crisis Ireland, and even by some of the more right-wing papers like the Irish Sunday 
Independent. A few people from across the political spectrum are asking some of the same 
questions about the hollowness of the dependent Irish economy that I and others, including 
Ronaldo Munck and Peadar Kirby, were asking for decades. Of course, financialization does play 
a role but it has been overestimated in many analyses of economic change. In particular, the key 
factors in the Irish economy are still tied to international productive sectors and particularly to the 
economy’s dependence on U.S. capital. Yes, financial capital has played a role but mostly an 
additive one that makes crises even more severe than they would have been anyway, and that 
changes the timing of crises. Financialization is largely a way that capital seeks profitable outlets 
for the economic surplus when there is insufficient demand or opportunity for productive 
investments. TNC disinvestments from Ireland were already occurring from 2001 but then all 
kinds of strange financial manoeuvres enabled corrupt Irish speculators to keep the domestic 
economy profitable for them until the whole thing crashed five-to-seven years later. So-called 
financialization did not cause the crash but it postponed, lengthened, and deepened it.  
When we talk about what drives economic cycles in Ireland we should be talking mainly 
about productive corporations and especially U.S. corporations, and about demand. Even those 
corporations that appear to be “dematerialized,” as some popular accounts like to assert, are highly 
material. Google’s product may be “dematerial” in a sense but look at the vast amounts of water 
and other resources they use in “producing” their main product. And look at the crucial role Google 
plays in the material economy, from advertising to logistics to sales. I have always been suspicious 
of approaches that either downplay the material aspects of economy or which try to focus on one 
“leading sector,” particularly haute finance, as the center of the world-economy. As much as I love 
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Arrighi’s Long Twentieth Century, his focus on finance was never any more convincing than 
Stephen Bunker’s focus on economies of scale and scope in the transport of raw materials as the 
driver of hegemony…probably even less convincing. 
As for the PIIGS, as I have already indicated, the dependent nature of Ireland is quite 
specific and therefore so are the causes of its recurrent economic crises. Yet the whole European 
periphery suffers from the orthodox policies that emerge from the Eurocore. The central insistence 
on putting balanced budgets above social welfare forced austerity measures throughout the EU 
periphery, so everyone suffers from that. And the measures that are forced on peripheral EU states 
through bailout agreements increase the pressures against the poor. The only Keynesian measures 
adopted are those that are designed to save banks and financial institutions from their own 
profligacy and corruption. As a result, all of the PIIGS including Ireland continue to have by far 
the highest poverty rates in the pre-1989 EU and these poverty rates are the least ameliorated by 
social transfers. So it is the impact of austerity rather than the source of crisis that is general across 
the PIIGS. 
 
ASM: What is your current assessment of politics in both the Republic and Northern Ireland? What 
do you see as likely future developments? How might political changes affect academic analysis 
of Ireland?  
 
DO: I think left alternatives are important at the national level and I am heartened by the emergence 
of more solid left movements throughout Ireland, including Sinn Féin. I hope the current left 
alternatives prove to be more trustworthy than previous ones, which collapsed into moribund 
mainstream non-alternatives like the Irish Labour Party. But I am increasingly convinced that the 
heart of future politics is not in electoral parties and processes. It is in the people. Real politics that 
will change society is built in everyday life in communities. The most important change of politics 
world-wide in the last twenty years is the revival of anarchism, and especially the beginnings of a 
dialog between Marxism and anarchism. Marxism tells us a lot about capitalism, crisis, and the 
nature of states, institutions, class relations and other unequal relations in capitalism. But it has not 
had a lot to say about what the historian Fernand Braudel refers to as “material life,” that huge 
sector of life into which capitalism tries to sink its roots but is largely unable to do so. We forget 
how much of our lives we live outside of and even in opposition to capitalism. As my colleague 
Andrej Grubacic and I put it, we live much of our lives on the edges of capitalism.  
Many of the things we work hardest at are things that we enjoy doing together with others. 
This is the unpaid “work” of building community, efforts that mainstream society does not 
consider work because they do not receive a wage, even though we exert much time and sweat 
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doing them. Indeed, we work harder and with more dedication doing things for which we receive 
no wages than the so-called “work” we do in formal employment. And when we do these things 
we are making directly democratic decisions about how our lives and our communities will be 
structured. I think the future of “politics” in Ireland as everywhere else in the world lies in building 
these everyday relations of life, to the point where more and more things are done outside of 
capitalist processes of accumulation or state institutions, and more of our time and energies are 
spent doing things for each other than doing things for someone else’s profits. In academic 
analysis, this kind of thought is gaining ground. Every year more Chomskys and John Holloways 
and James Scotts appear in the academy and elsewhere. That is the real future of politics. 
 
ASM: Where does Northern Ireland fit into your current views of global political-economy?  
 
DO: It doesn’t. It is an anomaly, a relic. Of course, there are many other anomalies in the world, 
including the Islamic State and Saudi Arabia, yet we have to take them into account because they 
do have impact in international politics. But as I have said, the main role of Northern Ireland, as 
was the whole island of Ireland before partition, has been a testing ground for security policies and 
technologies, political strategies, and so on. And of course the North before the peace process was 
also a hugely important example of resistance to people all around the world. And I suppose the 
peace process has been an important policy experiment, especially in ways of pacifying 
populations without affecting any real political change. But I think Northern Ireland’s days are 
numbered.  
 
ASM: What does the potential of Scottish independence (and perhaps also the general break up of 
the United Kingdom) mean for Northern Ireland? And what might it mean for the Republic? 
DO: I have long held that Scotland not Northern Ireland is the key weakness of Britain. It is also 
a key to Irish unity. Northern Unionism is based on the historical Scots-Irish connection. How can 
northern Unionists maintain their loyalty to a Union and a monarchy that no longer includes their 
ancestors? Scotland will probably exit the union before the north of Ireland does. Then it all comes 
crashing down…or, at least it should. The so-called United Kingdom has been a forced anomaly 
for too long and the sooner it is gone, the better.  
But then the real work begins. Whether we are talking about Ireland or the Basque Country 
or Catalonia or Kurdistan the real question is not about what kind of state the people of those 
regions must endure but what kind of democracy they can build. So for the Republic, or for 
Scotland or even England for that matter, unity will clear the national problem off of the table and 
new questions about democracy and representation can finally emerge. We can finally get onto the 
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real business of building horizontal institutions of governance in which people take a more active 
role and have a direct say in how their communities are run, and not just the right to vote in barely 
meaningful elections. We can forget about questions of nation and instead work at building 
community, at building relations of mutual aid in those communities, and in that way building a 
new future that does not depend on nation-states or on the uneven economic and power relations 
in the interstate system or its regional groupings like the EU. Even as we seek national rights we 
can begin building these relations of mutual aid and community. It is happening already among 
Kurds in Rojava. They are not waiting to overthrow the Turkish or the Syrian state but are just 
building today the kind of society they want to have in the future. At the same time they are 
building Kurdistan. Could Celts in Ireland, Scotland, and elsewhere learn from this? Maybe so. 
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Abstract 
A long debate about the American “transition to capitalism” has been settled via a rough consensus on the gradual 
prevalence of rural capitalism in the north; and that even small, subsistence-oriented farm households engaged in 
some market exchange, while market-oriented farm households engaged in some subsistence activities. Yet certain 
Marxist scholars argue that even prevalent market exchange did not necessarily signify a capitalist economy. 
Similarly, certain world-systems scholars see the debates as somewhat pointless, inasmuch as capitalism is a 
systemic characteristic that exists regardless of any individual identification. These latter notions derive in part 
from Braudel’s tripartite structure of early modern economic life, which sees self-sufficiency and basic daily 
survival existing alongside market economies and everyday forms of exchange, with the capitalist world-economy 
in turn overarching, yet not necessarily affecting, the other two levels. This paper posits that colonial America’s 
“transition” to capitalism was effectively the addition of Braudel’s second layer of economic life — the market 
economy — onto the first layer of self-sufficiency and basic material life. The paper explores the notion of 
geographically-uneven Braudelian economic structures and transitions within the late 17th and 18th century colonial 
Hudson Valley, demonstrating that even within relatively small geographical spaces it is possible to find different 
means of Braudelian economic life, and by extension, varying articulations with the world-economy and possible 
paths to eventual core emergence. 
Keywords: Braudel, Hudson Valley, Capitalist Transition, Economic Structure 
ISSN: 1076-156X   |  Vol. 22   Issue 1 Page 214-246   |   
http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.615|   jwsr.org 
 
Vol. 1 |  DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 
 
Journal of World-System Research   |   Vol. 22   Issue 1  | Leitner          215 
 
jwsr.org   |   http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.615 
Interpreting the American “transition to capitalism” occupied many economic and social historians 
of the northern colonial United States and early republican period during the 1970s-1990s, though 
the debate stems back to the early 20th century (Gilje 1996; Goldsworthy 2011; Post 2009). More 
recently, after about two decades of back-and-forth over the subsistence versus market orientation 
of colonial and early republic rural Euroamericans, as well as the timing of the market transition 
(Dunaway 1996a: 6-7), a rough consensus gradually emerged on several points: that rural 
capitalism in the north became more prevalent over time, especially during the late 18th and early 
19th centuries (Lamoreaux 2003: 438); that there were regional differences in this transition’s 
timing, in part based on the crops grown in a given area (Hornsby 2005; Lemon 1987); and that 
even small, subsistence-oriented farm households engaged in a certain amount of market 
exchange, while market-oriented farm households engaged in at least some subsistence activities 
(Bushman 1998; Kulikoff 1993). Various Marxian participants concluded that even where market 
exchange became predominant in the British North American colonies and early United States, it 
wasn’t necessarily a capitalist economy (Merrill 1995: 317-25; Mutch 1980: 856; Post 2009). In 
doing so, they were following their classical definition of capitalism as a market economy ruled 
by, or in the interests of, capitalists, as well as echoing Braudel on the idea that “the market” and 
capitalism are not coterminous per sé. 
As Dunaway (1996a: 9) points out, a world-systems perspective obviates these debates via 
a broader and “more inclusive definition of capitalism” that not only examines production relations 
but also governance structures, land tenure arrangements, and labor mechanisms. In this 
perspective, one can be engaged with—and therefore basically a part of—the capitalist world-
system regardless of any self-conscious individual or group identification with capitalism: e.g. in 
a time-space such as 17th-18th century Appalachia, a major supplier of raw materials to the core 
from soon after Euro-indigenous first contact (Dunaway 1994), “it would have been almost 
impossible for… a subsistence producer to be totally free of the capitalist economy” (Dunaway 
1996a: 231). This also implies the modern world-system’s inherent geographical unevenness 
(Chase-Dunn 1989: 41-42, 68). Beyond the basic core-semiperiphery-periphery structure, 
Dunaway acknowledges that local economic sectors could “remain outside the realm of capitalist 
relations,” despite the larger regional economy being articulated with the capitalist world-economy 
and more-or-less structured along capitalist lines (1996a: 232). 
 Dunaway borrows that notion from Braudel, based specifically on his tripartite conception 
of 15th-18th century economic life, comprised of: (1) self-sufficiency and basic daily survival, or 
“material life”; (2) the market economy and everyday forms of exchange; and (3) capitalism itself, 
or more specifically the capitalist world-economy (Braudel 1977: 39-40, 112; 1981: 23-24, 560-
62; 1982: 229-30; also see Arrighi 2001: 113-14; Talbot 2011: 59-64). Indeed, what has been 
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viewed as a “transition” to capitalism in colonial America is effectively the gradual, often 
contested, and geographically uneven addition of Braudel’s second layer of economic life—the 
market economy—onto the first layer of self-sufficiency and basic material life. In turn, this 
process was arguably driven by the third layer of the larger capitalist economy (Bruegel 1996b: 
257, 269; Merrill 1995: 317, 325; Talbot 2011: 63-64, 84-85). 
It is of course also a part of the larger process identified by world-systems analysis as 
incorporation, by which an expanding world-system “absorb[s] new peoples, new territories, or 
both” (Hall 2012: 47), albeit often in fits and starts while being contested by those seeking to resist, 
or at least negotiate, their incorporation (Leitner 2013: 265, 267, 273, 281). While this 
phenomenon is more typically explored for indigenous groups, especially in North America (e.g. 
Bush 2005; Dunaway 1996b; Hall 1989), a version of it occurred with Euroamerican settlers, who 
while arguably already within the capitalist system (Dunaway 1996a: 16), still had to face its 
deepening, i.e. the expansion of the market into their local economies (cf. Wallerstein 1989: 130). 
Given this Braudelian transition’s geographical unevenness, it is most accurately explored 
at a regional level, inasmuch as “regions are the sub-unit of the world-economy that may be best 
defined as engaging in core or peripheral activity (or both in the case of the semiperiphery)” 
(Driscoll and Kick 2013: 2). However, as Driscoll and Kick (2013: 7) later explain, regions are 
“spaces in which processes of production, labor, exchange, and consumption ‘hang together within 
an open system that nevertheless exhibits some kind of structural coherence’ [Harvey 2006: 102].”  
Terlouw (2011: 203) adds the caveat that regions are tricky analytic units, given that they “are not 
lasting entities, but are constantly created and destroyed”; he prefers instead to use cities as a proxy 
for regions. By extension, we should try to have a heightened sensitivity to the possible existence 
of subregions, i.e. smaller regions nested within larger spaces that exhibit some greater coherence 
of their own (cf. Chase-Dunn 1989: 209-10; Driscoll and Kick 2013: 2). To the extent that 
neighboring subregions are peripheral to the same core area, we might expect them to manifest 
different types of peripheral relationships, given such differences as, e.g., crops produced, 
resources extracted, land tenure, and the attendant social relations of production. 
In a recent attempt at world-systems analysis of colonial American political-economic 
change, Leitner (2013) tries a broader regional approach. Adapting Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) 
nested interaction networks approach to world-systems, he compared the relatively successful 
transition from a prestige goods economy to a bulk goods economy in colonial New York with the 
rather less successful transition thereof in colonial Canada/Quebec. However, while alluding to 
New York’s diverse economic geographies, his colony-to-colony comparison elides the colony’s 
“internal diversity” (Dunaway 1996a: 7) and the unevenness of the supposed transition to a grain-
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growing, bulk-goods economy. Per Leitner (2013), as the fur trade declined, New York gradually 
became a bulk-goods economy, producing grain and other foodstuffs for the Caribbean colonies.  
A closer examination reveals two different paths to a bulk goods economy, or indeed, two 
different paths to the core, and also different models of internal core-periphery relations. One of 
these paths posits an explicit and rather straightforward port-hinterland structure via which 
commodities were produced and exported to external markets (Earle 1992a; 1992b). The other 
path posits fairly complex “networks of regional exchange” between hinterland and port as largely 
dependent on the agricultural social structure, and dictated in part by individual farm families’ 
attempts to attain basic self-sufficiency prior to market engagement (Vickers 1996).  
The Hudson Valley arguably contained both these models of northeastern colonial 
American economy and contained areas with varying degrees of Braudelian transition in close 
proximity in the decades before the Revolution. Even within relatively small geographical spaces, 
one can find different means of articulation with the world-economy and different levels of 
Braudelian economic life (cf. Braudel 1977: 44; Bruegel 1996b: 269; Dunaway 1996a: 232). 
 
Staples vs. Social Structure:  
Core-Periphery Models of the Colonial American Northeast 
Indeed, Chase-Dunn (1980: 195n6) hints at this when, after commenting on the tenant-landlord 
class structure of the colonial Hudson Valley vis à vis the other American colonies, he notes “that 
in regions where soil productivity and climate is intermediate [in this case, between cold, stony 
New England and the warm, fertile southeast], political and institutional factors more easily affect 
the type of class structure that develops.”  Given the relative complexity of the Hudson Valley’s 
agrarian tenure, he was perhaps more correct than he realized.1  
Earle’s regional comparisons are developed in some depth (1992a; 1992b). In an overview 
of English colonization efforts in mainland North America, he identifies ideal-typical spatial 
configurations of settlement in the four main eastern seaboard colonial regions: New England, the 
“middle” colonies, the Chesapeake colonies, and the South (Earle 1992b: 486-89). New England 
was marked by large coastal commercial centers, chiefly Boston, with merchants engaged in active 
overseas trade, while its interior locales were otherwise self-sufficient. By the mid-18th century in 
the middle colonies, the major coastal entrepôts of Philadelphia and New York City were linked 
with smaller inland towns via roads and rivers, by which grain was shipped to the major ports. 
Grain, especially wheat, a high-bulk, highly perishable raw commodity, promoted urbanization 
and later sustained industrialization and economic growth, because it required extensive transport 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Having also remarked that the landlord-tenant structure was an evolutionary process, while it was rather more a 
politically-drive one; see below. 
 
Journal of World-System Research   |  Vol. 22   Issue 1  |   Transitions in the Hudson Valley          218 
 
jwsr.org   |   http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.615    
and service infrastructure, along with pre-shipment processing. Middleman profits “accrued to the 
handlers” of wheat and other “bulky…perishable commodities”; and he identifies a radial 
geographic system of tributary “transport service centers” that became British North America’s 
“first sizable interior towns,” typically demarcated by distances of a quarter-, half-, and full-day 
(ca. 30 miles) wagon-journeys  (Earle 1992a: 113-18, 138, 143; 1992b: 487-89; also Hornsby 
2005: 156-57; Leitner 2013: 276-77; more generally, Bunker 1989; 2005: 224).  
In contrast, low bulk, less perishable raw commodities, such as those found in the southern 
colonies, e.g. tobacco or rice (Earle 1992a: 98, 142-43)—or even non-food commodities like naval 
stores (Driscoll and Kick 2013: 14-16)—did not have the same infrastructural needs, and as a result 
did not have the linkages leading to later growth (Earle 1992a: 140-42). Due to tobacco planters’ 
geographic dispersal among the estuaries, and their subsequent self-sufficiency, Chesapeake 
settlement geography was “cellular,” with small tobacco ports “each linked directly with London 
and British outports” (Earle 1992b: 486; 1992a: 99-114). 
Rather than a regionally-comparative staples approach, Vickers (1996) examines 
hinterland social structure and economic processes in the northern colonies, and posits a dynamic 
and burgeoning economy comprised of still largely self-sufficient yet surplus-producing 
agricultural households, local crafts- and tradespersons, and larger merchants in the coastal 
seaports. While acknowledging that “fertile soil allowed wheat to grow into an important staple 
export very soon after [European] settlement” in the Hudson Valley, as well as New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania, “even the most commercial” of grain farmers were still highly diversified in their 
agriculture (Vickers 1996: 219). In general, Vickers argues that the complex northern colonial 
economies weren’t solely the product of merchant-led staple trades (cf. Hornsby 2005: 193-96; 
McCusker and Menard 1985: 19-32), but rather were founded on the surplus produced for these 
trades by numerous, mostly self-sufficient farm households, which also provided local demand for 
consumer goods. Colonial merchants in turn gathered these households’ surplus; indeed, the 
merchants were there in the first place to satisfy the demand for goods by the numerous farm 
families that had come to settle the northern colonies, as well as coordinating early regional 
industries via “the manipulation of capital” (Vickers 1996: 230-31; also see Chase-Dunn 1980: 
197-98; Hornsby 2005: 140; Matson 1998: 250-51; Mutch 1980: 851, 858). The agricultural 
hinterlands also provisioned the seaports, helping promote “a highly diversified service and 
manufacturing population” in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia (Vickers 1996: 221, 238). 
While this model best fits Boston (see Vickers 1996: 231-32), in the middle colonies, 
especially Philadelphia, Vickers’ model converges somewhat with Earle (1992a; 1992b). Though 
acknowledging its rapid 18th century growth, thanks to its fertile hinterland and William Penn’s 
family-focused settlement policies to promote economic diversification, Vickers points out that 
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Philadelphia was “the least sophisticated of the major colonial seaports,” due to its near-exclusive 
focus on wheat. This was because a single staple could not by itself necessarily “guarantee the 
parallel development of port facilities, merchant exporters, or a thriving maritime sector”; these 
would have to wait for further British government investment in the 1750s, during the Seven 
Years’ War (Vickers 1996: 235-37). 
Vickers (1996: 234) concludes similarly for Dutch New Amsterdam and its stunted mid-
17th century single staple economy:  because the main export (beaver fur) had a high value relative 
to its bulk—i.e. it was more economical to ship trade goods back to North America, not people, 
and the Dutch West India Company took an anti-settler stance for much of its tenure (also see 
Leitner 2013). Vickers (1996: 234) further points out that only after the English conquest did Old 
World-style family farming start becoming more prevalent in New York, thanks to greater 
immigration by family groups—ironically because of British agriculture’s “intensified 
commercialization,” which created a surplus population of expropriated peasants (Chase-Dunn 
1980: 198). As found throughout the northern colonies, this allowed for a gendered household 
division of labor: men typically engaged in primary production (farming, trapping, hunting, and 
fishing) and women typically processed the acquired resources (Vickers 1996: 219-20). Local 
merchants were available to purchase surplus produce, and in turn trade with merchants in the 
larger ports, including New York, which became more commercially important after a slow start 
under the Dutch (Vickers 1996: 234-35; also Leitner 2013: 275-77; Wermuth 2001: 62-63).  
Vickers also posits that certain actors in colonial America’s regional hinterlands were 
externally oriented via relations with their regional seaboard port, particularly local merchants who 
gathered the agricultural surplus from the numerous small producers (1996: 221-22, 230, 235). 
Others were more locally-focused, i.e. many of the small farmers actually producing a surplus; and 
while arguably they were more subsistence oriented, maintaining subsistence likely required at 
least some trading activity, putting them into larger networks of trade whether they realized it or 
not (Vickers 1996; also Matson 1998; Wermuth 2001; cf Dunaway 1996a: 24-50, 195-223). This 
is a conclusion that aligns with both structural Marxist and world-systems interpretations of port-
hinterland relations in colonial America, which see local merchants in small, upriver ports as tying 
non-capitalist small farmers into larger multi-nodal capitalist trade networks, with upriver 
merchants in turn “dependent upon the import-export business of the seaport merchant for their 
supplies of goods” (Mutch 1980: 851; also Dunaway 1996a: 33, 197, 206-08). 
 
The Hudson Valley’s Socioagroecononomic Subregions 
Both Earle and Vickers posit a spatial gradient, whereby local economies nearer the coast tended 
to be more explicitly articulated with (or its actors perhaps just more aware of) the larger world-
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economy, which apparently held for farmers as well as merchants: “[a]long the coast, near port 
towns, and adjacent to navigable rivers, farmers were attuned to Atlantic markets from the 
beginning,” with production for “the market” gradually coming to include inland farmers 
(Bushman 1998: 361). Indeed, the colonial Hudson Valley apparently had a geographic divide 
between export staples-oriented areas where economic actors were more-overtly/intentionally 
capitalist; and subsistence-oriented areas with generally less-overly/intentionally capitalist 
economic actors. While Vickers’ model may have been generally true west of the Hudson, which 
was settled largely by smallholders, east of the river were the manors and patents: large, privately-
owned tracts of land, whose tenants were typically obligated to dispose of their agricultural surplus 
through their landlords. Stemming from contemporary 18th century policy debates (Countryman 
1981: 15), there is a long tradition in New York historiography that sees the large private estates 
as having been essentially negative, both for the tenants’ well-being and for the colony’s 
socioeconomic development:  the big landlords held concentrated political and economic power, 
and the estates suppressed the colony’s population growth by making New York unattractive to 
new settlers aspiring to a freehold farm (e.g. Archdeacon 1979; Greenberg 1978: 483-84; 
Humphrey 1998; Kammen 1975: 190; Lustig 1995: xvi-xviii; Matson 1998: 230-31). 
Revisiting early-mid 20th century anti-landlord histories, Kim (1978: viii-x) argued they 
were limited in scope, period and data, with even the most “comprehensive” of these works (Mark 
1940) distracted by some violent events, i.e. the various incidents of tenant riots in the 1750s-60s 
(see Kammen 1975: 302-04), impelling the author to ignore the many decades of quiet “order and 
prosperity” on the estates. Kim’s work also confronts the basic historical point of manorial 
holdings: to convert tenant surplus beyond “‘their subsistence and reproduction needs’” into 
landlord income (Bruegel 1996a: 1402, quoting Rodney Hilton). This arguably held in the Hudson 
Valley as it did anywhere else (Humphrey 2004: 241-42). Seen in Braudelian tripartite perspective, 
the east-of-Hudson landlords, a group firmly ensconced in the second layer of economic life (“the 
market”) and aspiring to eventually ascend to the third layer (“capitalism”), were at the very least 
in a structural position that dictated keeping their tenants at a subsistence level (the first layer of 
economic life). Kim instead posited that landlords often had to grant very favorable terms (e.g. 
deferred rent for months at a time; lower rents overall; lenient rent collection; and the right to profit 
from improvements) in order to attract tenants, whom they needed for rental income (which itself 
was often difficult to collect and in arrears), land development, and agricultural surplus production 
(Kim 1966: 151; 1970: 597-612; 1978: 157-72, 223-36). 
Yet even those who disagree with Kim (e.g. Archdeacon 1979; Greenberg 1978: 483-84; 
Humphrey 2004; Lustig 1995: xvi-xviii) are also focused on the major landholdings largely east 
of the Hudson, rather than the fee-simple smallholders west of the river (though some are: e.g. 
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Countryman 1981: 27-29; Smith 1979: 758-59). It was not until the 1990s that several works 
examined the society and economy of smaller private farms that developed on the Hudson’s west 
bank, as well as parts of the east bank (e.g. Bruegel 1996b; Fabend 1991; Wermuth 2001). Despite 
institutional differences in landholding, both sides of the river had similar physical, agricultural, 
and geographical constraints, particularly in terms of climate and crops that could be grown 
(Bruegel 1996b). Again, the small freehold agriculture on which Vickers (1996) bases his 
interpretation likely holds better west of the Hudson (see Fabend 1991; Wermuth 2001) than on 
the east bank, where small farmers were more likely to be tenants (Kim 1970; 1978).2  East of the 
Hudson, Earle’s (1992a; 1992b) staple interpretation may be more apropos. The Braudelian 
context cuts across both models, with arguably all three levels of economic life occurring in the 
Valley; as well as his acknowledgement of cities driving regional economic change, as local cores 
with regional hinterlands (Braudel 1982: 188). In this instance the local context comes from New 
York City’s role as the colony’s official port—its physical and institutional link with the world-
economy (Ciccantell and Bunker 1998: 1-4; Leitner 2013: 275-77)—and a major demand-source 
for foodstuffs in itself. 
 
New York City and its Hudson Valley Hinterland 
Braudel (1982: 188) indicates supply sources are the first of a city’s catchments, and as the 
colony’s official entrepôt, New York City ca. 1670-1760 was indeed “a port city highly dependent” 
on its surrounding “commercial farmers” (Matson 1998: 227). Though small by European 
standards, by 1680 New York City merchants were exporting over 60,000 bushels of grain and 
“gristing an equal amount of flour” annually, to supply Newfoundland’s fisheries and the 
Caribbean plantation colonies (Burrows and Wallace 1999: 87; Matson 1998: 100). The merchants 
in turn took political steps to formalize the city’s dominance within the colony and promote bulk 
goods trade, vis à vis Albany and the Hudson Valley’s grain producers, not unlike Paris just a few 
decades earlier, with “a series of regulations” to ensure that its “markets were kept constantly 
supplied” (Braudel 1982: 38). In response, New York governors in the 1670s and ‘80s granted 
monopolies to the city merchants over certain bulk staples and transport, including: flour sifting 
and grading (known as “bolting”); wheat, beef, and pork packing; Hudson River carrying; and a 
customs tax and monopolies over both exports and imports (formalized by gubernatorial decree in 
1686), making New York City “the colony’s sole port of entry” (Leitner 2013: 275; Norton 1974: 
84). Post-1680, the city’s merchants “enjoyed a virtual stranglehold” on the colony’s trade 
(Burrows and Wallace 1999: 85). 
                                                                                                                                                             
2In commenting on the manorial parts of the Hudson Valley, Vickers (1996: 225) basically agrees with Kim about 
low annual rents and easy credit allowing tenants “to operate much like freeholders.”   
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In formal effect during 1678-92, the flour bolting monopoly “probably aided the city’s 
overall development,” as the number of houses nearly tripled (343 to 983), its commercial fleet 
nearly doubled, and the total number of merchants rose from 80 to 134 during 1674-95 (Matson 
1994: 403-04; 1998: 104). Conversely, when the bolting monopoly was not in effect, new flour 
mills were noted to have been constructed in the colony’s outlying areas, “attesting to rising 
prosperity in the hinterlands” (Matson 1998: 102). Albany’s own agricultural hinterland grew 
thanks to early 18th century demand for wheat and wheat flour, the colony’s second city becoming 
both a trade center for farmers and city merchants and a port where “wheat and flour were certified, 
packed, and often exported directly to overseas markets” (Kim 1978: 112-13; Norton 1974: 93-
94). 
In much of the central Hudson Valley however, particularly west of the river, most 
communities lacked access to “good ports,” instead relying “on diversified farming,” rather than 
producing cash crops for long-distance trade (Wermuth 2001: 17). And yet, before the early 19th 
century construction of better roads and the Erie Canal, “a thinly populated stretch of the Hudson 
and Mohawk River Valleys monopolized grain production and trade in New York” (Wermuth 
2001: 34), prompted by demand from the Caribbean sugar colonies and European food shortages 
(Leitner 2013), in addition to New York City’s burgeoning needs. As a result, “[b]y the 1740s, 
almost every town in the colony had a grist-mill to which farmers brought grain” from where it 
might end up in the city to be consumed or exported (Matson 1994: 408). Regardless of which 
riverbank, farmers over 15 miles from the city brought summer “harvests to these country mills, 
paid [the millers] in grain, and consigned portions of the flour to middlemen or storekeepers at 
negotiated prices,” though some sold their flour directly at city markets, shipped via rented small 
boats (Matson 1994: 408). Manor tenants were generally obligated to turn over at least part of their 
produce to their landlord, who also typically controlled the manor’s mill (Matson 1994: 412; and 
see below). 
In the colonial northeast, mills were in fact “social necessities…intimately connected to 
agricultural production” and “crucial to the welfare of the inhabitants,” who took “communal 
action” to support the mills (Henretta 1978: 11). On the other hand, a “‘mill seat’—land beside a 
waterfall suitable for powering a saw[-or any other-]mill”—could mean “prosperity and local 
power” for those acquiring it and building a mill alongside (Taylor 1989: 16). Mills also helped 
connect local producers and larger markets (and the market economy more generally)—and were 
thereby an indicator of Braudel’s second level of economic life—with gristmill operators a source 
of “both market information and a conduit to such markets,” similar to local merchants, many of 
whom were also mill operators (McCusker and Menard 1985: 321-22). For Hudson Valley 
landlords (mostly on the east bank), constructing both saw and grist mills for their tenants was 
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ostensibly a matter of “primary importance” that in turn enabled rent payment, increased the land’s 
value, turned wheat into revenue-generating flour, and encouraged settlement on manor lands by 
assuring prospective tenants of mill access (Kim 1970: 607-08; 1978: 229). Mills were therefore 
also promotional devices: a necessity for settlement and successful farming, and arguably “the 
concern of everyone in the community. Instead of being the instrument of a landlord’s exploitative 
impulses, a mill was an institution upon which the common economic welfare and even the 
survival of the community rested” (Kim 1978: 165-66). Most generally, the existence of a grist 
mill is a rough proxy of local colonial economic development—“the basis of early industrialization 
in British America” (McCusker and Menard 1985: 325)—whether grain was being ground locally 
for the subsistence needs of those who grew it, in line with Vickers (1996); or to turn it into flour 
for export, as Earle’s (1992a; 1992b) work implies. Both of these models have some truth to them 
in the colonial Hudson Valley, though the emphasis may be a matter of precisely where one looks.  
 
Agriculture, Trade, and Development in Four Hudson Valley Subregions 
We can identify four colonial Hudson Valley subregions, based on bank (east vs. west) and 
distance upriver (see Map 1). The river’s east bank had the very large estates and numerous tenants 
stereotypical of the colonial/early national Hudson Valley; while west of the river the farmers 
tended to be independent smallholders of just a few hundred acres, with tenantry much less 
common (Wermuth 2001: 46). To the north, near Albany, the estates east of the river specialized 
in wheat growing, whereas closer to New York City they were more diversified, in part due to 
topography and in part due to the city’s food demands. On the western bank, though marked by 
different tenure relationships, the area to the north was also marked by a specialization in wheat, 
with the areas closer to New York City engaged in daily trade in foodstuffs rather than export 
staples. These differences in land tenure as well as distance upriver helped create different 
subregions, each of which display different stages of Braudelian transition, and are amenable to 
differing historical interpretations. 
 
West of Hudson, mid-valley: Small Family Farms of Ulster County/Kingston 
A port on a major river, Kingston was more connected to New York City and larger markets 
beyond than were its neighboring inland towns: “an important market town” from the 1660s, 
Kingston in fact became provincial New York’s “granary” by 1670 (Wermuth 2001: 31). Kingston 
storekeepers gathered neighboring farmers’ surplus produce, then sold it to downstream merchants 
(Matson 1998: 138). Into the early 1700s, only a small part of this agricultural surplus was 
exported, because of “primitive” transport and communications systems; and even by the mid-
1700s, only two sloops made the Kingston-New York run, and even then only every other week 
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Map 1: Selected Manors and Patents in the Colonial Hudson Valley 
 
in the spring and fall—a shortcoming that larger, more commercially-oriented farmers 
circumvented by hiring sloops to ship their produce directly to New York City (Wermuth 2001: 
53-54). Though no more than 30 percent of Kingston-area farmers in the 1700s were major 
agricultural exporters (Bruegel 1996b: 254; Wermuth 2001: 58-62), Ulster County farmers in 
general “supported attempts to promote the export of their surplus grain [and flour],” which along 
with the trade in wood and barrel staves “in turn stimulated the emergence of related service 
industries, creating a demand for day laborers and small manufacturers,” thereby promoting 
economic diversification (Wermuth 2001: 31, 53). For their part, Kingston-based interests in the 
18th century “encourag[ed] the production of its rural hinterland for trade downriver” (Wermuth 
2001: 17). As a formally corporate community, Kingston officials engaged in a sort of local 
mercantilism “to facilitate internal economic development… [albeit] reconciled with the social 
needs and demands of the local community” (Wermuth 2001: 29-30).  
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With very little external competition, Kingston’s economic interests were generally 
unified, resulting in both formal and informal promotion and regulation; day-to-day economic 
workings were “not left to the vagaries of the free market” (Wermuth 2001: 32, 35). Yet 18th 
century Ulster County agriculture was comprised of mostly small, privately-held family farms, 
with a local economy focused on household production in a “community-oriented trade system” 
linking “agricultural, service, and mercantile trades” in an interdependent web (Wermuth 2001: 
30, 62-65). This local trade web was not isolated from larger markets, especially “since 
shopkeepers traded many of the goods they accumulated from the myriad of small exchanges 
downriver to New York City” (Wermuth 2001: 61); but neither was it yet controlled by these larger 
markets. If it was perhaps a market economy, it was not yet a “market society” (Wermuth 2001: 
34; also Bruegel 1996b: 269; 2002; cf. Kulikoff 2003). Based on Wermuth (2001), Kingston and 
much of surrounding Ulster County appears to align with Vickers’ (1996) network model of the 
rural northeastern colonies. From a Braudelian standpoint, starting from a pre-1700 locale in which 
most were concerned with securing their material existence, over the decades an increasing number 
were at least occasionally engaged in market exchanges (Matson 1998: 110, 227), albeit not as 
major long-distance trading/finance capitalists. Rather, these were mostly “comfortably 
subsisting” family farmers, who were typically not interested in producing for commercial 
markets, though still needed cash for taxes, land purchases, and certain manufactured goods 
(Wermuth 2001: 46-47, 51-52).  
 
Table 1: Ulster Co. Population 










       *white residents only 
        Source: O’Callaghan (1849-51: 1: 694, 695, 696, 697; 3: 996) 
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 And yet, while maybe not precisely the sort of industrial and infrastructural development 
Earle (1992a; 1992b) posits for grain producing and exporting regions, there was at least basic 
growth in Ulster County, which more than quadrupled its settler population between 1700 and the 
1770s (see table 1), being considered “well inhabited” by a 1774 gubernatorial report to the Board 
of Trade in London (O’Callaghan 1853-61: VIII: 441). But manufacturing development was weak 
even post-independence in the late 18th century, because of few markets (which also faced British 
competition) and local merchant investment in financial instruments, real estate, and sectors other 
than manufacturing or even just rural outwork (Wermuth 2001: 87). Despite the end of its flour 
bolting monopoly (see above), it may just have been New York City’s sheer size relative to the 
rest of the colony, and the demands for hinterland agricultural surpluses that its growth generated, 
that suppressed grain/flour-based industrialization in the mid-Hudson Valley of the kind Earle 
(1992a; 1992b) details for the southern and mid-Atlantic colonies.  
Indeed, by the 1720s, “New York’s merchants aggressively sought exportable surpluses 
from a large region that radiated along waterways and wagon paths,” and it became thereby a 
“favored place of export” in place of more provincial/local ports for grain millers all over the 
northern colonies, including the Hudson Valley (Matson 1994: 406). Even so, though most export 
(and consumption) was still via the city, New Jersey and Hudson Valley farmers eventually “took 
greater control of processing and marketing their commodities,” thanks to the construction of 
increasingly complicated local grist mills in “almost every town in the colony” by the 1740s 
(Matson 1994: 408). Ulster County probate records in fact mention grist mills as early as 1743, 
with mills in Kingston proper by 1744 (Anjou 1906: 130, 143, 155; Foote 2007: 361-62).  
We see therefore the gradual movement of those who a few decades previously would have 
been fully involved with securing their daily material existence now becoming more involved in 
the regional market economy (cf. Braudel 1982: 21)—and via the regional entrepôt, with other 
markets elsewhere in the world-economy (cf. Dunaway 1996a: 198, 206-08). Yet this was still an 
inherently uneven process. In the Catskill Mountain foothills a few miles west, “poor but 
industrious” small farmers in the 1780s-90s were still more focused on subsistence, despite the 
occasional market engagement; per Bruegel, “it was a rural population who, in Fernand Braudel’s 
architectural conception of economic activities in society, lived below the threshold of a market 
economy” (1996b: 257). 
 
West of Hudson, downriver: Independent Patentees in southern Orange County  
Located mostly in far southern Orange County and partly in New Jersey, the 16,000-acre (or 25-
square mile) Tappan Patent was purchased from the Tappaen Indians by a group of 14 ethnic Dutch 
New Yorkers in 1682, who then further subdivided and sold large parts of the land to smaller 
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farmers (Fabend 1991: 15-19; Nordstrom 1973: 29). It was not purely a speculative venture, “being 
one of the very few patents [in what would become Rockland County]…which was bought with 
the idea of a permanent settlement,” with most of the new patentees homesteading the land (Green 
1886: 39). Those settling the patent wanted relief from New York’s port duties by becoming New 
Jersey residents, which would thereby enable them to export crops and timber (and probably fur, 
traded by local indigenous peoples; Greene 1886: 39) via the free ports of Philadelphia, Burlington, 
and Perth Amboy. These hopes were frustrated by most of the patent’s actual location within the 
colony of New York (and its requirement to export all goods via New York City), as well as New 
York’s temporary annexation of East Jersey in the mid-1680s; and the outlawing of direct trade 
with Amsterdam, on which many ethnic Dutch residents had relied even after the English conquest 
(Fabend 1991: 18-21; Matson 1998: 52).  
Much like the rest of the colony, wheat was the main export crop for the Tappan-area 
farmers (Fabend 1991: 84-85, 210-11), but proximity made them important food suppliers to New 
York City. The Tappan Patent was in fact close enough for daily traffic to the city, sending a “fleet 
of small boats, filled with foodstuffs” downriver, which “usually return[ed] with the flood tide” 
later in the day (Fabend 1991: 85; Nordstrom 1973: 28). Despite their regular trade with New York 
City, Fabend (1991: 56-57, 78-80, 84-85) splits the difference between Vickers’ and Earle’s 
models (or, conversely, between the various Braudelian levels of economic life) and views the 
Tappan patentees along a subsistence-market continuum, similar to how Wermuth (2001) sees the 
contemporary Ulster County agricultural economy. She concludes they were driven by 
circumstance: the patentees would readily market their surplus “to the extent that opportunity 
permitted,” selling to neighbors, to local merchants, and in New York City markets (Fabend 1991: 
84, 85)—Braudel’s second level of a basic market economy. Some patentees also had family 
members in bolting and baking businesses within New York City, “trusted connection[s]” who 
would purchase their patentee relatives’ wheat and flour as well as find the best price for their 
produce (Fabend 1991: 210). However, if the opportunity did not permit them to do so, whether 
due to poor harvest or other reasons, “they learned to be content with a livelihood closer to the 
subsistence level” (Fabend 1991: 84)—Braudel’s first level, meeting their household’s quotidian 
physical and material needs. 
The patent became socio-economically stratified during the 18th century, as a “prosperous 
minority” expanded its land holdings (Fabend 1991: 86-92). The Haring family, descended from 
original patentees, increased its overall acreage from 3,000 to 4,373 by the late 1770s. Conversely, 
the number of leaseholders rose, not unlike the tenants on the manors across the river—indeed, 
one of the patent’s landowners (William Bayard, a leading colonial New York merchant; Matson 
1998) referred to his holdings as a manor, and in 1773 sold off nine tracts in 150- and 200-acre 
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lots for £3-£4 per acre. Examining the microeconomics of land purchases by former tenants, 
Fabend (1991: 93) points out that someone renting 200 acres from Bayard for ten years and not 
having their lease renewed would be paid £300; if they tried purchasing one of Bayard’s 1773 
sales, they could have acquired up to 100 acres. However, a new farm’s start-up costs would 
probably impel the former tenant to buy a smaller piece of land, “one in the subsistence category 
of 51 to 80 acres…to reserve some of his small capital for expenses.” Indeed, by the 1770s, the 
patent and its surrounding area was “inhabited…by significant numbers of subsistence and 
marginal farmers, unlanded laborers, and tradesmen with small properties” (Fabend 1991: 93)—
persons who were mostly ensconced in Braudel’s first economic level, that of basic daily material 
survival. 
 Writing in the late 19th century, Green (1886: 39-40) judged the patent a near-term 
developmental failure, insofar as it did not urbanize according to its founders’ intention. Green 
partly blamed New York-New Jersey boundary issues, which had been indicated by 18th century 
observers as an “obstruction” to Orange County’s growth (Smith 1972: 216), and an issue not 
resolved until the late 1700s (Schwarz 1979: 74-88, 133-61, 179-90). The other reason for 
Tappan’s comparatively modest growth (see Table 2; cf. Tables 1, 3, 5) was the “rapid settlement 
of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys,” with Orange County’s overall development judged a 
“struggling advance” (Green 1886: 39-40, 48). 
 
Table 2: Orange County Population 











Source: O’Callaghan (1849-51: 1: 689, 691, 693-97) 
 
 For southern Orange (present-day Rockland) County, the early-mid 18th century was “an 
era of peace and plenty,” albeit with a still relatively low population of Euroamerican settlers 
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(Green 1886: 48). While slow, settlement did prompt road building, aided by public funding from 
1730 on; “numerous inns” for travelers were built, particularly on the main road along the 
Hudson’s western bank (Green 1886: 48-52). Interior settlement also prompted investment in 
Hudson River docks; gristmills and sawmills “built where the water power and public demand 
warranted them,” in at least five southern Orange locales; “and roadways, that had been cut from 
the nearest highway to these mills, were sometimes further extended till they joined another 
highway” (Green 1886: 51). 
Industrial and transport infrastructure development in 18th century southern Orange County 
aligns with Earle’s middle colonies model (1992b: 489). Yet even though wheat continued to be a 
major export crop in southern Orange (Fabend 1991: 84), the type of development Green (1886: 
48-52) and Fabend (1991: 55-56) discuss was arguably driven as much by the sort of smallholding 
household-based rural economy that Vickers (1996) posits was key to the northern colonies’ 
development, albeit in a slower, more limited way at first. In other words, surplus export and 
attendant industrial and infrastructural development came in the wake of gradual smallholder 
agricultural development and production, not unlike what happened in Ulster County some 75-80 
miles upriver, though perhaps a bit more rapidly given the burgeoning New York City consumer 
market’s daily demands. In terms of those food demands, though Braudel posits that colonial 
British North America’s towns “had to live by their own resources and emerge from the 
wilderness…the real parallel for them is the medieval city” (1981: 520). New York’s later 
experience better harmonizes with what he recounts about London, Paris, and other large west 
European cities in 1500-1800 vis à vis his levels of economic life. In those cities a relatively large 
urban area’s quotidian material needs (the first level) impelled parts of its rural hinterland to move 
from a general concern with subsistence and into the realm of at least basic market relations (the 
second level; Braudel 1982: 38-42). 
 
East of Hudson, upriver: Manors and Wheat Production in  
Albany and Columbia Counties 
While smallholders predominated west of the Hudson, New York’s nine largest private holdings 
were mostly east of the Hudson (see Map 1), and arguably match up most closely with Earle’s 
(1992a; 1992b) model of northeastern colonial economy. Following on from the Dutch West India 
Company’s mid-17th century manorial system, meant to promote agricultural settlement in New 
Netherland (Bachman 1969; Rink 1986), English colonial authorities established something 
similar after the conquest. Attempting to win political allies (Kammen 1975: 79-80), New York’s 
governors granted 14 manors and at least 14 non-manorial patents (Bonomi 1971: 185). Like the 
Dutch intended, the manorial grants were also meant to promote agricultural settlement for both 
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economic development and defense, and were a response to the colony’s transition from a fur 
exporting to a wheat exporting economy (Kammen 1975: 167-71; Kim 1978: 14-16, 42, 129; 
Matson 1994: 396-98). Farmland prices rose, leading New York City's larger merchants—among 
them the Philipses, Van Cortlandts, and Livingstons—to invest in rural grain milling and real 
estate, almost entirely east of the Hudson (Bonomi 1971: 186-87; Kim 1978: 26-28). 
Per Kim (1978: 242-48), tenants came to the manors from various backgrounds and with 
various motives. Chief among them were the “desperately poor,” often former indentured servants 
unable to purchase either land or farming equipment, which landlords generally “provided at the 
initial stage of settlement.”  A second group was “persons with marginal property” who were 
looking to avoid large early debts, learn about an area before purchasing land, and remain 
geographically close to family. Thirdly were the entrepreneurs, looking “to exploit the [manors’] 
commercial and industrial possibilities,” by setting up shops, mills, taverns, and inns, assuming 
the manor’s proprietor was either “unable or unwilling to establish and operate such facilities.”  
Kim’s three basic tenant types roughly mirror the Braudelian economic triptych: the former 
indentured servants merely trying to ensure quotidian material survival; the smallholders who 
planned on engaging with the market, but in a limited way; and those who were much more self-
consciously engaged in profit-seeking, though admittedly not at the level of what Braudel saw as 
the “anti-market” of true capitalism (Talbot 2011: 259). 
Large landowners wished to attract settlement in order to promote commercial and 
agricultural development, thereby increasing the land’s value and generating an exportable 
surplus—or at the very least supply their grist mills (Kim 1970: 597-98; 1978: 157-72). Among 
the very largest with a 160,000-acre manor by the mid-1700s, starting in the late 17th century the 
Livingston family built mills (including the first gristmills in their part of the Hudson Valley), 
general stores, a brewery and a bakery, by way of both attracting and gleaning profits from their 
tenants (Kierner 1992: 26, 41, 65-85; Kim 1978: 39-40, 148-50, 167; Matson 1998: 99). The 
Livingstons “were particularly demanding” of tenant improvements, at least on their main manor, 
regarding quality of house and barn construction (Kim 1978: 221-23). However, by the 1730s, 
wheat was Livingston Manor’s main crop, and its production for export (as both bread and flour) 
was “crucial to the Livingstons’ commercial interests” (Kierner 1992: 96; also Kim 1978: 192). 
They therefore were less likely to push tenants too hard, in order to keep them on the estate and 
producing as much grain as possible (Kim 1970: 597-98), with more tenants being recruited from 
Europe in the 1740s (Kierner 1992: 67n39; Kim 1978: 167). By 1767, the manor’s 285 tenant 
families leased 30,000 acres of land and produced about 50,000 bushels of wheat, ten percent of 
which went to the proprietor as rent (Kierner 1992: 71-72, 92). The tenant population grew to 460 
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families in 1774 (Kim 1978: 238), though declined during the Revolution, to 355 by 1784 (Kierner 
1992: 91; also see Bruegel 1996a: 1399n14). 
Iron was the Livingstons’ third major export product, after lumber and wheat (Kierner 
1992: 5). Taking advantage of their nearby iron ore deposits in Connecticut, local forests for fuel, 
the Hudson for transport to New York City, and cheap tenant labor, the Livingtons built the 
colony’s “first permanent ironworks,” with a blast furnace in 1743, a forge in 1745, and two more 
forges in 1749 elsewhere on the estate. A community grew up around their main ironworks, 
including housing for workers and managers, a general store, gristmill, churches, schools, and 
taverns. Over the next 25 years, the Livingtons further expanded the works and produced consumer 
goods, including “nails, kettles, pots, musket shot, carriage wheels, chimney backs, stoves, and 
other assorted items,” besides basic pig and bar iron, with the family becoming New York’s 
“premier iron producers through the Revolutionary  era” (Kierner 1992: 80-83; Neu 1952: 3-8). 
Mirroring New York’s larger economic transition from fur to grain (Leitner 2013; Matson 1994), 
the Livingstons went from fur-trading merchants to landowners / grain exporters, and then nascent 
industrialists. Though perhaps not quite at Braudel’s third level, the family also converted its 
economic power into political power (the main reason they received such large land grants in the 
first place), becoming among the leaders of the colony’s “landed interest” (Bonomi 1971: 69; 
Kierner 1992: 10-47). 
The upper Hudson Valley’s other two other major landed estates were owned by the Van 
Rensselaers: Rensselaerswyck (850,000 acres), established in the Dutch period, straddled the river 
around Albany; and Claverack (250,000 acres), just to the south of Rensselaerswyck’s eastern half 
(Kim 1978: 36-37; see Map 1). Unlike the Livingstons, the Van Rensselaers were not as 
commercially diversified (Kierner 1992: 80-81), nor were they as demanding with their tenants, 
apparently due to their land being far enough north to have settlement-hampering security concerns 
vis à vis the French and their indigenous allies, up through 1763 (Kim 1970: 590-91; 1978: 144, 
222-23, 238-40). Over its first 80 years (1634-1714), Rensselaerswyck only grew by about one 
family (5-6 persons) per year, to 82 tenants and 427 persons overall; though comprising about half 
of Albany County’s land, it contained only one-seventh of its population (Kim 1978: 235-36). 
During 1714-1779, Rensselaerswyck grew from 82 tenants to approximately 1,000; Livingston 
Manor grew similarly, from 33 to 460 during 1716-1776, growth rates that were actually a bit 
faster than the provincial average (Kim 1978: 238), whose white population rose from 27,000 to 
169,148 during 1715-1776; but slower than Albany County, whose combined black and white 
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Table 3: Albany City and County Population 










Source: O’Callaghan (1849-51: 1: 689, 691, 693-96; 3: 905) 
 
For 18th century landlords, more tenants meant more agricultural production, especially 
wheat (Kim 1970: 598). This was particularly true for the Livingstons and Van Rensselaers in the 
upper valley, with land and soil well-suited to wheat growing (Cohen 1992: 115). Maximized grain 
production also allowed firmer control of prices, milling, transport, and marketing: Robert R. 
Livingston built and monopolized all mills on the manor, with grain transported to New York City 
from his wharves (Matson 1994: 412). From one perspective (e.g. Kim 1978: 231-34), tenants 
benefited from having major landlords (particularly those who were also major overseas traders) 
purchase and/or market their produce, especially if they were “remote from the market,” as they 
still received something resembling fair market value. 
But though transport and marketing were key “conveniences,” a given tenant “probably 
compromised his ability to secure the greatest possible return on his produce” because landlords 
typically held preemptive purchase rights to their tenants’ grain. For instance, the Livingstons’ 
tenants were required to grind all their grain at mills on the manor, while being charged 10 percent 
of their produce to do so (Kierner 1992: 92). There was, nonetheless, a great deal of tenant-landlord 
bargaining over price; and some of the Livingstons did not always exercise their preemptive right 
to buy their tenants’ available surplus (Kim 1978: 231). But landlords still maintained a certain 
“ubiquitous” economic power over their tenants, who required financing for initial subsistence 
needs, milling and transport, which could well put them into further debt. Surviving evidence 
indicates that between a third and a half of Livingston Manor tenants avoided non-rental debt, 
implying that between a half and two-thirds incurred such debt (Humphrey 2004: 241-42; Kierner 
1992: 93-94; Kim 1970: 599). 
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Their basic structural power over their tenants also put manorial proprietors in a position 
akin to merchants west of the Hudson. A manor’s mill owner, whether the proprietor or those 
granted mill-rights on a given manor, “often became the leading store-keepers in rural areas 
because farmers needed mills to grind their grain and—in a cash-poor economy—they also traded 
their grain for tools, dry goods, and other items their families needed,” including basic “daily 
necessities” (Kierner 1992: 41). As a result, these general stores induced settlement in their vicinity 
(Kim 1970: 599). In a Braudelian schematic, subsistence needs (the first economic level) drove 
engagement in local markets (the second level), to the benefit of those engaging with more distant 
markets (part of the third level). 
But this was not necessarily true in all instances. Per Kim, a manor’s ideal-typical 
economic configuration contained “the linked activities of wheat growing, milling, commercial 
trading, and operating stores” (1978: 160). In the upper Hudson Valley, only the Livingstons 
became that integrated, their gristmills turning their tenants’ wheat into “flour, bread, and 
biscuits…in turn packed in barrels made of their lumber and…shipped on their sloops for overseas 
market” (Kim 1978: 160), part of the bulk goods network Leitner (2013) discusses. Livingston 
tenants were also a captive market for imported goods. By comparison, Rensselaerswyck’s tenants 
had nearby Albany’s extensive commercial options, which obviated any commercial development 
that might have been undertaken by the Van Rensselaers, who besides lacked “sufficient capital 
and ambition” to become overseas traders like the Livingstons (Kim 1978: 160-61). In Braudelian 
perspective, the Livingstons were on the way to possibly becoming full third-level capitalists, and 
that with only half the tenants Rensselaerswyck had. Yet their tenants were still very much in the 
first or at most second levels of Braudelian economic life: even into the 1760s, Albany County tax 
rolls indicate that “the majority of tenants on both” Livingston and Rensselaerswyck Manors “lived 
near or at the bottom of the social hierarchy,” with about 90 percent of Livingston Manors’ 
residents and 88 percent of Rensselaerswyck’s assessed at ₤10 or less (Humphrey 2004: 240-41). 
By comparison, upon his 1769 death, Stephen Van Rensselaer’s estate’s ₤19,000 rating was almost 
80 times that of even his wealthiest tenants’ holdings; while his fellow “manor lord” Robert 
Livingston Jr. had holdings in 1778 rated at about ₤30,000, not including his urban property in 
Albany or New York City (Humphrey 2004: 241). 
 
East of Hudson, downriver: Mixed crops on Westchester County’s Manors 
Similar to Livingston Manor, but closer to New York City, Philipsburgh Manor was also a 
relatively well-integrated locus of production. Its proprietors were major trading merchants like 
the Livingstons: they saw agriculture as a commercial enterprise, leading them to promote wheat 
growing and mill construction (Countryman 1981: 18; Kim 1978: 160-61; Matson 1998: 99). 
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While both Philipsburgh and Cortlandt, Westchester County’s other large manor, were smaller 
than the two large upriver manors, their average leaseholds were larger (see Table 4). The  
 
Table 4: Manor Size & Average Leasehold 










   160,000 
     92,000 





   *including Claverack 
    Sources: Kim (1978: 36-37, 39-40, 69-70, 189); Kierner (1992: 26) 
 
Livingstons and Van Rensselaers believed that, due to soil fertility, 80-120 acres was more than 
adequate for a farmer to grow wheat on their manors (Cohen 1992: 115; Kim 1978: 190-91). 
Downriver in Westchester this was not the case, with poorer soil and hillier terrain leading the 
Philipses and Van Cortlandts to grant their tenants larger leaseholds. Unable to compete with mid-
18th century Albany County’s wheat production, and presented with New York City’s burgeoning 
meat and dairy demand, the Westchester manors began to diversify into livestock grazing after 
1730 (Hornsby 2005: 155; Kim 1978: 191-92). As a result, upriver tenants paid rent in wheat, 
while Westchester tenants paid rent largely in cash, at least after 1750 (Kim 1970: 598; 1978: 192-
94; Reubens 1965: 440). 
Prospective tenants’ other settlement options, especially fee-simple “freehold” ownership, 
slowed the Westchester manors’ settlement. A freehold was the British North American mainland 
colonists’ ostensible choice, and the mid-Atlantic colonies’ primary mode of agricultural 
settlement (Greenberg 1978: 483-84; Hornsby 2005: 153; Kammen 1975: 299-302). Founded in 
1693, Philipsburgh Manor had just 20 families in 1700, and still only some 60 tenants and 309 
residents overall by 1712; while Cortlandt Manor was founded in 1697 but contained just 17 
families and 91 residents in 1712 (Kim 1966: 12-15, 32, 59; 1978: 67-69, 235-36). Though 
comprising over half the county’s land area, combined the two manors had only 14 percent of 
Westchester County’s 1712 population (see Table 5). The county’s small freehold towns were all 




Journal of World-System Research   |   Vol. 22   Issue 1  | Leitner          235 
 
jwsr.org   |   http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.615 
Table 5: Westchester County Population 
(black and white residents, except as noted) 
Year Population  
(black & white) 
1698  1,063 
1703 *1,946 
1712 *2,803 
1723  4,409 
1731  6,033 
1737  6,745 
1746  9,235 
1749  10,703 
1756  13,257 
1771  21,745 
 *residents’ race unspecified 
     Source: O’Callaghan (1849-51: 1: 689, 691, 693-97) 
 
 Philipsburgh grew to 272 tenant families by 1776 (Kim 1978: 238; Reubens 1965: 438), 
providing a convenient market for original proprietor Frederick Philipse and his major overseas 
trading operation (Howell and Keller 1977: 135). Like the upriver Livingstons, Philipse’s business 
was initially based on the fur trade, but later included grain and flour (Matson 1994: 412; 1998: 
363n5). He built “mills, blacksmith shops, and cooperage works at his main manor after 1693” to 
provide him with flour to export (Howell and Keller 1977: 130-39; Matson 1998: 115). There was 
even some tertiary production of hardtack “ship biscuits” by the manor’s bakehouse, established 
as part of his “model…full-scale production-distribution cycle, unique for its time” (Howell and 
Keller 1977: 135). Frederick’s son and brother-in-law expanded the manor’s “mills, blacksmith 
shops, coopering works, and tenant settlements” during the 18th century (Howell and Keller 1977: 
139-42), and traded with other mainland colonies and the British Caribbean (Matson 1998: 60, 76, 
99). By the mid-18th century, with some 1,100 tenants and 24 slaves, Philipsburgh had become “an 
agro-industrial complex… [producing] a variety of grains for the New York market.”  These were 
“ground and bolted (sifted)…in its own mills, packed…in its own barrels, and shipped…downriver 
in its own sloops” (Burrows and Wallace 1999: 128), including about two tons of flour each day 
“during peak seasons of the 1740s” (Matson 1998: 234). But aside from its more industrialized 
section, Philipsburgh Manor was still noted in 1775 for being sparsely settled and rural (Reubens 
1965: 438). 
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In comparison, Cortlandt Manor was much less of an integrated economic unit, marked by 
“complete administrative anarchy” until 1712 (Kim 1966: 59-61; 1978: 161). Containing only four 
or five tenant families as of 1701 (Bonomi 1971: 195), pre-1712 settlement was focused near the 
river just south of Peekskill, with most of its acreage “left unimproved” and the manor lacking 
good roads other than near the Hudson (Kim 1966: 79-80). Early Cortlandt Manor leases typically 
required tenants to build houses, plant fenced fruit orchards, and cultivate the land, though 
particular details varied per landlord; tenants were typically expected “to make good use of the 
land” in order to increase their own income (Kim 1966: 114-16; 1978: 221-23). By the 1730s, 
Cortlandt Manor was part of a “newly diversified agrarian economy” with a decreased role for 
wheat, but with tenants that were by now arguably engaged more in commercial than subsistence 
farming, and when they paid rent at all, did so largely in cash (Kim 1966: 144-47, 205; 1978: 194). 
With few mills of their own even into the 1730s, Cortlandt tenants took their grain to mills in 
adjoining patents and townships (Kim 1978: 169), a mixed blessing for the manor’s development. 
Indeed, at its 1732 division amongst the Van Cortlandt heirs, the manor still contained only about 
20 tenant families, with settlement hampered by a general preference for freehold ownership, by 
tenancy-in-common (reducing the incentive to improve leaseholds), and uncertainty about the 
heirs’ intentions (Kim 1966: 85-87). 
The division was initially no spur to the manor’s development. Each of the ten heirs was 
given four widely-dispersed, non-contiguous lots, which “impeded the development of an integral 
plantation system with mills and other facilities”—aside from the fact that most of the heirs were 
neither experienced, nor interested, nor local, nor wealthy enough to engage in “large-scale land 
development.” Only two of the heirs built mills on their land, while a third had one build on a 
leased mill site. In debt and facing low rental returns, eight of the ten sold off nearly half the manor 
(41,792 of 86,000 acres) during 1736-1776. The land sales and “generous lease terms” aided 
Cortlandt Manor’s settlement, along with new roads that tied it together internally and linked it 
closer to the outside (Kim 1966: 85-87, 95-110; 1978: 150-56, 169, 181-84, 421-24). 
Westchester’s two large manors broadly exhibited a version of each type of colonial 
northeastern development: Philipsburgh more along the lines posited by Earle’s (1992a; 1992b) 
bulk staple export model; while Cortlandt was somewhat closer to Vickers’ (1996) independent 
households and small merchants model. This is also the reality of an unevenly developing world-
economy, where local economies can have elements and actors that are not yet fully capitalist 
(Braudel 1977: 112; Dunaway 1996a: 232). Philipsburgh was part of an integrated agroexport 
operation, with attendant industrial and infrastructural development; while Cortlandt, in part due 
to its fractured ownership (Kim 1966: 55), was developed later and to a lesser degree (e.g. with 
much less milling investment) by smaller proprietors, many of them absentee, with its typically 
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more independent tenants producing a more diversified set of crops, and infrastructure provided 
(if at all) by the local state. 
Despite tendencies toward agro-industrial commercialism by certain proprietors, on all the 
Hudson Valley manors the tenants did most of the actual work and value creation (Humphrey 
1998: 142, 156, 158; Kim 1966: 199). In a colony with abundant land but relatively scarce labor, 
this explains why proprietors were eager to attract tenants and were often lenient about rent 
(Hedrick 1933: 75; Kammen 1975: 301; Kim 1966: 40-46; 1970; 1978: 163). As well, farm 
households had the option of moving to nearby colonies with land available for fee-simple 
ownership, making the colonial Hudson Valley a partial exception that upholds Domar’s (1970) 
thesis whereby an economy can only have either two of the three factors of free land, free peasants, 
and non-working landowners, barring “exogenous” political factors (also Solow 1991: 35-37)—in 
this case the existence of alternative land tenure within the same colony and/or nearby colonies. 
This also partly explains the Hudson Valley’s various overt tenant-landlord struggles during the 
1750s-1840s. Underlying the more obvious pecuniary concerns about milling monopolies, first 
choice of crops, and relatively high lease re-sale fees owed to landlords (Bonomi 1971: 193-94), 
Hudson Valley tenants developed a labor theory of land value, by which their occupancy and 
improvements justified their right to eventual fee-simple ownership (Humphrey 1998). This was, 
ironically, similar to North American indigenous peoples’ usufruct-based notions of land value, 
and was of course at odds with the landlords’ title-based notion of land ownership (Humphrey 
1998: 147-57). 
While many of the manorial proprietors may have been starting to resemble fully capitalist 
actors in the Braudelian (if not Marxian) sense, the basic work of farming in 18th century New 
York was difficult: dependent on climatic vagaries, spatially-extensive, and reliant on (scarce) 
hand-labor using primitive tools, they lived lives that were physically difficult and often financially 
precarious (Bruegel 1996b; Hedrick 1933: 67-68; Humphrey 2004: 239; Wermuth 2001: 48). 
Westchester in particular was noted for its poor soil and steep, rocky topography (Reubens 1965: 
440). In partial consequence, both manorial and non-manorial landlords granted tenants rent-free 
periods of up to 12 years, giving them time to develop their farmstead, support their families, and 
in turn produce and export surplus and pay rent (Kim 1978: 171-72). Most early-mid 18th century 
Westchester manor tenants, while increasingly involved in commercial production and becoming 
more affluent (Kim 1978: 264-65), were like other northeastern farmers elsewhere in this era: their 
primary concern was working the land to secure their household subsistence on at least a seasonal 
basis (Kim 1966: 204-07; 1982: 329; Post 2009: 472; Reubens 1965: 440-41, 446). While the 
landlords straddled Braudel’s second and third levels of economic life, the tenants straddled the 
first and second levels.  
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Conclusion: Gradual and Partial Transitions in the Colonial Hudson Valley 
The 18th century colonial Hudson Valley contained various levels of Braudelian economic life co-
existing in what was otherwise a peripheral region of the contemporary capitalist world-economy; 
that is partly the reason for different models of colonial northeastern economy as formulated by 
Earle (1992a; 1992b) and Vickers (1996). Seen another way, there were arguably different 
varieties of core-periphery articulation, determined in part by the level of Braudelian economic 
life in which peripheral actors existed. The independent smallholding farm households that 
comprised most of the western bank’s population existed at the levels of subsistence and basic 
local markets; their dealings with larger markets were mediated by local merchants who 
aggregated local surpluses and traded in turn with their counterparts in the burgeoning colonial 
entrepôt of New York City. However, New York City’s daily subsistence needs pulled hinterland 
farmers into the market, similar to Braudel’s (1982: 38-42) discussion of western European 
urbanization’s effect on neighboring rural areas in the same era, and analogous to the “spatial 
articulation” of rural commodity producers with larger regional entrepôts in 18th-19th century 
Appalachia (Dunaway 1996a: 198). 
East of the Hudson, large landlords directly articulated with actors elsewhere in the world-
economy, via production and export of wheat to the Caribbean, in line with Earle’s (1992b) model; 
and were arguably at Braudel’s third level of economic life, or at least aspired towards it, e.g. at 
Philipsburgh and Livingston Manors, with their integrated agroindustrial and overseas trading 
operations. The smallholders predominating west of the Hudson—some of whom were successful 
enough to become landlords—were themselves part of a larger regional staples economy in which 
the middle colonies were noted for grain and especially wheat production (Earle 1992b; Hornsby 
2005: 156; Vickers 1996: 219). Manor tenants were a mixed group (Kim 1978: 242-48, 264-65), 
and presumably even those with a more upwardly mobile and entrepreneurial bent still had to be 
concerned with basic subsistence at least initially, as well as being subject to limited technology, 
labor scarcity, and geographic and climatic vagaries. But if generally more subsistence-oriented 
than their landlords, tenants’ structural location forced them to at least articulate with the higher 
Braudelian levels (i.e. local and regional markets and the world-economy), via cash crop 
production for landlord export. 
As suggested above vis à vis the Domar (1970) thesis, the Hudson Valley’s manorial 
economy had a certain world-historical a-typicality in that attempted commercial export 
agriculture with scarce labor did not lead to “coerced cash crop labor” as in eastern Europe 
(Wallerstein 1974: 91-114). This is for the simple reason that tenants in British North America 
were not formally tied to the land as east European serfs were, and were free to remove to nearby 
areas with available land—hence the landlords’ relative lenience regarding rent, in an attempt to 
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better attract and keep tenants (Kim 1970; 1978). Per Solow’s comments on Domar, “[t]here 
certainly were positive rents and tenant farmers in colonial America, but the essential nature of the 
northern colonies was not that of a landed aristocracy” (1991: 37), with this very essentiality 
helping keep tenants from becoming serfs. In that respect, the colonial Hudson Valley manors of 
the late 1600s-1700s were not entirely unique, as agricultural rents and/or land prices have been 
kept low to induce settlement in other world-historical timespaces: the western Dutch peatlands 
ca. 1000-1300; various parts of 14th century post-Black Death rural Europe; the 19th century 
Hungarian steppe; and the central and western United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
(Anderson 1974: 324; Braudel 1981: 193; van Bavel and van Zanden 2004: 512-13; White 1991: 
141-47; Wolf 1997: 111). 
Nor was there large-scale chattel slavery in the Hudson Valley, unlike the southern colonies 
and greater Caribbean, trade with which was a major spur to the northern colonies’ major 
industries, including shipbuilding, grain and sugar milling, rum distilling, and cotton textiles. All 
these sectors depended on trade with a set of regional economies explicitly reliant on chattel 
slavery (Burrows and Wallace 1999: 118-90; Matson 1998: 215-64; Richardson 1991). Yet, in the 
“bread colonies” slavery was uneconomical largely because wheat’s seasonal labor demand was 
short but intense, typically requiring just a few days for fall planting and 10-14 days during 
midsummer harvest, a point emphasized by both Earle (1992a: 180-81, 228-35) and Vickers (1996: 
225-26), and earlier surmised by Domar (1970: 30). Better therefore to have tenants (or for smaller 
farmers, seasonal hired hands) who could feed themselves, than to buy slaves and be obligated to 
feed and maintain human property during the long off-season (Post 2009: 470). Instead, African 
slaves were more typically used on 18th century Hudson Valley estates as skilled labor, such as the 
two dozen slaves (see above) who ran Philipsburgh Manor’s milling, dairying, and international 
shipping operations (Brawarsky 2003; Harris 2004: 343-44; McManus 1966: 46-67). A population 
that grew its own food contrasts sharply with certain other parts of British North America, such as 
eastern North Carolina, where the use of land and labor for nonagricultural extractive activities led 
to the region becoming a net food importer and conversely a net cash exporter, “a hindrance on 
the region’s economic growth” (Driscoll and Kick 2013: 16). Whereas in the colonial northeast, 
Vickers argues the dialectic between “diversified rural households” and “a sizable merchant 
community” in New York City “spurred…productive, linked development” that eventually 
prompted regional core emergence (1996: 235, 247-48).  
At least in part, this regional core emergence was also due to the differential developmental 
effects of wheat as opposed to other types of staple crop, a point noted by both Earle (1992a, 
1992b) and Vickers (1996), and explicated in world-systems literature by Bunker (1989; 1992; 
2005). Conversely, having wheat as its major 18th century staple product helped the Hudson Valley 
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avoid the effects of colonial extractive underdevelopment that Driscoll and Kick (2013) explore in 
eastern North Carolina and Smith (1987) explores for Charleston and its hinterland. The region’s 
success is due at least in part because it helped promote intensive industrialization in New York 
City (Burrows and Wallace 1999: 118-90), including the arguably core activity of shipbuilding for 
the bulk goods trade with the Caribbean (Leitner 2013: 277). Further, given that the “spatial 
separation of production, exchange and use in extractive economies” makes it extremely difficult 
for extractive regions to sustain economic development (Bunker 2005: 220-21), having a nearby 
major urban-industrial center that later became a world financial capital and exemplar of Braudel’s 
third level of economic life in turn helped pull its surrounding agro-extractive region into the core.  
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In the last half century, the global economy has experienced notable changes in the location of 
industrial activities and hence in the structure of the international division of labor (IDL). These 
changes have been central elements of the so-called contemporary process of “globalization.” Of 
crucial significance in this process has been the consolidation of East Asia as a manufacturing 
powerhouse. Several methodological approaches and theories have emerged to account for the 
post mid-1960s transformations in the economic geography of global society. Global commodity 
chain (GCC) analysis and the New International Division of Labor (NIDL) theory are two of 
such attempts. Both originated from within the same scholarly tradition, namely, World-Systems 
Theory (WST). Yet, while the former has become part of the mainstream in the fields of 
economic geography, industrial organization, and development studies, the latter has, after a 
short-lived success, fallen into the dustbin of intellectual history. 
The present paper has two main goals. The first goal is to advance a critique of “chain-
focused” analyses of global economic development, crucially those inspired by institutionalist 
and neo-Marxist views. Secondly, to re-evaluate the analysis of post mid-1960s changes in the 
spatial location of industrial activities proposed by Fröbel et al. (1980) in their original NIDL 
thesis, especially the rise of East Asia as the new “workshop” of the world. For these purposes, 
the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main ideas of leading scholars 
working within the GCC framework to account for global-economy dynamics and national-
development experiences, uncovering their contributions and weaknesses. Section two revisits 
Fröbel et al.’s main claims regarding those processes and the critiques advanced against them. It 
also reveals central positive aspects and key problems of their analysis that have been ignored by 
early critics. Section three puts forward an alternative account of the structural dynamics of the 
stratified global economy that appropriates key parts of Fröbel’s analysis, while overcoming its 
shortcomings, in order to contribute to the development of critical analyses of GCCs. Section 
four presents an analysis of the evolution of the global semiconductors industry that illustrates 
the main points advanced in the previous sections, thus supporting the general claims made there. 
A final section closes the paper with its main conclusions. 
 
Global Commodity Chains and Uneven National Development 
As noted above, GCC analysis emerged as an attempt to account for the structure and dynamics 
of the global economy within the tradition of WST: i.e., to explain the long-term reproduction of 
the stratified capitalist world-system and the trajectories of national societies within it (Bair 
2005, 2013; Selwyn 2012: 207-8). Unsurprisingly, it did not take long for this analytical tool to 
become popular in a variety of social sciences studying the contemporary process of economic 
“globalization” and associated changes in the location of industrial productions and national-
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development experiences. In particular, for the study of East Asia’s structural transformation 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in view of the inability of dependency theory-inspired branches 
of WST to account for such process (Gereffi 1990; Storper 2008). 
Defining development as the process of upgrading the mix of economic activities towards 
technology- and, crucially, skill-intensive ones (Gereffi 1990: 524), as the East Asian nations 
undoubtedly were managing to do, GCC analysis attempted to provide a methodological 
framework to study the micro- and meso-economic foundations of the process of national 
economic development. GCC analysis, in this instance, focused on the forms of integration of 
individual capitals in the global market – i.e., how they relate to other firms and contribute to the 
creation and appropriation of the value of commodities. This framework provided a hierarchical 
typology of individual capitals (and eventually of petty commodity producers) and a mapping of 
their progression within the world-system; and thus a way to represent its stratified structural 
dynamics (Selwyn 2012: 209). 
Due to its micro/meso-level perspective, GCC analysis soon found practical use; it 
offered a conceptual framework for sectoral studies and for the design of public policies directed 
at fostering firm’s upgrading capabilities and, hence, national development. Yet this approach to 
the study of economic development has not been without issues that bring into question its 
transformative power. First, “chain focused” analyses tend to take the direct, non-market 
relations amongst firms (i.e. the structure of governance of commodity chains) as the underlying 
force accounting for their economic relationships, even though the former are the concrete forms 
through which the latter come about. They thus misrepresent the nature of inter-firm relations 
and the forces explaining the flow of surplus-value amongst them in the process of 
differentiation of industrial capital that results from the immanent laws of capitalist competition.1 
Secondly, and the focus of the critique advanced here, the GCC framework provides only a 
formal account of how inter-firms relations reproduce the structural dynamics of the stratified 
world-system (i.e. of the spatial dynamics of the global economy) but not of why this occur in the 
way described, which is ultimately needed to understand national developmental experiences 
and, to devise political actions tending to affect them (Selwyn 2012: 207).2 Hence, despite its 
theoretical origins in WST, the GCC framework has been used by mainstream political 
institutions (World Bank, World Trade Organization, UK and U.S. international development 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 See Iñigo Carrera 2008: 137-48 for the general-theoretical development; and, Starosta 2010a, 2010b for a 
discussion in the context of GCC analyses of contemporary organizational changes in industrial production. 
2 See Starosta (2010b: 555-7) for an outline of the critique of the GCC literature offered below.  
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agencies, among others) as much as by their irreconcilable critics (Selwyn 2015: 257; Bair 2013: 
3-4).  
 Indeed, notwithstanding the widespread and variegated use, the mainstream version of 
GCC-focused analysis of national, regional and global development has, as much as the rest of 
the development economics discipline, increasingly revolved around an institutionalist view of 
state/market dynamics. Effectively, when accounting for the specific participation of national 
firms and economies in the global production networks developed since the mid-1960s by 
industrial multinational corporations (MNCs) attempting to reduce production costs, crucially 
East Asia’s upgrading dynamics, leading scholars have gone from a focus on state policies and 
institutions (Gereffi 1995: 124-6; Humphrey 2004) to rather unspecific non-state institutional 
and cultural factors allegedly determining the quality and quantity of local entrepreneurs and 
firm behavior (Gereffi 1998: 58-9). The question that is not answered in these analyses, however, 
is why it was only then that industrial capitals began to find it profitable to pursue the 
international separation of productive activities leading to a new kind of IDL, and why East 
Asian institutional settings only then became conductive to economic development (see Grinberg 
2013 for a critique of the institutionalist literature). 
Picking up these tensions in mainstream versions of GCC analysis, leading young 
scholars working with the framework to analyze contemporary global-economy transformations, 
crucially the trajectories of “non-core” regions, have begun to propose forms for reclaiming it for 
critical social theory. Thus, Bair (2005, 2013) and the other contributors to this Journal’s special 
issue on the topic (JWSR, Vol. 20(1); see, e.g., Quark 2013) suggest that the way forward is to 
bring WST back into the heart of GCC analysis: i.e. to understand GCCs as conduits for the 
reproduction of a stratified global political-economy rather than as developmental opportunities. 
Undoubtedly, this strategy points in the right direction. Yet, it should be taken cautiously. 
Despite claims to the contrary, many, though certainly not all, WST analyses reproduce 
mainstream methodological nationalism while considering, often implicitly, the capitalist world-
system as the outcome of the politico-economic interaction of nation-states rather than 
understanding these as the former’s modes of existence.  
From a perspective that has points in common with that of Open Marxism (see, e.g. 
Burnham 1994), Selwyn (2012: 2015), in turn, claims that, to the degree that it fails to see the 
specificity of capitalist social relations in the production of surplus value, WST becomes part of 
the problem and, hence, cannot be part of the solution. In a series of papers in the Journal of 
Economic Geography, this author develops the point and proposes an alternative solution.  
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The problems with WST and GCC are cumulative: a limited understanding of capitalism 
gives rise to an overly exclusive focus upon technologies and managerial strategies in the 
understanding of innovation which then obscures labor from sight. Noting these numerous 
weaknesses might lead some to reject the GCC framework as possessing any 
methodological utility. However, the ways in which GCCs are structured and connect 
capital and labor in one part of the world with capital and labor in other parts of the world 
means that they are real determinants of labor regime formation, local capitalist 
configuration and its developmental trajectory. […]. What is required is a methodology that 
enables us to investigate whether and how workers’ actions impact upon the accumulation 
process and contributes to the shaping of wider developmental processes. (Selwyn 2012: 
215-7)  
 
In other words, in his first paper Selwyn, like Open Marxism’s key contribution, proposes to 
include labor-capital antagonistic relations—i.e. the allegedly open-ended and contigent process 
of class struggle—as a “co-determining” factor of national-level technological development and 
therefore of firms’ upgrading pathways. Yet, as his second paper makes it clear, “[c]lass relations 
cannot be understood only as existing within nation states (or workshops), but must be conceived 
of as global social relations. That is, just as the most powerful units of capital (lead firms), with 
the assistance of hegemonic states and international institutions, seek to organize their relations 
with subordinate units of capital, so too do they seek through the governance of their GCCs to 
organize global capital-labor relations” (Selwyn 2015: 267-8). 
Again, this approach certainly constitutes a parallel move in the right direction. Yet, it 
falls a step short. On one hand, Selwyn (2012, 2015) rightly argues that the production of 
surplus-value and the valorization of capital take place on a global scale. On the other, this 
author misses that class relations cannot, at the same time, be considered as co-determining 
forces of national developmental processes, and hence of the world capitalist economy. For, 
irrespective of the historical processes in which they are constituted, in capitalism, social classes, 
and hence their antagonistic relations, are continually reproduced in the process of capital 
accumulation, which is global in terms of its immanent structure, long-term potencies and 
general dynamics, and national in its forms of realization (Marx 1976: 723-4). Put differently, 
Selwyn’s approach is unable to account, other than with references to seemingly conjunctural 
processes and subsequent path dependence, for the determination of the relative strength of 
social classes and the outcome of their interaction in each national section of the world market. 
Indeed, the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of re-producing human life resides 
in that the organization of social labor—i.e. the allocation of each of the individual fragments 
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that constitute society’s total capacity to produce use values—is regulated autonomously, 
through the exchange of the products of individual capitals that pursue no purpose other than 
maximizing their valorization and expansion; their never-ending augmentation. In other words, 
the thing-like general social relationship amongst private and independent producers 
(commodities/money) develops into the automatic subject of social reproduction (capital), and 
this process takes the historically specific form, and becomes a by-product, of the accumulation 
of the total social capital. With social labor organized under this form, free individuals not only 
have to put all their senses, conscience and will to produce for markets. They also need to 
represent in the market the exchangeability of the commodities they own. Hence, in the process 
of social reproduction they relate to each other not as individual persons but as personifications 
of commodities who recognize each other as owners of private property (Marx 1976: 178-269; 
Postone 1996: 75-83; Iñigo Carrera 2014: 557-59). 
Organized as a process of capital accumulation, social reproduction becomes, for the first 
time in human history, a universal, worldwide process. Not only the impersonal character of 
market transactions allows for the interaction of geographically-dispersed individual fragments 
of social labor (i.e. productive units in the form of individual capitals). The boundlessly 
expansive nature of the process of capital accumulation itself necessarily results in such ever-
increasing interaction. Yet, due to the private form under which social labor is realized, capital 
accumulation started, and has so far existed, as formally independent, though fully 
interdependent, national processes that constitute politico-economic (i.e. accumulation) units in 
themselves. The world market, then, is not the context in which individual capitals and national 
economies develop, or simply the sum total of national markets interconnected through flows of 
commodities, money-as-capital and labor-power, as mainstream economics considers it. It is the 
other way around: national markets/economies are integral parts of the totality constituted by the 
world market/economy, and hence the forms in which the process of capital accumulation on a 
global scale realizes itself. International movements of commodities and “factors of production” 
are concrete forms through which the global unity of capital accumulation comes about (Marx 
1976: 222, 247, 702, 929; Fröbel et al. 1980: 8; Wallerstein 1983: 18-9; Burnham 1994: 226-9; 
Postone 1996: 100, 149, 258; Iñigo Carrera 2008: 148-9). 
Intra-class cooperative relations and inter-class antagonistic interactions are political (i.e. 
direct as opposed to market mediated) forms of organizing the allocation of the individual 
fragments of social labor. Yet, contrary to Selwyn (2012) and Open Marxism, they are the 
product of the actions of individuals who are themselves personifications of commodities, and 
hence forms of realization of the general social relationship of capital accumulation. Put 
differently, class relations are the form through which individual sellers and buyers of labor-
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power—the commodity whose consumption by capital results in the creation of wealth, value 
and surplus-value—engage in the collective trading of that commodity in order to 
maximize/minimize its market price; thus subsuming their inherently competitive relationship as 
sellers/buyers of the same commodity into a cooperative relationship that clashes with that of 
those at the other pole of the market relationship (Marx 1976: 373-413; Iñigo Carrera 2008: 95-
105). 
 The historical specificity of the capitalist state thus develops in this process as the direct 
representative of the process of capital accumulation in its unity, assuring the normal 
consumption of labor-power and its reproduction with the attributes needed by the total social 
capital. And, by virtue of its very nature, the capitalist state subsumes all the direct actions 
necessary for the normal development of the process of capital accumulation beyond those 
related to the reproduction of labor-power—e.g. the partial or complete centralization of capital; 
the political representation of national processes of capital accumulation in the global economy. 
These actions, however, do not develop as planned, consciously regulated processes. Rather, as 
any other necessary form of realization of the autonomously regulated process of capital 
accumulation, they develop through profitability crises and class-based political conflicts (Marx 
1976: 779-80; Iñigo Carrera 2008; 106–108).3 
 In sum, the actions and antagonistic interaction of social classes, as well as the nation-
state policies in which they manifest themselves, should not be seen as autonomous forces that 
(co)determine national developmental experiences, as in policy- and politics-centered analyses of 
GCCs. Rather, they should be understood as forms of realization, politicized mediations, of the 
global process of capital accumulation, through the specific determination of each national 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 This analysis of the capitalist state shares with other Marxists analyses the view that the state is a non-neutral 
institution, as in mainstream contractualist theories, that yet appears as autonomous of particular interests. However, 
the analysis of the state pursued here departs from these Marxist approaches in various ways. Crucially, this Marxist 
tradition that goes from structuralism-functionalism (Poulantzas 1969) to Open Marxism (Burnhman 1994), through 
the German “state derivation” school (Hirsch 1978), does not understand the state as a concrete form of realization 
of the most general direct social relationship amongst commodity owners—the class struggle—through which their 
general indirect social relationship—capital accumulation—comes about. Rather, Marxist analyses, explicitly or not, 
regard the state as an institution whose necessity springs independently of the process of capital accumulation, yet is 
formally subsumed by capital to fulfill several functions the help reproduce the system as a whole while gaining 
some de facto autonomy. Hence, the capitalist state is not understood there as a necessary form of realization of the 
normal reproduction of capital accumulation, and of its historical potencies, but as a second-best, contingent solution 
for capital to address the crisis tendencies and contradictions inherent in the process of accumulation—e.g., inter-
capital competition, fall in the rate of profit, the power of labor. Even Open Marxism authors who regard the state as 
a mode of existence of fetishised social relations fail to see the inherently antagonist capitalist class relations that 
take form in the state as modes of existence of the general social relationship of capital accumulation. In other 
words, they fail to recognize the thing-like general social relationship amongst commodity owners as the alienated 
subject of social reproduction and social classes as collective personifications of the commodities in which the 
capital relation is embodied. 
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portion of the total social capital, which includes the political representation in the world market, 
with its specifically determined strength, vis-à-vis other national portions of global capital (Iñigo 
Carrera 2008: 150-64). 
 Hence, the issues raised in this section against “chain-focused” analyses of global 
economic development are not directed at the methodological research framework, but to the 
theories incorporated in it. Nevertheless, as Bair argues (2005), the framework’s meso-economic 
orientation is partly to blame insofar as it tends to divert attention from the analysis of the 
general dynamics of the process of capital accumulation (see, e.g., Mahutga 2013). 
Consequently, authors working with it, crucially those discussed here, fail to understand GCCs 
as economic forms of realization of the autonomoulsy regulated process of capital accumulation 
on a global scale, which comes about through the IDL and both global- and local-level political 
developments. 
 
The NIDL and Late Industrialisation4 
It was argued in the previous section that, as a theory-light framework, GCC-focused analyses of 
regional uneven development can be filled up with various theoretical contents. The mainstream 
branch of GCC analysis fills it with firm- and policy-centered institutionalism that fails to 
account for the inner dynamics of global capital accumulation. Alternative GCC analyses like 
those of Bair (2013) and colleagues (see, e.g., Hough 2011; Quark 2013), as well as those of 
Selwyn (2012, 2015) fill it with different versions of critical social theory that, though moving 
beyond firm- and policy-centrism, remain, intentionally or not, focused on national-level, 
politico-economic processes as underlying explanatory factors. In this section, it will be argued 
that the key to overcoming the limits of these versions of GCC analysis of contemporary global-
economy transformations, crucially the process of “globalization” and East Asian developmental 
experiences, is to be found in the critical revision of the work of Fröbel et al. (1980). Their NIDL 
theory was consolidating as the leading political-economy branch within WST when the GCC 
analysis came on stream and dethroned it. Yet their views are largely ignored by authors working 
with the latter approach. The next section will put forward an account of those processes that 
builds on the insights on the Marxian critique of political economy reviewed in the previous 
section, incorporating the rational kernel of Fröbel et al.’s theory but leaving aside its 
problematic tenets. 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 This section is based on, and elaborates from, Grinberg (2011: 160-5). Early versions of the section were written in 
collaboration with Guido Starosta. 
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 The main novelty, and key contribution, of the NIDL theory developed by Fröbel et al., 
resided in that the fast post-1960s expansion of “developing-country” manufactured exports that 
resulted in the overhauling of the economic geography of industrial production was not regarded 
as being simply the product of nation-state economic policies trying to promote them, or the 
planned design of lead firms (i.e. MNCs) attempting to cost-cut through off-shoring or 
subcontracting, as in mainstream GCC analyses. Rather, these authors argued, it resulted from 
changing objective conditions in the process of valorization of industrial capital on a global 
scale. First, there had been significant improvements in communications and transport methods 
leading to strong reductions in the costs of spatially dispersing productive activities. Secondly, 
there had been large advances in the simplification of manual labor processes in manufacturing 
production, as a result of the intensification in the technical division of labor, which could then 
be performed by lower-skill workers. Thirdly, there were large industrial reserve armies (i.e. 
surplus populations) in the “periphery” of the world-system as a consequence of technological 
developments in the primary sector, such as the Green Revolution, and rapid population growth. 
According to these authors, these “new” objective conditions allowed industrial capital to 
relocate several production processes to “non-core” countries and take advantage of the low-cost 
labor-power available there by establishing world-market factories. 
Hence, the fast growth of manufacturing production and exports, and of national output, 
in the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) during the 1960s and 1970s is 
understood by Fröbel et al. (1980) to have resulted from the combined effect those three 
processes, however limited the long-term developmental potencies of this modality of capital 
accumulation were thought to be by the authors. Though the vast pool of relatively cheap and 
unskilled labor existing in East Asia made the region particularly suitable for the development of 
world-market factories, Fröbel et al. (1980) did not consider these processes to be specific to that 
region. Conversely, these authors argued, world-market factories were by the mid-1970s 
establishing and consolidating in most of the periphery of the world-system. 
Although these hypotheses were at the center of scholarly debates in the fields of 
economic geography, industrial organization and development studies until the late 1980s, they 
have beenabandoned after receiving a wide range of criticisms on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. First, as critics have rightly stressed, the initial formulations of the NIDL theory 
contained generalizations which cannot account for evident differences in national/regional 
developmental trajectories that would unfold subsequently (Jenkins 1984; Henderson 1989). 
Contrary to the predictions emerging from their analysis of the global economy, the development 
of world-market-oriented industrial sectors would not spread evenly across the periphery of the 
capitalist world-system. Even during the period covered by their study, 1960s and 1970s, while 
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the East Asian NICs, the so-called Tigers, were becoming major producers of garments and 
electronic goods for world markets, South American industrial sectors, though not those of 
Caribbean Basin countries (Grinberg 2010), remained largely unaffected by these global-
economy changes and continued producing mainly for domestic consumers, even if some 
countries in the region also began to host Export Processing Zones (e.g. Brazil). Secondly, also 
contrary to the predictions offered in Fröbel et al.’s early analysis of the process, some of the 
countries which developed world-market-oriented manufacturing sectors would go through 
continuous industrial deepening/upgrading, labor-force up-skilling and steady increases in real 
wages. In this sense, the impressive developmental and growth record of the first generation of 
East Asian NICs openly undermines a theory which made export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
based on low-waged, unskilled labor-power the center of its argument, as pointed out by critics 
(see, e.g., Gereffi 1990). Fourthly, and closely connected to the latter point, changes in the IDL 
have been more variegated in terms of nations’ participation and firms’ commercial strategies 
than envisaged in Frobel et al.’s formulation of the NIDL theory (Sayer 1985; Henderson 1989; 
Gereffi 1995). 
 Yet, despite these untimely problems, the original NIDL theory got it right in one crucial 
point. Contrary to what is usually claimed by some of their critics (see, e.g., Jenkins 1984; 
Schoenberger 1988), MNCs were considered by Fröbel et al. (1980: 46) not as the underlying 
driving force but as “institutional” mediations of the structural changes that were transforming 
the geographical location of productive units and the direction of capital and trade flows. In 
effect, ffect, Fröbel et al. (1980: 8, 24-5, 44-8) rightly related the emergence of the NIDL, and 
the specific GCCs in which it has materialized, to the process of self-valorization of capital, and 
hence the production of surplus-value, on a global scale. Nevertheless, as Iñigo Carrera points 
out (2008: 66), they failed to understand this process as a historical form of realization of the 
development of society’s productive forces, and thus exclusively focused their analysis on the 
de-skilling aspects of technological developments (Fröbel et al. 1980: 25).  
 As a consequence of that, the authors failed to notice that neither the three “pre-
conditions” they pointed out, nor the development of industrial productions for world markets 
based on them, were processes exclusive of the post-late-1960s period. As the “industrious 
revolution” metaphor reveals, Japan’s pre-1960s industrialization had been similarly based 
(Sugihara 2003). What was then new, however, were the replacement in several industrial 
productions of the increasingly expensive Japanese labor-force with that of its poorer neighbors, 
including some of its former colonies; and, crucially, the rapid advance of computerization and 
robotization of industrial productions which, directly or indirectly, multiplied the scope of those 
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three conditions, crucially the variety of simplified labor-processes that could be performed by a 
relatively cheaper and lower-skilled workforce.  
 Indeed, though missed by their critics, the main problem with Fröbel et al.’s (1980) 
approach to the NIDL, and the cause of their inability to grasp fully the transformations at stake, 
including its long-term potencies and the above-mentioned regional disparities, was that they 
failed to properly locate their origin in the increased mechanization/automation of large-scale 
industry and its impact upon the differentiation of the skills of the different parts of the industrial 
labor-force, rather than in the intensification of the manual division of labor (Iñigo Carrera 2008: 
66; Grinberg 2014: 732). Hence, the authors missed that even in the labor-intensive sector they 
studied in detail, the garments industry, unskilled manual workers were incipiently performing 
tasks as appendages (feeders) of the automated machinery (sewing machines). In other words, it 
was not the tool but the raw material what largely remained in the hands of manual workers. 
And, though they realized that automation in the capital-intensive textile industry was having a 
similar effect on the IDL, they related the process to differential legal restrictions on working 
hours and production runs favoring the “economical” use of relatively expensive means of 
production rather than to the transformations in the productive subjectivity of the global 
collective worker (Fröbel et al. (1980: 150-6), as will be argued in the next section. It was that 
problem that led the author’s to one-sidedly focus on a single, and arguably the most superficial, 
manifestation of the NIDL (i.e. the relocation of unskilled-labor-intensive activities to cheap-
labor countries), as their critics rightly noticed (Jenkins 1984; Sayer 1985; Schoenberger 1988; 
Henderson 1989).5 
This section advanced a critique of Fröbel et al.’s analysis of post-1960s developments in 
the IDL, stressing its main contributions and uncovering the source of its problematic tenets. The 
next section will put forward an account of the structural dynamics of the process of global 
capital accumulation and of the formation and development of contemporary GCCs that starts 
from the analysis of the forms of production of relative surplus-value on a global scale—i.e., 
from the analysis of the manifestations of the Marxian Law of value on the world market. This 
account of global political-economy developments attempts to address the theoretical concerns 
of critical analyses of GCCs like those of Bair and colleague (2005, 2013) and Selwyn (2012, 
2015). 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Interestingly, Gereffi (1995) recognizes the development of flexible automation as being at the center of the 
technological changes at stake in the formation of the NIDL. However, following Kaplinsky (1989), he focuses on 
the impact that technological changes in production processes were allegedly having on plant sizes and not on the 
industrial labor-force skills requirements. Moreover, empirical studies have subsequently shown that the 
development of flexible automation only reduced production scales at product level (mainly by reducing the time 
setting and calibrating the systems of machinery) but not at plant and firm level (see, e.g., Alcorta 1999). 
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Global Capital Accumulation and the NIDL6 
As every concrete form of realization of the process of capital accumulation, its global unity is 
only fully developed in the process of production of relative surplus-value. Effectively, beyond 
the expansion of markets, which requires new consumers to have sold something first, it is in 
attempting to reduce the value of labor-power, and thus increase the amount of surplus-value 
produced in a given period of time, that the total social capital searches for places where 
particular natural or historical conditions allow it to reduce the cost of producing the 
commodities that directly or indirectly reproduce the labor-force without investing in 
productivity-enhancing technological development. As is broadly acknowledged, this process 
originally centered on the search for regions where, due to non-reproducible natural conditions, 
raw materials could be produced at a lower cost, or at all, which gave place to the classical IDL 
(Marx 1976: 579-81; Howe 1981: 91-4; Iñigo Carrera 2014: 562-3).  
 This form of subsumption of portions of the planet into the global circuits of 
accumulation, however, was ridden with a structural contradiction that determined the long-term 
pattern of capitalist development there. If, on the one hand, the total social capital managed to 
enhance its valorization capacity by reducing the value of labor-power, on the other, this was 
partly offset by the drain of social wealth in the opposite direction towards the owners of the 
natural conditions of production in the form of ground-rent (Marx 1981: 779-916), regardless of 
how these social subjects were constituted in the historical process of appropriation of the new 
territories. From being simply a source of cheap primary commodities, these spaces of 
accumulation thus became also determined as sources of ground-rent for industrial (productive) 
capital (Iñigo Carrera 2008: 150-6; Iñigo Carrera 2014: 562-3; Grinberg and Starosta 2014: 241-
2). 
Until the approximately 1930s, the process of capital accumulation through ground-rent 
appropriation generally revolved around the production, transport and international trade of one 
or various primary commodities. Then, whenever colonial states did not directly appropriate 
rent-bearing lands or monopolize foreign trade, capitals invested in those and related sectors, as 
well as foreign creditors, became private landowners’ main partners in the appropriation of the 
local ground-rent. But, from the 1930s, and crucially after the end of the Second World War 
(WWII), this position began to be taken over by industrial capital invested in manufacturing, in 
whose valorization cycle originated the bulk of the surplus-value that formed the ground-rent. 
The so-called process of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that consolidated in most 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 This section is based on, and elaborates from, Iñigo Carrera (2008); Grinberg and Starosta (2009); Grinberg 2013). 
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primary-commodity producing countries between the 1930s and 1950s, reached its peak during 
the commodities boom of the 1970s, and reproduced in a limited form thereafter, has been the 
paradigmatic form through which this specific modality of capital accumulation has come about 
(Iñigo Carrera, 2013: 149-52). As any other politico-economic manifestation, these regions’ 
specific participation in GCCs (mainly as producers of raw and semi-processed materials) has 
been a form of realization of this specific modality of capitalist development. Unlike primary-
sector capitals, industrial firms other than those processing raw materials (both foreign- and 
domestic-owned) have almost exclusively produced for the small-sized, yet protected domestic 
markets while their capacity to valorize normally (despite their small scale of production and the 
use of obsolete technologies) has depended on their ability to appropriate ever-increasing 
amounts of ground-rent. 
 As every concrete form of realization of the production of relative surplus-value on a 
global scale, the IDL has also been subjected to the former’s continuous development. During 
the last forty years or so, both have experienced profound transformations as a result of the 
process of computerization and robotization of large-scale industry, especially since the 
microelectronics revolution of the mid-1970s. Though the process is inherent to the capitalist 
development of society’s productive forces through the system of machinery (Marx 1973: 632; 
Marx 1976: 492-553; Iñigo Carrera 2014: 564), this leap forward in the automation of industrial 
activities— i.e. in the transformation of the productive attributes of individual labor into 
productive attributes of the collective laborer that yet exist as powers of capital objectified in the 
machinery—has greatly accelerated the internal differentiation of the collective woker of large-
scale industry. On one hand, these technological transformations have involved the further 
expansion of the productive attributes of wage-laborers performing the more complex parts of 
the work-process, both of those involved in the vanguard development of scientific knowledge 
and its technological application and of those in charge of organizing the material unity of 
increasingly large and complex production processes. The cost of producing and reproducing 
these kinds of wage-earners has thus tended to increase. On the other hand, the automation of 
production processes has rapidly simplified the productive functions of most manual laborers 
remaining in the shop-floor as operators or appendages of the increasingly self-calibrating and 
self-adjusting machines, whenever it has not replaced these altogether and transformed workers 
into a surplus for the process of capital accumulation. Tacit, particularistic skills gained through 
lengthy on-the-job experiences of learning-by-doing have been replaced by a set of general skills 
acquired through formal technical education which, in most cases, have required a shorter period 
of overall training and have rapidly become trivialized, standardized and routinized. The cost of 
producing and reproducing this type of wage-laborers has thus tended to decrease. Moreover, the 
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new technological conditions have themselves generated a multitude of production processes still 
subjected to the manual intervention of low-skilled laborers, like the assembly, testing and 
packing of electronic micro-components and appliances (Aglietta 1979: 122-30; Coriat 1992; 
Balconi 2002; Iñigo Carrera 2008: 56-9; Grinberg and Starosta 2009: 771; Grinberg 2013: 178-
82). 
In terms of their general content, potencies and dynamics, those transformations in the 
productive attributes of the different portions of the collective worker of large-scale industry 
have been global. Yet, they have resulted in a novel differentiation of national spaces of 
accumulation and in the reconfiguration of the IDL, and hence of the production of surplus-value 
on a global scale (Iñigo Carrera 2008: 55-93; Iñigo Carrera 2014: 565; Grinberg and Starosta 
2009: 771-2; Grinberg 2013: 180-1). Effectively, based on those transformations in the labor-
process, and the associated revolution in communication and transportation methods, industrial 
capital has become increasingly able to disperse spatially the component parts of the labor-
process according to the most profitable combinations of costs and productive attributes of the 
different national fragments of the global collective worker, rather than out-rightly engaging in 
the politically-expensive differentiated reproduction within the industrially-advanced countries, 
where the technological developments originally generated; thus giving birth to the NIDL.7 
Regardless of individual capitals’ national origin, and the changing forms and structure of the 
GCCs through which it comes about, the NIDL has, directly or indirectly, reduced the costs of 
reproducing the global labor-force and has thus increased the mass of surplus-value available for 
the valorization of the total capital of world society, the active subject of the process of 
accumulation. In other words, it has enhanced the process of capital accumulation on a global 
scale (Fröbel et al. 1980: 46; Iñigo Carrera 2008: 63-72). 
In general terms, the formation of global chains of production of surplus-value has been 
driven by the location of simplified labor-processes in regions where local labor-forces are not 
only relatively cheap but, also, whose specific productive attributes include the disciplined 
subordination to centrally- and hierarchically-organized collective labor-processes and the 
habituation to repetitive manual work during long hours. This has been the case of working 
classes whose formation occurred in wet-rice cultivating societies, like those of East Asia.8 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Transport and communication methods have not developed independently of the changes leading to the 
conformation of the NIDL. First, the technologies behind the development of transport and communication methods 
have been the same as those leading to the automation and computerization of industrial labor-processes. Second, 
industrial capital’s necessity to spatially disperse productive activities has constituted a key pulled factor for the 
development of labor productivity in those areas.  
8 Wet-rice cultivation is highly labor-intensive, notably during implantation and harvest periods, and, crucially, 
whatever their extent and complexity, irrigation systems require – unlike dry-land agriculture or husbandry – the 
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Those characteristics have made the East Asian labor-force particularly productive when 
working as an appendage of the increasingly automated machinery systems or in manual 
assembly operations (Iñigo Carrera 2008: 65-72, 76-83; Grinberg and Starosta 2009: 772; 
Grinberg 2013: 182). It is this historical background, rather than the alleged initial egalitarian 
distribution of landed property suggested by Selwyn (2012: 216) following Kay (2002), that has 
determined the region’s central place in the NIDL and its consolidation as a global industrial 
power (see Grinberg and Starosta 2009 for a detailed critique of this argument). As noted, the 
emergence of the Japanese textile industry as a global leader in the early twentieth century, and 
its consolidation in the post-war period, had already resulted from similar skill-replacing 
technical changes (the replacement of mule-spinning with ring-spinning machinery), well before 
that post-1960s developments in equipment automation greatly accelerated the process (Silver 
2003: 87-9). Similarly determined was the emergence and growth of the Japanese electronics 
industry throughout the 1960s, as will be shown in the next section for the case of the 
components sector. 
As any other global-scale economic process, the NIDL has come about through the 
consolidation of a variety of national- and international-level political processes, in particular of 
specific nation-state policies and institutions, described in great detail by neoliberal (World Bank 
1993) and statist/institutionalist scholars (Wade 1990), and specific class and international 
relations, as described by their Marxist counterparts (Hart-Landsberg, Jeong, and Westra. 2007). 
Contrary to GCC-focused scholars reviewed in section 1, these political process did not 
determine the specific characteristics of capital accumulation in East Asia, and the region’s rapid 
industrial upgrading and mode of participation in the IDL through GCCs; they simply mediated 
its transformations and development. Thus, in those Northeast Asian countries (plus Singapore) 
that around the early 1960s became sources of relatively cheap and disciplined labor-power to 
perform the simplified parts of industrial labor-processes, state policies and political/economic 
institutions concentrated on the creation and subsequent reproduction of the necessary conditions 
for industrial capital to accumulate under that new specific modality. Despite different national 
variations, all East Asian “developmental” states not only facilitated the outward-orientation of 
the industrial sector while centralizing capital in productions with large scale economies and 
nurting private infant industry. They also pursued decisively the repression of the labor-force 
while upgrading worker skills. In other words, policies and institutions associated with East 
                                                                                                                                                       
“cooperation at various levels between the farmers in a single water control unit” (Bray 1986, 67). Moreover, 
intensive agriculture has also led to particularly marked (hierarchical) gender division of labor, as it drew male labor 
away from household activities and resulted in the large use of heavy ploughs (Baserup 1970; Alesina, Giuliano and 
Numm 2010). See Quark (2013) for a WST-inspired analysis of GCCs that considers the structuring role of gender 
relations. 
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Asians “developmental” states and EOI experiences, and local firms’ chain-participation 
patterns, have been the political and economic forms of realization of processes of capital 
accumulation based on the use of a relatively cheap and disciplined workforce for simplified 
industrial activities, through which the production of relative surplus-value on a global scale has 
come about (Grinberg and Starosta 2009: 772-3; Grinberg 2013: 182-3; Grinberg 2014: 718-31). 
On the other hand, in those countries that became exporters of capital to, and importers of 
commodities from, the East Asian NICs, economic policies changed in the direction necessary to 
mediate the transformations at stake. And, so did the discourse and actions of those international 
institutions of governance that have expressed more directly the material unity of the process of 
capital accumulation on a global scale (e.g. World Bank and World Trade Organization).9 
As mentioned above, processes behind the NIDL have not been static, as Fröbel et al. 
(1980) suggested in their original theorization on the topic, but have resulted in a wide and 
constantly changing range of combinations of relative cost and characteristics/productivity of 
national labor-forces. First, though the NIDL initially centered on the international relocation of 
unskilled-labor-intensive processes, like clothing, footwear and microelectronics assembly, the 
aforementioned skill-replacing technological changes have increasingly affected relatively 
complex processes and industries, like chemical, steel, shipbuilding, motor-vehicles, and 
microelectronics production/design (Coriat 1992; Hasegawa 1996; Ernst 2001; Brown and 
Campbell 2001; Balconi 2002).  
 Secondly, while surplus populations in the most advanced East Asian economies became 
exhausted, domestic labor-forces began to be reproduced, increasingly through state mediation, 
under new conditions which, in turn, have enabled them to perform increasingly more complex 
activities. As this process of skills upgrading occurred, the conditions of reproduction of 
industrial workers improved substantially. In some cases, the transformations came about 
smoothly (e.g. in Japan). In others cases, crucially when the process had to be done relatively 
rapidly, they were realized through working-class strong activism leading to political opening 
(e.g. in late-1980s South Korea). Thus, contrary to Selwyn (2012, 2015), local-level processes of 
class struggle, and working-class agency, have been the political forms through which the 
reproduction of industrial workers’ productive attributes have came about, and hence the 
production of value and surplus-value in national economies, as a result of the development of 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 Geopolitical processes cannot account by themselves for the transformation of East Asian economies. Briefly put, 
they cannot explain the, initially reluctant, U.S. support for EOI rather than ISI programs as originally envisaged for 
the region. See Grinberg (2014: 714-15). 
 
Journal of World-System Research   |   Vol. 22   Issue 1 | Grinberg          263 
 
jwsr.org   |   http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.605 
the NIDL and the production of relative surplus-value on a global scale (see Grinberg 2014:728-
30 for the South Korean experience). 
Thirdly, new sources of relatively cheap and disciplined labor-power became available in 
the region and in other non-core parts of the capitalist world-system. Productions in specific 
industrial branches and subsectors, then, expanded in some countries while contracting in others 
where new and more advanced activities developed, following a rhythm determined by the 
evolution of those factors—i.e. the technological changes and the relative cost and productivity 
of national work-forces. The multilayered, dynamic structure that thus emerged has not, 
however, negated the original characteristics of the NIDL, as claimed by many of Fröbel et al.’s 
critics. Rather, this structure has been a concrete form of realization of the NIDL. The different 
sub-regional divisions of labor have all revolved around the NIDL’s main trend, namely, the 
relocation of simplified labor-processes to territories where capital has had access to a labor-
force that, due to its historical origins as surplus population (largely) working in wet agriculture, 
has been relatively cheap and highly disciplined, and thus productive under the prevailing 
technological conditions (Iñigo Carrera 2008; Grinberg 2010, Grinberg 2014: 719-20). 
Undoubtedly, the NIDL has come about through a variety of continually-developing, 
across-the-border inter-firm relations and, in some cases, has resulted in the emergence of 
global-scale capitals in non-core countries, as rightly noted in GCC-focused analyses (Gereffi 
1995; Sturgeon 2008). None of these developments contradict the original characteristics and 
general trends of the NIDL. They have been its concrete historical forms of realization, broadly 
determined by the materiality, including proprietary structure, of the productive processes at 
stake—i.e. whether or not it has been technically and commercially viable for industrial capital 
to fully or partly fragment them internationally, and whether or not the processes emerging in 
non-core countries have required relatively large scales of production. In other words, within 
each GCC, regardless of its structure of governance (and the differences between them have 
become increasingly slight as noted by GCCs authors like Sturgeon (2008)),10 production 
processes have been subdivided and spatially-located according to the inner dynamics of the 
NIDL, as accounted for a revised NIDL theory. In some industrial branches, crucially where 
fixed-capital investments, including patent licensing, have been considerable, and minimum 
efficient scales high relative to total demand, as in the case of semiconductors, the process has 
                                                                                                                                                       
10 Effectively, unless the chain driver in a “buyer-driven” GCC is simply a commercial capital with no involvement 
in the production and design processes in a kind of putting-out system, the difference between buyer-driven and 
producer-driven GCCs is more of form than substance, revolving around a cut-off point in terms of outsourcing/off-
shoring activities. The excessive focus of most GCC analyses on the governance structure of GCCs—i.e. on the 
direct forms of realization of inter-firm indirect relationships – rather than the valorization cycle of industrial capital 
have led scholars to miss out this point until global-economy trends reduced the differences. 
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led to the emergence of global suppliers based in non-core countries. In others cases (e.g. 
garments assembly), production in these parts of the capitalist world-system has been under the 
control of small capitals. In all cases, differences in the participation in the production of relative 
surplus-value have constituted the source of inter-firm, and across-the-border, transfers of 
surplus-value and, hence, the force behind the differentiation of firms’ valorization capacities 
(Iñigo Carrera 2008: 137-48; Starosta 2010a). 
 Hence, the NIDL has superseded the classical IDL based on the determination of some 
countries as producers of raw materials for the world market (whether or not this has been 
accompanied by the development of industrial production for domestic markets as a form of 
recovering ground-rent by capital) and the concentration of advanced industrial production in 
others. The presence of distinctive natural conditions, enhancing the productivity of labor in 
primary productions, or simply permitting them, in the former group of countries played a crucial 
role in their form of participation in the capitalist IDL. The NIDL has tended to revolve around 
the international fragmentation of the different segments of the collective laborer of large-scale 
industry. Some countries have tended to concentrate within their boundaries the great bulk of the 
skilled labor-force and therefore of the most complex, core-like work-processes, while 
increasingly incorporating low-skilled, low-wage activities (mainly the United States and the 
European Union).11 Other countries/regions have been mainly transformed into sources of 
relatively cheap and disciplined labor-power for simplified, though increasingly complex, 
productions (initially Japan and the East Asian Tigers, and then Southeast Asia, Mexico, China, 
India, etc.). Yet, a third group of countries has remained participating in the world market as 
producers of raw materials and, therefore, as sources of ground-rent for global industrial capital 
(e.g. South America, Africa and Australasia), and, in some cases, as reservoirs of surplus 
population (Iñigo Carrera 2008). 
 
The NIDL and the Semiconductors Industry 
The previous section put forward an account of the post-1960 structural dynamics of the 
stratified global economy rooted on the Marxian critique of political economy that reveals the 
nature of processes leading to the formation and on-going development of the NIDL. In this 
analysis, it was argued that GCCs should be understood as conduits of the IDL, and hence as 
forms of realization of the production of surplus-value on a global scale. This section examines 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 First, immigration from Third World countries and regional economic integration has helped satisfy the increasing 
local demand for unskilled labor-power. Second, the replacement of the welfare state with its neoliberal successor 
has also played its part in increasing the local supply of this type of labor-power (Sassen 1988; Iñigo Carrera 2008, 
72–6). 
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the specific manifestation of those general trends in the semiconductors industry. The experience 
of this sector is particularly illustrative of those processes. Not only has it been at the center of 
the skill-replacing technical transformations leading to the NIDL, but also, partly due to its 
young history, it has been itself a leading sector in the process of international fragmentation of 
industrial production under its different stages and modalities. Moreover, to a large extent due to 
the latter, the evolution of this industrial sector has been used as key evidence to disprove Fröbel 
et al.’s hypothesis (see, e.g. Sayer 1986; Henderson 1989). 
The production of semiconductors is at the core of the microelectronics, and thus 
electronics, industries. The sector emerged in the aftermath of WWII when the transistor 
replaced the vacuum valve as the main device used to control the motion of electrons and 
produce electrical amplification through non-mechanical means. Though the industry was 
originally closely related to the U.S. defense sector, the transistor rapidly became a key input 
used to manufacture consumer and capital goods incorporating electronically-controlled 
functions. Already in the early 1960s, however, the transistor was replaced by the integrated 
circuit (IC), as technological improvements in materials and production equipment permitted the 
combination of several transistors into one single system. The IC, or microchip, is basically a 
network of tiny wires fabricated on a surface, connecting transistors that switch on and off for 
processing data in binary code (Flamm 1985: 39-48; Brown and Linden 2005: 280). 
Since its origins, the production of ICs has involved several labor processes which, 
though functionally integrated and subjected to on-going transformations, are technically 
disarticulated and thus spatially separable: design of the device’s physical structure and 
functionality; wafer production (the production of a thin slice of a semiconductor material, 
usually silicon); mask making (the production of the celluloid filaments that contain the 
microscopic electronic circuits); wafer fabrication (the process by which the circuits in the mask 
are transferred to the silicon wafer and etched into its surface); assembly of transistors, diodes 
and integrated circuits into the package; and, testing of the product. These component labor-
processes have required different types of equipment investment, specialized inputs and, 
crucially, labor skills. The design stage is relatively capital-intensive and, crucially, has required 
highly-qualified scientific and engineering workers. Wafer production, mask making and wafer 
fabrication, in turn, are the most capital-intensive parts of the production process, needing 
highly-skilled engineers as well as large numbers of technicians. Wafer fabrication has also 
required significant numbers of semi-skilled workers, particularly in the operation of diffusion 
furnaces. The assembly stage has been predominately an unskilled-labor-intensive process, 
though since the mid-1980s automated equipment has begun to replace manual labor. Finally, the 
testing stage, although increasingly capital-intensive and automated, has required large amounts 
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of both technical and unskilled labor-power (Flamm 1985: 48; Henderson 1989: 31-2; Brown 
and Linden 2005: 284, 296).  
Though semiconductor technology was born in the northeast of the United States, the 
industry rapidly relocated to the west coast, the Silicon Valley, in search for a more cost-
effective mix of labor-power:  
 
On the one hand, the industry’s demands for unskilled and semiskilled labor was largely 
filled by [relatively cheap and compliant] immigrant female Latino and Asian (especially 
Filipino) workers who resided in the San Jose area of the County, some distance from the 
centre of production in such north-County cities as Palo Alto, Mountain View and 
Sunnyvale. On the other hand, the industry’s demands for highly trained scientists, 
engineers, and technicians have been filled largely by white male graduates of local 
universities and colleges who tend to reside in relatively close proximity to the 
semiconductor plants and laboratories (Henderson 1989: 40). 
 
This “spatial fix,” however, would not be the industry’s last. A new one, replicating those 
national-level developments on a global scale, and anticipating those associated with the NIDL, 
would soon after take place. Taking advantage of the vast local availability of relatively cheap 
and highly-disciplined, crucially female, labor-power of peasant origin, Japanese industrial 
capital emerged, already in the late 1950s, as a major producer of simple transistors, mainly used 
in the local manufacture of radios for export markets. Later on, in the early 1960s, as argued by 
Fröbel et al. (1980), U.S. firms responded to this competitive pressure by moving their assembly 
facilities to East and, subsequently, Southeast Asian locations, where a labor-force with similar 
characteristics as, but cheaper than, the Japanese could be found, or by subcontracting these 
activities to local firms in the region. A similar process of international relocation of productive 
activities took place later on, when ICs became the leading semiconductor device used in 
electronic consumer and capital goods. Trade policies in the United States, including tariff laws, 
and in the recipient countries were modified to mediate politically these transformations in the 
IDL. The relatively low transport costs involved in the international movement of ICs, due to 
their low weight and small size, facilitated this process. Only the two leading captive producers 
(i.e. producing for internal use), IBM and AT&T, kept their assembly operations in the United 
States and adopted a higher level of automation than the offshore plants (Flamm 1985: 48-9; 
Scott 1987: 145-50; Brown and Linden 2005: 282-5). 
The place of Japanese capital in the global semiconductors industry, however, would not 
be limited to the lower end of the GCC, namely, the production of simple transistors used in low-
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technology electronic goods. A major transformation of the local industry occurred during the 
1970s and by the end of the decade Japanese firms were beginning to compete successfully with 
U.S. manufacturers in the production of one type of complex ICs: Dynamic Random Access 
Memory (DRAM) chips. This qualitative change in the economic geography of the global 
microelectronics industry, however, was not simply the result of the bold actions by the Japanese 
“developmental” state accelerating the process of industrial upgrading, as often argued (see, e.g., 
Cho, Kim and Rhee 1998, Mathews and Cho 2000). Rather, several other inter-connected forces 
favored this development in the structure of the microelectronics industry, all of them expressing 
the transformations in the process of capital accumulation on a global scale reviewed in the 
previous section. 
 First, though equipment automation had already begun, thus standardizing/simplifying 
labor-processes and reducing the tacit skills necessary to perform them, advances were limited 
and various steps of the production process (e.g. mask etching and wafer packaging) still 
required the intervention of manual laborers (Flamm 1985: 50-1; Balconi 2002: 366-7). By the 
1970s, industrial capital had access in Japan to a large supply of electronic engineers and 
technicians, though not of PhD-trained workers, at internationally-low cost while the fragmented 
or dual character of the local labor market, which resulted from the historical origins of the local 
working-class and manifested itself in the extended use of subcontracting to small capitals by 
lead firms, assured the provision of the semi-skilled portion of the labor-force at prices 
substantially below international levels. This was especially so in manual-assembly operations, 
where young female workers of rural origin predominated. Under these technological conditions, 
the acquiescence and discipline of the Japanese labor-force, of all types, manifested itself in fast 
learning processes and large productivity increases. Indeed, contrary to neoclassical economics 
predictions, Japanese producers were incorporating automated equipment more rapidly than their 
U.S. counterparts, despite having access to a lower-cost workforce (Linvill, LaMond and Wilson 
1984: 21, 48, 51; Mody and Wheeler 1987: 371-80). 
 Secondly, memory chips were (and still are) the most standardized, low-end segment of 
the ICs market (Tassey 1990: 91; Brown and Linden 2005: 285). They have thus been the 
segment of the industry with the lowest level of scientific and engineering skills requirements, 
needing relatively low design capabilities (Cho et al. 1998: 499; Ernst 1998: 29). Unlike in the 
microprocessor or application-specific ICs (ASICs) subsectors, in DRAMs manufacturing, 
especially since the introduction of complementary metal-oxide technologies in the late 1960s, 
most productivity gains have come from “improving process technology and thus learning 
economies and yields, primarily through continuous improvements on the shop-floor and tedious 
trial-and-error” (Ernst 1998: 29-30).  
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 Thirdly, Japanese firms were able to exploit the substantial scale economies existing in 
DRAMs production due to their vertical integration and large stake in the global electronic-
goods industry, also resulting from the dynamics of the NIDL (Cho et al. 1998: 494-6).  
As noted above, the extended and far-reaching actions of the Japanese “developmental” 
state, the political representative of the process of capital accumulation in Japan, accelerating the 
concentration of capital in the scales required and providing protection for local firms during 
their early-development stages, mediated politically the emergence, consolidation and growth of 
the local microelectronics industry. In other words, these direct forms of allocating individual 
portions of social labor came to life, and remained in place for some time, only because they 
realized a necessity of the indirectly regulated process of capital accumulation on a global 
scale—namely, the formation and development of the NIDL.12 
By the mid-1980s, as the “microelectronics revolution” manifested itself in a leap 
forward in the automation of operations in the sector, Japanese memory-chip manufacturers were 
not only comfortably out-competing their U.S. counterparts due to their lower production costs. 
They were also leading the way in the introduction of innovations in process, production and, 
consequently, product technologies in this segment of the industry (Tassey 1990: 93; Cho et al. 
1998: 496). By the late 1980s, Japan became the largest producer of semiconductors by volume 
and an important producer of manufacturing equipment (Linden et al. 2004: 251). Nevertheless, 
to a large extent chip designs were, well into the 1990s, developed through the local adaptation 
of circuit architectures licensed from U.S. firms. In the case of higher value-added devices like 
microprocessors, the technological dependence was even higher; they were mainly done under 
licenses from U.S. firms. This commercial strategy was not, however, without problems, as 
disputes over the copyrights of basic designs were frequent and contested in the courts of law 
(Mathews and Cho 2000: 152). 
In capitalism, however, the only constant is change. Through the early 1990s, the same 
forces that had led to the emergence, development and growth of the Japanese semiconductors 
industry began to move against it. While the automation of production equipment, including that 
used in assembly operations, advanced rapidly, microchip design also began to be affected by 
tacit-skill-replacing technical changes through the use of specialized software programs. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Despite being on-par to its U.S. counterpart during the pre-IC era, the Western European semiconductors industry 
fell behind thereafter. Crucially, without access to Japanese-style labor market and without a large US-style military 
contracts, European firms lack the scale to efficiently manufacture most ICs. Hence, they remained specialized in 
niche products for home markets and, crucially, in the production of equipment and inputs (Morris 1990: 111-33). 
European producers would need to wait until the integration of the European market advanced, and with it the 
consolidation of state support for the industry, and the “fabless/foundry” model consolidated, to regain global 
presence in the mass-production subsector.  
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development of equipment automation and design computerization not only permitted the 
production of more complex semiconductors, and thus reinforced the trend. It also resulted in the 
further standardization/simplification of production processes and gave place to new 
transformations in the industry’s IDL that have gone beyond Fröbel et al.’s predictions but fit the 
analysis of the NIDL (i.e. the revised NIDL theory) advanced in the previous section (Brown and 
Campbell 2001: 452; Balconi 2002: 367-9; Leachman and Leachman 2004: 207).  
 First, U.S. firms began to concentrate on the higher end of the industry’s value chain: the 
production of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment; the production of automated-design 
software; and the design and production of microprocessors and, to a lesser extent, ASICs. The 
latter were increasingly produced in the East Asia Tigers, notably in Taiwan and Singapore, and 
to lesser extent in the Caribbean Basin countries, where there was already a large semi-skilled 
and highly disciplined/acquiescent (thus productive and easily-trainable), yet relatively low-
priced labor-force, as well as a sufficiently large supply of specialized engineers.13 This type of 
commodity-chain structure manifested itself in the emergence of non core-country “foundries” 
specialized in wafer fabrication for different clients (in some cases outsourcing the assembly 
work to lower-wage countries) and core-country “fabless” (i.e. without fabrication facilities) 
companies specialized in the design of the microchips (Leachman and Leachman 2004: 220-4; 
Brown and Linden 2005: 289-92). On these bases, the U.S. semiconductors industry reversed the 
previous trend and by the mid-1990s had, again, secured a larger share of the world markets of 
semiconductors than its Japanese counterpart (Linden et al. 2004: 251).  
Secondly, Japanese producers began to lose an increasingly larger segment of the 
DRAMs market to Korean capitals producing under own brand as well as for others, without 
being able to compete successfully with U.S. firms in the design and production of higher value-
added microprocessors and ASICs. Korean capital took advantage of the relatively low design- 
and skill-intensity of the product and the easy access to production technology. Yet, Japanese 
capital expanded and consolidated its position in the market for semiconductor-manufacturing 
equipment, thus moving up the global value chain (Ernst 1998; Leachman and Leachman 2004). 
Like in Japan before, widespread and far-reaching state actions mediated the 
development of the industry, including worker upskilling, in the East Asian Tigers, especially in 
Korea and Taiwan where the more capital-intensive parts of the sector’s commodity chain 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 In 1996, wages in “Electrical Equipment, Appliance and Component Manufacturing” in Singapore, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Mexico were 8.85, 6.40, 6.97 and 1.40 US$ per hour, respectively. They were US$ 16.64 in the United 
States and US$ 20.93 in Japan. Even if these industry-wide averages hide differences in the quality of the workforce 
and complexity of the tasks performed, they serve as an indication of international labor-cost disparities (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). 
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consolidated and domestic capitals thus played a more extended role (Mathews and Choo 2000). 
Yet, contrary to the authors reviewed in section 1 and in accordance with Fröbel et al.’s analysis, 
East Asian state actions were, like the earlier actions of the Japanese “developmental” state, the 
political forms through which local processes of capital accumulation came about as an 
expression of global-scale economic transformations. 
In South Korea, for instance, extended state investments to transform the local 
microelectronics industry from low-skilled, foreign-controlled assembly operations into high 
value-added components manufacturing (i.e. to move it up the global value chain) started around 
the early 1970s, but would only fully pay off in the mid-1990s, when the material conditions for 
this to occur (i.e. further skill-replacing technical changes) had matured and the Korean 
workforce finally reached the levels of productivity of their U.S. and Japanese counterparts, at a 
fraction of their cost (Baily and Zitzewitz 1998: 265). In the mid-1980s, around 80% most of the 
sector’s workforce was still employed by MNCs, or domestic firms subcontracted by these, to 
assemble and package semiconductors, while the other fifth were employed by domestic firms 
both fabricating wafers and assembling them for own consumption and under original equipment 
manufacturing arrangements (Henderson 1989: 59, 64-6). Until the early 1990s, indigenous 
advances in “memory-chip” wafer fabrication depended heavily not only on often outdated 
foreign technology and designs, but also on foreign-trained engineers to manage the projects and 
overseas investments in R&D centers. Moreover, Daewoo’s mid-1980s attempts to move beyond 
DRAM manufacturing into more complex, skill-intensive ICs, like microprocessors, failed 
completely and were quickly abandoned (Bello and Rosenfeld 1992: 157-61; Hong 1997: 99, 
106-7; Mathews and Cho 2000: 121-9). 
As Tiger firms moved up the global value chain, and the local workforce thus improved 
in quality and increased in cost, as a form in which the NIDL’s inner dynamics realized 
themselves, their place in lower-value-adding activities was taken over by capitals located in 
other countries of the region, and the Caribbean Basin, where industrial capital had access to 
labor-forces with relatively similar productive attributes but significantly lower prices. In some 
cases, this spatial movement was coordinated by U.S. and European lead firms; in others, by 
Japanese and Tiger firms. Yet in other cases, the process emerged through the relatively more 
independent actions of indigenous companies (Brown and Linden 2005). These business-models, 
and related institutional variations, did not, however, change the economic content of the process 
at stake—namely, the relocation of simplified/standardized labor-processes to places where 
industrial capital could use a relatively cheap and disciplined workforce and thus increase the 
mass of surplus-value available for its process of valorization on a global scale. 
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Those national experiences sharply contrast with the South American ones, where 
industrial capital has continued accumulating through the recovery of a portion of the local 
ground-rent. In Brazil, for instance, extended state efforts to promote the production of 
semiconductors for domestic consumers began in the late 1970s, when an enlarged ground-rent 
and large loanable-capital inflows complementing it were sustaining the expanded reproduction 
of the process of capital accumulation through ISI deepening. However, as soon as these masses 
of extraordinary surplus-value contracted in the course of the debt crisis, state actions channeling 
them to industrial capital reversed (i.e. state support dried out) and the local microelectronics 
industry rapidly collapsed. It only started to revive somehow in the mid-2000s, when the global 
commodity-price boom manifested itself in the strong expansion of the Brazilian ground-rent and 
of the process of ISI mediating its appropriation by industrial capital (Grinberg 2016). 
The automation of microchips design has not only facilitated the international separation 
of the design and fabrication stages. This process has also tended to simplify several parts of the 
design engineering work, made possible its modularization and its international fragmentation. 
Effectively, taking advantage of these developments, the improvements in telecommunication 
technologies (resulting themselves from the on-going microelectronics revolution) and the local 
availability of relatively low-cost engineers, industrial capital began in the late 1990s to relocate 
to Asia the less tacit-skill- and creativity-intensive parts of the now simplified design work. Due 
to the large local labor-force with engineering skills and experience in chip manufacturing, 
Taiwanese and Korean capitals have been at the forefront in this new transformation in the IDL 
in the semiconductors industry (Ernest 2005). Yet, the production of (high value-added) circuit-
design software and manufacturing equipment, as well as the capacity to design and produce 
microprocessors and complex ASICs, have lagged in these countries well behind world-market 
leaders in the U.S. and Europe (Joo 2005: 21; U.S. Department of Commerce 2015). 
Hence, the experience of the semiconductors industry shows that the key force explaining 
the formation and development of the NIDL, and the contemporary process of stratification of 
the capitalist world-economy through GCCs, has not been the general necessity of lead industrial 
capitals (i.e. MNCs) to reduce costs in order to increase profits, as in mainstream GCC-focused 
analyses, but the realization of this necessity under specific historical conditions that determine 
the forms of production of surplus-value on a global scale. The analysis of the semiconductors 
industry presented here has also shown that those conditions have not resulted from the 
simplification of manual work-processes due to the intensification of the technical division labor, 
as envisaged by Fröbel et al. (1980), but due to a leap in the automation of manufacturing 
equipment—i.e. in the transformation of manual labor’s productive attributes into productive 
powers of the machinery. This trend has resulted in the increased differentiation of the 
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productive attributes of the collective worker of large-scale industry and in its international 
fragmentation. Finally, the analysis of the global semiconductors industry also showed that East 
Asia’s ability to benefit from, rather than being exploited by, GCCs has not came from national 
state’s capacities, entrepreneurial quality, or the initial balance of class forces, as argued by the 
chain-focused authors reviewed in section 1. Rather, it has resulted from industrial capital’s 
access there to a labor-force whose historically-developed, and politically-enhanced, productive 
characteristics have closely matched those required by the new technological conditions at a 
relatively low cost. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper presented a critique of GCC-focused analyses of the structural dynamics of the global 
economy. This critique showed that despite their multiple contributions those analyses remain 
nation-centered and thus fail to account fully for the forces behind the conformation and 
evolution of the IDL and hence of national and global developmental patterns. The paper then 
argued that the key to overcoming the limits of these versions of GCC-focoused analysis of 
recent transformations in the capitalist world-system is to be found in the critical revision of the 
work of Fröbel et al. (1980).  
Hence, the paper claimed that the process of capital accumulation is global in terms of its 
general structural dynamics and national only in its forms of realization. It was argued, then, that 
the global unity of capital accumulation is developed in the process of production of relative 
surplus-value, which comes about through the IDL and the formation and development of GCCs. 
Originally, this process revolved around the spatial separation of industrial and raw-material 
production, resulting in the classical IDL. Since the 1960s, automation-driven tacit-skill-
replacing technical changes resulted in the transformation of the composition of the collective 
worker of large-scale industry and in its international fragmentation, thus giving place to a new 
type of IDL that superseded the classical IDL; the so-called NIDL. This process has materialized 
in specific GCCs and in the specific geographical dispersion of their component parts. Industrial 
capital then began to take advantage of the particular historical origin of the East Asian working 
classes, and subsequently of those of other regions, to locate there those simplified productive 
activities that could be profitably performed by cheaper though highly disciplined/acquiescent 
labor-forces. South America and much of Africa, on the contrary, have remained integrated in 
the global economy as producers of raw materials and, increasingly, reservoirs of surplus 
population.  
Processes behind the NIDL have not been not static; nor have their effects on the 
productive attributes of the global collective worker. Contrary to Fröbel et al., they have 
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manifested themselves in the continuous transformation of labor processes, increasingly 
affecting relatively complex activities, and, in some cases, in the upgrading of workers’ skills 
and firms’ capabilities. Hence, the structural transformation of the East Asian societies and the 
massive improvements in the conditions of reproduction of the labour-force there. These claims 
were substantiated with the analysis of the global semiconductors industry which showed the 
concrete manifestation of those general trends in a crucial manufacturing sector. 
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This timely book combines food regime and governance approaches to explain the material, 
ideological and power dynamics of the global agro-food system and its discontents.  Nora 
McKeon’s book contributes to a growing literature detailing the shortcomings of the dominant 
industrial corporate food system in nourishing the world’s people and environment. Yet it moves 
beyond many such volumes in identifying promising alternative agro-food initiatives based on 
traditional family/peasant farming and local food provisioning, and alternative food governance 
efforts which empower local citizens and communities and restrict corporate profiteering.  
McKeon draws on her unique insider view of United Nations policy venues and local food 
movements in Africa to argue that food security and food sovereignty can and must be linked. 
Nora McKeon provides an insightful, historically grounded analysis of the dominant 
industrial corporate agro-food regime and its material and ideological underpinnings.  She 
explains the roles of multilateral agencies, national governments, and transnational corporations, 
as well as powerful new actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, in the contemporary 
industrial food system, illuminating trends in corporate concentration and financial speculation. 
The book offers a powerful critique of neoliberalism in the agro-food sector and clarifies how 
recent world food price spikes and climate crises are tied to failures in food system governance. 
Challenging the idea that only industrial corporate production can feed the world, McKeon 
shows how in fact the vast majority of food eaten by people around the world comes from 
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peasant farming and local food systems. While these local food webs are under siege, most 
recently through land and water grabs, she argues that they are best able to ensure access to 
healthy food for all and foster environmental sustainability and resilience. 
A key contribution of this book is its interrogation of key concepts upholding the global 
industrial corporate agro-food system, as well as those challenging the dominant paradigm. Nora 
McKeon analyzes how neoclassical economic notions of progress, development, and 
modernization foster the techno-industrial treadmill in agriculture and underpin a definition of 
food security based on international comparative advantage. The book critiques this market-
based conception of food security, contrasting it with a rights-based food sovereignty conception 
promoted by social movements in the Global South.  McKeon explains the key dimensions of 
this alternative paradigm, including its links to alternative development ideas, practices, and 
policies. This discussion merges food security and food sovereignty concerns through a focus on 
the “right to adequate food.”  
Nora McKeon demonstrates how conventional food governance failures have fueled 
recent world food crises and, more importantly, how new local and global initiatives are 
emerging to forge a rights-based global agro-food system. What makes this volume both unique 
and highly persuasive is its combined discussion of innovative civil society efforts to foster food 
sovereignty from the bottom up and new United Nations efforts working to democratize food 
security governance from the top down. McKeon provides a rich discussion of emerging 
grassroots efforts to reclaim control over the food system, assessing their achievements and 
suggesting ways to reinforce these efforts.  This analysis draws inspiring examples from across 
the globe, from Bolivia’s peasant farmer’s markets, Florida’s farmworkers’ Fair Food Program, 
and from McKeon’s own work with small farmers in West Africa.  The discussion of new global 
governance approaches focuses on the rise of the United Nations Committee on Food Security 
and its successes and failures in integrating civil society actors and concerns.  McKeon provides 
an insightful insider’s view of this important new governance arena and its policies to protect 
local land and natural resource rights and to steer agricultural investments in support of local 
food security and small producers.  
This book illuminates challenges and emergent possibilities within the global agro-food 
system and invites readers to become engaged in fostering food rights at home and around the 
world. Written in an engaging style, the book is suitable for a wide audience.  Many readers will 
find the numerous textboxes useful in explaining central theoretical concepts, providing 
illustrative examples, and presenting key movement insights and approaches.  This book is 
recommended for classroom use in advanced undergraduate and graduate level social science 
courses related to agro-food studies, globalization, and development. 
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Natalia Lambek, Priscilla Claeys, Adrienna Wong and Lea Brilmayer, eds. 2014. 
Rethinking Food Systems: Structural Challenges, New Strategies and the Law. New York and 
London: Springer. 238 pages, ISBN 978-94-007-7777-4 Cloth ($129.00). 
 
This collection of essays is structured around a paradox that is as obvious as it is scary: Food is a 
human necessity and a source of life. However, global food systems (and more specifically the 
corporate-capitalist way of conceiving food as a commodity that is produced, processed, 
transported, consumed and disposed of, according to the desires of worldwide consumers) are 
increasingly generating death, income inequality, poverty, food insecurity, socio-economic 
deprivation and environmental degradation. 
Rethinking Food Systems: Structural Challenges, New Strategies and the Law is thus 
inspired by the editors' call for a change to “our current path” (1) and by the invitation not to be 
deceived by the unicorn of productivism (i.e. the idea — openly challenged in the introduction of 
the book — that food insecurity and famine are the consequence of a mismatch between 
production and consumption, and that increased productivity represents the solution to any 
current problem). On the contrary, as Claeys and Lambek argue in their introductory chapter, a 
real transformation of the global food framework can only be obtained through the identification 
and solution of structural problems that are the result of social, political and economic 
powerlessness, laws, and historical circumstances that continue to limit or interfere with the 
ability of so many to grow or purchase the food they need (3). 
Published almost ten years after the “Global Food Crisis” of 2008, Rethinking Food 
Systems contains an introduction and nine contributions divided into three sections, each one 
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“reflecting interconnected approaches to achieving social change through using legal tools: 
institutionalizing new legal and policy frameworks […]; regulating government and third parties 
[…]; and, governing and adopting governance structures” (13). All the pieces express a general 
disinterest in discussing what went wrong ten years ago; rather, they are inspired by the desire to 
propose new and alternative ways of thinking about what food systems should look like and what 
role law may play in constructing them. 
Undoubtedly, the focus on law and the forward-looking attitude of the volume represent 
the two most valuable contributions to the ongoing debate around what we eat. As a matter of 
fact, even critical legal scholars seldom engage with the role of law in defining how food is 
produced and distributed, and when they do, they tend to criticize the status quo without 
engaging in any constructive endeavor. On the contrary, this edited volume looks at law not only 
to criticize its role in the construction of the current food system, but also to recognize it as a 
mechanism of socio-economic transformation. In addition, the introduction is particularly useful 
from the point of view of law and world-systems research because of its reconstruction of the 
food system as a multi-spatial and multi-legal phenomenon that is, at the same time, shaped by 
the content of often overlapping legal orders (international, regional, national, sub-national), and 
by the behavior of various actors (international organizations, national parliaments, and courts 
above all, but also corporations, civil society organizations and social movements). 
Far from being a coherent legal space with well-defined boundaries and organization, the 
food system represented by Claeys and Lambek is legally and politically dense, charged with 
social and legal struggle, and riddled with tensions and prevarication—a realm where even the 
role of the state as a pivotal element of the international legal order is questioned. Anyone 
interested in legal interventions should thus take into consideration the issue of legitimacy and 
recognize the multiplicity of a system that does not have a center and that is resilient to change 
(to use a word that is often abused within the arena of environmental studies and whose negative 
implications are too seldom discussed). At the same time, and this is discussed in the 
introduction too, legal interventions are not seen as the sole possibility for change, and their 
effectiveness is not taken for granted. On the contrary, the authors are aware that social 
transformation may not be best achieved with legal tools and that, even when this is the case, 
lawyers may choose between creatively playing with existing structures, thinking of new legal 
institutions that operate within the same framework (such as international trade law and World 
Trade Organization law) or imagining alternatives that completely redefine the legal construction 
of the global food system (including its global reach). For these reasons, it is important to 
recognize the validity of the project and the significant contribution that it is aiming for in the 
field of law, food and inequality. 
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Unfortunately, the combination between the ambitious nature of the enterprise —
rethinking the legal elements that underpin a food system constructed through centuries of public 
violence, legal authority and legalized subordination (McMichael 2009) — and the diversity of 
the contributors' backgrounds (academics, activists, members of the United Nations, etc.) results 
in a series of papers that often repeat themselves, seldom dialogue with each other, and, more 
importantly, tend to flatten their legal analyses of the right to food and food sovereignty as the 
‘legal crowbars’ to open up the global food system. As a consequence, the overall approach to 
law and food systems appears a little fragmented (despite criticizing the fragmentation of the 
international legal order as one of the causes of the current inequality), excessively positivist, and 
not attentive to the unexpected and unpredictable consequences that legal interventions may 
generate when operating in a legally dense and power-laden framework. 
In particular, I found the expectations generated by the introduction only partially 
satisfied by the subsequent three sections, although I must admit that I approached the volume 
with a critical legal background, some knowledge of the link between law and the food system, 
and the conviction that law is not only indeterminate, but also an instrument of coercion that 
favors those who ‘act from above.’ Therefore, the comments below are expressed from the point 
of view of someone who both considers it essential to talk about law and legal reforms in the 
context of the historical and contingent allocation of power, and believes that law cannot lead to 
any systemic transformation without the redefinition of the way in which resources are allocated 
between and within communities. Having thus laid out my biases, I found most, but not all, of 
the contributions suffering from two main weaknesses. 
First, it is my impression that most of the authors seem to adopt a positivist and optimistic 
approach to “the law” (6) and legal tools that is coupled with the idea of democratic states and 
broad participation as implicit goods. In particular, laws and rules are seen by many contributors 
as neutral and technical elements that will lead to the expected outcome if they are generated 
within democratic institutions and properly enforced. In this light, some authors claim that in a 
fragmented and incoherent legal world, the goal for lawyers is to obtain legal coherence and the 
recognition (by courts, parliaments and international organizations) of the right to food (or food 
sovereignty) as the interpretative standard – or even the legal censor – that limits any other legal 
framework (international trade, investments, mining policies, the consolidation of market 
oligopolies, etc.). 
As a consequence, the introduction of a right to food legislation in Uganda is described 
by Rae (chapter 4) as a step forward and a great achievement, despite the top-down nature of the 
process, the lack of public participation and the significant hurdles represented by budget 
constraints, economic inequality, international trade and internal political tensions. Similarly, 
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Lambek (chapter 5) correctly identifies the right to food as barring states from negatively 
impacting their citizens’ livelihoods—for example, by authorizing open-pit mining. However, 
she dismisses too quickly issues such as developmentalist ideology, the lack of alternative paths, 
budget constraints and reduced resources, the status of economic dependency in which several 
peripheral countries have been drawn, and the need for something more than individual naming 
and shaming. Even De Schutter (chapter 10), whose scholarship is among the most critical in the 
area, evidences a very optimistic attitude towards the World Committee on Food Security (CFS) 
as a multi-stakeholder venue of engagement and collective identification of the international 
trajectory to implement the right to food. As others have underlined (McKeon 2015), including 
Borras and Franco in their thought-provoking and must-read contribution to this volume (chapter 
7), the faith in ‘inclusive’ participation and the institutionalization of dissent often overlooks the 
multiple forms of misrepresentation and the power imbalance within the institutionalized space 
of political confrontation. In addition, they may also lower the aspirational threshold, transform 
political issues into technical contestations, and are seldom enriched by an effective and diffused 
mechanism for full accountability. 
Secondly, I was left with the idea that the authors and editors should have manifested a 
stronger sensibility toward the historical construction of the global food system and the 
interconnected nature of the legal structures that lurk behind it. To the former point, only 
Gonzalez (chapter 8), Borras and Franco, and De Schutter provide the reader with some hints 
about the historical trajectory of the food system and the close link between colonialism and the 
way in which power and resources are distributed today. However, the colonial and unequal 
roots of food represent a political, economic and legal condition that must be taken into 
consideration if we really want to transform it. As for the interdependence between actors and 
legal orders, my own scholarship attempts to expose the complexity, unpredictability and 
political implications that characterize any attempt to legally map and intervene in transnational 
and multi-legal phenomena, such as the system that links sugar cane production in Cambodia and 
consumers in the United Kingdom (Ferrando 2015). As Lorenz (1993) and his Essence of Chaos 
teach us, a butterfly flapping its wings in Tokyo can produce a tsunami on the other side of the 
planet several weeks later; this is true, I think, also for the legal construction of the food system 
and any law-based approach to its modification. For this reason, it would be interesting to 
promote Brilmayer and Moon's invitation (chapter 6) to third-party states to label or boycott 
products tainted by land grabbing, but their intervention would have been sharpened by the 
recognition that land grabbing is often linked to actors who are closely associated with 
governments whose interventions the two authors invoke (for example, Norway may boycott 
products produced with grabbed land, but Norwegian workers may lose their pensions if the 
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Norwegian sovereign wealth fund stopped investing in all land-related projects). At the same 
time, lawyers and legal scholars cannot forget that interventions at any point of a complex legal 
system are likely to generate negative — or positive — systemic spillover effects that may go far 
beyond the intentions of the intervener. Consequently, we must be more cautious when 
suggesting that legal changes can lead to the desired outcomes (including when coherence is 
obtained between the right to food and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, or TRIPS, as suggested by Hauger in chapter 9). 
In conclusion, Rethinking Food Systems certainly is a timely and very welcome attempt to 
engage with the legal roots of the inequality and insecurity that thrive in the capitalist food 
system. Above all, it is a commendable enterprise because it does not stop at critiquing the 
disaster of the current food system, but it identifies punctual interventions and recommendation 
that may be put at the center of public campaigns and recrimination (if not at the center of a 
bottom-up legal action). The hope is that the unsolved questions posed by the book and the 
internal tensions between some of its contributions will stimulate further investigation, more 
writing, and the consolidation of a more critical understanding of law as a coercive tool that 
often reproduces power structures and that, for this reason, must be carefully and critically 
appropriated and utilized to create a food system based on redistribution, dignity, equality and 
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Stefan Ouma. 2015. Assembling Export Markets: The Making and Unmaking of Global Food 
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For markets and supply chains to emerge and persist, entrepreneurs must confront an unending 
onslaught of “sociotechnical puzzles” (5). They must connect intricate assemblages of people 
and things in the midst of social, economic, political, technological, biophysical, and semiotic 
flux. Assembling Export Markets (AEM) brings an array of such sociotechnical puzzles to life 
and powerfully demonstrates that how market participants attempt to solve these puzzles often 
proves at least as important in shaping market consequences as do the macrostructural dynamics 
more commonly emphasized by political economists. 
Stefan Ouma draws on fieldwork in Ghana to deconstruct the emergence of two value 
chain segments — one for cut pineapples and the other for mangoes — at the “frontiers” of the 
global fresh produce market. He seeks to show “how global agrifood market connections are 
carved out from a heterogeneous world, how they are rendered intelligible and technical, and 
what opportunities, costs, risks, and disciplinary forces accompany them” (206). Packed with 
tireless theorizing and vivid ethnographic description, this book makes for a challenging but 
more than worthwhile read. 
AEM’s central project is to draw on interpretive analytic techniques and methodical 
empirical examination to reconstruct the interactional stories that are often missed within the 
global value chains (GVC), agrarian political economy, and development studies literatures 
(among other bodies of work). Ouma pushes back against the widespread tendency toward 
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“abstracting markets,” instead focusing his book on “how markets…come into being practically” 
(3). Achieving this aim requires close observation of the “organizational forms, resources, 
technologies, strategies, and practices” (5) from which market strands emerge. The study is 
explicitly designed to answer how questions rather than what or why questions about market 
formations. Nonetheless, after reading the book I was convinced that the former project has 
important implications for the latter. 
In attempting to excavate unseen layers of value chains, Ouma draws on tools from the 
“social studies of economization and marketization (SSEM).” SSEM consists of strands from 
economic sociology and science studies including performativity, actor-network, and convention 
theories. The book offers relatively little critique of SSEM literature itself, except to occasionally 
note that SSEM tends to lack empirical engagement with developing-world settings and that the 
field can have a tendency toward relativism and depoliticization that Ouma does not wish to 
share. Yet the book spends more time discussing the SSEM literature than it does the GVC and 
political economy of development literatures that it seeks to productively critique. I would have 
preferred that the SSEM discussions be slightly condensed to make room for more of the book’s 
constructive criticism of GVC and development studies, but this comes down to a matter of taste 
and interest. 
The book’s two case studies each center on a (respective) firm relying on local contract 
farmers for supply. The first is Tongo Fruits (TF), a just-in-time pineapple processor-exporter in 
relatively prosperous and well-connected southern Ghana. The second firm, Organic Fruits 
Limited (OFL) exports mangoes from comparatively poor and insulated northern Ghana (both 
company names were changed to protect anonymity). The fresh produce sector constitutes a 
substantively important arena for study since many development agencies have recently chosen 
high-value crop export as a strategic leading sector for development. In Ghana as elsewhere, the 
development establishment and government agencies have invested heavily in such chain 
upgrading schemes. The two firms studied in this book have themselves been held up as 
examples of successful exporters in various agency reports. 
From the constellation of similarities and differences between these case studies Ouma 
takes advantage of abundant opportunities for productive comparisons and contrasts. On one 
hand, both firms operate at the “frontiers” of the global agrifood market—geographic spaces in 
which connections to global markets remain thin, sketchy, and contested (see Ouma et al. 2013 
for a more in-depth discussion of the frontier concept). Both firms are heavily embroiled within 
the discourses and practices of corporate social responsibility, investing in host communities and 
at times blurring the lines between business and development work. TF and OFL faced similar 
challenges in “creating” contract suppliers they could work with from the subsistence farmers 
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and spot market traders who predominated before the arrival of these firms. On the other hand, 
the two cases represent two different contract farming models. And they operate within about as 
dissimilar socioeconomic environments as can be found within the Ghanaian export agrifood 
sector. 
The book takes the firms as starting points, and then zeroes in on links between the firms 
and their suppliers. Although buyers (primarily Western European retailers) regularly come up in 
the analysis, downstream elements mostly remain outside of the author’s direct empirical eye. In 
focusing on the firm-supplier links, the book seeks “to reconstruct crucial market encounters” 
among diverse actors at this nexus, including the firm’s management and staff, external 
consultants, and farmers, as well as influential stakeholders from global development NGOs to 
local chiefs. Ouma asks questions like “How are such encounters organized? How (un)equal are 
they? How are prices being constructed? What sociotechnical arrangements structure these 
processes? What controversies arise during such encounters?” (43-44). 
Ouma refers to his method as “critical ethnography of marketization.” As he puts it, 
“‘knowing the market’ can be understood as the capacity to effectively align human and 
nonhuman elements so that a good can be qualified and objectified to a given modality of 
valuation, calculated, and detached. What I did during my research was to trace how people 
performed these alignments during interviews or their daily work” (86). Analyzing transnational 
connections requires expansion beyond traditional place-bound ethnography. Ouma instead sees 
his method as “a way of arranging sensitizing questions, sites of interest, and different methods 
of text generation and analysis in a recursive and reflexive manner…in order to unsettle the 
taken-for-granteds of global capitalism” (79). 
While the first four chapters introduce the book’s goals, cases, methods, and theoretical 
concerns, chapters 5-9 constitute the empirical and analytical core of the book. Of these, chapters 
5 and 6 explain how the case study firms were able to create and stabilize the respective 
circumstances in which they were able to operate. Chapter 5 takes a broader perspective of how 
entrepreneurs envisioned their nascent market niches and brought them into being at the macro-
level—for example, how founders were able to mobilize the necessary capital and make the 
necessary local connections; how they created the necessary “ontological reconfigurations”; and, 
how the two firms established their respective business models and gained the (relative) trust of 
producers. Chapter 6 takes a more ground-level perspective on how Ghanaian farmers emerged 
as market agents through their interactions with the firms. Although these chapters are full of 
insightful theorizing and instructive empirical accounts, they proved a bit unwieldy for this 
reader, and I found it difficult to extract cohesive arguments. More interpretively inclined 
readers, however, will feel right at home with these chapters. 
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On the other hand, Chapters 7 and 8 are much tighter and more focused. Each deals with 
a core theme (power and crisis, respectively), and each fleshes out its theme with reference to a 
central example from each of the two cases. Chapter 7 attempts to transcend homogeneous 
conceptualizations of power as a “substance,” instead exploring the micro-level interactions and 
“(anti)politics” through which power struggles actually play out. Ouma highlights “qualculative” 
power as key, i.e., the power to quantify and judge quality according to prevalent market norms, 
often with the use of technologies and algorithms. 
I found the most memorable discussion within this chapter to be a section on power 
struggles between TF and its contract farmers that occurred through “valorimeters,” the 
mechanisms used to value the fruit purchased from contract farmers. Because of volatile demand 
from retailers, the company sometimes rejected higher than usual quantities of pineapples, and 
these rejections “were often not justified on grounds of under-demand or canceled orders, but by 
advancing technical arguments” (157). TF employees rejected pineapples because of low 
demand but claimed that they were doing so because of low quality. He points to the example of 
tests performed with refractometers—devices the company used to test sugar content. Because 
farmers generally did not own refractometers, there was not much they could do to argue when 
told that their pineapples had the wrong sugar content. This is a dimension of power that would 
be neglected by most political economy analyses. 
Chapter 8 considers crises that occurred within each of the case studies. Here, I found 
OFL’s story to be the more interesting of the two. OFL’s crisis came about largely as a result of 
its flawed reading of “nature,” and resultantly faulty agronomic and business strategies. The 
company’s consultants estimated vital parameters of inputs required and outputs expected, and 
then based their production plans, finance and investment plans, etc. around these estimations. 
These “calculations became a linchpin for the mango project. Everything was based on them” 
(192). When it became clear that the equations had underestimated the number of years it would 
take mango trees to bear fruit and the years for which they would need irrigation, the entire 
project fell into an existential crisis. The company was forced to reconfigure and rebuild its 
operations, and could easily have gone under. 
AEM is careful to maintain focus on the areas that its research design is best equipped to 
address, i.e., the how questions, and Ouma explicitly seeks to “move beyond an instrumentalist 
critique of actually existing value chain development.” Yet the book presents a wealth of insights 
that, if followed up on, could provide useful policy implications relating to often overlooked 
mechanisms. For example, NGOs striving to increase the bargaining power of small farmers in 
global value chains would do well to pay close attention to the subtle knowledge/power 
interfaces that the book highlights, for instance in its discussion of “valorimeters.” Supply chain-
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oriented development strategists concerned with the well-being of small farmers would do well 
to heed Ouma’s suggestion that “regional markets, which require a less demanding and costly 
agencementization, should be considered as viable alternatives…in the context of Africa 
agrifood industries” (212-213). While readers inclined toward political economy and policy-
relevant development studies may struggle with this book more than those oriented toward 
interpretive SSEM-type theory, it is perhaps the former readers who have most to gain from this 
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Alana Mann. 2014. Global Activism in Food Politics: Power Shift. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 205 pages, ISBN 978-1-137-34139-6 Cloth ($95.00). 
 
As an academic with expertise in Communications, Alana Mann has angled her unique book, 
Global Activism in Food Politics, to address the logistics of ‘framing’ in the global food 
sovereignty movement—an approach that underlines the delicate balancing act inherent in 
sustaining a transnational alliance with diverse local chapters. This particular occupational hazard 
derives from the unique structure of the central player in the food sovereignty movement: La Vía 
Campesina (LVC), whose operational principle depends on the autonomy of member 
organizations, even as LVC is committed to member-based collective action at extra-
regional/national levels, all the way up to the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Food 
and Agricultural Organization’s Committee on World Food Security. Power Shift, the book’s 
subtitle, refers to the process of scaling up advocacy and discursive frames from grass-roots 
organizations via “engagement with state governments, regional trade councils and supranational 
bodies such as the FAO” (6). Mann notes that scale shifting can be “uneven, ambiguous and 
inconsistent” (144), given that the food sovereignty movement takes the form of a network, and 
that local political-economic conditions fluctuate, altering opportunities for grassroots 
organizations. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that “the scope for autonomy provided by loosely knit 
relationships paradoxically contributes to the durability and stability of the network” (144). And 
of course the thread running through this thoughtful study is that insofar as the food regime 
undermines farming cultures, exploits agricultural workers and degrades ecosystems, it provides 
continuing cause for collective action. 
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Another key thread in Mann’s study concerns the nature of LVC as a transnational 
movement, purportedly the largest social movement in the world, spanning over 70 countries in 
North and South and involving over 200 million members (small producers and landless workers). 
She notes LVC’s now legendary ability to resist representation by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and its jealous protection of its own agenda setting, which distinguish it from other 
transnational advocacy networks. This is a central theme in Mann’s nuanced characterization of 
social movement logistics. Here Mann references social movement theorists’ observations of the 
balancing act between local realities and transnational framing, suggesting that “the construction 
of a global campaign jeopardises the diversity of subject positions of members” (152).  
She illustrates this diversity via a careful reconstruction of three case studies of domestic 
organizations: the National Association of Indigenous and Rural Women (ANAMURI), a Chilean 
organization uniting indigenous and non-indigenous women; the Asociación Nacional de 
Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo (ANEC), a Mexican civil association of 
60,000 small/medium farmers and over 200 grain producer cooperatives; and the Basque Farmers’ 
Union Euskal Herriko Nelazarien Elkartasuna (EHNE). As Mann notes, ANAMURI focuses on 
gender, indigenous and worker solidarities, organizing around seasonal worker health, sustainable 
agriculture and preservation of traditional seeds; ANEC focuses on preserving maize culture and 
sustainability of rural livelihoods (competing with agribusiness in the market); and, EHNE 
promotes Basque heritage, reaches out to consumer organizations, and engages in Spanish and 
European Union (EU) parliamentary politics. Mann’s point is that food sovereignty provides the 
ideological bridge between such local/domestic social and political particularities, given the 
interpretive elasticity of the concept of ‘food sovereignty.’ This elasticity derives from the 
fundamental importance of local autonomy in a transnational movement to democratize food 
politics on the foundation of sustainable agriculture. As such, the food sovereignty frame is an 
alternative to neoliberal conceptions of food security (via ‘free trade’) in defending local 
economies, women’s rights, agrarian reform programs (rural livelihoods rather than simply land 
reform, World Bank style), protection of diversity and indigenous seeds, and national food policy 
autonomy.  
While Mann’s book is devoted to evaluating the capacities and claims of the food 
sovereignty movement and its strategic alliance building, it also offers a cogent summary of the 
institutional contours and social, economic, and environmental consequences of the food regime. 
This includes a substantive mapping of the political economy of agribusiness, from production to 
retailing, and of the rise of oppositional movements (from land-based through identity-based to 
alternative food networks), to the impacts of neoliberal food security policies via a 
trade/investment regime that erodes local and national food provisioning as well as the integrity of 
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ecosystems. Given her discursive predilections, Mann pays close attention to representational 
strategies of the food sovereignty movement writ large, emphasizing a maturing human rights 
politics, including promoting “the peasant farmer as a viable economic entity” (35). This strategy 
resonates at the United Nations (UN), where a Resolution of the Human Rights Council has created 
an Intergovernmental Working Group to consider the formal recognition of the rights of peasants 
and rural workers (a group constituting 40 percent of humanity), acknowledging the key role small-
scale producers play in global food provisioning (producing up to 70 percent of food).  
While such initiatives, together with the incorporation of ‘food sovereignty’ principles in 
the national constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and in administrative organs of 
Senegal, Mali and Nepal, represent some “reclaiming of the state in the face of globalizing forces” 
(141), Mann is careful not to exaggerate the significance of these forms of ‘power shift.’ The UN 
of course is composed of member states, and, as Mann points out, Northern governments’ 
representatives “perceive that the struggle for peasant rights is not their struggle, and shy away 
from the very word ‘peasant’” (67), dismissing the mass of people who live and trade on the 
margins or outside of capitalist economy. Even so, Mann notes that LVC sees promising new 
openings in the international context, such as mounting resistance to U.S. ‘unilateralism,’ 
weakening of neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, growing links between 
civil society and the UN, gradual recognition of food sovereignty by governments, the specter of 
TNC gigantism, and a maturing climate change debate in which LVC claims small-scale 
agriculture returns energy to the soil and reduces carbon emissions, effectively cooling the planet. 
Arguably, the value of this comprehensive book is its didacticism, attentive to the 
possibilities and limits of alliance building. Mann notes that LVC is breaking out of its self-
imposed autonomy (an initial strategy to avoid NGO-style compromise, or academic influence), 
and realizing the importance of reaching out to other movements and struggles, many of which are 
directly or indirectly connected to what is happening on the land (from consumer movements, 
through precariat struggles with race, class, and gender dimensions, and environmental 
movements), and various organizations like the World Social Forum, Occupy Wall Street, People’s 
Global Action, and Our World is Not for Sale. In these potential alliances Mann sees the possibility 
of mass actions attracting media attention and public notice, as precursors to putting pressure on 
governments, international/global governance institutions, and transnational corporations. Mann 
challenges the food sovereignty movement to recognize the significance of projecting alternative 
narratives via public media outlets to inform citizens and states of the rights and potential of farm 
cultures and communities that are effectively marginalized in neoliberal discourse, and to develop 
media training to understand how to gain access to media outlets and how to project alternative 
narratives.  
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And, where dominant narratives circumvent movement voices, access to alternative media 
outlets becomes critical. Here Mann emphasizes the importance of “providing opportunities for 
social movements to produce and generate their own content, alternative platforms enable them to 
avoid frame ‘traps’ that lead to ambiguity, error and misrepresentation” (160). Even there, she 
maintains, there is always a danger of reducing face-to-face encounters via keyboard activism. 
One solution she offers is the example of farmsubsidy.org, which provides an alternative, virtual, 
public sphere regarding agri-food politics in the EU. Thus: ‘While investigative journalists have 
traditionally sought to reveal government money-trails, the tools to do so are now available to 
citizens through cross-border data-sharing initiatives such as farmsubsidy.org’ (162). Finally, 
Mann outlines some important strategic possibilities for the food sovereignty movement, such as 
recognizing the livelihood dimension of biofuel production for some farming communities (even 
as fuel crops displace food crops) and addressing current conceptions of ‘crisis’ in such a way as 
to offer alternative ontological frameworks that preclude a market solution reflex and promote 
coalition building to transform food systems. At a time of growing interest in, and adaptation of, 
‘food sovereignty’ demands and claims, this book is a comprehensive, clear-headed and 
challenging template for agri-food scholars and activists alike. 
 
Philip McMichael 
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Jennifer Clapp. 2012. Food. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 218 pages, ISBN 978-0-7456-
4936-8 Paper ($19.95). 
 
Food, by Jennifer Clapp, is a valuable contribution to the burgeoning critical social science 
scholarship on agriculture and food. It is part of Polity Press’s “Resources” series, whose other 
books include the similarly succinctly titled Timber, Coltan, Fish, Water, Coffee, Oil, Land, and 
Diamonds. In Food, Clapp takes a global perspective, identifying major political and economic 
forces shaping the global food economy and fueling its crises of hunger, uneven development, 
and ecological devastation. Food is written in clear, accessible language, and is coherently 
organized and focused on key political economic dynamics that play leading roles in these major 
social and ecological problems in the global food economy. 
Clapp begins by detailing the increasingly globalized scope of food trade today and 
specifying that the book examines the international political and economic dimensions of the 
global food economy. The book focuses on four key forces: developed countries’ investments in 
industrial agriculture and international food market expansion; international rules and 
agreements that unevenly liberalize agricultural trade; the rise of transnational corporations; and, 
the financialization of food and agriculture. She highlights what she calls the new “middle 
spaces” that have been opened up by these forces—nodes in the global food system “where 
control and influence over how it operates has become concentrated” and “where norms, 
practices, and rules that govern the world food economy are shaped by the very forces that are 
leading to its expansion” (6). This analytical focus on such global-scale political and economic 
actors and forces makes the book a welcome addition to recent literature on agriculture and food, 
which has paid more attention to localized food systems, specific commodities, and regional 
food politics.  
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The next four chapters elaborate these primary explanations for the contemporary crises 
in agriculture and food. First, Clapp succinctly details the history of developed countries’ 
investments in industrial agriculture and the expansion of international food trade. Chapter 2 
focuses on post-war government food aid programs, price supports, and other policies designed 
to maximize domestic agricultural production and create markets for the surplus product, as well 
as the Green Revolution programs to export the industrial model to countries in the global South. 
Clapp adeptly explains the underlying changes in developed nations’ logic, specifies how these 
different initiatives articulated with each other, and identifies the resulting social and ecological 
consequences.  
In Chapter 3, Clapp identifies the role of uneven trade rules in shaping the current global 
food system. Specifically, she details how the trade liberalization components of structural 
adjustment policies and international trade agreements systematically serve the interests of 
developed countries by allowing them to maintain their own long-standing protectionist policies, 
and how they disadvantage developing countries by making them liberalize their agricultural 
sectors and render them vulnerable to market forces. The chapter importantly identifies not only 
what is problematic about neoliberal policies in principle, but the uneven and unfair ways in 
which major policies and agreements have been implemented in practice. That said, it would 
have been helpful here if Clapp had provided more explanation for why the policies evolved in 
this lopsided way. She rightly emphasizes the World Bank’s argument – which undergirded this 
uneven set of trade rules – that subsidies (which many developed countries have) are less “trade-
distorting” than import tariffs (which were more available to resource-strapped developing 
nations). However, I wanted some technical evaluation of this argument. Is it well justified, or 
not? Relatedly, Clapp does not discuss the governance processes within these institutions; a 
political economic analysis of decision-making processes in the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization would help explain how these institutions’ 
outcomes have evolved in these grossly uneven ways. 
In Chapter 4, Clapp details the rise and practices of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
She explains that, while some corporations have operated internationally in agricultural trade for 
hundreds of years, their power has skyrocketed under the trade liberalization policies detailed in 
the previous chapter. Clapp details the degree of corporate concentration in agricultural inputs, 
processing, distribution, and retail, and she valuably identifies mechanisms through which TNCs 
use their power to shape the rules of the game. 
Clapp devotes Chapter 5 to financialization, detailing the ways in which food and finance 
have become increasingly and problematically linked in recent decades. Clapp describes this 
“intermingling of food and financial markets,” shows how this has led to increased global land 
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grabs and investment in biofuel production, and identifies how these trends put food and 
agriculture in the hands of financial investors, and thereby contribute to catastrophic volatility in 
food prices. This chapter is Clapp’s most novel contribution to the scholarship, as these are new 
forces whose impacts are just starting to be understood. However, I imagine that many 
undergraduates will need guidance through this chapter, as derivatives, futures contracts, 
commodity index funds, and other technical concepts will be new to many of them.  
Finally, in the concluding chapter, Clapp showcases several ways in which social 
movements are working to combat these problems: fair trade, food sovereignty, and food justice 
advocacy efforts to reform existing rules. I especially appreciate that she introduces the reader to 
social movement efforts to confront and reform agricultural policies of developed nations and the 
World Trade Organization, rather than only showcasing the secessionist, market-based, and 
perfectionist forms of activism that tend to dominate popular and scholarly accounts of food 
politics. Clapp ends the book by posing a question – “Which way forward?” – inviting the reader 
to consider the potential of the various efforts to combat the global food system’s multiple, 
complex crises. Clapp offers no answer, but I don’t fault her for this. Clapp is focused on 
identifying the roots of the problems. Examining the strengths and limitations of various reform 
efforts is a task for us to take on elsewhere.   
Readers will notice that much of the content here has been covered well by other 
scholars. While this is true, Clapp’s contribution is bringing this material together, updating it, 
and, crucially, making it accessible. The book is particularly well suited for undergraduate 
audiences, who will appreciate the clear writing as well as the thoughtful suggestions for further 
reading. As one who regularly teaches an introductory Food and Society class to undergraduates, 
I am always on the lookout for new scholarship that clearly explains complex global political and 
economic material to readers unfamiliar with these institutions and their activities. Clapp’s Food 
fits the bill. It is timely and up-to-date, and it makes otherwise abstract material readable, 
compelling, and engaging. Importantly, it makes clear why global political issues – not just local 
ones – matter. 
 
Jill Lindsey Harrison 
Department of Sociology  
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Philip McMichael. 2013. Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions. Halifax: Fernwood Press. 
xii + 196 pages, ISBN 978-1-55266-575-6 Paper ($18.95). 
 
In Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions, Philip McMichael compiles much of his career’s work 
around what he calls the “food regime project.” This has been primarily a theoretical and 
interpretative enterprise geared to situating and understanding food and agriculture in the capitalist 
world economy since the nineteenth century. Along with work developed by and with Harriet 
Friedmann, the food regime approach outlined in McMichael’s book has been highly influential 
since the late 1980s in interpreting the dynamics of food and agriculture in the world economy. 
McMichael’s book offers a useful collection of his own work, discusses other elaborations of the 
food regime perspective, including the different tack taken by Friedmann, and endorses the food-
sovereignty program advocated by Via Campesina, a major global social movement that advocates 
agroecology to mitigate climate change. In what follows, I first provide a brief summary of the 
food regime perspective and the three historical regimes that have been identified and 
characterized since 1870. I then offer a critical but appreciative review of McMichael’s book along 
with a number of suggestions for theoretical refinement. 
The task of food regime analysis is primarily to situate “the rise and decline of national 
agricultures within the geopolitical history of capitalism” (1). McMichael continues: “It was not 
simply about food, but about the politics of food relations.” Citing from his article with Friedmann, 
he says that the concept was meant to link “international relations of food production and 
consumption to forms of accumulation broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation 
since 1870” (1). Ultimately, argues McMichael, “the question concerns what is the stabilizing 
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condition of a regime: trade, currency, or agri-food production relations and their realization 
through trade?” (15). 
The first food regime, dominated by the British Empire, was meant to produce cheap food 
by extending the agricultural frontier to its colonies. This would enable Britain to focus on 
manufacturing for the world. The second food regime started after a transitional period between 
the first and second world wars of the twentieth century, this time dominated by the United States. 
Rather than extensive, the U.S.-dominated food regime was intensive: it was predicated on new 
agricultural technologies that would eventually be identified with the Green Revolution, including 
hybrid seeds, mechanization, petro-chemical fertilizers and pesticides, monocropping, etc., and 
publicly-funded agriculture research to help articulate it to industry. Its crisis started in the late 
1970s. McMichael terms the third food regime “corporate” because there was a shift from national 
agricultures to corporate management of the market in the interest of financial capital.  
 
Methodological Problems: Levels of Abstraction, Units of Analysis and Causality 
McMichael does a fine job of summing up the evolving conceptualization of the “food regime 
project.” When addressing some of its critics, McMichael’s discussion is gauged at a very high 
level of abstraction, as he speaks primarily of “capital” in general and focuses on the world- system 
as the chief unit of analysis. This focus has been both the strength and the weakness of the food 
regime perspective, as developed by McMichael. One welcome aspect of his discussion, however, 
is that he posits the food regime analysis as open to scrutiny and extension by other scholars, which 
several of us have done.  
One of the chief features in McMichael’s theorizing is trying to identify a single “principle” 
that rules each food regime: empire, state, and market, respectively. Corresponding features of 
capital accumulation in each food regime are: extensive (1st), intensive (2nd), and financial (3rd). In 
an inductive, empiricist turn, however, McMichael extrapolates what Vía Campesina has done 
since its founding in the mid-1990s and raises its proposed food sovereignty project and 
agroecological practices into the emerging principle of a post-corporate food regime.  
Via Campesina has become a significant peasant movement, which acts on a global scale, 
but advocates for the realization of food sovereignty on a national level. Many scholars have 
endorsed this movement, and the fact is that its constituent organizations are predicated on acting 
upon their domestic states, not merely on the global sphere (Otero et al. 2013; Gürcan 2014). Yet, 
McMichael disqualifies a class-based national approach (81) because he presumes that the only 
valid or effective sphere for political action is the global. I have critiqued this transnational-
globalist position in favor of an internationalist nationalism elsewhere (Otero 2011). My reasoning 
is that, whereas the world economy is indeed global, politics continues to be fundamentally local 
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(i.e., national and subnational). It is from this bottom-up location that significant transformation 
can take place, not only because this is where local working classes and peasant ecologies are 
actually situated, but also because “capital” (its owners, that is) has already colonized the global 
sphere (Otero 2004). Privileging the global as the sphere of struggle is tantamount not only to 
accepting capital’s terms of engagement; it is a choice that will almost certainly end in defeat. 
Thus, if the “food regime” is a form of historical method to which other dimensions may 
be added, as McMichael usefully proposes (108), then one must decide what are the relative causal 
dimensions, scales and units of analysis. We need to develop a systematic ordering of concepts in 
which a conscious decision is made as to what are the core dynamic dimensions of the food regime, 
what are the causal directions and interactions between which entities, and how does change 
happen. Short of this, we are left with an abstract theoreticism on the functioning of capital in 
general in the world-system at large. Or we are left with inductive empiricism to derive what, for 
instance, is the emerging “principle” in the midst of a crisis of the neoliberal or corporate food 
regime, although it may be developing on the margins of capitalism itself. McMichael’s treatment 
of crisis and restructuring does both: abstracted theoreticism drawing on multiple sources of 
ecological and peasant-studies thinking, and inductive empiricism drawing on social movements 
proposing the food sovereignty project based on a new peasantry.  
Much of the implicitly or explicitly causal language that McMichael uses is inaccurate 
when discussing crisis and restructuring of the food regime. For instance, starting with the grand 
theoretical statement that the “patterning of food regimes is represented, phenomenally, as a 
succession of regulatory structures organizing the relations of production and circulation of food,” 
he then asserts: “Such regulatory structures represent episodes of [capital] accumulation dynamics 
governed by patterns of expansion and crisis (109, emphasis added). How do expansion and crises 
govern regulatory structures? Are they not the product of class struggles by specific classes or 
class fractions that manage to impose certain types of regulation that favor their historical 
interests? If so, what classes or class fractions are these?  
With these abstractions and the empirical truism that there is an ecological crisis turning 
into catastrophe, McMichael proceeds to analyze the accumulation crisis that started in 2007-2008 
through the food regime lens. He offers many good insights and interesting empirical quotations 
from various sources, but some are gauged at such a general level that they make me wonder about 
their usefulness or reliability. For instance, there is the calculated food calorie inflation of 20 
percent since the 1960s per “average global citizen” (111-112): how do we determine the extent 
to which this caloric food inflation represents mostly increased empty-calorie consumption by the 
masses or primarily increased nutritional content (e.g., fruits and vegetables) for the upper-income 
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groups? And how is such caloric inflation allocated among countries in the world economy? A 
class-diets perspective would come in handy here (Otero et al. 2015).  
Then, for more ad hoc data, we learn that a third of the world market was closed to food 
exports in the midst of the 2008 crisis (112). But how does this figure square with the “fact” that 
only a mere 10 percent of the world’s agricultural production is traded (157)? These contrasting 
data clash with other dramatic figures cited by McMichael, which highlight the extent of food 
dependency in developing countries: By the mid-1990s, fully 80 percent of foreign exchange in 
“low-income food deficit countries went to food imports” (55-56); food bills in food-dependent 
countries grew by 20 percent from 1990 to 1999; and, by the mid-2000s, fully 70 percent of 
countries in the “global South” were net food importers (55-56). If only 10 percent of world food 
is traded, does food dependency in developing countries affect primarily the poor? The rich? Both? 
McMichael’s heavy use of ad hoc data from a variety of sources, including “grey sources,” leads 
me to suggest that he could use more systematic and rigorous empirical research, not to mention 
some theoretical mediations to connect his data and conclusions. 
 
Theoretical Problems: Neoliberalism, Peasant Populism, and Marx’s Capital 
My main disagreement with McMichael relates to his conceptual portrayal of the third food 
regime, which is conceptually flawed in several respects. To start with, he names it “corporate” 
because in the shift from national agricultures to corporate domination of the market, he argues, 
the shift was done in the interest of financial capital. Ironically, though, rather than corporations 
per se, McMichael points to neoliberalism (implemented by states via neo-regulation) as the third 
food regime’s core. If this is so, why does he not employ this term “neoliberal food regime” more 
often in his analysis (indeed, he uses it only once in the book, on page 77)? Citing other authors, 
McMichael states: “A savage regime, neoliberalism is premised on redistribution, rather than 
production, of wealth” (45). Neoliberal globalization, he claims, reverses the order of the second 
food regime: “States now serve markets” (47). We have discussed our disagreements with 
McMichael’s naming and characterization of the third food regime elsewhere (Pechlaner and Otero 
2010; Otero 2012; Otero et al. 2013).  
McMichael revisits the agrarian question, which was a major theoretical and political 
debate at the turn of the twentieth century among European Marxists. In short, he claims that the 
classical debate was “capital-centric” and what we need in the twenty-first century is a peasant-
ecology focus around the food sovereignty project (see chapter 4). For McMichael, it’s no longer 
simply an agrarian but an ecological question geared to repair the metabolic rift between human 
beings and nature. The “metabolic rift” is just one of very many conceptual phrases that 
McMichael fails to properly define upon first use. Instead, he cites a phrase from Karl Marx quoted 
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by another author that merely states the problem but is far from a definition. The short glossary 
contained in the book does not mitigate this problem. Ultimately, McMichael shifts the agrarian 
question from a question of capital (in which labor should be but is not included—more on this 
below), and asserts a populist, peasantist project, as if this were not itself a class project. 
As if the whole problem were merely a theoretical-analytical one, McMichael proposes to 
reframe the agrarian question as a food question. This move would supposedly allow us to 
transcend “the food regime’s abstract market calculus”—again hypostatizing both food regime and 
market. McMichael then goes on to formulate a series of proposals such as enhancing the practical 
(use) values of peasant agriculture, essentializing (137) and universalizing (145) peasants in the 
process. He suggests that “food sovereignty” is the emerging principle in the post-corporate food 
regime. McMichael posits the food sovereignty “project” as the countermovement to capital’s 
corporate food regime, which includes a wide range of practices “that incorporate, recover and 
develop value orientations supporting positive social and ecological relations of reproduction, in 
contradistinction to the under-reproducing tendencies of capitalism” (156). 
Much of McMichael’s discussion of repeasantization seems to imply that it’s all a matter 
of how peasants are “viewed” by theorists (145-147) or their organic intellectuals (not his term): 
whether peasants are seen as backward and inefficient, or as stewards of the land capable of feeding 
the world in an ecologically sustainable way. In fact, much of the peasantry that does continue to 
exist, including Van der Ploeg’s new peasantry, do so either thanks to European subsidies or 
tenacious resistance in view of harsher realities in the rest of the economy. So, yes, the differentia 
specifica of peasantries is their ability to intensify labor, or what Alexander Chayanov called “self-
exploitation.” But there are physical limits to this and, short of also idealizing poverty, enhancing 
peasant production requires social mobilization to bend state policies in their favor. How can such 
policies be promoted without an alliance with urban working classes, including those with middle-
to-upper income concerned about food quality? How can we formulate such questions without a 
proper understanding of the state, also, as an entity traversed by class struggle and not merely a 
reflection, epiphenomenon, or an instrument of “capital”? 
Make no mistake: capitalist farmers, particularly those in the United States, are also 
subsidized and this has been a chief factor decimating the peasantry worldwide. But the question 
about repeasantization is not merely analytical; it is chiefly political. Properly addressing it 
demands a food regime analysis with suitable theoretical mediations about class structures and 
states; methodological sophistication with units of analysis below the world-system, including 
world regions and nation states; and political sensitivity toward the subordinate classes as a whole, 
not merely the peasantry. 
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In formulating theoretical positons on the workings of the food regime, food sovereignty 
and climate, McMichael could have used less uncritical reliance on the language of his sources, a 
practice that often seems eclectic. He acknowledges that it may be problematic to draw on 
“conventional language” like “food sovereignty” and, especially I would say, “ecological capital.” 
These two concepts encapsulate the program proposed by McMichael, in tune with other 
agroecologist scholars and Vía Campesina. Let me reiterate that I sympathize with this program. 
But the way in which McMichael argues for it leaves a lot to be desired in theoretical and analytical 
rigor.  
McMichael’s theoretical strategy to assert the sustainability of the food-sovereignty 
program is to start with a critique of what he calls “capital-centrism,” attributed to both classical 
discussions of the agrarian question and later developments of the food-regime perspective, 
including his own. The trouble with this phrasing is that McMichael refers to “capital” in relation 
to the owners of capital, not to capital as a social relation that includes the non-owners of capital, 
i.e., workers. As Karl Marx put it, capital “. . . is not a thing, but a social relation between persons 
which is mediated through things” (1977: 932). In fact, the whole process of capital accumulation 
is not merely about accumulating money or expanding profitability, but also extending the capital-
labor relation. However much capitalism has changed in the era of neoliberal policies and 
prominence of finance capital, workers and their labor power continue to play a critical role in 
producing the conditions for profit making. Much new profiteering is also based on extractive 
activities like mining, land grabbing, and other forms of expropriation discussed by McMichael, 
but this profiteering amounts mostly to redistribution of existing social surplus value. Thus, placing 
the gaze primarily on the “analysts and captains of industry” while ignoring workers necessarily 
ends up in an incomplete look at the contradictions and dialectic of capitalism.  
In sum, Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions offers a useful compilation of McMichael’s 
contributions to food regime analysis in a single text. It contains sharp and lucid insights into the 
functioning of food and agriculture on a world scale, as few scholars are capable of providing. 
Given the openness of the perspective espoused by McMichael, his insights promise to continue 
inspiring other researchers to elaborate the intricacies of food, health and climate relations in 
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